




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# Human Sentiment and the Future of Wildlife

DAVID E. COOPER

*Department of Philosophy  
University of Durham  
Durham DH1 3HN, UK*

**ABSTRACT:** Identifying what is wrong with the demise of wildlife requires prior identification of the human sentiment which is offended by that demise. Attempts to understand this in terms of animal rights (individual or species) and the benefits of wildlife to human beings or the wider environment are rejected. A diagnosis of this sentiment is attempted in terms of our increasing admiration, in the conditions of modernity and postmodernity, for the ‘harmony’ or ‘at homeness’ of wild animals with their environments. The diagnosis is defended against certain misunderstandings, and implications are tentatively drawn from it for environmental education and the management of wildlife.

**KEYWORDS:** Animal ethics, animal rights, environmental education, moral sentiment, species, wildlife

## I.

How wildlife is to be managed in the future depends, in large part, on why it is thought important for wildlife to have a future.<sup>1</sup> Someone who thinks in terms of the medical or photographic opportunities which wildlife provides is liable to advocate policies different from those of a person who appeals to ecological balance. People to whom the fates of individual animals matter are unlikely to pursue exactly the same policies as those for whom it is the species that really counts.

The management issue, then, turns on broadly moral considerations which are not the preserve of scientists and experts in the way that the implementation of proper policies may be.

Unfortunately, the blunt moral questions, “Why ought there to be wildlife? Why would it be wrong to allow its demise?” have a certain intractability. To begin with, ‘wildlife’ is a vague term. Does it, for example, apply to the deer herds of Nara or Richmond Park? It is also a huge category, embracing several million species, some 50,000 vertebrates included. It is not obvious that the demise of mussels or termites would be wrong for the same reasons as that of dolphins or leopards. Intractability is due most of all, however, to the immaturity

of our moral thinking on such matters. There have always been individuals, from the Buddha to Bernard Shaw, concerned about our treatment of wild animals, but it is only with the recent massively visible threat to wildlife that serious efforts have been made to construct a 'wildlife ethic' as an extension to that seasoned moral thinking whose compass, hitherto, has been human beings alone.

Our 'human ethic', seasoned as it is, still allows of course for large disagreements: nevertheless, there is some consensus as to why we feel it important to have principles for the decent treatment of our fellows. It is because we are, in David Hume's words, creatures with a 'limited sympathy' for one another. We need, therefore, orderly outlets for this sympathy, and ways of reducing the antagonisms to which the limitations on that sympathy give rise. It is far from clear what the analogous basis for a 'wildlife ethic' might be. After all, in our century, at least, antagonisms between humans and animals are settled, rather easily, in favour of the former. Power, not principle, is sufficient to resolve such conflicts.

It is, though, with the more tractable question of why many of us *feel* it is important that wildlife should be 'morally considerable' – of why we would regard it as something dreadful if certain species were denied a future – that I engage. Our question, that is, is one about a human *sentiment* concerning these species. Unless that sentiment is diagnosed, little progress can be made towards answering the direct question of why it is 'really' wrong to aid and abet the extinction of wildlife – just as, I would suggest, progress in devising a 'human ethic' requires clear appreciation of that 'limited sympathy' on which standards of reciprocal behaviour are founded. (I refer, you will have noted, to a sentiment concerning *certain* species. This is because few people could claim, hand on heart, to view the prospect of a cockroach-less world with the same gloom as they do that of a world without, say, elephants and dolphins. This is not to suggest that cockroaches don't matter at all; only that any understanding of why they might must refer back to a sentiment which does not normally include them in its scope. Analogously: the terms of a decent 'human ethic' extend to repulsive people for whom few of us could feel any natural sympathy).

My strategy is this: first, I argue that the most familiar reasons given for concerning ourselves with wildlife fail to do justice to the sentiment which inspires such concern, and fail therefore to provide effective platforms from which to speak on behalf of wildlife. Second, I try to diagnose the nature of this sentiment; and, finally, I consider the management and educational policies that an ethic which went with the grain of that sentiment might favour.

