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Forest Rights, Privileges and Prohibitions: Contextualising State Forestry Policy in Colonial Tanganyika

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SUMMARY

This paper analyses the development of state forest management in Tanganyika and its effects on African access and use rights within the larger context of British colonial governance. It explores how the ideologies and interests represented by scientific forestry, the League of Nations Mandate, indirect rule, and the general process of African peasantisation intersected in complex and contradictory ways to restructure African forest rights. Efforts to resolve contradictions resulted sometimes in the spatial segregation of African and Forest Department interests, sometimes in uneasy compromise, and, ultimately, in a steady erosion of peasant access to forest lands and resources

INTRODUCTION

Securing bureaucratic control of forest lands and timber constituted a critical ingredient in the mix of political-economic forces which historically shaped territorial nation-states across the globe. From Europe to South and Southeast Asia to Africa to North America, the state appropriated forest areas as part of a general claim to all land and resources within its boundaries. During Europe’s ‘age of empire’, the creed of ‘scientific forestry’ was increasingly employed in legitimating state claims on forest lands in colonial territories. Colonial foresters trained in scientific forestry assumed that bureaucratic control of forests was the most economically efficient and socially equitable means of exploiting timber resources and protecting against land degradation. The implementation of bureaucratic control in the colonies heralded the dominance of a European conceptualisation of society-nature relations. Resource management interventions ‘presupposed different assumptions about how land should be settled and used ... [and] laid far more stress on rigid spatial division between land set aside for different purposes’. Forestry interventions criminalised many existing land
uses and spatially segregated what were once integrated production activities. State forestry programmes also had the effect of extending colonial authority into the most remote regions of empire. Through road building, surveying, and the construction of field stations, forest management activities dramatically increased the level of surveillance and control over rural societies and helped secure territorial dominion. In the process, local systems of forest use and access control were nullified and society-forest relations were fundamentally altered.

It would be a mistake, however, to assume a uniform, universal, and complete usurpation of local control by the state throughout the colonised world. The process was historically and geographically uneven and not all local use rights were swept aside in a rising tide of irresistible state power. In some cases, local political elites were instrumental in the process of locating and classifying state reserves and active resistance by forest dwellers often shifted reserve boundaries and forced concessions from state authorities. Within colonial administrations themselves, there were heated, ongoing debates about the legitimacy of state forestry versus local claims on forests and timber. In colonial Tanganyika, for instance, there existed a diversity of interests among factions of the colonial administration, at times running counter-current to one another. Tanganyika laws and forest regulations eliminated some access rights and protected others, as colonial officials struggled amongst themselves over the proper balance between African land and resource claims and the goals of scientific forestry. Explaining which rights were criminalised, which were protected, and why necessitates an examination of the structure of colonial rule in which forestry was embedded. We must, as Berry argues for agricultural schemes, understand the design and effects of state foresters’ interventions ‘in the context of colonial processes of governance in general’.

This paper analyses the development of state forest management in Tanganyika and its effects on African access and use rights within the larger context of British rule. Specifically, I investigate how the ideologies and interests represented by scientific forestry, the League of Nations Mandate, indirect rule, and the general process of peasantisation intersected in complex and contradictory ways to restructure African forest rights. Though the agency of both African political elites and the masses of peasants and pastoralists had significant influences on the shape of forest policy, I focus this paper on the shifting alliances and oppositions that developed among segments of the colonial administration. Efforts to resolve differences within the administration resulted sometimes in the spatial segregation of African and Forest Department interests, sometimes in uneasy compromise, and, ultimately, in a steady erosion of peasant access to forest lands and resources.

The principal period under investigation begins with the formal implementation of British state forestry in 1920 and ends in 1955. I begin by drawing a rough sketch of colonial Tanganyika’s political economy to establish the context for the implementation of scientific forestry. I follow this with a section describing the emergence of the Tanganyika Forest Department and analyse its
forests to develop a timber industry and a system of government forest reserves. The next section concerns the effects of government timber policy and forest reservation on the land and resource rights of African communities in the forest zones. The penultimate section more closely examines the fundamental ideological and material interests which guided the formulation of forest policies. I conclude with an explanation of why forest laws took the form they did, highlighting the ambiguities of colonial laws and policies, the competing interests within colonial governance, the changing status of Tanzania within the British empire. The primary sources of information include colonial documents housed at the Tanzania National Archives, the Public Record Office in London, Rhodes House Library at the University of Oxford, and the Oxford Forestry Institute.

CONSTRUCTING TANGANYIKA’S COLONIAL POLITICAL ECONOMY

Colonial Land Tenure

Germany declared the German East Africa protectorate in 1891, a year after the Anglo-German agreement of 1890 had firmly established the boundaries of British and German territories in East Africa. Initially, European settlement in the protectorate was encouraged as part of Germany’s Kolonial Politik. This resulted in a rush of land alienations beginning in the northeastern highlands and, by the turn of the century, moving into Mount Kilimanjaro and Mount Meru. Land alienation, however, was not an all out land grab by settlers. Alienations were controlled by a German administration increasingly ambivalent about the presence of European farmers, largely because of a perceived shortage of African labour. At the end of Germany’s occupation, 1,300,000 acres, slightly less than one percent of the country, had been alienated as freehold. While proportionately small, alienation involved the most productive lands of the region.

Following Germany’s defeat in World War One, the League of Nations ‘mandated’ most of German East Africa to Britain, whose forces occupied the largest share of the protectorate at the time of the 1919 Versailles Peace Treaty. The British deported the remaining German settlers and eventually replaced them with British and other European immigrants. British administrations were generally unsympathetic to European settlement and by 1937 only 1.31 percent of the country had been alienated to freehold or long-term leasehold. The government did not allow any substantial expansion of alienated lands until after World War Two when the amount of alienated land was roughly doubled.

