CHAPTER 1

Global Parks

_National Parks, Globalization, and Western Modernism_

“Πολλὰ τὰ δεινὰ κ’ οὐδὲν ἀνθρώπον δεινότερον πέλει” (Wonders are many, and none is more wonderful than man). These words, from Sophocles’ tragedy _Antigone_, were the first to echo through the chamber of the National Council, the larger of the two houses of the Swiss Parliament, shortly after 8 o’clock on the morning on 25 March 1914.1 Suddenly, it was clear to everyone (even those still half asleep) that the day’s business would be anything but ordinary. “From the start,” reported the _Neue Zürcher Zeitung_, Walter Bissegger’s “presentation, which excelled in both content and form, put the parliamentary assembly in that exalted mood conducive to supporting ideational propositions.”2 At issue was a “federal law to establish a Swiss national park in the Lower Engadine” that in draft form foresaw an area to be specified for the “protection of all animal and plant life from human influence.”3

Bissegger had chaired the parliamentary commission that prepared the item for the National Council. Now, his task was to present the proposed bill. Although the reporter of the _Neue Zürcher Zeitung_ was not entirely impartial to the speaker—Bissegger was, after all, the paper’s editor-in-chief—there can be no doubt that the chair’s rhetorically polished delivery impressed his fellow councilors. The most vivid illustration of human greatness, said Bissegger, expanding on his opening statement, “is the fact that, once humans had become the absolute rulers of the earth and their fellow creatures, they felt compelled to protect those creatures to some degree against their own power and depravity by erecting barriers to create plant and animal sanctuaries, sacred spaces for nature.”4

Thus, Bissegger situated the idea of a national park in the larger context of human history. Man had won the battle for existence and achieved dominion over the earth. But his omnipotence obliged him to act responsibly and to assure the well being of other living beings. According to Bissegger, these noble thoughts gave rise to the international conservation movement, and by extension to the matter at hand. Everything was in order, Bissegger told his colleagues, referring to the thorough work of his commission. The “question you must decide is ultimately a fundamental one: Do we wish to provide a sanctuary for animals and plants, protected insofar as possible from human impact,
a preserve in which for 100 years all commercial use, foresting, grazing, and hunting will stop, in which no chopping or shooting will be heard ever again, and where domestic animals may not encroach?”

The content of the presentation and the debate that ensued in parliament will be discussed in the next chapter. Here, I address the global issues that so occupied Bissegger. On which knowledge did Bissegger base his parliamentary address? What historical convergence enabled him to see that in 1914 human-kind was at a turning point, and to call for a fundamentally new direction? And what convinced him that a “national park” was the perfect mechanism for this realignment? Answering these questions requires pulling together developmental strands from very different temporal and spatial dimensions, and understanding their mutual effects. With Fernand Braudel one could tackle the problem by applying two categories of time: *longue durée*, for gradual societal shifts, and *courte durée*, which refers to abrupt changes, most of which actually have little effect from a long-term perspective. Adding a theory of social learning, such as that suggested by Hansjörg Siegenthaler for the industrial era, further helps to explain why certain short-term phases of history are marked by sudden larger changes that do have far-reaching, long-term effects. Such short-term phases are characterized by deep uncertainties within society, widespread discussion of societal crises, and for these very reasons are particularly open to change. In the years preceding the First World War, the Western world was going through just such a phase, idealized as the *Belle Époque* and lamented as the *Fin de Siècle*.

In these first years of the twentieth century, not only was the idea for a Swiss national park developed and realized. As I will show, the term “national park” also acquired global meaning that, in the following decades, would be the basis of powerful, consequential conservation initiatives at the international, imperial, and national level. Focusing on this formative phase of the global significance of national parks entails a shift in the thematic as well as the spatial and temporal links. In seeking to reconstruct the conditions under which the national park idea gained form and momentum globally, the question of who invented it (a discussion that is hardly enlightening in any event) is superfluous.

This shift in focus also brings into play an approach that has recently been promoted by both global history and history of technology. The previous practice of separating developments into phases of discovery and dissemination proved inadequate for historical events. First, the seemingly original invention itself builds on assumptions and thus on previous events. Second, it became clear that simple diffusion models do not suffice to explain how inventions spread. Rather, the dissemination of an invention always implies its transformation. Consequently, the history of social and technological innovation now focuses not on inventors and their inventions but rather on the communi-
ceptive processes of negotiation that both support and, even more important, literally shape these developments.9 Thus, media and forums for social negotiation move to the center of attention.

Chief among the themes to emerge from this turn is the question of the authorship of ideas. Both self-stylization and labeling processes are discursive devices conducive to constructing a master narrative that is highly persuasive and that in turn facilitates the selection and ordering of events. Thus, the idea acquires a quasi-official history that includes a distinct starting point. Through subsequent editing of the narrative, an origin myth emerges that imbues the idea with a social context and a particular identity. For over a century, advocates (and, increasingly, critics) of the national park idea have invoked such an origin myth: the founding of Yellowstone in 1872, which promoted the idea of the national park, and which became the template for countless copies around the world. The preoccupation with this origin myth, its powerful influence, and its (de)construction constitute a preface to what follows on the emergence of the national park as a global phenomenon.

The Myth of Yellowstone

“In 1872, few men had vision enough to foresee that newly established Yellowstone National Park embodied not the end, but only the beginning of the national park idea,” proclaimed a report on the one hundredth birthday of Yellowstone National Park in 1972.10 Even today, for many Yellowstone represents the start not only of the global history of national parks but also (and especially) of officially designated conservation areas. This view of Yellowstone as the lodestar of a worldwide conservation movement has recently come under fire. According to social scientists Dan Brockington, Rosaleen Duffy, and Jim Igoe, international conservationists made Yellowstone into their own founding myth. Moreover, centering the movement in the Western world and especially in the United States served not least to establish and perpetuate the movement’s balance of power. The authors propose three arguments why using Yellowstone in this way is a mistake. First, Yellowstone is a problematic model because it originated the practice of driving indigenous peoples from national parks. Second, choosing Yellowstone as a starting point sidelined older forms of territorial protection. For example, in earlier times throughout the world, ruling dynasties conferred special protection to religious sites and hunting grounds. Finally, the enshrining of Yellowstone represented only those activities that were undertaken at the state level and executed in writing. Local and regional protective measures by smaller social groups or illiterate societies were systematically excluded.11 The criticism by Brockington et al. is justified, but not sufficient. A diffusion history anchored in Yellowstone is questionable
not only because of the dubious moral character of its ground zero and because of what it leaves out, but also because of what it purports to depict. It suggests both historical continuity and linear and homogeneous development that, as I will show, is inconsistent with the history of protected areas.

