In recent years, two major concerns of the international conservation community have been the governance of protected areas and the need to balance biodiversity conservation with the rights and livelihood needs of local communities living in and around...
protected areas. These concerns were prominently displayed at the 2003 World Parks Congress (WPC) held in Durban, South Africa, and the smaller follow-up Durban+5 meeting held in Cape Town, South Africa, in 2008. The Durban WPC’s overall theme was “Benefits beyond Boundaries,” and the Durban Action Plan produced at the Congress declared, “governance is central to the conservation of protected areas throughout the world.”¹ A search for “new paradigms” in governance was a topic at the Durban+5 meeting.² These statements and much other activity at the WPC and afterward clearly illustrate a global conservation concern about how and for whom protected areas are governed.

The Ngorongoro Conservation Area (NCA) in northern Tanzania offers an excellent opportunity for a historical analysis of both protected area governance and the balance of biodiversity and local people’s interests. The Ngorongoro Crater Highlands are well known for the 18 km-diameter main caldera with its tremendous density and variety of wildlife. The western plains of Ngorongoro are an important rainy season grazing area for the migratory wildlife of the Serengeti. Ngorongoro is also home to around 62,000 people, the vast majority of whom are members of the Maasai ethnic group.³ The NCA was carved out of the Serengeti National Park (SNP) in 1959 after a decade of controversy over the rights of Maasai pastoralists in the previously established SNP.⁴ This debate reached far beyond the then

* Although tracing the author for proof correction proved impossible, the editors decided nevertheless to publish this article. For the same reason, the article appears without the map that was to accompany it.


⁴ “Maasai” is now the recognized spelling of this pastoralist ethnic group that straddles the Tanzania-Kenya border, and it is the spelling that will generally be used in this article.
British colony of Tanganyika with organizations such as the Society for the Preservation of the Fauna of the Empire and personalities such as the German zoologist Bernard Grzimek weighing in.\(^5\) After great controversy, the NCA was created as a “multiple land use” area with the goal of balancing the interests of conservation and pastoralist development, and with the hope of “maintain[ing] the coexistence of pastoralists and wildlife in a natural traditional setting.”\(^6\)

The origins of the NCA invite the exploration of several questions. One, what sort of governance institutions were created to fulfill the NCA’s original mandate? Two, how have these institutions changed over time? Three, what have been the forces and processes that have shaped the governance of the NCA from 1959 onward? Four, have these patterns of governance served the interests of biodiversity conservation and pastoralist development in the NCA?

Answers to these questions require a close examination of the period going from the late 1950s to the mid-1960s, which was a particularly critical time for the NCA. During these years, the basic governance framework of the area was established, guided by various international conservation organizations and actors, a framework that continues to this day. While ostensibly created to equally serve both Maasai pastoralist and wildlife conservation interests, conservation quickly dominated the governance of the NCA. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, a strong national park governance model already existed in Tanzania and elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa, and this model was easily applied to the NCA. No similarly powerful governance model existed in colonial Africa for the management of a “multiple land use” area where both social and conservation values were to receive equal attention. As a result of this imbalance in the existing pool of available ideas and practices, the approaches to gov-


ernance adopted in the NCA were nearly identical to those found in conventional protected areas, African national parks and game reserves, and the NCA came to be managed primarily as a wildlife conservation park rather than a multiple land use area.

This important historical period is often overlooked in legal and management histories of the NCA, where the usual format is to discuss the formal creation of the NCA in 1959 and then skip ahead to 1975, when the legislation governing the NCA was amended. While the legal review of the NCA undertaken as part of the IUCN-sponsored Ngorongoro Conservation and Development Project and a later study of the same topic by the Tanzanian Land Rights Research and Resource Institute reach very different conclusions, they both see the 1975 legislation as the major turning point in the governance of the NCA. However, the present article argues that the 1975 legislation only slightly altered the ways in which the NCA was actually managed, and that the really significant changes took place long before that, during the first few years of the NCA’s existence.

This argument draws upon an important source of documents, which has been little used in studies of the NCA: the archives of Henry Fosbrooke, the first Conservator of the NCA. During 1993 and 1996, research was conducted in the archives located at his home in Lake Daluti near Arusha, Tanzania. After his death in 1996, these archives were moved to the University of Dar es Salaam Library. In addition to the Fosbrooke archives, extensive work was conducted in the archives of the Ngorongoro Conservation Area Authority (NCAA). This archival work was complemented by interviews with individuals having contemporary and historical connections to the NCA.

The conclusion elaborates on the durability of the patterns of governance that were established early in the history of the NCA. Maa-

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8 Interview respondents were granted anonymity because of the continuing controversy over many aspects of the NCA’s management and the political sensitivity of these issues in Tanzania.
sai residents of the NCA continue to be marginalized in the NCA’s management system. The Tanzanian government and international conservation interests still dominate the decision-making process, and power remains centralized in the person of the Conservator and the NCA Board of Directors. Wildlife conservation and tourism remain as more important objectives than pastoralist development or any other multiple use possibilities, and history continues to wield a heavy influence over the people and non-human nature of the NCA. The case of the NCA should encourage contemporary advocates of protected area governance reform to seriously explore the complex governance processes and histories of such areas as guides for policy development and implementation. It is possible that adaptive management models of protected governance will provide a means for addressing the issues generated by governance and historical complexity.

**Governance and Protected Areas**

In the 21st century, the international conservation community has become interested in the concept of governance as a way of improving the management of protected areas around the world. In the conservation world, governance has been defined in a number of ways. Often there is a relatively simplistic focus on the “principles of good governance,” problems of corruption and/or a conflation of governance with ownership. Other authors pursue a more sophisticated vision of governance as the “interactions among structures, processes, and traditions that determine direction, how power is exercised, and how the views of citizens or stakeholders are incorporated into decision-making.” For better or worse, the idea of governance has a hold on the imagination of many national and international policy makers.

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makers in the field of conservation, much as it earlier attracted the attention of development organizations and agencies. Thus, it is the responsibility of historians and social scientists to critically engage governance, if only to provide illumination for contemporary policy debates, and the NCA provides a particularly useful case study for an examination of governance in the context of protected areas and international conservation.

In order to be a useful theoretical tool, governance needs to be seen as having four major dimensions. First, governance includes the formal and informal rules that guide action. National legislation, protected area management plans and regulations, international conventions, and elements of institutional culture all fall into this category. Second, governance extends beyond the actions of any particular state and involves private business, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and international actors. This is particularly important in the case of Africa, where biodiversity initiatives have often come from abroad, and where post-colonial states have been, and continue to be, weak relative to other political, social, and economic actors. Third, governance contains a discursive dimension, and governance processes rest upon shared senses of meaning and knowledge. Protected area governance requires an agreed-upon understanding of the social and ecological role of such areas, what they are meant to protect, and how such protection should be accomplished. Fourth, governance systems are expressions of power relationships and sites of contestation. The existence of protected areas as a land use choice indicates that certain interests have triumphed at the expense of other interests, which would prefer alternate land use options.\textsuperscript{11}

All four of these dimensions of governance are evident and important in the case of the NCA during the late 1950s and early to mid-1960s, when important rules involving land use and management as well as broader institutional arrangements concerning the place of the NCA in the overall state structure of Tanganyika/Tanzania were established. Non-state actors, such as international conservation organizations and western scientists, played a significant role in the development of the NCA’s governance system. Western science and conservation values became the authoritative lenses for the knowing and understanding of the NCA, its people, and its non-human nature. Finally, the governance system established in the NCA reflected and reinforced patterns of power and interest current at the time; the newly independent Tanganyikan state and international conservation actors secured their interests and a role in management decisions, while the Maasai and other residents of the NCA found themselves excluded.