In addition to its own lack of interest in subsidising white settlers, the Colonial Office was somewhat constrained by the League of Nations Mandate. The 1922 Mandate agreement specified that:
[I]n framing the laws relating to the holding or transfer of land and natural resources, the administrating authority should take into consideration native laws and customs, and respect the rights... of the native population.17

The Mandate subsequently provided an important part of the international political-economic context within which the administration of the colony developed. The Mandate’s influence was felt in the system of land tenure that the Colonial Office chose for Tanganyika, outlined in the 1923 Land Ordinance. Under the Ordinance – modelled upon the land law developed earlier in the Nigeria colony – all land was declared ‘public’ (Crown) lands controlled by the Governor. Freehold land, less than one percent of the territory throughout colonial rule, was exempted from the category of public lands.18 Public lands were also alienated as leaseholds, which, in many respects, functioned like freeholds. Africans were granted ‘rights of occupancy’ on public lands which would remain under local control through customary tenure systems.

As James pointed out, although the Land Ordinance affirmed the importance of indigenous claims, it nevertheless contradicted the Mandate and did not provide the legal procedures to protect the rights of Africans it upheld in principal.19 That is, declaring the ‘entire territory... “public lands” is inconsistent with protecting native laws and customs and local interests’. 20 Yet the wording of the Preamble to the 1923 Land Ordinance explicitly endorses the validity of African land and resource rights:

Whereas it is expedient that the existing customary rights of the natives of the Tanganyika Territory to use and enjoy the land of the Territory and the natural fruits thereof in sufficient quantity to enable them to provide for the sustenance of themselves, their families and their posterity should be assured protected and preserved.21

This statement in defence of customary rights was largely illusory, however, as it had no legal force and could not protect Africans from further alienations nor preserve their access to forests. (The Preamble could, however, be used in the arguments of ‘pro-African’ administrators inclined to defend African rights against European encroachment.) Furthermore, it appears from the wording that rights were defensible only for subsistence use, which, as will be seen, had important implications for forestry policy.

Indirect Rule and the Process of Peasantisation

Land law was integral to the general administrative principals which guided the rule of Tanganyika, which in turn were guided by clear material interests, or lack thereof. British-ruled Tanganyika was the ‘Cinderella of the Empire’, 22 offering little to attract the interests of capital. Furthermore, the Colonial Office was not keen on encouraging European estate development because of what the Germans
previously referred to as the ‘labour calamity’. The first British governor, Sir Horace Byatt, believing there was insufficient African labour in the territory, discouraged settlers. Additionally, the Mandate prohibited Britain from favouring European immigrant interests over Africans’. European plantation production, with the notable exceptions of sisal and coffee, was thus deemed inadvisable. These factors combined led to the Colonial Office’s determination that Tanganyika would be a ‘Black man’s country’, with an economy based primarily upon peasant agriculture. Thus, the introduction of cash crops as part of a gradual African peasantisation process was the principal structural change initiated by British rule.

In deciding the administrative system for this ‘Black man’s country’, the Colonial Office again drew from its experience in Nigeria. Tanganyika would be governed under the doctrine of indirect rule, developed earlier in Nigeria under Sir Frederick Lugard. The essence of indirect rule was the integration of existing indigenous political systems into territorial governance. Local political systems would be left intact (or ‘reconstructed’ in the case of Tanganyika) and governance conducted through local ‘Native Authorities’ which consisted of a chief and/or council, a native court, and a native treasury. When Governor Donald Cameron arrived in Tanganyika in 1925 fresh from an assignment in Nigeria, he brought an unquestioned enthusiasm for the principles of indirect rule. Indirect rule was appealing materially to the Colonial Office; administration could be conducted cheaply as chiefs and African functionaries would be paid by the native treasuries. It was also politically expedient; the Africans’ own leaders were responsible for implementing colonial policy, however unpopular. Finally, it was ideologically potent; indirect rule could be characterised as a necessary period of training before Africans could rule themselves. This latter rationalisation fits well with the Mandate’s directive that Britain would oversee Tanganyika as a Trust Territory, to be turned over to African self-rule at some unspecified future date. The ideology underlying indirect rule also provided a convenient reference for colonial foresters seeking legitimation for their often unpopular forest policies.

THE EMERGENCE OF STATE FOREST MANAGEMENT

‘Under Teutonic Discipline: German Forest Policy

State forestry under German rule began slowly in 1892, gaining momentum in 1903 with the appointment of the first full-time professional forester and the enactment of the Forest Conservation Ordinance a year later. The Ordinance created a system of forest reserves and established prohibitions against their use. According to Schabel, German motivations for establishing reserves were more environmental than fiscal. Nonetheless, the Germans were interested in mak-
ing the territory profitable and did seek to develop timber production for both domestic and external markets. Ultimately, however, timber would not contribute to colonial coffers, operating expenses remaining about double the revenue for the duration of German rule. In fact, most of the German forestry officials’ energy and finances were directed toward the exploration, demarcation and survey of forest reserves. A visiting forestry expert commented in 1935 that “[b]etween 1896 and 1914 this work was pushed on energetically”; nearly an understatement considering that the Germans had proclaimed 231 reserves from 1906 to 1914. The effect of German forest laws on existing African access and use was direct and immediate. ‘Under Teutonic discipline’, (which included corporal punishment and confinement in chains), all African settlement, cultivation, burning, and grazing was outlawed in designated forest reserves.