To test this hypothesis, it is worthwhile first to cast an impartial glance at Yellowstone in 1872. In that year, the U.S. Congress declared a 3,300-square-mile-wide area as a “public park or pleasuring-ground.” The term “national park” did not appear in the official decree, which would cause an uproar a hundred years later at a delicate historical moment. In 1972 the United States hosted the Second World Conference on National Parks. The international conservation community was invited to Yellowstone to celebrate the park’s centennial. It was only during the preparations for the event that the term’s omission in the founding documents was discovered. The US authorship of the national park idea was suddenly thrown into doubt and so was the celebration’s choreography. The matter was soon cleared up to the organizer’s satisfaction. The descriptor “national park” had been used for Yellowstone from its inaugural year, though legally the term “national park” only took on meaning decades later through consistent application.

Two determining features made Yellowstone a model for later national parks: the magnitude of the protected area and the fact that protection was under the aegis of the highest public authority. However, in 1872 neither of these aspects was front and center; rather, both were byproducts of the park’s creation. The extent of the protection was the result not of a vision of conservation but simply ignorance of the site. Contemporary debates left no doubt that the protection did not apply to integral habitats but to individual natural wonders: geysers, gorges, and waterfalls. These were to be excluded from private commerce and secured for the public. Because the wonders were still insufficiently mapped and the entire area was considered largely worthless economically, Congress drew the park boundaries generously. The second major feature, the federal solution, also stemmed from the fact that the targeted area extended over US territories—Montana and Wyoming—neither of which was yet a state. In his definitive work on the history of American national parks, Alfred Runte concluded that any resemblance of 1872 Yellowstone to modern concepts was completely unintentional. With respect to this shift in meaning, Roderick Nash notes that, for once, ideas followed actions. This finding—the absence of the later ideological structure at the founding of Yellowstone—did not prevent Nash from representing Yellowstone as the nucleus of a conventional diffusion history and celebrating the national park as an “American contribution to world culture.”

Without this ahistorical anticipation of eventual appreciation in value, the establishment of Yellowstone appears far less revolutionary. Moreover, continuities are visible that were obscured by the later narrative overlay. In particu-
lar, one of Runte’s meticulously traced threads leads to Yosemite State Park, founded in 1864, and from there to the urban parks that appeared in large American cities around the middle of the nineteenth century. The term “public park,” adopted for Yellowstone, refers to this park tradition. The American city park was inspired by the somewhat older European urban parks, which in turn built on an early modern aristocratic park tradition. In emphasizing public access, the American park concept explicitly distanced itself from this aristocratic legacy. Whether city, state, or national park, the American park would not be reserved for any exclusive stratum but rather open to all citizens regardless of who they were. This democratic impetus shaped American park history. But it did not prevent the rampant social and racial discrimination of the larger society from entering the park. The national parks long remained de facto places for the white middle class, while other groups were shut out or even expelled from park-designated areas.¹⁴

A second thread, similarly characterized by a dialectic of continuity and segregation, combines the early American national park with the European tradition of monuments. A goal of Yosemite and Yellowstone was to preserve natural wonders that were of both public and national interest. Monumental nature was the answer of the American cultural and traditional elite to the European nationalist cult of monuments. The natural history wonders of the American West would occupy the place that in European nations was allotted to their achievements—cultural history, ruins, castles, and cathedrals. Their wonders should fill Americans with patriotic pride and impress other nations. As Runte put it, the invention of the national park gave expression to a deeply felt lack of cultural identity, an inferiority complex vis-à-vis Europe reinforced by sharp European criticism prompted by the commercialization of Niagara Falls, the first major tourist attraction in the United States. The newly discovered natural wonders of the West would dispel all that. The aim of the inventors of the national park was to present to the (European) world a sophisticated, singular America in the form of impressive landscapes. The European framework for these efforts is evident not least in the numerous contemporary accounts in which the American natural wonders are compared with buildings and landscapes on the old continent. “Why should we go to Switzerland to see mountains or to Iceland for geysers?” the New York Herald asked its readers in 1872. “Thirty years ago the attraction of America to the foreign mind was Niagara Falls. Now we have attractions which diminish Niagara into an ordinary exhibition.”¹⁵

**Nature as National Symbol**

In Europe, too, newspapers reported the creation of Yellowstone’s national park. In 1873, under the headline “A Very National Park,” the London Times...
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noted the new institution and provided a detailed listing of its “curiosities”: “The wonders of Yellowstone include geysers, in comparison with which the geysers of Iceland are insignificant; hot springs, vapour springs, mud springs, and mud volcanoes; falls of 350 feet in height; canons of 5000 feet in depth; streams …; and mountain and rock scenery.” As a large part of the park was still unexplored, other marvels might be discovered, “for there seems no limit to the freaks which Nature … has played and continues to play in this wonderful region.” At the time, visits to the park could be made only on horseback, over difficult bridle paths. But there were no insuperable obstacles to future construction of carriage roads and a railway. On animal or plant life the article was silent.16