## II.

Four kinds of reasons dominate the literature on concern for the future of wildlife. The first appeals to the rights of individual animals. Hunting rhinos

violates the rights of actual rhinos and those of the rhinos which would have existed if their ancestors had not been exterminated. The second also appeals to rights, but this time to the rights of *species* to exist and flourish. A species, some say, is a 'vital lifestream' which, in a good world, is allowed to flow.<sup>2</sup> Besides these 'zoocentric' reasons, there are those which directly appeal not to the interests of animals, but to ones much narrower or much broader. The first of these argues for wildlife concern on the basis of its benefits for just one species, man. The other rests this concern on the benefits for whole environments, or ecosystems, or for 'Gaia' perhaps.

There are, of course, other arguments heard – those, for instance, which speak of duties to God's own creatures: but the four mentioned are the most familiar. It is worth saying a little about their interrelations, but it needs stressing straightaway that each of them comes in various shapes. Animal rightists can disagree as to exactly what rights individuals or species possess (to existence? to freedom? to a natural environment?), and as to the grounds, if any, for overriding these rights (hunger? self-defence? *Lebensraum*?). Arguments from human interests may cite anything from unusual meat products to aesthetic delight in the grace and form of some animals. And those whose concern is more global offer various criteria for the well-being of the environment to which wildlife contributes: ecological balance, maximum diversity, and the like.

Considered as final courts of appeal, the four kinds of reasons are incompatible, for even if they converge on a policy, the grounds for the policy are quite different. Whether or not they do converge depends on the particular versions proposed and on assessments of the empirical facts. All four *might* agree in condemning fox-hunting, for example: it causes individual suffering; it threatens the survival of the foxes; it encourages brutal attitudes, dangerous to other people, among its aficionados; and it disturbs nature's balance. Equally all four *might* agree to support, or condone, fox-hunting: it's better than leaving foxes to the mercies of the terrier-men; it encourages the fox population, since farmers profit by sparing the animals for the Hunt; it's very enjoyable and a welcome gesture of defiance against a society dangerously bent on destroying our traditions; and, by inducing farmers to grow hedges and woods, it encourages a variety of wildlife in the vicinity of the Hunt. By perming the various considerations mentioned, it is easy to produce conflicting verdicts on fox-hunting among spokesmen for the four positions.

On more general principles of wildlife management, the four kinds of reasons will *tend* to support different approaches. Other things being equal, advocates of individual animals' rights will be less sympathetic to management within zoos and 'safari parks' than those for whom the imperative is species conservation. *Prima facie*, those whose final concern is with human beings only will be less enthusiastic for recovering virgin wildernesses than those who speak the language of 'planetary health'. But I use terms like 'tend', 'other things being equal', and '*prima facie*', since the four positions are each too amorphous, and

the empirical facts too uncertain, for confident implications for practice to be drawn.<sup>3</sup>

Anyway, my immediate business is to suggest that none of the positions, in any of their versions, explains the judgement that there is tragedy – and a moral debacle<sup>4</sup> – in the continuing erosion of wildlife. None of them properly reflects the sentiment which underlies that judgement. I shall take them in turn, confining myself to one critical point against each.

(1) People sympathetic to the vocabulary of individual animal rights will, of course, deplore the violation of these rights which the manner of wildlife decimation often involves – for example, the capture of baby chimps and the accompanying murder of their mothers.<sup>5</sup> But since what offends the sentiment I am after is also the idea of a future stripped of wildlife, it cannot be solely the harm inflicted on actual animals which constitutes the offence. It is, so to speak, the failure of animals to exist in that future which disturbs. Now it is notoriously hard to explain what is wrong with such a future in terms of violating individual rights, for appeal would have to be made to the notion, perhaps an unintelligible one, of the rights of creatures which *might* have existed, but actually will not. Even if sense can be made of a merely ‘possible animal’s’ right to exist, the notion is surely too subtle to explain the familiar feeling that a world without wildlife would be a dreadful one. Or put it like this: the effect of understanding what would be dreadful about it in terms of violation of rights is to regard it as an offence against *justice*. But it is surely not our sense of justice which is primarily outraged at the prospect of the demise of wildlife. The complaint against such a future is not that it would be an *unfair* one.