**British Rule and the Forest Reserve System**

Upon taking control of German East Africa, the British administration closely followed the Germans’ forest regulations. Regarding the 1920 draft of the Regulations on the Conservation of Forests, the interim director advised, ‘I cannot do better than to refer you to the laws in existence under the German regime.’ The British government, he continued, ‘would be well advised to base its forestry laws on those of the Germans’. Essentially it did, proclaiming all reserved forests anew as a preliminary measure. In December 1920, D.K.S. Grant (previously of the Kenya Forest Service) was appointed the first Conservator of Forests. His primary charge upon taking office in January 1921 was the creation of a separate Forest Department based at the old German forest headquarters at Lushoto. The legal framework for administering the territory’s forests was established by the 1921 Forest Ordinance which incorporated all the previously designated German Forest Reserves. Gazetted forests in 1921 totalled 3,386 square miles, slightly less than one percent of the territory.

Once the new Forest Department assessed the forests in its charge, some were decommissioned, others added. By 1925, 212 reserves covered 3,707 square miles, most of which were closed montane tropical forests in the highlands. Throughout the early British period, the Department only nominally expanded the amount of reserved forest, due largely to inadequate funding and staffing. The Department’s 1934 Annual Report, for example, noted that for the seventh straight year, no surveyor was available for boundary surveys. The following year a visit by Professor R.S. Troup, Director of the Imperial Forestry Institute, proved to be the most significant event, up to that time, in the Department’s development. Troup’s terms of reference were vague, but the government mostly wanted his opinion on the direction of future forest policy. The recommendations of the Troup report guided forest policy in Tanganyika for nearly twenty years and provided the Department with a powerful tool for lobbying government funds. It immediately led to increased funding for state
forestry in the form of a ten-year plan to demarcate and reserve new forest areas financed by the Colonial Development Fund. \[42\] ‘[T]he clock of forestry progress was set back’, \[43\] however, as World War Two caused funding to dry up. By 1952, the fiscal picture had brightened, and the area of forest reserves was more than double the pre-war total, covering about 3.2 percent of the country \[44\] (see Table 1).

**The Development of a Timber Industry**

From its inception, revenue generation for the state was clearly the Forest Department’s raison d’être. For Tanganyika’s Conservator of Forests, the timber of the Empire’s step-child territory represented ‘idle capital’. \[45\] The Department would tap this idle capital principally by selling private concessions to the products of the government forest reserves and collecting royalties on harvested

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Government Forest Reserves (square miles)</th>
<th>Native Authority Forest Reserves* (square miles)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>3,934</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>4,019</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>4,060</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>4,067</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>5,770</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>4,443</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>4,470</td>
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<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>4,468</td>
<td>338</td>
</tr>
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<td>1946</td>
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<td>1949</td>
<td>6,661</td>
<td>393</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>8,381</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>10,945</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Alternatively referred to as ‘Communal Forest Reserves’, ‘Tribal Forest Reserves’ or ‘Native Authority forests’.

**TABLE 1. Total area of designated Forest Reserves in Tanzania, 1933-1952**

Sources: Annual reviews of the Tanganyika Territory Forest Department, *Empire Forestry Review*. 
timber. As Troup reaffirmed after his tour of the territory, the ‘ultimate aim should be to make the Department a profit-earning concern’. The territory’s forest resources would also contribute to growth and profit in other sectors, particularly railways and mines. Revenue for the state, however, was slow to materialise. Before the dream of profit could be realised, the government had to create a timber market where virtually none existed. Only in 1928 did revenue from timber concessions exceed expenditures, and this proved ephemeral, due to the onset of global economic depression in the following year. Throughout the first two decades of its existence, the Forest Department spent far more than it earned (see Table 2), succeeding neither in developing a sound export trade, nor in fully supplying the domestic market. Consequently, the value of annual timber imports was sometimes more than double that of exports. The Public Works Department and the Railways both had to import most of their timber needs because they could not get a supply of adequate quality and price on the domestic market. A 1938 government survey found that only 24 per cent of the territory’s timber supply came from its forest reserve system.

The demand for timber sparked by World War Two combined with a market for sleepers in railway construction in Iran created a boom in the exploitation of Tanganyika’s forests. The boom translated into a sudden reversal of the historic pattern of timber imports exceeding exports in the territory. In 1939, for example, imports exceeded exports by 753 tons. By 1942, exports exceeded imports by 5,700 tons with 95 per cent of timber production for military or government. Wartime buyers learned about Tanganyika’s timber and the boom carried over for a few years beyond the end of the war. The average annual revenue for the government during 1946-50 was more than double expenditures (see Table 2).

Despite the wartime boost, the Forest Department, twenty-five years after its establishment, did not have the basic ecological knowledge needed to decide which species could be planted on what lands and under what prescriptions. A review of the Department’s annual report for 1942 ‘questioned whether any working plans had ever been made’. According to W.A. Robertson, Forestry Advisor to the Secretary of State, the post-war situation had not advanced much beyond the Germans’ accomplishments. Under British occupation, the proportion of land in forest reserves was increased only slightly, from 1.09 per cent to 1.3 per cent. Training of African foresters was deemed inadequate, and reserves were remote, scattered and small, their boundaries ill-defined. Even through the Second World War, lands controlled by the Forest Department had yet to produce more than a quarter of the territory’s timber output.

As war demand dissipated, the territory was faced with finding new markets for its timber to replace the military contracts. The Colonial Office envisaged East Africa as the main supplier for Britain’s timber needs in the Indian Ocean.
and called for a conference of Conservators of Forests to discuss the development of a post-war export trade.\textsuperscript{56} Robinson, the Colonial Office’s representative at the conference held in Nairobi in February, 1947 remained sceptical about the abilities of East Africa to meet the demands of an export trade without significant increases in the reservation of forests and capital investment.\textsuperscript{57} The government responded, nearly doubling expenditures on the Forest Department in 1949 (see Table 2) and, in the same year, accelerating the reservation of forests (see Table 1).