Yellowstone was similarly received in Switzerland, where both French- and German-language newspapers reported the founding of the American national park. As did the Times (and also contemporary American reports), the broadsheets emphasized the marvelous world of hot springs and geysers. “A new region of thermal springs is currently attracting the attention of the geographical world,” wrote the Journal de Genève in 1872. The Neue Zürcher Zeitung described the area as inhospitable and mountainous and thus ill suited to livestock or mining. “The hot springs and geysers delight the eye of the beholder not only as something wonderful to look at but also through the miraculous power of their waters to give health and new vitality to the sick. So much so that in a few years, the national park will have become a place where people in search of healing will flock from all over the world; in an area that until then had been totally uninhabited, rarely visited by Indians, and up to just a few years ago by no civilized people.”17 Nor was the Neue Zürcher Zeitung wrong in its prediction. In fact, Yellowstone became a public bath facility, and bathing in the hot springs was allowed until well into the twentieth century. Yellowstone’s distance from civilization and seemingly unspoiled nature were a source of fascination, though the perception was false. Native American groups roamed the area seasonally, collecting plants, hunting, and fishing. Following the establishment of the national park, those activities were prevented by the military, thus bringing about the seemingly untouched-by-humans landscape that would become a hallmark of Yellowstone.18

In the 1870s and 1880s, national parks were founded in Canada, New Zealand, and Australia. Each of these British settler societies interpreted the American model in their own way, with the first Australian national park in Sydney more strongly oriented to the periurban parks of London’s imperial metropolis than to the park far from the city in the American West. Together, these developments represent initiatives that placed the exploitation of tracts of land under state control.19 Whether in those years similar efforts were being made somewhere in Europe is not known. The guiding principle behind the establishment of Yellowstone—to remove natural features of the landscape
from the reach of commerce through state control and make them accessible as a public good—argues against such initiatives. The possession of land in Europe was usually clearly defined and was mainly in private or communal hands and, apart from state forests in certain countries, was rarely under the control of the central government. The potential for a nation-state to demonstrate ownership of disputed land by designating it a national park was exploited by Europe only in the twentieth century. Early examples include the establishment of national parks in areas of Sweden inhabited by the Sami (Lapp) people since 1909, and Stelvio National Park, created in 1935 by fascist Italy in formerly Austrian territory.20

Another factor was that, in European countries, nature had less national symbolic value than it did in the United States. In Europe, government promotion of national identities focused on cultural institutions and events: maintaining monuments and traditions, funding the arts, and national museums and fairs. Some measures, in particular regarding cultural heritage, involved protection of areas, for example, the Prussian government’s purchase of Drachenfels at Königswinter in 1836. The preservation of the Rüti meadow by Lake Lucerne as a national memorial in Switzerland came very close to the basic plan for Yellowstone. With the successful propagation of a new national historiography that situated the origin of the nation well back into the Middle Ages, in the nineteenth century the Rüti became the birthplace of Switzerland. It was said to be the site, where, in 1291, in a conspiratorial meeting, the three “original Swiss cantons” of Schwyz, Uri, and Unterwalden swore an eternal oath of allegiance thereby giving rise to the Swiss Confederation. In the 1850s, plans for a hotel were drawn up to serve as a window on this defining setting. To prevent that from happening, the Swiss Public Welfare Society bought the land with money acquired through nationwide fundraising and in 1860 entrusted it to the federal government as an “inalienable national resource.”21

The display of a common cultural heritage would make a nation palpable. From this vantage, nature was interesting first and foremost as a cultural landscape that reflected national characteristics. The relative importance attached to dramatization of a landscape by a nascent national iconography tended to increase in the absence of any other single objectification and thus naturalization of obvious commonalities such as language, race, or origin. In addition, in the United States, the national identification with nature following the Civil War was particularly useful because of its neutral character. American nature was there before the first settlers, and was at its finest not in the southern or northern states, but in the western territories, a place synonymous with American pioneering spirit. In a typical example of nationalistic myth making, at a time when its colonial exploration was drawing to an end, the West was becoming the cradle of America, “Nature’s Nation” (Perry Miller).22 In Western Europe, Switzerland’s cultural heterogeneity and conflict-ridden recent past
predisposed it to conceive national identity in a common political space. In addition to the historical myth making, in the Swiss federal state, which had only just been created in 1848 through civil war, land was a major resource in building a unified nation. Here was the chance to adopt a discourse around landscape that had its roots in the learned circles of eighteenth-century Europe. Influenced by the essays and travelogues of authors such as Albrecht von Haller, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and Johann Wolfgang Goethe, the Alps were transformed into the Swiss landscape per se, in which the noble shepherd led a frugal but unhindered life. The aestheticization of the alpine setting and the idealizing of its inhabitants were absorbed into the national self-description of Switzerland and the Swiss. Switzerland was alpine, and the Alps were Swiss, even though only a small and ever decreasing number of people lived in the mountain regions, and statistically the Swiss portion of the Alps constituted no more than 15 percent. Throughout the nineteenth century and into the twentieth, the Swiss Alps claimed without challenge to be the most sublime landscape in Europe. They became the preferred destination of the emerging waves of middle-class cross-border tourism, which further strengthened the awesome image of the Swiss Alps and propagated it around the world along with corresponding travel literature. Also the Americans favored to measure their mountains against the Swiss Alps. In 1874, Mount Rainer, in Washington State, was characterized as “mountain scenery in quantity and quality sufficient to make half a dozen Switzerlands.” And several areas of the Rocky Mountains were touted as the “Switzerland of America.” Samuel Bowles used the label in 1869 for his popular book describing his trip through the Colorado Rockies. Of the later national parks, the Glacier and Rocky Mountain national parks in particular styled themselves as “Swiss.” The omnipresent reference to the Swiss Alps, in turn, further stimulated international tourism to Switzerland. In the second half of the nineteenth century tourist entrepreneurs eagerly promoted and developed the country’s alpine destinations, and tourism became an important branch of the national economy.