(2) Perhaps an analogous point could be made against the second position, but it is a different objection I will raise. Any diagnosis of our sentiment towards wildlife must take on board that most people would *not* equally regret the passing of the last tiger and the death of a member of a more numerous species.<sup>6</sup> Charles Addams’ cartoon of two unicorns ruefully gazing at the disappearing ark would not work with two hyenas instead. So concern for a species is not equivalent to one for members *qua* individuals. It is not easy to grasp the exact nature of this concern, but one thing is clear: despite today’s ubiquitous conservation speak, few people are happy with keeping species permanently ‘on ice’, in zoos or safari parks. Even those *parvenus* masters of conservation speak, zoo directors, must hold out to their public the prospect of one day returning their endangered charges to the wild. What matters to people, then, is the survival of a species *in situ*, in something like its natural state, not that of some confined, zoo-friendly *ersatz* species. But there is nothing in the bare idea of a species’ right to exist which can explain this aspect of conservationism: which means that it cannot, as it stands, capture the sentiment we are enquiring after. In practice, the imperative of species conservation tends to collapse into one or another version of the fourth position: species *in situ* are integral to ecological balance, perhaps, or promote the ideal of ‘maximum diversity in unity’.

(3) Simple, honest introspection confirms, for many of us, that our regret at the disappearance of wildlife is not a mere function of concern for human well-being alone. Indeed, spokesmen for wildlife often testify to feeling sullied and compromised by the pressure, in our utilitarian climate, to focus on human benefits. If concern for the future of wildlife were really concern for our own, we would be much more depressed by a threat to such useful creatures as mussels and spiders than by one to creatures as dispensable for our comforts as dolphins and elephants. Someone will say, 'What about the aesthetic value to us of dolphins?' But the aesthetic delight I have got from dolphins has been through watching films: so, if aesthetic pleasure is all that matters, then why, since there are plenty of these films in stock, should I worry if there are any more dolphins in the sea? After all, I do not worry overmuch that Fred Astaire is no longer with us, since what matters about him to me are his movies which, happily, I can still watch. Someone might, I suppose, say, "Look, the sheer knowledge that there are dolphins in the sea gives you pleasure: that's why it's important to you that they be protected." But this is a bizarre inversion of the truth. It is because it is important to me that there are dolphins that knowing they are there gives me pleasure.

(4) The rhetoric of species conservation tends, these days, to merge smoothly with an environmentalist rhetoric. But the relationship between 'animal ethics' and 'environmental ethics' is a murky one. It is easy, certainly, to exaggerate their separation: after all, animals do or should *have* environments – portions of the world which are significant to them, and in which they can pursue meaningful activities.<sup>7</sup> (So I am puzzled when I hear of a forthcoming book on agriculture and environmental ethics which is not going to discuss at all the plight of battery hens or dry-stall sows.) On the other hand, unless one builds into the very definition of the 'health' of the environment that this environment should abound with, say, tigers and dolphins, it will be at best a contentious claim that their continued existence is ecologically essential. If it turns out not to be, then, with the 'health' of the whole as the sole consideration, we ought not to feel *any* regret at the passing of these creatures. Put differently: if the sentiment towards such animals were purely a function of a sentiment towards Nature-as-a-whole, it would not be in the least offended by their demise. But, of course, it *would*. (Advocates of an exclusively 'holistic' ethic, like Aldo Leopold, tend to be very tough indeed on the fate of creatures deemed unhelpful towards general ecological welfare – to the point, indeed, that a critic like Tom Regan refers to their 'eco-fascism'.<sup>8</sup>) To be sure, one might include among the criteria for environmental 'health' that the creatures we tend to care about most should flourish. But, in that case, environmental concern no longer explains, but is partly explained by, the sentiment towards wildlife manifested in that care. So either way – whether the survival of various species is or is not built into the notion of environmental 'health' – our sentiment towards wildlife cannot be construed as a function of a global attitude towards Nature, the ecosphere, or whatever.