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
Year & Revenue & Expenditures & Balance & Free Issue & Adjusted Balance \\
\hline
1921-24* & 4,382 & 12,551 & -8,169 & 11,639 & 3,470 \\
1926 & 8,940 & 15,870 & -6,930 & — & — \\
1927-31* & 17,976 & 23,914 & -5,938 & 12,840 & 6,902 \\
1932-34* & 7,945 & 16,845 & -8,900 & 12,673 & 3,773 \\
1936 & 14,850 & 17,440 & -2,590 & — & — \\
1937 & 13,846 & 20,108 & -6,262 & 13,316 & 7,054 \\
1938 & 15,595 & 23,248 & -7,653 & 11,588 & 3,935 \\
1940 & 15,790 & 14,939 & 851 & 13,890 & 14,741 \\
1941 & 21,080 & 14,770 & 6,310 & 15,562 & 21,872 \\
1942 & 30,710 & 17,062 & 13,648 & 15,148 & 28,796 \\
1943 & 47,103 & 20,937 & 26,166 & 13,468 & 39,634 \\
1944 & 48,345 & 20,649 & 27,696 & — & — \\
1946 & 57,357 & 29,459 & 27,898 & 12,254 & 40,152 \\
1947 & 77,400 & 36,000 & 41,400 & — & — \\
1948 & 82,440 & 35,910 & 46,530 & 16,750 & 63,280 \\
1949 & 142,100 & 64,600 & 77,500 & 20,000 & 97,500 \\
1950 & 83,800 & 77,600 & 6,200 & — & — \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Average Revenue and Expenditure Figures: 1921-50}
\end{table}

constructed from data obtained in the annual reviews of Tanganyika Territory Forest Department, \textit{Empire Forestry Review} and R. S. Troup, \textit{Report on Forestry}
In 1953, Tanganyika’s Legislative Council approved a forest policy statement which would guide future forestry development. As with the Troup Report which preceded it, the policy statement essentially endorsed the status quo and recommended more of the same. Apropos of this, it gave priority consideration to forest reserves which were now recognised to be primarily for protection rather than production. This reflected the long-standing situation wherein most timber produced in the territory came from outside government reserves. The 1953 statement’s emphasis on protection also reflected the prevailing colonial preoccupation with controlling soil erosion and land degradation. This preoccupation, translated into forest policy, meant that the Forest Department would intervene to protect:

[all catchments, watersheds and other land which cannot, even with proper soil conservation practices, be used for agriculture or pasture without risk of soil deterioration or interference with water supplies.]

Soil and water supply protection were thus explicitly integrated with colonial forestry policy, as they had been since the 1930s. Troup’s 1935 recommendations for the development of state forestry so closely matched the proposals for the protection of water supplies that a single financial package encompassing both was funded through Colonial Development grants, but implementation was delayed by World War Two.

The new funding for forestry, soil conservation, and water supply protection exemplified the Colonial Office’s heightened interest in ‘developing’ its African territories. After the Second World War, Britain’s economic needs sparked a new wave of state intervention in the form of development planning, particularly for agricultural betterment schemes. These schemes integrated infrastructure development, agricultural extension, erosion control measures, and increased peasant production of cash crops, imposed on a reluctant peasantry by a ‘growing army of officials’. This post-war situation in East Africa has been characterised as a ‘second colonial occupation’, marked by a deeper penetration of the colonial state into nearly all aspects of rural African society. The rapid expansion of land under forest reserve in the early 1950s was integral to the ideology and practices of the second colonial occupation. Preservation of forests was directly linked to the preservation of a productive African peasantry. The low plains would become ‘the home of a stable peasantry only if the forests are protected... and if their rehabilitation is energetically furthered’. Forest reservations were thus seen as having an economic importance disproportionate with their areal extent and ability to supply timber. For Africans, as the case of the Mbeya Range Forest Reserve demonstrates below, the renewed interest in forest reservation often meant increased monitoring and surveillance by state officials, the loss of access rights to forest resources, and, ultimately, dislocation.
FOREST RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND PROHIBITIONS

FOREST POLICY AND AFRICAN ACCESS RIGHTS

*Forest Reserves and African Livelihoods*

State forest policies and practices had momentous effects on the livelihood strategies of many African communities located in the territory’s forest zones. There were two components of colonial forest policy which directly altered African land use and access to forest resources: (1) the creation of state forest reserves; and (2) regulations governing the exploitation of commercially valuable tree species. The former component had the most extensive and severe consequences for nearby African communities. The 1921 Forest Ordinance instituted a series of prohibitions in the forest reserves including cutting or removing trees or forest produce, firing, squatting, grazing, and cultivating. As restrictive as these rules were, the policy was such that it did not prevent ‘the exercise of any right or privilege recognised by the Governor’ whose officers could issue licenses for most of the prohibitions. An earlier opinion drawn on a draft of the first Regulations on the Conservation of Forests in 1920, recognised that Africans had ‘a right to grazing, firewood, and thatching and other products of the forest’. However, these rights were granted only through state mechanisms of control – local African institutions for controlling access would not be recognised—and thus ‘rights’ soon came to be seen (by foresters) as government-granted ‘privileges’. One significant (and ultimately contentious) concession was the free use by Africans of any forest produce taken by them for their own use only. The type of forest produce that could be legally taken under this clause was, however, greatly restricted by forest regulations. In 1928, the Department drew up a schedule of trees which could not be harvested from government reserves without payment of a fee. Unscheduled trees could be harvested free by Africans for domestic purposes, but not for sale. Thus, a two-tiered system of access was instituted based on whether a species had exchange value or use value only, with access to the former monopolised by the state.