The NCA’s Creation

The creation of the NCA as a protected area distinct from Serengeti National Park and as a “multiple land use area” rather than a more conventional national park was an extremely contentious process. The NCA’s creation took place in the context of an existing international framework for the governance of protected areas and wildlife conservation in Africa. At the same time, it involved elements specific to colonial East Africa. Multiple actors with varying degrees of power relative to each other played a role in the period from 1914, when the German colonial government created the first formal protected area on the forested slopes of Ngorongoro, to the NCA’s creation in 1959. International conservationists, colonial administrators,

12 Tanganyika gained independence in 1961. The United Republic of Tanzania, the current name of the country, was adopted in 1964 when Zanzibar was joined with mainland Tanganyika. This article uses whichever name, Tanzania or Tanganyika, is accurate for the period being considered. If no specific period is being referred to, then Tanzania is used.
local peoples, and African nationalists all contended with each other in debates and conflicts about how best to govern the non-human nature and people of the Serengeti-Ngorongoro area.

In 1914, German authorities established what is now the Northern Highland Forest Reserve of the NCA for the purpose of watershed protection, but their control of the area was short-lived. Following Germany’s defeat in World War I, the British governed Tanganyika as a League of Nations Mandate and designated the Serengeti as a Game Reserve where controlled hunting was allowed and the Ngorongoro Crater as a Complete Game Reserve where hunting was prohibited. The 1940 Game Ordinance formally created the Serengeti National Park (SNP), which included most of what is now the NCA. However, there were few resources for enforcement of these conservation regulations either before or during World War II, and their overall impact was limited.13

These Tanganyika-specific developments were part of a broader international governance system for the conservation of wildlife in colonial Africa which came into being during the first half of the twentieth century. One of the first steps in the process of creating this system was the 1900 London Convention for the Preservation of Wild Animals, Birds, and Fish in Africa. Though this treaty did not enter into force due to insufficient signatories, it was the first attempt to craft an international wildlife conservation convention. Shortly afterwards, in 1903, the Society for the Protection of the Fauna of the Empire (SPFE), one of the world’s first international conservation NGOs, was created in Great Britain. During the interwar period, the 1933 Convention for the Protection of the Flora and Fauna of Africa was negotiated and did enter into force. National parks as the primary mechanism of wildlife conservation were the central feature of

the 1933 Convention. These had already started to appear, beginning with the Albert National Park in the Belgian Congo in 1925 and the Kruger National Park in South Africa in 1926.14

During this time, the Maasai and other Africans living in and around the Serengeti-Ngorongoro area were minimally affected by these conservation initiatives and far more concerned with land alienation driven by cash crop production. This was also a period of recovery for African peoples who had been devastated by the ecological catastrophes of the late nineteenth century and the early years of the twentieth. The arrival of rinderpest from Eurasia destroyed East Africa’s livestock economy. Smallpox, colonial warfare, famine, and the resulting spread of tsetse-fly habitat all contributed to a decrease in the region’s human population, particularly amongst the cattle-dependent Maasai.15 The Maasai refer to this time as the *Emutai* (complete destruction), and estimates of population loss run as high as two-thirds.16 Ironically, one effect of these human and livestock population declines was to strengthen European perceptions of East Africa as a wilderness dominated by wildlife.17

After the World War II, a new National Parks Ordinance was enacted by the Tanganyikan colonial government in 1948. This created a National Parks Board of Trustees separate from the existing Game Department and provided the basis for the 1951 (re)creation of the SNP. Serious enforcement of the SNP’s status as a national park began in the early

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1950s. Numerous conflicts and controversies soon developed, and the National Parks Board found itself beset on all sides. Initially, the Board had thought that existing, “traditional” African peoples could continue to inhabit the SNP. However, the Maasai and other residents of the SNP objected to restrictions on livestock grazing, agriculture, and homestead construction, which accompanied national park status. On the other hand, international conservationists thought that any human habitation or use of the SNP’s land and resources violated the primary principle of the national park idea.\textsuperscript{18} Events elsewhere in East Africa contributed to a sense of crisis in and around the new SNP. The so-called “Mau Mau” uprising began in Kenya in 1951 with land as the most important concern of the Land and Freedom Army in its fight against British colonialism. In Tanganyika itself, the Meru Land Case made its way to the United Nations in 1951, and though this appeal was unsuccessful, it contributed to a growing sense of anti-colonial nationalism in Tanganyika.\textsuperscript{19}

Pressured by both international conservation interests and East African nationalists, colonial authorities in Tanganyika moved quickly from one option to the next in search of a stable governance framework that would be agreeable to all sides. The government’s first proposal, the 1956 Sessional Paper from the Legislative Council, called for a drastic reduction in the size of the SNP from 4,460 square miles to 1,860 square miles, and this was to be accompanied by the exclusion of human habitation and use from the remaining area of the park.\textsuperscript{20} International conservationists quickly assailed this proposal, and the Fauna Preservation Society – the recently renamed former Society for the Protection of the Fauna of Empire – sponsored an ecological survey of the SNP to refute the Tanganyikan


\textsuperscript{19} J. Iliffe, \emph{A Modern History of Tanganyika}, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK 1979, pp. 499-503; Neumann, \emph{Imposing Wilderness} cit., pp. 129-134.

\textsuperscript{20} Legislative Council of Tanganyika, \emph{The Serengeti National Park}, Sessional Paper n. 1, Government Printer, Dar es Salaam, Tanganyika 1956, p. 3.
government’s proposal. This survey, the Pearsall Report, came out in 1957 and recommended the creation of a larger SNP than had been proposed in the 1956 Seasonal Paper. However, more of the Ngorongoro Highlands was made available for the Maasai in the Pearsall proposal than in the earlier government plans.\(^{21}\)

The Tanganyikan government’s next move was a special Committee of Enquiry in 1957, which outlined the basic administrative geography that continues to govern conservation in the Serengeti-Ngorongoro region to the present. The Committee of Enquiry recommended the separation of the SNP into two parts, each with its own distinct governance approach. To the west and centered on the grassland plains of the Serengeti would be a classic, Yellowstone-style national park, free of all human habitation and consumptive use. To the east and including the Ngorongoro highlands would be a “Conservation Area” managed by a “Conservation Unit,” where human habitation would be allowed and the primary focus would be the conservation of natural resources for human use. These proposals were accepted in a 1958 Government Paper with only minor modifications.\(^{22}\)

For this plan to work, the Tanganyikan colonial government knew that it needed the support of the Maasai residents of the Serengeti-Ngorongoro region. Evidence of the colonial administration’s fear of Maasai violence can be seen in references to the “1959 Leopoldville riots” and similar incidents in then Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia) when discussing possible Maasai reactions to various management options.\(^{23}\) The government obtained Maasai support through


promises of material resources and opportunities for participation in the new Conservation Unit, as well as assurances of water and range development in the new NCA and a portion of the tourist revenue generated by visitors to Ngorongoro. A committee-like Conservation Authority was created to govern the Conservation Unit, and three Ngorongoro Maasai were part of this committee.  

In return for these assurances, twelve Maasai elders signed a document on April 21, 1958 where they “renounce[d]” all claims to and rights of residence inside the SNP.  

However, the Tangan-yikan government’s promises to the Maasai were not contained in a similar legal document. Instead, they were made in a speech by the colonial Governor of Tanganyika, Richard Turnbull, on August, 21 1959. Not only did this speech lack the legal weight of the agreement signed by the Maasai, the Governor’s promises to the Maasai were conditional on the “Ngorongoro Masai behaving themselves and not needlessly interfering with the game.” In stark contrast, the Maasai’s renunciation of rights to the Serengeti was unconditional and not contingent on the fulfillment of the promises that had been made to them.

