philosophy

Clive L. Spash’s editorial for Environmental Values 17.

Piers H.G. Stephens argues that several objections to preservationism may be answered by recasting the relationship between man and nature into a tripartite spectrum of ontological form between nature and artifact.

Barnabas Dickson analyses and criticises ethicist claims in environmental philosophy.

Peter Lucas responds to Laura Westra’s article “The Disvalue of ‘Contingent Valuation’ and the Problem of the ‘Expectation Gap’ ” (Environmental Values 9, no. 2 (2000): 153–71).

Carrie L. Hull discusses debates taking place among environmental scientists, providing a brief overview of the history of the formalist tendency in philosophy, and an illustration of the ways in which advocates of a strict laboratory methodology implicitly rely on this foundation.

Alastair Macintosh uses Plato and Bacon as yardsticks to consider the British government’s White Paper on science together with government research council reports as a basis for critiquing current science policy and its intensifying orientation, British and worldwide, towards industrial and military development.

Karen Green applies Korsgaard’s distinctions—one between intrinsic and extrinsic value, and the other between having value as an end and having value as a means—to some issues in environmental philosophy.

Avner De-Shalit discusses how the neglect of environmental philosophy in historical discourse of the environmental movement mistakenly identify “political ecology” with right-wing ideologies.

Joachim Schuetz argues that sustainability should be interpreted as a quest for conscious adoption of a global systems identity.

Peter Alpert discusses how implicit values in biology hold much promise for improving our relations with nature and each other.