## III.

None of the most familiar reasons given in defence of wildlife succeed, then, in tapping the sentiment which inspires that defence. Before I work towards characterizing this sentiment, I need to correct an impression that talk of a human sentiment may have encouraged: namely, that it is a permanent, perhaps innate, feature of our psychology. We are dealing, in fact, with something that is rather recent. We care about the fate of wildlife in a way that our ancestors generally did not.

Here is one attempt to account for, and identify, the sentiment which has grown up. It might be called, after the title of McKibben's popular book, 'the end of nature' hypothesis.<sup>9</sup> The world is increasingly becoming *our* world, a giant artefact. One-tenth of its land surface – and much more of its habitable surface – is cultivated or urbanized, and a good deal of the remainder bears a human footprint. Even the atmosphere bears the mark, notoriously, of our motor-cars and refrigerators. We will soon witness 'the end of nature', writes McKibben, where 'nature' is understood as what is 'wholly other', the counterpoint to human culture. And this, he holds, is something terrible, for human beings need the presence of this 'other' from themselves and their products. Our burgeoning sentiment towards wildlife and the environment is the expression of this need. One may, no doubt, speculate variously on the source of this need. Maybe people need to experience a wonder or astonishment which their very own products, however impressive, cannot supply. Or perhaps it is vital to them – and here the history of religion might be invoked – to feel dependent on, answerable to, something beyond the domain of their own activities and artefacts. Whatever the explanation, it is this need for the 'other' which underlies the concern for the wild.

But there, in those last two words, is the problem, for our purposes, with this account: it may explain a general concern for the wild, the whole natural environment, but not the more particular sentiment towards animal wildlife. That particular concern cannot, we saw, be subsumed under the general heading of environmental concern. Still, by calling attention to the galloping artificiality of the world and the unease which this occasions, 'the end of nature' approach starts in the right place. But we need to identify the dimensions of this artificiality which prompt our sentiment towards animal wildlife in particular.

Earlier in the century, people who predicted that technology would breed an alienated, rootless individual painted a nightmare scenario – Fritz Lang's *Metropolis*, Chaplin's *Modern Times* – of faceless clones chained to the production line. What has in fact materialized, however, is something gentler, but something to which people have yet to accommodate and something which is equally productive of rootlessness. I mean the erosion of the places which human beings once had in their environments.

Note the plural, for I am speaking not of *the* environment in which *everything*

is located, but of the milieus in which people are (or were) 'at home'. An environment, in this sense, is not defined in geometric terms, as the area of X square yards or miles which surrounds a person. Rather, it is a field of significance for someone: the domain in which he moves confidently and with unreflective ease, in which he 'knows his way about', and in which things and creatures have their place and meaning for him. Depending on the person's way of life, this field may coincide with a smaller or larger geographical space – from the smallholding of the traditional peasant to the oceans and ports of the 'China hand'.

It is possession of an environment which is eroded in modernity. The processes are familiar enough. Mobility, for instance: a person is born in one place, at school in a second, at college in a third, at workplaces in a fourth, fifth, and sixth, and retires in a seventh. And even if people stay put, the traditional ties – a craft, say, or a chapel – which bound them together into a community have either disappeared or lost the strength to provide a sense of what matters and of how to behave. As the old is replaced by the new, moreover, the differences between environments are levelled out – everywhere the same supermarkets, restaurant chains, TV channels and housing estates. A person can now go far away and not be lost: he is half 'at home' everywhere, but at the expense of no longer being fully 'at home' anywhere.