**Early Troubles at the NCA**

Problems started to manifest themselves soon after the NCA’s creation. The Ngorongoro Conservation Authority committee’s governance model attempted to combine Maasai participation and a more conventional colonial approach to district administration. The Authority had nine members – the District Officer who was the Chairman, four other colonial officials, three Maasai residents of the NCA, and one non-resident Maasai. This committee was supposed

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24 Foosbrooke, *Ngorongoro* cit., pp. 198-199. This Ngorongoro Conservation Authority of the late 1950s should not be confused with the Ngorongoro Conservation Area Authority created in 1975, which currently manages the NCA.

25 Agreement by the Maasai to Vacate the Western Serengeti, 21 April 1958, NCAAA.

26 Extract from H. E.’s Speech to the Olkiama on 27/8/59 relating to Ngorongoro Crater, NCAAA.
to be the central decision-making institution for the newly created NCA. However, it began to break down shortly after its creation. Only five meetings of the full Authority committee were held between July 1959 and May 1960. Records of the four meetings for which minutes are available show that the Maasai representatives pushed strongly for the water supply improvement and grazing access that they felt had been promised them in return for their departure from the Serengeti.\(^\text{27}\) During this period, two different colonial officials served as District Officer for the Ngorongoro District and thus as chairs of the Authority. In their reports, these two officials expressed frustration with the demands of the Maasai, and after 9 May 1960 no further meetings of the Authority were held.\(^\text{28}\)

From a governance perspective, the comments of P. N. Doole, the second chair, were particularly interesting. After he decided to stop holding meetings of the Authority with its Maasai members, he wrote that management of the NCA “continued to function more after the pattern of a district team.”\(^\text{29}\) By this, he meant a colonial top-down, expert-led administration without opportunities for significant local participation. Less than a year after the creation of the NCA, existing patterns of the colonial governance of African peoples and landscapes had reasserted themselves.

With their representatives removed from the Authority committee and denied access to the management of the NCA, one Maasai reaction was a series of attacks against the rhinos of the NCA. During 1959 and 1960, thirty rhinos were killed or wounded by the Maasai. These were clearly the attacks of aggrieved Maasai rather than poach-

\(^{27}\) Minutes of a Meeting of the Ngorongoro Conservation Authority held at Ngorongoro on 3\(^{rd}\) November, 1959, NCAAA; Minutes of a Meeting of the Ngorongoro Conservation Authority held at Ngorongoro on 3\(^{rd}\) December, 1959, NCAAA; Minutes of a Meeting of the Ngorongoro Conservation Authority held at Ngorongoro on 5\(^{th}\) January, 1960, NCAAA; Minutes of a Meeting of the Ngorongoro Conservation Authority held at Ngorongoro on 9\(^{th}\) May, 1960, NCAAA.


\(^{29}\) Ibid.
ers, as the horns were not removed, and Maasai spears were found in the animals. Doole was concerned that “the rhino killing may be a deliberate defying and annoying of authority and an attempt to rid the Area of the chief tourist attraction.”

To add to the difficulties of the NCA administration, these attacks were publicized, and in the process exaggerated, by Bernhard Grzimek of the Frankfurt Zoological Society, author of *Serengeti Shall Not Die.* Grzimek explicitly criticized the governing structure of the NCA and the “primitive” nature of the Maasai. He proposed that a Game Warden be given full control over the NCA as the District Officer for the area, and argued that law enforcement, stricter policing, and “collective punishment” were the only solutions to prevent Maasai attacks against rhinos.

The first Draft Management Plan for the NCA, drawn up in 1960 by the Authority after the exclusion of local Maasai from its operations, was as interesting for what it did not cover as for what it did. The bulk of this document was an extensive description of the natural environment of the NCA, forty-one out of a total of seventy-two pages. In those sections that did address social issues, Maasai attitudes were described as “conservative in the extreme,” with their elders in particular being not “enlightened” but instead “bigoted and conceited.” The Maasai were said to “regard any conservation measures adopted which prevent them from doing as they themselves wish as

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31 Grzimek, Grzimek, *Serengeti Shall Not Die* cit. This book is an essential guide for understanding the attitudes of early conservationists towards the Maasai and the relationship between pastoralism and conservation. Among other things, the Grzimeks repeat the myth that the Maasai were originally “light-skinned” and came from Egypt, and then moved south to the Rift Valley “interbreeding with the darker people of the Upper Nile” along the way, pp. 194-195. They also forcefully claim that “Pastoral people, whether black or white, never consider the soil and its vegetation, they never think of the future”, p. 192.


33 Ngorongoro Conservation Authority, *Draft Management Plan Ngorongoro Conservation Authority*, 1960, NCAAA, p. 49; a handwritten note on the plan indicates the author was the first District Officer for the NCA, J. Fehrsen.
a nefarious scheme to deprive them of their country.” Not surprisingly, the 1960 management plan had no provisions for including the Maasai residents in the management and governance of the NCA. On the subject of Maasai development, the plan’s major goal was the control of livestock numbers inside the NCA and the introduction of “scientifically planned [range] management,” which was explicitly contrasted with Maasai practices. Additionally, the plan called for the exclusion of “stock and uncontrolled persons” from the Crater and the Northern Highlands Forests. Both of these were, and are, important dry season grazing areas for Maasai livestock, and Maasai demands for access to forest grazing had been a major factor in the breakdown of the initial Ngorongoro Conservation Authority committee.

The 1960 plan and Grzimek’s vision for the NCA shared many discursive features and thus promoted similar ideas for the governance of the area. Both took a negative view of the Maasai and their range and livestock management practices. Grzimek and the 1960 plan essentially subscribed to the “cattle complex” view, that is, that from an environmental and ecological perspective pastoralists such as the Maasai irrationally accumulate cattle, and this irrational accumulation eventually leads to ecological disaster. Both regarded more effective law enforcement and police action as the only solution to the control of this “Maasai problem.” Neither saw any possibility for the integration of the Maasai into the management of the NCA as a way of ensuring Maasai cooperation. In contrast to the Governor’s speech of 1959, both also saw wildlife conservation as the primary goal of the NCA. They accepted that political factors made it impossible to remove the Maasai from the NCA. However, both saw the Maasai as

34 Ibid., p. 50.
35 Ibid., pp. 59, 61
36 For a general discussion of Ngorongoro Maasai livestock and range management practices, and also on the specific importance of forests to the Maasai, see Homewood, Rodgers, Maasailand Ecology cit; T. Potkanski, Pastoral Economy, Property Rights and Traditional Mutual Assistance Mechanisms among the Ngorongoro and Salei Maasai of Tanzania, IIED, London 1997.
an impediment to conservation of wildlife and habitat, and, in the case of the Authority, Maasai cultural attitudes were seen as an obstacle to livestock development. They did differ in one area, as Grzimek thought the Maasai could “develop more as [a] tourist attraction” due to their “picturesque” qualities, and they could be used to prevent an influx of farming communities into the NCA.\(^{38}\)

With independence for Tanganyika looming, the colonial government recognized that its initial governance model for the multiple land use management of the NCA was not working. There was increasing international pressure to emphasize the wildlife conservation values of the NCA. The area’s own administrators acknowledged that the NCA’s original management system had failed. The residents were alienated from the management, killing the NCA’s most valuable wildlife, and ignoring restrictions on livestock grazing and cultivation.\(^{39}\)

**Enter Fosbrooke**

In response to these problems, the colonial government reacted by securing the services of Henry A. Fosbrooke to be Chairman of the NCA Authority in 1961. Fosbrooke was allowed to concentrate exclusively on the NCA as he was not also required to serve as the District Officer for all of the Ngorongoro District. The colonial government hoped that he would make the NCA work and reconcile the increasingly divergent official goals of wildlife conservation and Maasai development. Fosbrooke had extensive experience as a colonial administrator and anthropologist amongst the Maasai of Tanganyika. At the time of his appointment, Fosbrooke had been the Director of the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute for Social Research in Lusaka, Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia), and he was a respected authority on colonial administration.\(^{40}\)


\(^{39}\) Fosbrooke, *Ngorongoro* cit., p. 199.