Despite this national pride in the Alps and their importance for tourism, it would not have occurred to anybody to place the mountains under government protection. Nor did anyone raise any particular objections to commercializing the Alps. Instead, there was a rush to exploit their potential tourism through development of transportation and hotel infrastructure. The objective of government policy, both enlightened and utilitarian, was the rational exploitation of natural resources. Overexploitation was to be prevented, to which end the Swiss government was endowed with additional powers in the revised constitution of 1874. This gave the state the ultimate oversight of the mountain forests, whose uncontrolled denuding, in the opinion of forestry experts, was responsible not only for landslides and avalanches but also lowland flooding. This same period also saw the establishment of the first federally sponsored
hunting law, which made a significant distinction between “useful” and “dangerous” animals. The law enabled the government to temporarily set up hunting districts—known as Freiberge—where game populations could be replenished and then re-released for hunting. Predators, of course, were excluded from protection. The same spirit guided federal regulation of fisheries.26

An exception to the prevailing utilitarian ethos was the simultaneous effort to protect flora and so-called glacial erratics (boulders), and in which aesthetic and patriotic impulses converged with enthusiasm for the Alps and natural history in an urge to conserve nature. The perspective of these conservation pioneers was, however, limited. Characteristic “Swiss” alpine plants such as edelweiss and alpenrose were high on priority lists. Some cantons enacted plant-protection ordinances that, because they were mainly funded by private initiatives, ruled out smaller protected areas. The first alpine gardens were also established, motivated not least by tourism. A veritable swell of popular support drove protection of glacial erratics. Around the mid-nineteenth century, a theory positing that the stones and boulders of the central region of Switzerland had been carried there by Ice Age glaciers was widely accepted.27 Consequently, also for interested laypeople, these objects were clearly accessible evidence of both natural history and the history of the country. The popular-
ity of glacial erratics was instrumental to the founding of the Swiss National Park. Yet this connection also had an element of randomness. When, at the start of the twentieth century, an outstanding example of a boulder was facing destruction, the Swiss Society for Naturalists became embroiled in a turbulent rescue operation. In the wake of that episode, the society founded a commission that, as I will show in the next chapter, constituted a crucial advance not only for conservation but also for the goal of a national park.28

The Value of “Unspoiled” Nature

Out of the earthly struggle for existence, Bissegger told his colleagues in the National Council in 1914, man had emerged as the undisputed master. “He has cultivated the majority of the earth for his benefit, and has labored tirelessly to continue and to complete his work.” In past centuries the Swiss, too, had “with unflagging zeal and little regard to cost” corrected rivers and creeks, dried up swamps and marshes, and deforested even the steepest slopes of the mountains. “But the righteous joy of achievement has recently been tinged with bitterness and something akin to remorse for the price we have paid, the dying out of animal species that were once of the pride of our land, the bear, the ibex, the vulture—and nearly the eagle—to name only the greatest and most impressive; the obliteration of our corrected waters, the diminution of our songbirds, and the extinction of noble plant species.”

Bissegger was essentially describing a threefold transformation. He weighed the corralling of nature and the needs of humans with the losses that this corralling of nature entailed, and the loss of experience for society, which gave the entire progress of civilization a bitter taste. In so doing, Bissegger summed up an environmental transformation that began in the eighteenth century and that over time fundamentally altered not only society and the environment but also society’s perception of the environment. Now, in addition to the threat the environment posed for people, people posed a threat to the environment. In the early 1930s, Viennese political economist Otto Neurath described this turnabout in striking terms: “In the past, when man met a swamp, the man disappeared; but now the swamp disappears.”29 And not only that: Increasingly, a swamp that had not yet disappeared was being transformed from a hostile place to a place one hankered for, from a dystopia to a heterotopia.30

What forces drove the rise in societal estimation of unspoiled nature? The answers, which can be found in the extensive literature on this subject, can be grouped into four strands.31 First, in economic terms, the development resulted from the scarcity of a good—“unspoiled nature”—in the nineteenth century. In the course of industrialization and the concomitant intensification and expansion of mining, agriculture, and forestry, the amount of land not
committed to production decreased. The world’s population was growing, and European settlers in particular were scouting the globe for ever more contiguous settlements. New transportation technologies, in particular, the steamship and railway, not only transformed the world of markets but also increased human mobility and, not least, created the infrastructural basis for the emerging middle-class tourism industry. And tourism in turn, through a dialectical process, increased the demand for “unspoiled nature,” which justified its provision. Scientific exploration and topographic surveying of the world helped to remove the last blank spots from the increasingly ubiquitous maps. At the beginning of the twentieth century, only the poles and a few mountain peaks had not yet been explored by Europeans. In the apt yet trenchant words of the French geographer Jean Brunhes, penned in 1909, “the limits of our cage” had been reached.32

Second, a new perception of nature had been emerging since the late eighteenth century. Romanticism ushered in an aesthetic appreciation of nature and turned it into a moral issue. Jean-Jacques Rousseau and others became pioneers of a new way of looking at nature, which sees nature as both the physical basis of life and as having an intrinsic value that liberates nature and engages with it. Outdoor experiences took on a transcendental quality and were perceived as enriching and morally uplifting. Mountain or coastal landscapes that previously had received little attention—and then, most often as barriers to traffic—became worthy travel destinations in themselves. Aside from philosophy, the natural sciences, too, were busy constructing a new perception of nature. In the 1800s, the Christian story of creation, which had shaped the image of nature in Europe for centuries, came under pressure. Scientific discoveries and findings, especially Charles Darwin’s epochal *Origin of Species* in 1859, were increasingly less compatible with biblical tradition. The world was evidently not only much older than previously thought, it had also changed significantly over time. This insight increased interest in the history of nature and of places where such history could be studied. These destinations acquired the aura of shrines, and the spirituality found in nature had the power to replace the creeds and services associated with the bible and religious bodies. Nonetheless, Christian belief and the new appreciation of nature often came together and were expressed through the sacralization of the Alps in the nineteenth century, when one peak after another was adorned with a cross.33

Third, the new interest in nature did not spread evenly within society. Rather, natural ethics and the natural sciences flourished in a specific milieu that took shape simultaneously in the industrializing Western countries: the urban educated middle class.34 From this stratum came the great majority of thinkers and scientists who revolutionized the image of nature and later also supported the conservation movement. In addition to its enlightened attitude, this social stratum also acquired a degree of prosperity that allowed its mem-
bers to pursue ideas beyond those concerned with meeting basic needs. The educated classes that we encounter in the history of conservation did not stop at their personal studies of nature; they read Rousseau and Darwin and met up in scientific societies. They reveled in nature and developed through their scientific excursions a keen sense for changes in the landscape. Nature conservation found the objects of its desire in peripheral rural areas, whereas its elites and its base came from urban households.