Technological modernity also transforms people's cognitive relation to their environments. The more technologized are the surroundings, the less relevant are the practical know-how, traditional skills, wisdom even, that people learned as apprentices from their elders. On the contrary, the knowledge that there is now a premium on acquiring may be a closed book to one's elders: the knowledge gleaned from manuals or courses at a College; the kind stored up and on tap in computers; the kind needed to operate the gadgets that have rendered obsolete an older knowledge that was 'in the hands'. Then there is the impact of an education suited to a changing, mobile world: one which encourages a reflective, critical, even ironic distance from whatever environments have been inherited – environments which are no longer to be fitted into, or taken as given, but to audit, assess, improve, up-date, flit in and out of. This distance is then widened by a media industry which permanently displays to us a veritable *smorgasbord* of interests, life-styles, values and tastes among which to pick, choose, and make up one's individual cocktail. A person has then become 'postmodern' man or woman: eclectic, pluralist, a citizen of the global village: a person, ultimately, who no longer inhabits an environment or world, but only *the* environment, *the* world.

Modernity and postmodernity are not, of course, without their admirers, and it is not my aim to debate the benefits which they may have conferred. But it is important to recognize how the developments sketched above confront a very ancient ideal, one which, for instance, received beautiful expression in the classic text of Daoism. This is the ideal of a smooth, natural, unreflecting immersion in



a way of life where things, creatures, and places have their ready and familiar significance – a life in an environment where one is fully ‘at home’.

There are many symptoms of the contemporary persistence of this ideal. For example, nostalgia for crafts, or admiration for the seemingly naive and innocent forms of life led by the few ‘primitive’ peoples that still survive. And here, too, I believe, is where to locate our current sentiment towards wildlife.

#### IV.

Two words which often figure in expressions of the sentiment towards wildlife are ‘admiration’ and ‘harmony’. We are to admire wild animals, and especially for their seeming harmony with their surroundings. I am proposing, if you wish, a diagnosis or perspicuous description of this admiration: for what we admire (envy, perhaps) is, in my terminology, the wild animal’s complete possession of its environment. Its harmony with its surroundings is no mere adaption to them – through camouflage, say, or ingenious thermostatic mechanisms. It consists, rather, in that unreflective ease of movement and activity, that practical knowledge ‘in the hands’ (or paws and claws) which, in a different modulation, is also what we admire in the traditional craftsman. As a living symbol of possession of an environment, the animal represents the antithesis of the technological artificiality of our present condition. More often than not, it belongs in a small and simple community where each creature has a natural place and role; absorbed in its environment, it is incapable of that ironic distance which *we* are increasingly incapable of closing; it fits itself into the rhythms of its life and the seasons, instead of endeavouring as we do to level them out; and its world is one, unlike our own, where things and other creatures have a consolingly stable significance and value.

Like any exercise in the phenomenology of an attitude, a suggestion like mine is hard to validate, and critics will charge that the diagnosis I offer may only describe my own, idiosyncratic sentiment. The final test, perhaps, is simply for you to try applying it to your own sentiments. But my suggestion has, I think some explanatory power: it lets otherwise puzzling phenomena fall into place. It can account, first, for the comparative recency, on a large scale, of the sentiment towards wildlife. Until recently, after all, people did not need *symbols* of a certain relation to an environment: they stood in it themselves. It can explain, too, the peculiar and proper hostility that people sharing the sentiment have towards the ‘humanization’ of wild animals – as performing seals, dancing elephants, tea-swilling chimps in bowler hats, and so on. Such stunts deny the animals’ dignity, people say: and so they do – and this, I suggest, is because such animals are dispossessed of their environments and are enlisted into just those artificial practices which, in the wild, they symbolize the absence of and which, in human manifestations, is a source of unease at our contemporary condition

Finally, my suggestion can explain why some animals are more apt than others to evoke our sentiment. It is because some – dolphins, say, or tigers – are so *obviously* creatures that possess an environment, so *visibly* ‘at home’ with the surroundings through which they move with absolute ease. All animals, of course, must be pretty well integrated with their surroundings to survive at all; but, as symbols of this integration, some animals are better than others.