\(^{40}\) L. Schumaker, “Constructing Racial Landscapes: Africans, Administrators, and Anthropologists in Late Colonial Northern Rhodesia”, in P. Pels and O. Sale-
One of Fosbrooke’s first governance innovations was the creation of the position of Conservator of the NCA. Instead of governing through the original Ngorongoro Conservation Authority committee chaired by the District Officer, Fosbrooke as the first Conservator unified the authority of the NCA’s chief executive in a single person. From this point onward, Fosbrooke demonstrated a skillful understanding and use of prevailing discourses about conservation and pastoralism to craft a governance system for the NCA that appealed to the interests of international conservation organizations and the recently independent Tanganyikan state. As such, he did not so much create new ideas, but wove existing ones into a broadly acceptable governance structure. However, the resulting governance system still substantially excluded Maasai participation and Maasai perceptions of their own self-interest.

The NCA was explicitly recognized as an international environmental resource, thus opening the door to increased involvement by international conservation organizations. Parallel to this internationalization, he also stressed “National Control of a National Asset” (emphasis in the original) as opposed to the previous vision of the NCA as subordinate to the more local, provincial administration. 41 This, of course, greatly appealed to the newly independent government of Tanganyika, which was seeking to establish its national authority.

While partly recognizing the ecological value of Maasai range and livestock management practices, Fosbrooke nonetheless insisted that these must be modernized along the lines of European livestock production systems. He distinguished between educated and enlightened Maasai, and their more backward counterparts. When he proposed a reorganization of the NCA Authority, he thought that local Maasai of “the younger age sets [would be] desirable” as Authority members. 42 These younger individuals were to replace the “three ‘official’ elders”


42 Fosbrooke, Comments on the Ngorongoro cit., p. 14.
who had originally held these positions.\textsuperscript{43} Fosbrooke called for an increased “territorial government” police presence in the NCA to combat “forest trespass” and “rhino killing,” though he did want to keep the NCA administration out of direct involvement in law enforcement.\textsuperscript{44}

In order to fund the operation of the NCA, Fosbrooke emphasized the importance of tourism and good public relations. Fosbrooke realized his plans for greater control over the NCA and externally directed development of the Maasai would require resources, which might not always be available from the national government. However, tourist revenue alone was insufficient for his ambitious plans, so the NCA became dependent on outside grants for capital improvements and other major projects. Fosbrooke’s governance vision required an increased internationalization of the NCA. During the period of 1961 to 1963, the NCA received £ 273,485 (US $ 765,758) from international sources. An additional £ 191,485 (US $ 536,158) came from the British Colonial Development and Aid Scheme, and a Pasture Research and Range Management Scheme funded by the Nuffield Foundation.\textsuperscript{45}

Fosbrooke pushed hard for an administrative reorganization of the NCA’s governance structure and the statutory amendments necessary to carry out his proposals. The general thrust of this reorganization was to centralize authority with the NCA as a branch of central government, concentrate power in the hands of one person at the NCA, and limit opportunities for participation. Fosbrooke wanted to make the Chairmanship of the NCA Authority a full-time position, not something held by the Ngorongoro District Officer. As noted above, he wanted new, younger Maasai to replace those who were on the Authority. Fosbrooke also proposed the creation of a new Advisory Board that would “assist” the Minister responsible for the NCA.\textsuperscript{46} The Northern Province Provincial Commissioner, B.J.J.

\textsuperscript{43} Ibid., p. 15.
\textsuperscript{44} Ibid., p. 3.
\textsuperscript{46} Fosbrooke, \textit{Comments on the Ngorongoro} cit., p. 3.
Stubbings, took Fosbrooke’s ideas even further. Stubbings agreed with Fosbrooke that the NCA should be run as a “project of central government,” but argued that best way to exercise this sort of “control” would be to discard the committee-like authority and replace it with “one person specifically appointed by the Minister” (emphasis in original). During the first meeting of the Ngorongoro Area Advisory Board, discussed in greater detail below, it was decided that this person should be known as the “conservator.” This position answered directly to the Minister of Lands, Forests, and Wildlife, with supporting contributions from an outside Advisory Board containing a very strong international conservation presence. Originally it was intended that the Conservator would chair a new and more effective committee-like Authority. However, by 1962 virtually nothing had been heard of this Authority, while the membership of the mostly non-Tanzanian and almost exclusively non-Maasai Advisory Board was prominently displayed in that year’s annual report.

The 1961 CCTA/IUCN Arusha Conference and the First Meeting of the NCA Advisory Board

A key event in the development of the NCA’s system of governance under Fosbrooke was the 1961 Symposium on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources in Modern African States held in Arusha and organized by the Commission for Technical Cooperation in Africa (CCTA) and the International Union for the

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48 H.A. Fosbrooke, Appendix III to a Summary of a Series of Meetings of the Ngorongoro Conservation Area Advisory Board held in the Provincial Offices, Arusha, on the 6th, 7th, and 11th September, 1961, NCAAA, pp. 2-3; Ngorongoro Conservation Area Advisory Board, Summary of a Series of Meetings of the Ngorongoro Conservation Area Advisory Board held in the Provincial Offices, Arusha, on the 6th, 7th, and 11th September, 1961, NCAAA, p. 4.


50 “Modern” being a euphemism for newly independent.
Conservation of Nature (IUCN). The primary reason for the Arusha Conference was concern in international conservation circles that African independence threatened the project of wildlife conservation in Africa because Africans were seen as either incapable of or unwilling to continue the colonial conservation project.\(^5^1\) The IUCN, in a General Statement on its African Special Project begun in 1960, stated that the “accelerated rate of destruction of wild fauna, flora and habitat in Africa … is the most urgent international conservation problem of the present time.”\(^5^2\) It went on to state, “The peoples of Africa and their administrations should be induced to look favorably upon their unique inheritance of faunal resources.”\(^5^3\)

There was particular concern over the limited number of Africans trained or interested in wildlife conservation. This was implicitly recognized in one statement from the IUCN, which said: “Few educated people have failed to be moved by it [the spectacle of an array of African animals in its natural setting].” Great emphasis was placed on establishing institutions for the training of African conservation professionals, and out of this conference arose the College of African Wildlife Management in Mweka, Tanzania, funded by the African Wildlife Leadership Foundation.\(^5^4\)

While mention was made of wildlife outside of protected areas and the potential economic rewards from “game cropping,” the main emphasis of the Arusha Conference was on the creation and operation of “Strict Nature Reserves” as defined by the 1933 London Convention on the Conservation of Fauna and Flora. The governance-related ele-

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\(^{5^3}\) Ibid., p. 2.

