Karen Green applies Korsgaard’s distinctions—one between intrinsic and extrinsic value, and the other between having value as an end and having value as a means—to some issues in environmental philosophy.
Stanley Warner, Mark Feinstein, Raymond Coppinger, and Elisabeth Clemence discuss global population growth and the demise of nature, appealing for a change in the nature of the discussion of population among environmentalists, to focus on the question of how best to manage remaining wildlife.
Angelika Krebs concludes that discourse ethics is an anthropocentric moral theory.
Gill Aitken discusses conservation in relation to individual worth.
Marthe Kiley-Worthington discusses integration of wildlife conservation, food production and development in relation to ecological agriculture and elephant conservation in Africa.
Graham Woodgate and Michael Redclift provide some theoretical starting points for constructing a social science approach to environmental issues.
Robin Attfield refutes the neo-Malthusian paradigm put forward by Holmes Rolston, arguing that authentic development will seldom conflict with nature conservation.
Robert L. Chapman discusses how one might set moral boundaries relating to immigration and environment.
Examining the concepts of “security” and “sustainability” Michael Redclift argues that, although the importance of the environment has been increasingly acknowledged since the 1970s, there has been a failure to incorporate other discourses surrounding “nature.”
Many philosophers consider favoritism toward humans in the context of moral choice to be a prejudice. While several terms are used for it, this article suggests that only the term “speciesism” be used. It attempts conceptual clarification with regard to other terms like “humanistic ethics” or “non-speciesist humanism.”