The fourth and final interpretive strand is the process of establishing territories, which took on a new character with imperialism and the building of nation-states. On the one hand, the existing colonial powers and countries aspiring to the global stage, such as Germany, Italy, the United States, and Japan (and, rather bizarrely, the Belgian king) not only nearly completely divided the world among themselves; they also tried, with the aid of modern science and technology, to bind their old and new colonies more strongly to the colonial center and to bring them under their rule. On the other hand, nation-states gave rise to government territories that became an important reference point for the formation of national identity. In the common space “imagined communities” became rooted. Biological determinism allowed deduction of national characteristics from the living space, and the national community could be founded in natural history. The geographical unity of the country virtually guaranteed the unique character of the population. As already mentioned, this model of identity had its fullest effect in nations that possessed few measurable commonalities. In the United States, the national parks were “vignettes of primitive America,” whereas in Switzerland their purpose was to create spaces in which “Old Helvetia” could rise again.

The Global Conservation Movement

All these processes continued to have an effect for many decades. In contrast, nature conservation as an organized movement arose within only a relatively short period of time—less than a generation. Between 1890 and 1914, in Europe, North America, and among the white populations of European colonies, associations formed and pledged themselves to the cause of preserving nature. Although at its founding in 1891, the Sierra Club stood more or less alone, by 1910 the United States boasted around twenty nature conservation organizations. The United Kingdom saw the founding of the National Trust in 1895 and the Society for the Preservation of the Wild Fauna of the Empire in 1903. And at the turn of the century, on the European continent, conservation organizations emerged in quick succession. The German Bund für Vogelschutz and the German-Austrian Verein Naturschutzpark, the French Société pour la Protection des Paysages, the Dutch Vereeniging tot Behoud van Natuurmonu-
menten, the Swiss Bund für Naturschutz, and the Italian Lega Nazionale per la Protezione dei Monumenti Naturali, for example, were all founded between 1899 and 1913. This list is hardly exhaustive.40

These organizations shared not only the time window of their creation but also their social roots in the urban middle class, a world view influenced as much by enlightenment as by romantic tradition, and an appeal to universalist understanding of the modern natural sciences. The new movement feared the loss of nature and demanded its protection, and was clever enough to support that demand with patriotic and nationalist arguments. That momentum, built up in the nineteenth century, exploded in the twentieth, was not accidental. In double hindsight, the early conservation movement was a product of the years in which the processes of globalization were not only increasingly obvious in the movement of peoples, material, and media, but also increasingly critically viewed. It was mainly Western middle-class elites who developed an awareness that was decisive for the synchronous appearance worldwide of nature conservation as well as for its being perceived as an issue. Thus, toward the end of the nineteenth century, many people experienced the world for the first time as a single, coherent entity. The transnational stream of people and goods, information and capital reached a mass hitherto unknown, supported by new technologies—the telegraph, railway, and steamship—that revolutionized communications and transportation. Time and space seemed to shrink.41 In European countries, rapidly expanding literacy gave rise to a new middle-class public that expressed itself in a flourishing press. As a byproduct of imperialism, the colonial powers increasingly established a European-trained middle-class elite outside Europe that shared European values and ideas about the world.42

The pioneers of nature conservancy came from this educated middle-class elite, which endorsed the global view of the world. At the same time, they clung to the thinking and ways of dealing with the political structures of the time, influenced by a dynamic juxtaposition of nation-states and (mainly European) empires as well as an energetic internationalism. In the latter, contemporaries optimistically saw great progress for humanity. But vision of the future that prevailed prior to 1914 was not, for instance, the establishment of supranational structures but rather international coordination and assimilation of nationally constituted units that went unchallenged as organizational building blocks.43 The goal of a national park was perfectly compatible with this conception of global order. “Thus, if it can be integrated with broader conservation efforts that are now beginning to stir the entire world, the national park represents a fine model of advantageously adapting big international ideas at the national level,” stated Swiss Federal Councillor Felix-Louis Calonder in Parliament in March 1914.44

Around the turn of the century, the ongoing globalization and industrialization push sparked a wave of societal uncertainty that sociologist Peter Wag-
ner has called the “first crisis of modernity.” With the rapid pace of change, everyday patterns of perceiving the world and acting in it became quickly obsolete. The rescaling of spatiotemporal perceptions precipitated a feeling of loss. The way of thinking was no longer contained by geographical limits, nor was the flow of goods and people. Nervousness and rashness, overstimulation and meaninglessness figured among the much-maligned time-related phenomena. Both Europe and America fell equally prey to neurasthenia and fears of degeneration. The Expressionist movement gave oppressive, lasting expression to this unease, whereas Cubism, in particular, attempted to capture the rapid change and multiplication of perspectives, while at the same time associating them with basic forms. Wilhelm Conrad Röntgen’s x-rays and Marie Curie’s radioactivity, Max Planck’s quanta, and Albert Einstein’s relativity theory shook the edifice of Newtonian physics to its very foundations, even as Sigmund Freud’s psychoanalysis explored suppressed and repressed lives and made them fodder for social debate. In no time at all, the world had become more complex, uncertain of where it stood, orientation more difficult, and the half-life of convictions shorter. The French sociologist Henri Lefebvre spoke of a “decline of the referential,” a solid linguistic and social anchor for everyday life that prevailed from 1905 to 1910. In view of the towering uncertainty, many contemporaries went in search of support and direction, and joined one of the numerous movements that cropped up in those years of social turbulence: one of the many new religious confraternities, one or another flavor of “life reform,” a women’s club, or an association for cultural heritage or nature conservancy.47