Let me avert a couple of possible misunderstandings. Although I emphasize the symbolic potency of animals in the wild, I do not at all count myself among those who condemn all keeping and training of animals by human beings. Today’s dogs and horses are heirs of long traditions of domestication and life among humans, and in the better of those traditions, these animals, too, can possess environments. I agree with Stephen Clark that:

We humans can learn to see and live in beauty only if we acknowledge the real presence with us in the world and in our homes and workplace of creatures that are contributing members of our community.<sup>10</sup>

Second, my suggestion may seem to fall into the class of human-centred justifications for the protection of wildlife discussed earlier. But it is not at all analogous to the argument that we should preserve wildlife because, say, it affords us aesthetic pleasure. Animals indeed afford us symbols, reminders, of something worthwhile – of a life congruent with the ancient ideal of integration with an environment. But we should protect them not *because* they serve as these welcome symbols, but because the lives they symbolize – *lead*, indeed – are to be admired. We protect them not in order to cater for a certain sentiment; rather that sentiment, properly diagnosed, intimates why they are worth protecting.

## V.

I have written at a level too general to yield specific proposals on educational and management policy: but in both areas, my discussion indicates broad directions.

There is a large consensus among environmental educators that concern for wildlife should be encouraged among young people, but the favoured strategies tend towards two extremes. First, an emphasis on the potential utility (medical etc.) to humans of flora and fauna and, second, concentration on the contribution of wildlife to ecological stability.

The former is illustrated by remarks like these:

... by stressing the legitimate right of animals to live and survive free of fear and suffering, and thereby understating the value of such creatures to humans, animal rights advocates sometimes fail to raise some of the most compelling arguments in favour of wildlife preservation, ignoring points that may appeal to many otherwise unconcerned people.<sup>11</sup>

This betrays a certain arrogance, for it is assumed that while ‘we’ committed *aficionados* discern the true value of wildlife, ‘they’ can only be impressed by appealing to their crassly pragmatic interests. Apart from the fact, already remarked upon, that many such appeals sound implausible, there now exists, if I am right, a widespread sentiment towards wildlife for education to both tap and help articulate. Teachers should not, therefore, be shy to encourage the young to recognize the value of wild animals, not in their practical ‘pay-off’, but as representing that beauty of an integration with a world which human beings have increasingly forfeited. And outside of the school, ‘we’ should not be cajoled by hard-nosed media interviewers into supposing that ‘they’ can only understand the language of utility.

The second strategy – manifest, for example, in National Curriculum documents on environmental education<sup>12</sup> – is indicative of the excessive prestige enjoyed by a ‘scientific’ approach in educational circles. No one denies the importance of studying wildlife as parts of ecosystems, but this should not exclude considering other perspectives – pre-eminently, the animals’ own. Teachers should facilitate understanding of animal behaviour in terms of how things are *for* the animals, of their goals, of what matters to them. For such understanding, we turn not to the scientist in his laboratory but to people who know animals in the manner of the forest-dweller, the observant hiker, or even the suburban family which attends to the wild visitors in its own back garden.

While the kind of education my discussion implies does not focus on utility and ecology, it is of course far from ignoring the value animals have for humans and the relations they stand in to environment. Indeed, it is precisely the animals’ relation to *their* environments which is the source of the value we discern in their lives, since it recalls for us a dimension of an ideal human life.

Finally, a few remarks on wildlife management. Here, too, the favoured strategies tend towards two extremes. There is, first, the idea of ‘the global zoo’: wildlife, if it is to survive at all, must do so within the precincts of zoos, parks, or ‘worlds of adventure’. At the other extreme, we find the demand to preserve or re-create primal wildernesses, areas where animals may live with only minimal ‘contamination’ by man, be he farmer, hunter, or tourist. The objection to the first strategy is obvious: the lives of wild animals matter to us precisely because they are wild and natural. The tiger in a cage – even one big enough for a land-rover to drive through – cannot be the symbol of a natural integration with an environment that its uncaged brother is.