While local forest communities could still obtain fuelwood and building poles from forest reserves, access to critical seasonal pastures was curtailed. Despite the 1920 ruling on grazing rights cited above, livestock grazing in reserves was very soon banned by British foresters. Particularly in the highlands of the Northern Province, where Maasai, Meru, Arusha, and other pastoralist and agro-pastoralist societies had depended on mountain pastures, the impact on livelihoods was severe. In 1947, a visiting judge investigating land issues in a section of the northern highlands observed:

> The demarcation of the Forest Reserves on Kilimanjaro and Meru and the prohibition of cultivation and grazing within the boundaries was probably as unpopular a thing as the government ever did in those parts.
The designation of the Mount Meru Forest Reserve, which was twice the size of the combined land areas reserved for Meru and Arusha settlement, meant a significant alteration of local African production strategies. Most importantly, areas of forest pasture critical to the maintenance of herds during dry seasons and drought were off limits to livestock under forest regulations.

In other cases of reserve establishment, such as the Mbeya Range Forest Reserve in the southern highlands, entire communities had to be moved and cultivation and grazing lands abandoned. In 1954, colonial authorities convinced 297 families living in five separate communities to move outside the proposed Mbeya reserve boundaries. The establishment of the reserve dramatically illustrates the expansion and intensification of state control over hinterland territory in the name of scientific forestry. Because the District Officer considered ‘compulsory eviction politically inexpedient’ and the largest community was ‘extremely averse to moving’, authorities were forced to resort to a combination of negotiation, coercion, and intimidation. Forestry under the ‘second colonial occupation’ literally translated into the invasion of the Mbeya Range by an army of state officials. As part of its campaign, the government built a road into the area (which had an ‘important psychological effect on the people’ living there), established permanent field stations next to the most resistant communities, and promised them ‘that if they refused to go, rigid soil conservation rules would be enforced and a baraza [local court] erected in the area where swift punishment would be meted out’. State power was thus woven into the fabric of daily rural life in an effort to mend what colonial authorities perceived to be a degraded landscape. Realising ‘they would have no peace’, the communities surrendered their access rights in exchange for monetary compensation, but declined to participate in the government’s relocation plan.

Those rights to resources within forest reserves that regulations still allowed Africans remained under constant attack by the Forest Department, whose officials tended to refer to them as ‘privileges’. The policy of ‘free issue’ for the subsistence use of African communities living near reserves drew the greatest ire from professional foresters. Free issue actually was a catch-all term for timber and other tree products taken without the payment of royalties, including the free use of building timbers and fuelwood by corporate mining operations. For instance, the 1941 Department annual report estimated that only £8,800 of £15,562 worth of free issue forest products went to Africans, with the greatest increase over the previous year’s total resulting from increased mining activity. Other annual reports estimated roughly equal proportions of free issue going to Africans and mining operations.

Nevertheless, foresters singled out free use by Africans as a major impediment to fulfilling the goals of scientific forestry. Professor Troup, for example, presented a lengthy polemic on the evils of free issue in his 1935 report. He began by citing Forest Department estimates that the annual royalty value lost to free issue from 1923 to 1934 averaged £12,786. These figures were intended to show
the potential surplus to the Department if free issue were eliminated (see Table 2). For Troup, free issue was a hidden subsidy for Africans. He reasoned that since the government is incurring management costs, it is not unreasonable to have Africans pay the state for the resulting benefits. Troup felt the policy of allowing Africans free use contradicted the Forest Ordinance which implied that reserved forests are free of rights. He further argued that because the majority of the population receive no benefits from forest reserves ‘it is only right that those in position to take advantage of them should pay for the privilege’. He concluded, finally, that ‘the timber trade of the country is handicapped by free issue’. He related this conclusion to a proposal that the Department increase trade in ‘sawn timber of small dimensions, much of which now goes to waste’. However, ‘[s]o long as natives are allowed free produce from forest reserves, the development of such a trade will be difficult.’ He recommended that the government ‘declare the non-existence of any rights to free produce from existing forest reserves’ and levy royalties on any and all forest products.

Separate but Unequal Forest Reserves

Troup’s opinion on free issue influenced the government’s programme to promote Native Authority forest reserves and plantations. With the advice of the Forest Department, the government had been assisting Native Authorities to establish their own forest reserves and plantations since the early 1930s (see Table 1). It appears that the programme had multiple objectives which carried greater or lesser weight within various sections of the colonial administration. Early administrators saw the Forest Department’s role in forest management as relatively minor as compared with Native Authorities. Governor Cameron envisaged the long-term role of the Department as advisory only, with Africans performing reserve management. In 1931, the Chief Secretary outlined the government’s position for the Conservator. The Governor felt, wrote the Secretary, that ‘the Government certainly had in mind the desirability of delegating responsibility for the protection of Forest Reserves to Native Administrations’. He went on to explain that ‘the ultimate object would be to effect a complete transfer of responsibility for the actual protection of forests, so that your Department would be in the position of an expert adviser’. The Governor was proposing forestry ‘on a shoestring’ – the extension of the principles of indirect rule to forest reserve management. Very soon after this exchange, the government, in consultation with the Forest Department and affected Native Authorities, began to move in that direction by creating ‘Native Authority Forest Reserves’ as part of the forest estate.