With their analyses of the assets and state of Western civilization, the conservationists both stimulated societal uncertainty and capitalized on the existential personal and social soul searching that it triggered. Attitudes toward nature became a basic theme of this introspection. As societal changes piled up, nature provided a salutary permanence, a still point in the turning world. “Thousands of tired, nerve-shaken, over-civilized people are beginning to find out that going to the mountain is going home,” wrote John Muir, the pioneer of the American conservation movement, on the first page of Our National Parks, in 1901. Twenty years later Carl Schröter, the co-founder of the Swiss National Park, similarly described the primary purpose of a national park as “re-creating the impression of Heimatnatur [native nature]; procuring for the agitated modern populace a quiet enjoyment of nature.” Muir, Schröter, and many others lamented the loss of an intimate relationship with nature and saw in it not only the dark side of civilized progress but a moral threat to civilization itself. By losing its connection with nature, civilization, so the subtext of the argument went, was sawing through its own branch. The rupture of the branch would cut the lifeline of civilization, separate it from its organic roots, and thus from the natural source of its renewal. Excluding areas from explora-
tion and civilization and preserving their “authenticity” would maintain these sources and simultaneously put the stamp of civilization on them. Thus, in 1914, “the pedagogical and ethical side of the new direction” was especially close to Bissegger’s heart. “The very idea fills me with joy that, one day, father, mother, and child will be able to wander for hours, refraining from plucking flowers and tossing them away, that the edelweiss on Alp Murtèr and in [Val] Cluoza may grow, bloom, and fade without any tourist … cramming his backpack with the immaculate plants.” Who, Bissegger asked his fellow councilors, could not be sufficiently moved by this beautiful vision of the future to sing, with Schiller’s Spirit of the Mountain: “Earth has room for all to dwell.” The horrors of the First World War gave extra weight to this cultural critique. The Swiss National Park, said Schröter in 1918, “must already be seen as a productive result in the hoped-for renewal process of overly materialistic, overly egoistic humankind.”

The risk to mental and physical health associated with the process of civilization was not believed to affect all social classes equally. Urbanites, softened by modern city living, were especially susceptible. Confrontation with the wild forces of nature preferably at an early age and periodically repeated was an excellent way of restoring masculinity and countering the latent feminization of society, which (to make matters worse) also threatened the nation’s military might. This link between urban civilization and vanishing manhood was largely responsible for the fact that protection of “wild nature” became nearly exclusively a male affair. Nowhere were social opportunities for women so restricted as in nature conservation. Their field of activity was primarily limited to animal welfare, and in particular the protection of birds, where female commitment combined to advantage with motherly empathy for the magisterial creatures and criticism of consumerism, such as the contemporary woman’s taste for furs and feathered hats.

**National Parks and Natural Monuments**

At the center of modern nature conservation, as it stood at the turn of the twentieth century, were two moral issues: the preservation of unspoiled nature or wilderness sites, and the protection of plant and animal species from extinction. In this context, extensive, contiguous protected areas took on new meaning. In the United States, in the late nineteenth century, the contours of a national park were already emerging. Yellowstone was the first, and was to become a global model of nature protection and a founding myth of the international conservation movement. No longer was it merely spectacular views and quirky curiosities that merited protection but entire landscapes, including their flora and fauna. This expanded perspective drew added impetus from the
rapidly growing idea of the 1890s that, with the end of the westward-oriented continental push, a chapter in American history was coming to a close. A frontier-less America would be a different America. The national parks addressed the resulting cultural insecurity by offering what seemed to be an opportunity to preserve a piece of American wilderness as the early settlers had encountered it. Protection of original landscapes would in turn preserve the cultural heritage of the already mythical figure of the frontiersman—that embodiment of typically male virtues such as energy, endurance, and resourcefulness—and enable future generations of Americans to share the frontier experience. The nascent conservation movement supported this interpretation, as did the railroads, which sensed a business opportunity in opening up outlying areas for leisure travelers. Together they developed the line of argument, soon to dominate the discourse, that in view of the expected proceeds from tourism, national parks in certain areas offered the best option from an economic standpoint, and the national economy was still attracting money that up to that point American holiday travelers had been spending in Europe. In the twentieth century, this utilitarian argument formed the basis for establishing a national park system that assigned a central role to visitors and their recuperative needs. The experimental character of the first decades eventually gave way to a firm ideological structure that bestowed on the US national parks their unique identity.54

In turn-of-the-century Europe and the European colonies, too, after hundreds of years of expansion, “frontiers” everywhere were disappearing, from the tropical forests to the polar regions, and from the deserts to the mountains.55 In this context, Yellowstone underwent a process of renewed discovery both inside and outside the United States. Beginning with the 1880s, in addition to the hot springs and geysers, the parks increasingly took on a function as refuge for the last American bison and other endangered species.56 In the colonial discourse, Yellowstone now emerged as a plausible model for the establishment of game preserves in Africa. The rapid depletion of African megafauna, especially elephants, had startled European researchers, big-game hunters, and colonial authorities. In London in 1900, the European colonial powers agreed a convention “for the preservation of wild animals, birds, and fish in Africa.” Although the convention itself never came into force, it promoted the designation of wildlife preserves in several African colonies.57

The reception of the American national park was hindered by the negative image of America nurtured by the European elite. America stood primarily for shallow commercialism. However, this image could also work to the benefit of national parks: Contrasting the idealistic goal of the national park with materialistic Yankee capitalism gave creating the European equivalent a cultural urgency. Wilhelm Wetekamp may have been the first to use this strategy when, in 1898, in the Prussian House of Representatives, he portrayed...
North America “whose materialism would otherwise be a dreadful deterrent” as a model to be emulated and called for the establishment of “state parks” in Prussia that would “serve as monuments to the developmental history of nature.”

Wetekamp’s offensive was heeded by the Prussian Ministry of Culture, albeit hesitantly. The follow-up, undertaken by Hugo Conwentz, a biologist and director of the provincial museum in Danzig, did not, however, adhere to the model of the American national parks. Rather, in a memorandum that appeared in 1904, Conwentz focused on so-called natural monuments as witnesses to original nature in all its diversity. In so doing, he made reference to no other than the father of German natural history, Alexander von Humboldt, who had used the term “natural monument” in one of his travelogues. According to Conwentz, who in 1906 was appointed to head Prussia’s newly created Staatliche Stelle für Naturdenkmalpflege, German nature was preserved best in many small, individual elements and not in a few large-scale reservations. The latter he believed to be only suited for sparsely cultivated areas. Therefore, Conwentz firmly rejected American-style national parks for his own country. When, beginning in 1909, the German-Austrian Verein Naturschutzpark strongly argued for the protection of “the typical German landscape” in three large parks that it envisioned situating in the Alps, the highlands, and the northern German plain, the plan found no favor with Conwentz. Nor did it help that the term “national park” was replaced by “nature conservation park” to give the matter a German flavor. Without state support, the society could not meet its own goals and had to be content with establishing a small private park on the Lüneburg heath.

