The Historicity of Institutional Trust and the Alienation of Maori Land for Catchment Control at Mangatu, New Zealand

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ABSTRACT

Environmental problems require collective responses, but resource managers conventionally lack the managerial legitimacy to inspire collective action. Recent perspectives in planning theory have entreated for collaboration with the institutions of civic society as a basis for inspiring legitimacy in environmental management. This article maintains that there is considerable merit in these institutional perspectives, but the historical impediments to institutional engagement and trust require detailed analysis if those perspectives are to be successful. There is an inherent historicity to all relationships of trust, and this may be acute in the case of collaboration with indigenous peoples who have experienced colonial dislocation. In New Zealand, the rapidity of land loss, the lack of historical opportunities for engagement in resource management, and past attempts to assimilate institutions and values may influence the present stance of Maori, who are the indigenous population, on environmental management. An historical assessment of a state afforestation project at Mangatu on the east coast of New Zealand demonstrates that Maori have seldom been trusted as environmental guardians. Their preferred forms of environmental governance have been subject to cultural disdain, yielding a legacy of institutional mistrust which will not easily be alleviated.

KEYWORDS

Catchment control, environmental management, afforestation, Maori land, institutionalism, trust
The object of environmental policy has shifted towards the institutions of civic society. These formal and informal networks of association are repositories of social capital which is a source of collective and concerted action. It is also recognised that public networks often benefit from greater institutional legitimacy than planning elites, and that institutional trust is a prerequisite for citizen buy-in to the goals of resource management. Supporters of a new institutionalism within planning therefore commend a transformation in management strategies to nurture institutional trust, develop hybridity in state–public networks, and encourage civic action through engagement with community organisations. These strategies represent a mature response to the technocracy in traditional approaches to planning, but the literature has not yet confronted the historical bases of the new institutionalism.

This article considers the impact of colonisation on indigenous peoples’ institutions and modes of governance, and concludes that colonial history is likely to be corrosive of institutional trust. In particular, it evaluates the discourses which inspired state acquisition of Maori land for conservation forestry. Vocal pressure groups who lived downstream of Mangatu represented Maori in ways that influenced the decision-making for upland afforestation. These depictions portrayed Maori as having neither capacity nor legitimacy as farmers and, hence, as unworthy landowners. This alleged lack of aptitude for farming was subsequently transfigured as a presumed deficit in silvicultural competence. The Mangatu owners were coerced into selling their land even though they accepted the need for conservation forestry and were willing to afforest independently their land in the headwaters of the catchment. Historical mistrust and paternalism towards Maori environmental governance explains the current lack of goodwill between environmental managers and local Maori.

HISTORIES OF INSTITUTIONAL (DIS)TRUST

Trust. The agencies responsible for resource management require the good faith and support of those with whom they have to consult or cooperate. Good faith is built on trust, and trust requires mutual respect. Participants need to feel wanted, and the implementing agency can only function effectively with their goodwill.1

The new institutionalism

There has been ongoing disagreement about the necessary balance between representative and participatory democracy in environmental management. In recent years, a new institutionalism has emerged as a counter to the partisan prescriptions in that debate, and it offers a promising alternative for reducing the social distance between expert and citizen knowledge, and for harmonising state
and civic action. A conceptual convergence has been evident within a burgeon-
ing literature on deliberative and inclusionary processes, strategies for enrich-
ment of social eco-capital and local capacity, and a reinvigorated and socially
reflexive co-management. The potential role of civic institutions in the mitigat-
on of resource conflicts and in the implementation of environmental impera-
tives has been at the forefront of this convergence. Increasingly, institutional
fixes are proposed for the value–action gap in environmental policy and for the
need to inspire collective responses to environmental disorder.

At the core of these new approaches is the concept of institutional trust. With
recognition that managerial legitimacy and regulatory compliance are functions
of citizen buy-in, a principal concern has been to identify the social foundations
for public support of environmental managers. This concern reflects heightened
awareness of the potential for local resentment of imposed regulations to disrupt
the implementation of management decisions. In contrast to planning’s techno-
ocratic traditions, it is now argued that partnership with non-state institutions
promotes social capital, networks of responsiveness and the social bases for
ecological resilience. To the extent that collaborative learning of environmental
problems and collaborative determination of appropriate responses yields politi-
cally defendable and self-enforcing remedies, this contention is convincing.
Existing impediments to institutional trust have received scant recognition in
this literature, however, and its proponents have remained ahistorical in their
approach.