Thus when Troup arrived in 1935 to evaluate the forestry programme, he found that the Native Authorities in Bukoba and Mwanza had begun to manage small reserves. Troup also saw Native Authority reserves as compatible with indirect rule, but his interest in African forest management had more to do with
finding a politically palatable way to eliminate free issue. He and his professional colleagues saw native reserves as a source for ‘purely local needs’ (i.e. domestic consumption) which could supplant free issue from government forests. An associated programme of plantation establishment on Native Authority lands was also promoted as a way to reduce free issue. In one such programme in the Mbulu District of the Northern Province, residents were stopped from exercising their right to free issue unless they were able to prove they had ‘made a genuine effort to plant trees on their own’. Forest Department staff, in sum, assumed a direct relationship between the creation of native reserves and plantations and the elimination of free use rights for Africans.

Cameron’s vision of Native Authority forestry was never fulfilled at the scale he imagined, but by the end of the 1930s, a ‘considerable number of small Native Authority Forest Reserves’ had been established throughout the territory. A review of the Department in 1938 provides a summary of the strategy.

In a Territory in which indirect rule is a feature of the administrative system, it is interesting to note the result of measures decided on in 1931 to promote an interest in forestry among the natives... additional areas, when ready for reservation, were made native tribal forests.

In line with the principles of indirect rule, any and all revenue derived from native reserves would accrue to the Native Authority treasury. This is not to say that Native Authorities were encouraged to generate revenue by marketing timber and forest products. The Legislative Council’s 1953 Forest Policy statement is unequivocal that native reserves would be ‘of strictly local value’. Thus, forest policy on Native Authority reserves was in accord with the government’s efforts to limit African participation in the territorial economy to that of peasant producer. The policy also resonated with Cameron’s ideas of creating ‘areas of limited African self-government’ as political training grounds. Since ‘forest preservation and afforestation are difficult lessons to learn... by the simple peasant’, Native Authority reserves would introduce Africans to the principles of scientific forestry, without conceding any control over the main forest zones or allowing market involvement. Finally, the idea of native reserves is representative of the tendency in European resource management to spatially segregate productive activities. Recognising that curtailing free use ‘would be considered a serious interference with traditional rights’, the administration and Forest Department concocted a long-term spatial solution to a political problem. The Forest Department and its clientele of timber concessionaires would exploit the government reserves, and the domestic needs of African peasants would be met by gradually developing a separate forest reserve system.
**State Monopolisation of Timber Revenue**

In addition to the reservation of forests and elimination of existing rights therein, the state also made claims on commercially valuable tree species outside of designated reserves. In 1926, the Attorney General ruled that since all African-occupied lands were public lands, the government owned *all* rights to cut and sell timber from these lands. As Africans were merely occupying public lands, they had the right to *use it only* and therefore had no authority to exploit and recover royalty on timber. Colonial officials, however, did not unanimously endorse this decision. Governor Cameron, for example, wrote in 1927:

> I entirely dissent from the view that the Forestry Department, is in any circumstances, entitled to credit in respect to royalty on timber on which they have not expended time or money and in most cases have never seen.

Nevertheless, as early as 1924, the state had claimed exclusive rights to cut loliondo (*Olea hochstetteri*, also known as African olive), even on African lands outside of forest reserves.

Mount Meru in the Northern Province served as the test case for the Attorney General’s 1926 ruling. In 1926, correspondence began between the Forest Department and the local administration which forced a clarification of the department’s power to control land use and timber harvesting on African lands. At this time, Sir Philip Mitchell (later Governor of Kenya) and A. E. Kitching were Provincial Commissioner and District Officer, respectively, for the area which included Mount Meru. In the communications between the administrators and the Forest Department, the right of the Department to collect revenue from Meru and Arusha lands was challenged. Kitching explained to Mitchell that Meru and Arusha Native Authorities understand the need to regulate exploitation, but wanted the power to control timber harvesting and wanted all resulting revenues to accrue to the native treasuries. The matter could not be reconciled locally, and Mitchell asked for a ruling from the Chief Secretary. In the meantime, the Conservator of Forests was pushing his department’s claims even further, reasoning that since ‘[r]oyalty is chargeable on timber *everywhere*’, it follows ‘that the destruction of forest ... is unlawful’ even on African-occupied lands. Based on this logic, the Forest Department tried to order Kitching to stop the Arusha and Meru from clearing trees to make room for cultivation on what all the parties recognised as ‘native’ lands.

The government eventually addressed the policy contradictions with a typically ambivalent decision. The Chief Secretary’s office ruled that:

> a native’s right in the land is the right of user only; the property in the land remains vested in the Governor. The native’s right to the natural produce of the land is limited therefore to the amount required by him for the sustenance of himself and his family and subject to this, Government is entitled to exploit the timber on such land.
Yet in the same decision, the Conservator of Forests was told ‘to refrain from issuing permits to exploit timber on land occupied by natives until the District Officer has been consulted and concurred’.

Two years later and without explanation, the Conservator himself ordered that no cutting permits be issued ‘on land claimed by the Wachagga [on Kilimanjaro], Waarusha and Wameru’.

Thus on Mount Meru and Mount Kilimanjaro, as throughout the territory, the state made sweeping claims to the ownership and control of resources, but granted use ‘privileges’ when it was politically expedient to do so.

