"The Moral Status of Beings who are not Persons: A Casuistic Argument"
Jon Wetlesen addresses the question: Who or what can have a moral status in the sense that we have direct moral duties to them?
Jon Wetlesen addresses the question: Who or what can have a moral status in the sense that we have direct moral duties to them?
In this essay Steward Davidson argues that bioregionalism’s assimilation of aspects of deep ecology, and particularly an emphasis upon cross-species identification, undermines the project in various ways.
This article replies to Alan Holland’s challenge to reconcile belief in non-anthropogenic intrinsic value with the poetry of John Clare and its projection onto nature of human feelings, and thus with projective humanism.
In his paper, Richard Shearman argues that a person living according to moral virtue will recognize that the nonhuman world should be valued and thus protected (at least in part) for its own sake.
Ernest Partridge discusses Alan Carter’s criticism of Thomas Schwartz’s “future persons paradox.”
The present paper is a commentary on very interesting papers by Thomas Dunlap, Thomas Hill, and Kimberly Smith, who take up the spiritual, ethical, and political perspectives respectively. Their accounts are described and evaluated.
This paper offers a critical examination of efforts to use Heidegger’s thought to illuminate deep ecology.
The purpose of the present paper is to provide an improved conceptual foundation for the debate around the precautionary principle in the form of an explication of the concept of precaution.
This paper argues that the analogy with warfare should not be used for justificatory or rhetorical purposes, but that it may nevertheless have a legitimate heuristic role to play in environmental philosophy.
This paper outlines a constructivist approach to environmental ethics which attempts to reconcile realism in the ontological sense.