\(^{5^4}\) The AWLF changed its name to the African Wildlife Foundation (AWF) in 1983, see Bonner, *At the Hand of Man* cit., p. 59.
ments of this idea of a “Strict Nature Reserve” are worthy of additional consideration. There was the critical role to be played by “a qualified scientific body” in selecting the sites for such reserves and assisting in their management.\(^55\) Also, such areas should be, to as great a degree as possible, free of “human interventions.”\(^56\) Perhaps most importantly from a governance perspective, they were seen as having both national and “international value,” thus creating a discursive space for the continued involvement of non-African conservationists.\(^57\)

However, a means was needed to “induce” Africans to “look favorably upon” conservation and to get “Modern African States” to “RECOGNIZE their responsibilities” (emphasis in original) towards wildlife. The solution was in essence an implicit contract. International organizations would provide technical expertise and material resources to enable newly independent African states to expand their control to include natural resources located in existing or prospective protected areas.\(^58\) In return, African states would allow outside experts a great degree of latitude in determining which sites should be protected and how the process of protection should be carried out.\(^59\)

This bargain was sealed by the “Arusha Manifesto” which was publicly presented by Tanganyika’s Minister for Legal Affairs, A S. Fundikira, and signed by Julius Nyerere, then Prime Minister of Tanganyika, Fundikira himself, and T. S. Tewa, Minister for Lands and Surveys. While the document was presented as a product of its African signatories, it was actually written by non-African representatives of the recently formed World Wildlife Fund. In the Manifesto, the Tanganyikan state accepted “trusteeship” of its wildlife as an African and global resource, and in turn called upon “other nations”

\(^56\) Ibid, p. 4.
\(^57\) Worthington, Treichel, General Statement cit., p. 1.
\(^58\) For a discussion of rural resource and population control as major element of state-building in Africa from the precolonial period to the present day, see J. Herbst, States and Power in Africa, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ 2000.
\(^59\) CCTA/CSA, IUCN, Draft Recommendations cit., p. 2.
to provide “specialist knowledge, trained manpower, and money.”

The Arusha Manifesto is regularly cited by international and Tanzanian conservation agencies to this day, and it can be found at the very start of the NCA General Management Plan of 1996.

Not only did the Arusha Conference reinforce all the discursive themes and ideas that Fosbrooke was utilizing in developing a governance structure for the NCA, it also gave him an excellent opportunity to mobilize specific international support for his vision of the NCA. Fosbrooke convened the first meeting of the NCA Advisory Board in Arusha at the same time as the Conference. This board was not a statutory part of the initial Ngorongoro legislation. However, one of Fosbrooke’s first desires upon arriving in the NCA had been the creation of such a body to “assist” the Minister responsible for the NCA. The first meeting of the Advisory Board contained only one Tanganyikan, a non-NCA Maasai who was Chairman of the Maasai Federal Council. Taking advantage of the international conservation experts present in Arusha for the Conference, Fosbrooke essentially packed the Board. The first Board meeting consisted of Fosbrooke, five colonial officials, the one non-NCA Maasai, a European representative of the local tourist industry, and ten representatives of wildlife research or international conservation organizations.

Not surprisingly, this Board generally recommended the approval of Fosbrooke’s modifications to the existing 1960 Draft Management Plan. A number of other important ideas, suggestions, and comments came out of this meeting. The Board agreed, “That the Authority should be transformed into a ‘projection’ of Central Government.”

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63 Ngorongoro Conservation Area Advisory Board, Summary of a Series of Meetings of the Ngorongoro Conservation Area Advisory Board held in the Provincial Offices, Arusha, on the 6th, 7th, and 11th September, 1961, NCAAA, p. 1.

64 Ibid., p. 3.
Also, as was noted above, it stated, “That this ‘projection’ should comprise a single individual, to be known as the ‘Conservator,’ who should discharge the function of the present Authority,” and “That the ‘Conservator’ should be directly responsible to the Minister.”

The Board revealed its attitudes toward the Maasai and their future development with the following, “A comprehensive survey of Masailand should be undertaken with long-term objective of loading (sic) the Maasai towards settled ranching.” This objective had its origins in a linear, “progressive” view of human development whereby the Maasai would move “through a phase of transhumance to that of ranchers” (emphasis in original). In addition to serving the Maasai “local man” in this “process of advancement,” the NCA was also supposed to serve the Tanganyikan “national man” and “the world.” The Board also took the view that “the crater is grossly overstocked” (emphasis in original) and agreed with Fosbrooke that it should ultimately be turned into a “wildlife park.”

The Board nominated itself to be the NCA’s chief policymaking body and made clear its support for a natural science-based, conservation-focused governance system for the NCA by stating, “The Advisory Board, including the best technical and scientific advisers available, should be charged with the formulation of general policy.” Also, it called for the primary technical consultant working in the NCA to be an ecologist. Finally, setting precedent for similar documents in the future, the minutes of this first Advisory Board revealed its attitudes toward the Maasai and their future development with the following, “A comprehensive survey of Masailand should be undertaken with long-term objective of loading (sic) the Maasai towards settled ranching.” This objective had its origins in a linear, “progressive” view of human development whereby the Maasai would move “through a phase of transhumance to that of ranchers” (emphasis in original). In addition to serving the Maasai “local man” in this “process of advancement,” the NCA was also supposed to serve the Tanganyikan “national man” and “the world.” The Board also took the view that “the crater is grossly overstocked” (emphasis in original) and agreed with Fosbrooke that it should ultimately be turned into a “wildlife park.”

65 Ibid., p. 4.
66 Ibid., p. 2.
67 Fosbrooke, Comments on the Ngorongoro cit., pp. 2-3.
70 W.H. Pearsall and P. Scott, Appendix VI to a Summary of a Series of Meetings of the Ngorongoro Conservation Area Advisory Board held in the Provincial Offices, Aursna, on the 6th, 7th, and 11th September, 1961. NCAAA; Ngorongoro Conservation Area Advisory Board, Summary of a Series cit., p. 3.
71 Ibid.
Board meeting and its reports were to be kept confidential.72

One of the most interesting elements of the first Advisory Board meeting was the visit to the NCA that Fosbrooke organized for a majority of the Board’s members on September 9, 1961. While at the NCA, the visiting Board members met none of the local Maasai. They did however observe “serious over-grazing all over the Crater floor,” “that the Lerai spring [on the crater floor] was being wastefully used,” and “that the forests were being heavily grazed.”73 Based on this brief one-day trip, a number of “immediate recommendations” were decided upon to “restore order, both (i) ecologically and (ii) legally.” These recommendations centered on increased control over Maasai movements of livestock and an increased police presence in NCA.74

The report of this visit makes no mention that it took place in the midst of a drought. There is no thought that poor range conditions and the Maasai’s use of the forest for grazing might be related to the inter-year variability of the NCA’s climate. Later, Fosbrooke acknowledged the “extraordinary recuperative power” of the NCA’s vegetation following the end of this drought.75 This awareness of the area’s variability and dynamic nature had no effect on the livestock development plans laid out in the same document.

The Tanganyikan government generally accepted the Advisory Board’s recommendations, except that the government thought it best to go slowly on “freeing the Crater from human occupation.”76 The government did not formally respond to the idea of a permanent, statutory Advisory Board, but granted implied permission for it to continue operating. The result was a formal amendment of the Ngorongoro Conservation Ordinance in 1963, which gave legal standing to almost all of the reforms that Fosbrooke set in motion. Only the Advisory Board failed to receive statutory status, but from

72 C. Mace, Letter to Members of the Advisory Board, 18 December 1961, NCAAA.
73 Fosbrooke, Appendix III cit., p. 1.
74 Ibid., p. 2.
76 Mace, Letter to Members of the Advisory Board cit.