Two remarks on the other extreme strategy are called for. First: given the pressures of poverty, population growth and tourism, it is utopian or frivolous even to insist that vast tracts of land in Africa or India – or England, for that matter – be set aside for the exclusive habitats of animals, out of bounds to all but a few privileged human visitors. The only complete wildernesses we are, realistically, likely to create are those where nothing lives – neither man nor beast: like those lunar landscapes left by giant herds of cattle which briefly grazed where tropical

forests once grew. The most we can hope to achieve are *relative* wildernesses where human beings and animals coexist: perhaps in forest regions more gently and sustainably exploited than presently occurs in Sarawak or Brazil. No one, of course, pretends that the trick of promoting areas where humans and wildlife may exist in 'symbiosis' is easy to perform. And some of the suggestions for how it might be done sound depressing: like a former Director of London Zoo's scenario of African villagers profiting from 'safari' hunts and the selling of animal souvenirs to the tourist hordes that pile through their lands.<sup>13</sup> But the trick must be brought off if wildlife is to be neither extinguished nor corralled inside a global zoo.

The second remark is that the creation of wildernesses, even if it were more practicable, is not obviously an ideal. For if wildlife is to evoke the sentiment I described, it must be visible: some people must experience how wild animals live if they – and we, however vicariously – are to appreciate the lives of these creatures. Thus – to take some small-scale but telling illustrations – one should welcome, and not dismiss or only grudgingly concede such efforts as: *Into the Blue*'s support for areas where people may 'swim with dolphins' that themselves choose to 'swim with humans'; the *Fox Project*'s encouragement of a controlled presence of foxes adjacent to our everyday lives; or the Ranthambore Society's revival of traditional Indian crafts and agriculture that do not intrude, beyond necessity, on the wildlife in the surrounding landscape. These are undramatic illustrations of human beings incorporating into their lives an experience of animals that adds to those lives. They do not illustrate something 'second best', an unfortunate but necessary accommodation with a harsh, modern reality: rather, they recall a relationship to animals that was once a natural feature of human existence. Indeed, it is only with the erosion of that kind of relation, and the experience of this as a loss, that the future of wildlife can be appreciated by us as an 'issue' or 'problem' at all.

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> Some people dislike reference to wildlife *management*, and understandably so, since it smacks of the 'dominion' attitude to animals. But the phrase is now common currency and here to stay. Let me make clear that, as I use the phrase, 'management' could as well apply to a 'hands off' policy of letting animals get on with it in wildernesses or oceans as to one of corralling them in 'safari parks' or 'sea-worlds'.

<sup>2</sup> See, for example, Rolston 1986, esp. ch. 10.

<sup>3</sup> According to an article in the *New Scientist* (Macklin 1990) the Director of London Zoo "believes that the public is being misled by a barrage of animal welfare appeals disguised as conservation campaigns", whereas the Director of *Zoocheck* "does not distinguish between animal welfare and conservation".

<sup>4</sup> Milan Kundera writes (1984, p. 289): "Mankind's true moral test... consists of its attitude towards those who are at its mercy: animals. And in this respect mankind has suffered a

fundamental debacle.”

<sup>5</sup> Those, like Peter Singer, who do not like this particular vocabulary, can of course equally deplore these evils, but in different terms.

<sup>6</sup> Those, like Tom Regan, who dismiss all but the individual animal’s rights, are therefore insensitive to most people’s feelings about species. See Regan 1984, Ch.9, Section 3.

<sup>7</sup> See Cooper 1992.

<sup>8</sup> Regan 1984, pp. 361-2.

<sup>9</sup> McKibben 1990.

<sup>10</sup> Clark 1987, p.176.

<sup>11</sup> Regenstein 1985, pp. 131-2.

<sup>12</sup> See, for example, The National Curriculum Council, *Curriculum Guidance No. 7*, “Environmental Education” 1990 .

<sup>13</sup> “The Society and Conservation in Africa”, Memorandum, 9/1/91

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