Conwentz fought passionately for his ideas and promoted them beyond Germany, where they met with a rapid and positive response. The natural monument became the key concept of an early European discourse on nature conservation. State and linguistic boundaries proved surprisingly easy to surmount. In Holland, the Vereeniging tot Behoud von Natuurmonumenten was founded in 1904; in Switzerland, the Kommission für die Erhaltung von Naturdenkmälern und prähistorischen Stätten in 1906; and in Italy, the Lega Nazionale per la Protezione dei Monumenti Naturali in 1913. Legal structures were established for the protection of monuments de la nature in France (1906) and naturminnen in Sweden (1909), whereas in Russia, around the same time, conservationists had begun to worry about the survival of their “pamiatniki prirody.” The European natural monument represented a protective strategy comprising many small areas, in contrast to the American national park, which epitomized an approach oriented to protecting large areas. The question of which of the two strategies was more successful in preserving species would be one of the great recurring environmental debates of the twentieth century.

That both strategies could be pursued in combination was shown by Sweden, which in 1909 enacted two laws: one on natural monuments, and a sec-
ond on national parks. The concept of the natural monument was inspired by
Conwentz, whereas the national park was largely adapted from the American
model. The parliamentary legislative committee spoke of the double character
of the national park, which was both a natural wonder to be preserved and
a tourist attraction to be exploited in patriotic fervor. Thus, along with state
responsibility Sweden adopted the paradoxical goal of the American model:
preservation through public use. The more scientifically oriented rationale put
forward by the Royal Academy faded to the background. In 1910, the bound-
daries of nine national parks were fixed. Whereas the five parks located in the
southern part of the country encompassed only a few square kilometers, the
four parks in northern Sweden assumed American dimensions, which dove-
tailed with Norrland’s image as Sweden’s America.63

The concept of the natural monument also came in useful in the United
States, although whether that is due to a random coincidence of time and ter-
minology is unclear, as to date no obvious link has been found to the debate in
Europe. The Antiquities Act, adopted in 1906, authorized the president to set
apart so-called national monuments, which included historic and prehistoric
sights. The president then in office was Theodore Roosevelt, whose connec-
tion to nature conservation was strong. But Roosevelt also used the law to
bypass Congress and create national park-like entities, such as the over 3,300-
square-kilometer Grand Canyon National Monument, in 1908. This and other
national monuments were later transformed into national parks that, with the
creation of additional categories of protection, became the crown jewels in the
system of protected areas and enduring icons of American conservation.64

The Globalization of the National Park

In 1905, the Swiss forester Robert Glutz delivered a paper before the Solothurn
nature history society titled “Natural Monuments: Threats and Preservation.”
Glutz regaled his listeners (and later readers) with a detailed overview of Con-
wentz’s concept of the natural monument and the American national park.
He described Yellowstone as a protective area for the American buffalo, then
segued immediately to the idea of natural monuments. “This national park
in the Rocky Mountains is the greatest effort to protect natural monuments
ever undertaken,” he said, “an idea worthy of the great American Republic,
the land of ‘unlimited opportunity.”’ For Glutz, Yellowstone was no longer the
wonderland of geysers, tumbling waterfalls, and bizarre rock formations, as it
was perceived at its founding three decades earlier. No, it was a “museum of
natural monuments, a botanical and zoological garden, in which all individ-
ual animals and plants threatened with extinction by North America’s rapidly
growing civilization could find a last refuge.” In Glutz’s portrayal, the national
park was the best mechanism for saving nature from the damaging effects of civilization. The park was comprehensive and served ideally to unite the conservation functions of museums and gardens. But Glutz also saw that the use of this mechanism in Europe could be problematic, “because in this expanse we can no longer find any area that is unlicked [sic] by culture.”

Glutz bundled together a transnational discussion of the global loss of natural space and biological species with the civilizing consequences to be drawn from that. Only in this context did the national park triumph outside the United States and other British settler colonies. A Yellowstone National Park charged with additional meaning was now viewed worldwide as a model of nature conservation that Western cosmopolitan elites adopted, discussed, and reproduced locally around the world. Contrary to popular narratives, the global spread of the national park should not be understood as a linear transfer but as a complex game of takeover and appropriation, imposition and rejection, dependence and isolation, fostered by a global conservation movement that grew rapidly after 1900.

As Glutz’s text also exemplifies, the national park did not constitute the only model of conservation. Indeed, the US national park was newly interpreted, selectively adopted, and fused with other approaches. The most important of the competing ideas was the small-scale natural monument that targeted the protection of individual natural elements. In his address of 1914, Walter Bissegger noted that the German Länder and Austria had established state agencies for conservation and “small reservations for circumscribed aims, the conservation of certain animal and plant forms.” The natural monument remained closely associated with Germany and with Conwentz’s name, and was especially recommended for countries or areas that were densely settled and highly developed. For such regions, which owing simply to the then-current definition of civilization were concentrated in Europe, national parks were mostly viewed as inappropriate and impractical.

In contrast, for less populated and exploited landscapes, the large-scale conservation area was a proven means of preserving conditions at a distance from civilization. Against the expected march of “civilization,” geographic boundaries and “nature” enclaves could thus be created. For this type of nature conservation, the United States in the 1900s was the inevitable reference. The strongly associative connection between national park and North America promoted or hindered adoption, depending on whether the similarities or differences to the American landscape and society were emphasized, and whether the term “America” was meant positively or negatively. The national parks of other countries of the “New World” were hardly noticed globally. They were overshadowed by the Yellowstone “original,” whose myth making was now in full swing and largely left out historical contingencies—not surprising since this is precisely the inherent function of creation myths. The legend of the birth of
Yellowstone National Park in 1872 was created in 1900 largely to mute criticism that persists up to today.