The basic forms of the present NCA were essentially set down in 1963 and only superficially modified in 1975. The 1975 legislation’s two major changes were the replacement of the non-statutory Advisory Board with a formal Board of Directors and the prohibition of cultivation anywhere in the NCA.\footnote{Games Parks Laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act (No. 14 of 1975 ), Tanzania.} This last point is less important than it might first appear, as one of Fosbrooke’s first acts after being armed with his new authority in 1963 was an official rule prohibiting cultivation in ninety percent of the NCA, limiting it to land near the village of Endulen in the west of the NCA.\footnote{Ngorongoro’s Annual Report 1963 cit., p. 15} The 1975 legislation essentially gave domestic legal standing to patterns of governance that were already formally and informally part of the NCA.\footnote{For an alternative discussion which emphasizes the formal legal importance of the 1975 legislation, see Shivji, Kapinga, \textit{Maasai Rights} cit..}

It should by now be clear that Fosbrooke’s ideas and efforts were a critical part of the development of governance forms at the NCA. Even after retiring from the post of Conservator in 1965, his involvement with the NCA and Maasai issues continued up until his death in 1996. A number of factors relating to Fosbrooke need to be taken into account when assessing his legacy. In some circles, especially international “indigenous peoples” advocates campaigning on behalf of the Maasai of the NCA and elsewhere in Tanzania, Fosbrooke is seen as an almost saintly figure whose time as Conservator of the NCA was a “golden” age for its residents.\footnote{International non-governmental organization activist, interview with author, 5 March 1996, Arusha, Tanzania (handwritten notes in possession of author); M. Loft, \textit{Conservation of Nature, Common Sense and Fair Play for the Underdog: An Obituary for the Late Henry Fosbrooke}, CBE, 10.10.1998 - 25.4.1996, unpublished.} What this article has aimed to make clear is that while Fosbrooke was perhaps
somewhat more sympathetic to and knowledgeable about the Maasai than other Europeans and non-Maasai Tanzanians involved with the management of the NCA, he was nonetheless a creature of his time and both a product of and an effective agent for the then prevailing discourses on conservation and pastoralist development. This is not to demonize Fosbrooke, but instead to draw a more nuanced and accurate picture of his tenure at the NCA and the ideas that informed the governance system which he helped to put in place.

### The Dirschl Management Plan

Salomon ole Saibull became the first Tanzanian Conservator of the NCA when he replaced Henry Fosbrooke in February 1965. This was part of a general trend towards Africanization of the Tanzanian civil service which had been called for in the 1963 report of the Africanization Commission. However, the Commission also noted a temporary need for expatriate technical staff.82 Few Africans had experience with

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or an interest in wildlife conservation, so the conservation sector was one of the areas most in need of non-African personnel in order to carry out the vision advanced at the 1961 Arusha Conference. This dependence on Americans and Europeans can be seen by looking at the composition of the NCA’s Advisory Board and senior staff during the mid-1960s (Table 1). During the mid-1960s, non-Tanzanians almost always outnumbered Tanzanians on the Board and in senior staff positions. The influence of the 1961 Arusha Bargain is also illustrated by the “interests” represented by the various members of the Advisory Board during this same period (Table 2), “international interests” being the largest category of members.  

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>NCA Conserv.</th>
<th>Tanzanian Central Govt.</th>
<th>Tanzanian Local Govt.</th>
<th>Tourist Interests (a)</th>
<th>“Masai” Interests (b)</th>
<th>Research</th>
<th>International Interests</th>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967 (c)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) Tourist interests were also represented by the Principal Secretary of the Ministry of Information and Tourism and some tourism sector representatives are listed as representing “local interests”;
(b) The representatives of “Masai interests” were not residents of the NCA;
(c) Not included in this row is the Director of Tanzania National Parks who represents “local interests” on the 1967 Advisory Board.


83 Tables 1-2 only cover the years of 1964 to 1967 because comprehensive data for the post-1967 period is unavailable. The unpublished report for the period 1968
Canada provided and funded a significant number of the NCA’s non-Tanzanian senior staff during the second part of the 1960s. The nature of the jobs performed by these Canadian staff and their positions in the NCA’s hierarchy illustrate the NCA’s reliance upon international knowledge and discourses. In 1966, both the NCA’s Conservation Ecologist and Game Biologist were Canadians, as was the NCA’s Ecologist in 1967. Tellingly, the positions of Conservation Ecologist and Ecologist were listed second in the “Staff” sections of the 1966 and 1967 Annual Reports respectively, just underneath the position of Conservator and above that of Senior Assistant Conservator.\(^8^4\) In addition to the Canadian aid, the NCA was also receiving assistance from the U.S. Peace Corps and various British sources. In 1965, an unrelated rift between the British and Tanzanian governments in 1965 terminated British aid.\(^8^5\) The U.S. Peace Corps aid went toward filling an important senior staff position, first known as “Assist. Conservator (Technical)” and later as “Assist. Conservator (Forests),” during this period.\(^8^6\)

The most important product of this period of intensive Canadian involvement in the NCA was H. J. Dirschl’s *Management and Development Plan for the Ngorongoro Conservation Area* from 1966. This plan illustrates how the ideas developed during the Fosbrooke period had become deeply entrenched in the NCA’s governance system. Dirschl explicitly described his plan as building on and “shar[ing] the objectives” of the first 1960 plan, Fosbrooke’s 1962 revised management plan, and W. J. Eggeling’s 1962 report to the Tanganyikan government on Fosbrooke’s proposals.\(^8^7\) Dirschl adopted Eggeling’s proposed

to 1982 blames this breakdown in record keeping in part on the “conservation controversy” and then the transfer of the NCA to the “newly created Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism,” see NCAA, Annual Reports 1968-1982, NCAAA, p. 9.

\(^8^7\) H. J. Dirschl, *Management and Development Plan for the Ngorongoro Conser-
“governmental directive” word for word as a strategic guide for the elements of his 1966 plan, writing, “The Ngorongoro Conservation Area is not only the home of resident Maasai and of their stock, and an important source of water for adjoining lands, it is also world-famous for the abundance and variety of its wildlife in a unique scenic setting. For these reasons it is an asset both of national importance and of international significance.”

Dirschl, Eggeling, and the Tanganyikan government, which supported this directive, thus applied the core concept of the Arusha Bargain to the specific case of the NCA.

Later in his proposed directive, Eggeling stated that a “stable [natural] environment ... is essential for the achievement of ... conservation and rational development of the long-term objectives of the Area.”

There are two major features of interest in this portion of the directive. First, there is the assumption that environmental stability is not only desirable, but also possible in the Ngorongoro area. In fact, the opposite is true; variability and heterogeneity characterize the climate and landscape of northern Tanzania. When he reviewed previous research in the NCA, Dirschl did acknowledge that “few studies of vegetational aspects have been carried out in the Conservation Area.” It seems clear that Eggeling’s vision, and Dirschl’s acceptance of this vision, was based more on a broader quasi-ecological discourse of stability and equilibrium than on empirical knowledge of the NCA.

A second element of Dirschl’s proposed directive, which requires comment, is its call for “rational development.” Implicit in this phrase was a criticism of the “irrational” nature of pastoralist natural

88 Ibid., pp. 2-3.
89 Ibid., p. 4.
90 Ibid., p. 52.
92 Dirschl, Management and Development Plan cit., p. 44.
resource use and management, a discourse with a long history and considerable staying power amongst some conservation and development experts. This critique of pastoralism was made more explicit when Dirschl stated, “It is well agreed that lasting economic progress for the Maasai has to be based on the acceptance of modern range management and farming methods which are incompatible with nomadism.”\textsuperscript{93} However, Dirschl did not say exactly who had “agreed” to this proposition, and in the section of the plan which reviewed previous research in the NCA, there was no mention of any studies that supported this position.\textsuperscript{94} Like the emphasis on the importance of environmental stability, this characterization of pastoralism was based primarily on existing discourses rather than field research.