DISCUSSION: MATERIAL AND IDEOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FOREST POLICY

The colonial state’s forestry policies resulted from the complex and often contradictory interplay among the material demands of colonial occupation, the principals of scientific forestry, and the doctrine of indirect rule, which in turn intersected with British ideologies of racial and cultural superiority. In the case of Tanganyika, the material demands were straightforward. The League of Nations Mandated Territory would receive relatively little investment from the Colonial Office, and, to the degree possible, would generate a surplus based primarily upon African peasant production and the exploitation by European (and some Asian) capital of the country’s natural resources. The former agenda meant a constant struggle to keep (African) producer prices and wages depressed, and free access to forest resources for household subsistence assisted in this. In a sense, free access to forest resources provided a subsidy in nature. It helped reduce producer prices and wages since household essentials such as fuelwood and building poles could be obtained by the labour of wives and children rather than by cash purchases. The second, related agenda of promoting resource extraction by European capital is epitomised by the attorney general’s ruling that the Department would control the exploitation of all commercially valuable timber in the territory through concessionary sales to European companies. The only rights to timber granted to Africans were non-commercial species to fill household subsistence needs – for the Forest Department, it was ‘incontestable that the heavy timber is not required by the... natives for... sustenance’.

The Attorney General’s ruling fitted comfortably with foresters’ ideas of the superiority of scientific forestry and the inefficiencies of African use and management. In advocating particular state forestry policies, colonial foresters often employed the rhetoric of European racial and cultural superiority. For example, the Department’s arguments on timber rights were predicated on the supremacy of scientific forestry over African land management systems, which foresters depicted as wasteful and degrading. This argument is embedded in the broader ideological legitimation of colonial rule which posited that Africans had historically failed to develop the potential of the land and in fact ‘were losing
Thus forestry policy, like colonial occupation in general, would be ultimately beneficial to African welfare by correcting situations of ‘wanton destruction by natives’. From the beginning of British colonial rule, officials assumed that the territory’s forests were being ‘rapidly destroyed by shifting cultivation’, despite the fact that the practice was rare or non-existent in the closed montane forests where early reservation efforts were focused. According to the Conservator, any cutting of loliondo for African cultivation constituted a ‘waste of a valuable commodity’. Uncontrolled fire, attributed to variously to herding and honey-hunting also was seen as a ‘very serious menace’. (The Forest Department instituted their own programme of controlled burning after outlawing African burning practices.) Colonial officials, in sum, attributed the violation of forest laws not to any political motivations or alternative land management systems, but to ‘ignorance and neglect’. The Safwa, the peoples forced out of the Mbeya Range Forest Reserve in 1954, were depicted by the District Commissioner as ‘politically backward [and] primitive in [their] agricultural practices’, thus helping to justify their removal in the name of scientific forestry.

Europeans in various sectors of government realised that the forest laws greatly restricted African land use and access to forest products. For their part, forestry professionals simply did not acknowledge that indigenous Africans were afforded any prior claim to land and resources. The Conservator of Forests reasoned in a 1933 circular that since inter-tribal warfare kept territorial claims in flux, there was no reason that the African’s ‘claim is more valid than that of the non-native’. Commenting on the proposed forest rules of 1928, one official decreed that the ‘natives have no more inherent property in the forest than in the land, and, besides, must always be protected against themselves’. These opinions, in part, reflect the assumed superiority of scientific forestry and the general superiority of European culture; Africans at their stage of cultural development could not appreciate the value of forests and the complexities of their management. Apropos of this, the Provincial Commissioner, Northern Province wrote in 1947, ‘we are of the opinion that the native authorities are not yet capable of controlling any part of a government forest reserve’. Other administrators took much more of a proactive stance in defending African claims to forests and timber. Contra the Conservator’s comments above, an administrative officer contended that African rights to the free use of timber for household subsistence is confirmed in the Preamble of the Land Ordinance (quoted above). Kitching had earlier drawn an even broader interpretation, arguing that the Forest Rules of 1928 were inconsistent with the Preamble because they did not allow commercial exploitation and explicitly limited African rights to taking only what they needed for domestic use. Ultimately, rights of access were whittled away through the late 1940s and early 1950s as part of the post-war trend in colonial governance toward intensification of production and increased state control over natural resources.
CONCLUSIONS

During the British occupation of Tanganyika, contradictory political and economic forces developed that both threatened and protected African claims to forest lands and resources. The decision to base Tanzania’s economic development on peasant production, the implementation of indirect rule, and the League of Nations Mandate were all factors which combined to provide limited support for African claims, and which provided some administrators with the basis for arguing against the more draconian forest policies. These factors also, however, created the conditions for ambiguous and even contradictory government policies and rulings regarding African rights. On one hand, the state claimed monopoly control over all land and resources; on the other, African land rights were supposedly privileged by the Mandate. The Land Ordinance, which reflected the Mandate, could be used to argue both for and against the right of Africans to market commercial timber. Indirect rule was itself an ambiguous and malleable doctrine which could support contradictory arguments concerning the role of to Native Authorities in forest management. Finally, government efforts to implement scientific forestry meant that African claims seemingly endorsed by the Mandate and the Land Ordinance were under constant threat of elimination.

The stand taken by individual officials regarding African rights largely reflected their positions within the colonial administration. Troup’s opinion on free use, for example, illuminates the basis for much of the tensions between different sets of interests. For practitioners of scientific forestry, the elimination of customary rights and state control of forest exploitation were axiomatic. Troup made it very clear that customary rights must be eliminated because they inhibited accumulation, both for the state and private capital. Foresters were under pressure to generate revenue and African rights were standing in the way of efficient exploitation. Administrators, on the other hand, were keenly aware of the importance of forest for peasant households and that if they pushed so far as to threaten livelihoods, protest and even violence might ensue. While foresters urged the implementation of a fee schedule for minor forest products, administrators warned that the ‘proposal would arouse intense opposition’ among Africans. Of all the recommendations in Troup’s report, the elimination of free use for Africans drew the most cautionary responses, with Governor Harold MacMichael warning that it was not ‘wise to make any sudden and drastic change’. For administrators concerned with order and stability and a modicum of legitimacy, the proposals from natural resource professionals to curtail existing access rights were political dynamite.