In his address, Walter Bissegger also invoked the first national park and associated its founding with the “fear of impending extinction of the bison, … which had captured the attention of the finest Americans.” Nevertheless, this portrayal was historically false, though Bissegger can hardly be expected to have known it. The Zurich politician purely and simply passed on the Yellowstone myth, whose chain of reasoning was sublimely adaptable to a Swiss national park. There might be “just one way to effectively combat the gradual destruction,” asserted Bissegger, citing a pamphlet titled “Die Naturschutzbewegung und der schweizerische Nationalpark (The conservation movement and the Swiss National Park)” published in 1911 by Gustav Hegi, a Swiss botanist at the University of Munich: “Creating larger national parks, in which everything that was originally native is granted permanent asylum.” In 1914, the Swiss Parliament voted to establish such a sanctuary. Thus it happened that, shortly before the outbreak of the First World War, the national park established over the previous years in Grisons found solid federal government support. How this national park came about, and how it quickly rose to be the best-known alternative worldwide to the American park model, will be the subject of the next chapter.

Notes

1. Amtliches Bulletin Nationalrat 24 (1914), 156.
3. Schweizerischer Bundesrat 1914, 19; see also Schweizerischer Bundesrat 1912.
4. Amtliches Bulletin Nationalrat 24 (1914), 156. For biographical information on Bissegger, see Historisches Lexikon der Schweiz.
5. Ibid., 159 f.
6. Braudel 1958. In his work on the history of the Mediterranean world, Braudel (1976) described a third “geohistorical” time axis, the “quasi-motionless time” of natural elements such as seas, islands, and mountains, as well as climate. In the same vein, Reinhard Koserle (2000, especially 27–77) proposed a three-tier time concept based on notions of experience.
9. See, for example, Gugerli 1998; Kaelble 2006.
13. Nash 1970, 731. Runte 1987, 47. Cf. Miles 2009, 9–26. On the founding and the early years of Yellowstone, see also Magoc 1999. The invention of the national park is also often credited to the painter Georg Catlin, who as early as 1832 was calling for a “nation's park, containing man and beast” to protect Native Americans and wild animals. In addition, whether Yosemite (1864) or Yellowstone (1872) should be considered the birth of the national park is a matter of considerable debate. See Runte 1987, 33–47. Absent the insistence on defining the exact origin of the national park idea (as is the case here), this debate and others like it lose much of their relevance.


15. Cited in Runte 1987, 11. See also further remarks therein. However, Runte overstates his case in claiming that European countries lacked only a stimulus like the commercialization of Niagara Falls to develop the national park idea (7). Areas attractive to tourists have always been largely unrestrictedly commercialized, even in Europe.


27. See Krüger 2008.

28. See chapter 2.


31. However, the available literature refers mostly to individual countries. Surveys worth perusal include Walter 1996 (Switzerland), Schmoll 2004 (Germany), Steinberg 2002a (United States), Beinart and Hughes 2007 (British Empire). In contrast, a comprehensive global treatment of the nineteenth century from an environmental history perspective is still lacking. Preliminary attempts can be found in Radkau 2008; Burke and Pomeranz 2009; Uekötter 2010. Compelling syntheses of global history of the nineteenth century are those by Bayly 2004; Osterhammel 2009.

32. Brunhes 1911.

34. On Germany, see, for example, Daum 2002; on Switzerland, Bürgi and Speich 2004.


37. This train of thought had already been well elaborated in the eighteenth century by Johann Gottfried von Herder. Kirchhoff and Trepl 2009a, 39–41.


39. Runte 1987, 84 f. In 1887, and thus five years before the Sierra Club, the Boone and Crockett Club was founded by sportsmen at the urging of future US president Theodore Roosevelt. See Reiger 1986, 114–141.

40. The list can be expanded by including involvement of other countries as well as simultaneously emerging goal-related organizations for heritage protection. Such an inventory would be complicated by the poor state of research on the history of nature conservation in Europe. For a few clues, especially in relation to national parks, see Kupper 2008. Trom 1995 offers a Franco-German comparison. For a landscape and environmental history of Europe, see Delort and Walter 2001; Walter 2004.

41. Kern 1983 is still the best book on this topic.

42. See, for example, Bayly 2004; Conrad 2006.

43. See Geyer and Paulmann 2001; Herren 2000, and on the relationship of nation-states and empires, see also Leonhard and Hirschhausen 2009.

44. Amtliches Bulletin Nationalrat 24 (1914), 184. Paul Sarasin’s concept of world nature conservation, which also dovetails with this theme, will be introduced in chapter 2.

45. Wagner 1995. An atmospherically rich evocation of these years can be found in Blom 2008. See also Hobsbawm 1987, 243–261; Drehsen and Sparr 1996; Haupt and Würffel 2008, and with reference to the history of technology in Switzerland, Humair and Jost 2008.


47. See Bachmann 1999; Rohkrämer 1999; Graf 2000; Hall 2011.


49. Schröter 1924, 387.


51. Schröter 1918, 765.

52. See Haraway 1989, 26–58; Jarvis 2007; Isenberg 2000, 164–192. This was also the impetus behind the international scouting movement.

53. On Germany, see Wöbse 2004; Gissibl 2005; on Great Britain, Gates 1998. In the United States, the spectrum of female activity was somewhat broader; see Merchant 1984. No corresponding research exists for Switzerland.

54. On Yellowstone as an experimental landscape, see Jones 2012. The connection between national parks and tourism will be delved into more deeply in chapter 6.

55. On early modern times, see Richards 2003.


59. Conwentz 1904.

60. The quote comes from Floericke 1910, 13. See Kupper and Wöbse 2013, 10–37. The plans were later expanded to include a fourth park that was to be situated at the seashore. Floer- icke 1913, 15.


62. See Lewis 2007b.

63. See Mels 1999.


65. Glutz-Graff 1905, 18 f.


68. Ibid.

69. Ibid. Hegi 1911. For biographical information on Hegi, see Historisches Lexikon der Schweiz.