When looking at Dirschl’s specific proposals for the governance of the NCA, two more elements illustrate how it reinforced and elaborated on the previously established pattern of top-down, expert-led governance. The first element of the plan to be considered is more process-oriented: how decisions should be made, who should be consulted, and in what forums. The second element focuses on Dirschl’s elaborate proposal to divide the NCA into seventeen “land-use zones.”\textsuperscript{95}

In terms of process and administrative organization, Dirschl argued that the Advisory Board needed additional scientific and technical expertise in the form of more “ex officio” scientific members and also a “scientific sub-committee.”\textsuperscript{96} As a result of Dirschl’s advice, the Director of Tanzania National Parks and later the Director of the Serengeti Wildlife Research Institute were added to the Advisory Board.\textsuperscript{97} Dirschl did acknowledge “misunderstandings” between the area’s residents and the NCA’s management.\textsuperscript{98} However, he supported the earlier exclusion of local “Maasai elders” from the original committee-like Ngorongoro Conservation Authority because their “mistrust” of the

\textsuperscript{93} Ibid., p. 52.
\textsuperscript{94} Ibid., pp. 52-60.
\textsuperscript{95} Ibid., pp. 84-108.
\textsuperscript{96} Ibid., pp. 75-76.
\textsuperscript{97} Ngorongoro Conservation Unit, \textit{Ngorongoro’s Annual Report 1967} cit., p. 6
\textsuperscript{98} Dirschl, \textit{Management and Development Plan} cit., p. 77
government had made this situation “unworkable.” 99 Dirschl’s solution was the creation of a “permanent forum” consisting of “an informal group of local residents ... in order to keep the resident human population informed regarding the operation of the Conservation Unit, and conversely to inform the Unit staff of the wishes and problems of the people.”100 However, this “informal group” was to have no real power to make or change management decisions.

In general, zonation schemes are an important way of “seeing” and controlling non-human nature and social relationships with this nature.101 Dirschl’s land use plan is a clear example of this phenomenon. He stated that the NCA “falls quite logically into 17 separate units” and that following his proposals “will result in a sound and natural development of the natural resources of the Ngorongoro Conservation Area.”102 As with his use of the word “rational” to position indigenous pastoralist practices as “irrational,” Dirschl was deploying “logical” in this section of the plan to implicitly argue that other, non-scientific ways of knowing and describing the NCA’s landscape would be “illogical.” Dirschl aimed to eliminate all Maasai use of four of the seventeen zones, the Ngorongoro Crater, the Northern Highland Forest Reserve, Olaoti Forest, and Empakaai Crater, and to remove Maasai settlements from another two zones, the Western Escarpment Highlands and South Oldupai-Doloinya.103 Over time, a number of these removals have indeed taken place. Today, Maasai settlements are not allowed in either of the Craters nor in the Forests, and access to these resources is restricted.104 In nine of the remaining eleven zones, Dirschl wanted to concentrate and to some degree sedentarize the resident Maasai through the provision of water and

99 Ibid.
100 Ibid., p. 78.
101 For a discussion of these processes of “seeing,” see J.C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed, Yale University Press, New Haven, CT 1998.
102 Dirschl, Management and Development Plan cit., p. 73.
103 Ibid., pp. 84-85.
104 Homewood, Rogers, Maasailand Ecology cit.
improved pasture, as well as the introduction of “sound range management involving fenced pastures and rotational grazing.”

**Links Between the Past and Present in the NCA**

Of what importance are the events and ideas of thirty years ago to the more recent management of the NCA? The argument here is that the legacy of this period still has a powerful effect on the contemporary governance of the NCA and continuing attempts to make it live up to its promise of “multiple use.” A set of discourses about conservation and pastoralism took root in the NCA soon after its creation, and the governance structures of the NCA remain little changed despite the passage of time and seeming impact of new ideas and even “paradigms.” The longevity of the NCA’s governance framework illustrates the need for a multi-dimensional vision of governance, as in this case where power and interest have been critical elements in the long-term maintenance of governance patterns in the NCA. Recent developments have left the basic governance relationships between international actors, the Tanzanian state, and local Maasai basically unchanged even if some of the details and some specific actor interests are altered.

Ultimate authority in the NCA still rests with the Conservator who is responsible only to the NCA’s Board of Directors and the central government, not to the residents of the NCA. The Tanzanian legal analysts Issa Shivji and Wilbert Kapinga argue that this arrangement is “in breach of the constitutional rights of the Maasai.” Resident Maasai participation in the management of the NCA is virtually non-existent. The Board of Directors generally has two Maasai members: the Chair of the Ngorongoro District Council and the MP for Ngorongoro District. However, when the Board met to approve the NCA General Management Plan in March 1996, none of

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105 Ibid., p. 85.
106 Shivji, Kapinga, *Maasai Rights* cit., p. 44.
the Board members were actual residents of the NCA.\textsuperscript{107} Attempts by residents to develop or empower themselves, often with the support of international NGOs and donors, have generally been met with resistance by the NCA Authority. In fact, a recent Conservator attempted to reserve to himself the right to approve or disapprove the operation of any NGOs inside the NCA.\textsuperscript{108}

There has been NCAA support for a Pastoral Council which would advise the Conservator. However, like the “informal group” proposed by Dirschl in 1966, this Council has no formal legal standing or authority.\textsuperscript{109} The NCA Authority continues to insist that it should have a virtual monopoly over all development efforts aimed at the residents of the NCA. NCAA officials cite the powers and responsibilities granted to them by the 1975 legislation, but the roots of this claim can be traced back to the Fosbrooke era and the 1962 Management Plan for the NCA.\textsuperscript{110}

The primary focus and successes of the NCA have been in the area of wildlife conservation rather than the development of the Maasai, or in even helping them to maintain their pre-NCA standard of living.\textsuperscript{111} This point was even acknowledged by the 1990 report of the Ad Hoc Ministerial Commission on Ngorongoro commissioned by the Tanzanian government.\textsuperscript{112} There is unfortunately significant evidence that the Maasai residents of the NCA are not benefiting from wildlife conservation and tourism in the area. In 2004, the Ngorongoro District, of which the NCA compromises about half of the district, led Tan-

\textsuperscript{107} NCAA, General Management Plan cit.
\textsuperscript{108} E.B. Chausi, Re: NGOs Operating in the NCA, 1995, NCAAAA.
\textsuperscript{109} Shivji, Kapinga, Maasai Rights cit., p. 61.
\textsuperscript{110} NCAA senior staff, interview with author, 30 May 1997, Ngorongoro Crater, Tanzania (handwritten notes in possession of author). NCAA Board member, interview with author, 6 June 1997, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania (handwritten notes in possession of author).
\textsuperscript{111} However, even the conservation effectiveness of the NCA is coming under scrutiny. UNESCO’s World Heritage Committee (WHC) dispatched a Reactive Monitoring Mission to the NCA in 2007 because of concerns about the area. See UNESCO WHC, Ngorongoro Conservation Area cit.
zania in maternal deaths, at a rate of 15.6 per 1,000 pregnancies.\textsuperscript{113} Evidence of the partial demise of the very livestock economy that the NCA was supposed to promote comes from increasing importance of small-scale subsistence agriculture to Maasai residents. Despite research that indicates that this extremely limited cultivation of maize and other food crops is having and will likely have no effect on the NCA’s conservation values, the NCAA is opposed to any agriculture in the NCA. Agriculture was specifically forbidden in the current General Management Plan, and it continues today only because of the direct intervention of the President of Tanzania.\textsuperscript{114}

Secrecy is still a major feature of the governance of the NCA. In 1997, it was discovered that the NCAA intended to try and gain formal, legal title to the land of the NCA. This would essentially remove all Maasai claims to village land ownership and control. This was not publicly revealed by the NCAA or its Board, but came out through the MP for Ngorongoro who was an ex officio member of the Board.\textsuperscript{115} Since then, the NCAA has been prevented from securing full and formal \textit{de jure} title to the land. However, it receives all the lease revenue from tourist lodges located inside the NCA and thus has \textit{de facto} ownership in this important economic sphere.\textsuperscript{116}