Colonial laws and policies were indeterminate and ambiguous about African rights because political-economic conditions were such that they could not be otherwise. In essence, the law placed all regulatory control in the hands of the Governor, while granting some African rights to collect products of the forest.
Consequently, the government could avoid the political trouble of attempting to curtail all African rights without having explicitly to relinquish state authority. Customary African forest uses, if not redefined as ‘crimes’, were considered ‘privileges’, granted and revocable at the discretion of the Governor. The character of these privileges was shaped by the colonial political economy as well as European ideas about scientific resource management. Commensurate with their primary economic role as peasant producers, African communities in the forest zones would be allowed access only to subsistence products without commercial value. At the same time, the laws prohibited them from using their access privileges to participate in the market economy by selling timber. In this way forest laws prevented them from meeting their cash needs by competing with Europeans in the marketing of forest products. In short, allowing Africans free access left them with one foot in the subsistence economy and helped fuel accumulation for the state and European and Asian capital.

The contradictory positions of different segments of colonial government and the contradictions within the various laws concerning customary rights were never fully resolved, if for no other reason than they never had to be. There simply was not a great deal at stake for the colonial government as Tanganyika was never regarded by Britain as an important possession. The amount of money and effort it was willing to invest in order to control the territory was minimal. The forests it claimed were remote, scattered, and inaccessible – there was little to attract international capital and the timber industry emerged only with the demands of World War Two. Solutions to conflicts within the administration or between the state and the African peasantry were subsequently often partial and ad hoc. Foresters were thus frustrated in their early efforts to establish scientific forest management. Initially, they did not have the political strength to completely eliminate African rights nor the funding needed to secure forest reserves and enforce the legislated prohibitions to which the Governor did agree. With the ‘second colonial occupation’, forest reservation and control took on a new urgency for the Colonial Office and the Forest Department received the political support and funding it had sought for almost three decades. For Africans this meant a new wave of prohibitions, stricter state enforcement of forest laws, and, in general, diminishing control over land and resource utilisation.

NOTES

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Peasant Resistance in the Himalaya (Berkeley, 1989).


13 Ibid.

14 John Iliffe, A Modern History of Tanganyika (Cambridge, 1979), p.142. He notes that two successive German Governors after the turn of the century regarded settlement as experimental, with second privately hoping for its failure.

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19 Ibid., p. 19.

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21 Land Tenure Ordinance, Tanganyika Territory, No. 3/1923.

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63 Iliffe, A Modern History, p. 443.
67 Tanganyika Territory Forest Department, Forest Rules of 1921.
68 Leechman to Chief Secretary 17 May, 1920, TNA Secretariat File 2708.
73 Ibid., p.9.
74 Ibid., p.10.
75 Ibid., p.13
77 For example, Conservator of Forests to Chief Secretary, 4 April, 1933, TNA Secretariat File 21559.
78 Troup, Report on Forestry, p.35.
79 Ibid.
80 See for example, Moffett, Tanganyika: A Review of its Resources, p.662.
81 Chief Secretary to Conservator of Forests, 9 June, 1931, TNA Secretariat File 10580.
82 From Berry, ‘Hegemony on a shoestring’.
83 Troup, Report on Forestry, p.15. Troup states that the native authority forest reserve scheme ‘has much to commend it’, including the fact that it is in line with principles of indirect rule.
84 Troup, Report on Forestry, p.15.
85 Provincial Commissioner, Southern Highlands to Chief Secretary, 5 May, 1939. TNA Secretariat File 23259.
87 Governor Young to Under Secretary MacDonald, 5 July, 1939, TNA Secretariat File 12005.
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94 Chief Secretary to Provincial Commissioner, Northern Province, 14 May, 1927, TNA File 45/9, Accession No. 69.
95 Minute by the Acting Governor, TNA Secretariat File 40562.
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97 Arusha District Annual Report, 1924, TNA 1733/1:36.
98 The series begins with a letter from the local forester stationed at Olmotonyi near the Arusha people’s reserve on Mount Meru to the Arusha District Officer, on 6 September, 1926, (TNA FOR/16, Accession No. 472) concerning the harvesting of commercially valuable trees on Arusha and Meru Native Lands. In the following months the debate over timber royalties and ownership was taken to ever higher levels, eventually being decided in the Chief Secretary’s office.
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100 District Officer, Arusha to Provincial Commissioner, Northern Province, 20 Nov., 1926, TNA FOR/16, Accession No. 472.
101 Provincial Commissioner, Northern Province to Chief Secretary, 29 Mar., 1927, TNA FOR/16, Accession No. 472.
102 Conservator of Forests was quoted in a letter from the Forester, Olmotonyi to District Officer, Arusha, 4 Oct., 1927, TNA FOR/16, Accession No. 472. (underlining in original).
103 Acting Chief Secretary to Conservator of Forests, 2 May, 1928, TNA FOR/16, Accession No. 472.
104 Ibid.
105 Conservator of Forests to Asst. Conservator of Forests, Moshi, 14 Oct., 1930, TNA FOR/16, Accession No. 472.
106 Berry, ‘Hegemony on a shoestring’. As Berry explains, the nature of colonial rule forced administrators to constantly manipulate its policies as a means ‘to prevent [Africans] from becoming economically independent enough to ignore the opportunities afforded by European-controlled markets and jobs’ (p.330).
107 Conservator of Forests to District Officer, Arusha, 11 May, 1928, TNA FOR/16, Accession No. 472.
109 Forester, Olmotonyi to District Officer, Arusha, 14 Sept., 1927, TNA FOR/16, Accession No. 472.
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