International conservation organizations and donors still play a large, if not the leading, role in the NCA. The IUCN organized the Ngorongoro Conservation and Development Project in the late 1980s

and provided extensive technical and material assistance with the most recent General Management Plan.\textsuperscript{117} While the process of writing the plan did see a fair degree of local involvement, the plan was changed afterwards in a number of important areas by the Board of Directors, and its final approval was resisted by many residents of the NCA.\textsuperscript{118, 119} The Frankfurt Zoological Society, brought to the NCA by the Grzimeks, is responsible for rhino conservation in the Crater and has been a major supporter of the NCA Authority in its current form.\textsuperscript{120} The African Wildlife Fund, successor to the African Wildlife Leadership Fund, helped to organize and facilitate a number of workshops between local residents and the NCA Authority. However, like the Pastoral Council, these workshops and the residents participating in them had no formal authority or role in management and policy decisions.\textsuperscript{121} The Arusha Bargain of 1961 was most recently reaffirmed when a UNESCO-


\textsuperscript{118} The extent of these changes can be seen by comparing NCAA, Board of Directors Review Draft General Management Plan, 1995, NCAAA; NCAA, Public Review Draft General Management Plan, Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania 1995; NCAA, \textit{General Management Plan} cit. The two most important changes made by the Board were its deciding against allowing cultivation in the NCA and its decision to not seek a formal legal opinion on the land tenure status of the NCA.


\textsuperscript{120} FZS senior staff, interview with author, 12 September 1996, Ngorongoro Crater, Tanzania (handwritten notes in possession of the author).

\textsuperscript{121} AWF senior staff, interview with author, 8 April 1997, Ngorongoro Crater, Tanzania (handwritten notes in possession of the author).
sponsored “Reactive Monitoring Mission” to the NCA consulted only with Tanzanian state officials and whose closest contact with the NCA’s residents appear to have been while flying over the area.\textsuperscript{122} Quite often, conservation organizations working in the NCA follow a pattern of secrecy similar to that of the NCA Authority and are unwilling to discuss in any detail their projects inside the NCA.\textsuperscript{123}

DANIDA, the Danish development organization, has been attempting to organize and fund a Maasai development project separate from the NCA Authority. The reasons for this initiative lie in a complex history of Danish involvement in the NCA and Danish domestic politics.\textsuperscript{124} On one side, DANIDA has met considerable resistance from the NCAA and its parent ministry, while it has been criticized from the other by advocates for indigenous peoples in Denmark.\textsuperscript{125} Originally, DANIDA’s planning documents called for development of an alternative system of pastoral development governance outside the NCAA’s control. This generally proved to be impossible as the NCAA has been unwilling to relinquish any control over development projects inside the NCA. As a result, the Ereto Ngorongoro Pastoralist Project has been primarily focused on technical restocking, veterinary medicine, and water development exercises rather than pushing for major governance changes.\textsuperscript{126}

\textsuperscript{122} UNESCO, \textit{Ngorongoro Conservation Area} cit., p. 22.
\textsuperscript{123} IUCN-East Africa senior staff, interview with author, 22 May 1997, Nairobi, Kenya (handwritten notes in possession of the author).
\textsuperscript{124} DANIDA, \textit{A Broad Outline on Previous and Planned Danish Assistance to the Pastoralists of the NCA}, paper presented at Community Donor/Supporter Meeting on Multiple Land Use in the Ngorongoro Conservation Area, London, 27-29 August 1997.
\textsuperscript{125} Natural Peoples World, \textit{Phase I of Economic Recovery Programme for NCA Pastoralists}, Project Proposal Document, 1994, provided to author by NPW staff; NCAA senior staff, interview with the author, 7 March 1996, Arusha, Tanzania (handwritten notes in possession of author); DANIDA official, interview with the author, 25 September 1996, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania (handwritten notes in the possession of author).
Implications for Contemporary Protected Area Governance

Two major lessons emerge from this study of governance in the NCA. First, governance is a complicated and multi-dimensional concept where power, forms of knowledge, and actor interests need to be considered. Reducing it to idealistic notions of “good governance” is insufficient and likely to be counterproductive. Second, it is clear that contemporary governance processes often have deep historical roots. Those interested in more effective protected area governance should pay greater attention to the histories of the sites where they work. One major factor linking these two lessons is complexity. Neither governance nor history is simple and straightforward. Effective governance that serves both conservation values and human needs must be based on vision that recognizes and appreciates the role of complexity. Adaptive management with its emphasis on participation and open decision-making provides one pathway to incorporate complexity in protected area governance.

The basic parameters of the NCA’s governance system are by no means unique in sub-Saharan Africa. As with almost all protected areas, there are a wide variety of actors, state and non-state, domestic and international. These various actors have an equally diverse and often conflicting collection of discursive visions about the forms, functions, and role of the protected area and its resources. As in the Ngorongoro case, power can take a number of forms, and it is unevenly distributed amongst the various actors. Out of such complex stews of actors, discourses, and power emerge the formal and informal rules that govern protected areas. The South Africa National Parks experience in the wake of the end of apartheid in 1994 has been very similar to the NCA case in a number of ways. In both cases, there was a convergence of interests and visions between state and international actors, and generally the exclusion or minimal involvement of local peoples in the process of transforming South Africa’s national parks system.127

One failing of many contemporary conservation projects is their inability or unwillingness to come to terms with the complex histories of the lands and peoples affected by their initiatives. The recently completed UNESCO-sponsored Reactive Monitoring Mission to Ngorongoro contains no information on, or consideration of, the history of the NCA, apparently assuming technical solutions to contemporary problems can be created in a state of historical ignorance. When conservationists acknowledge history, it can be a simplified and romanticized history that celebrates the conservation project and great figures, usually non-Africans. One classic case was Dian Fossey of *Gorillas in the Mist* fame, who become an international icon for her work with the mountain gorillas of Rwanda even though her actual behavior in the field was deeply problematic and in many ways counterproductive to her stated goal.


It should be noted that simplifying and romanticizing history is not a monopoly of conservationists. The Maasai have been one of a number of African pastoralist communities that have taken up the banner of “indigenousness” as a strategy of political empowerment. However, the histories promoted by such indigenous peoples and their advocates can be as one-dimensional and self-serving as those told by some conservationists.

Numerous empirical and theoretical studies have demonstrated

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that even when complexity has been acknowledged, top-down authoritarian governance systems face extreme difficulties trying to manage situations of social and natural complexity effectively. Attempts at the intensive management of a protected area by a technocratic elite with significant resources still create significant social and ecological problems such as in South Africa’s Kruger National Park during the heyday of the apartheid period. Dryzek’s theoretical analysis of the weakness of “administered hierarchies” highlights their inability to handle situations with “high degrees of uncertainty, variability, and complexity.” Unfortunately for the peoples and lands of the Ngorongoro region, historical processes have resulted in just such an administered hierarchy governance model for the NCA.

By way of a concluding thought, this article suggests adaptive management as a means for overcoming the governance challenges posed by complexity. While originally promoted as a way to better manage variable and heterogeneous natural landscapes, adaptive management also provides a governance model for enhancing social outcomes. Open and participatory governance systems result in better quality decisions and higher levels of social support for such decisions. As this model of protected area governance is adopted


137 Dryzek, Rational Ecology cit, pp. 216-229.
elsewhere in the world, it is to be hoped that the weight of history can be overcome, and this governance model finds its way to the NCA.