The cultivation of institutional trust through strategies to enhance its compo-
nents – civicness, citizenship and social capital – is not a perfunctory exercise.

In an article which best represents the new institutionalism, Selman contends
that:

Social capital may be understood as a glue which holds communities together
through mutual interdependence. Its bonds are the organizations, structures and
social relations built up by communities and individuals independently of
government and corporations; its solvents are lack of civic commitment, lack of
shared memories (historicity) or future hopes (futuricity), and the rise of individu-
alism.

Selman provides a measured analysis of strategies that neutralise the solvents
and accentuate the bonds – collaborative learning, decentralisation of govern-
ance, social networking, and inclusionary discourse. These strategies have been
advanced beyond theory to praxis through investigation of innovations in social
networking as a catalyst for institutional legitimacy. For example, land and
environmental care groups have been promulgated as trusted communicators of
ecological requirements and as conduits for meaningful liaison amongst plan-
ners, scientists and the public. Nonetheless, Selman’s definition and its
implications for the broader concept of institutional trust are challenging. If lack
of shared memories is corrosive of social capital, then recollection of institu-
tional disdain towards the competence of non-state agents is likely to be even more destructive. If the independence of lay organisations is a determinant of citizen trust, then historical attempts to subjugate those organisations will be a barrier to civic engagement in the present. Put simply, institutional trust is bi-directional: formal institutions of environmental management must bestow such trust to receive it from their citizenry. Management styles which allow scope for planners to exhibit trust in the institutions of civic society may incrementally enhance planners’ legitimacy, but they may also be thwarted by the historicity of institutional (dis)trust.

This article posits an historical basis to all relationships of trust. The general principle may, however, be acute in the case of indigenous peoples who have endured colonisation. The latter displaces traditional environmental regulation, often resulting in a legacy of mistrust which obstructs the implementation of environmental policies. Moreover, when this historicity of trust is fully articulated, it becomes evident that the historical impediments to indigenous peoples’ trust in management are both multifaceted and indivisible. Lack of historical opportunities for collaboration in resource management will affect indigenous peoples’ relationships with the institutions of planning, but so too will such processes as land alienation and cultural assimilation. In such hallmark examples as the afforestation at Mangatu, several vectors of colonial transformation collide in one place, highlighting the contextual complexity which confronts the new institutionalism.

Colonial history and environmental governance

The present relationship between resource managers and Maori must therefore be placed in its historical context. In 1840, representatives of the Queen of England and chiefs from most tribes signed the Treaty of Waitangi which protected Maori rights both within, and to manage, the environment. Yet, non- correspondence between the English and Maori versions of this Treaty weaken its protective mechanisms. Article II confirmed Maori ownership of their lands, forests, fisheries and other natural assets for as long as it was their desire to retain those resources. The Maori version guaranteed to the signatories their *tino rangatiratanga* – the essence of their chieftainship – over natural resources and habitats for their harvest. Notionally, therefore, the Treaty safeguards the form, status and authority of Maori environmental governance, as well as Maori ownership and access to resources. Paradoxically, the English version of Article I transferred sovereignty to the Queen of England, even though the Maori version only forfeited *kawanatanga* or limited government. These discords between Maori *rangatiratanga* (Article II) and Crown *kawanatanga* (Article I) yield an inherent tension in the balancing of key articles and in the implementation of Treaty rights. This tension has been central to environmental grievances which have been brought before the Waitangi Tribunal, which was established in 1975.
to interpret the Treaty, hear Maori objections and submit recommendations for reparation.14

The earliest expressions of Crown sovereignty included executive and legislative attempts to divest Maori of their land. Protection mechanisms that were compatible with Article II guarantees to preserve Maori land ownership were abandoned within four years of the signing of the Treaty. In the early 1860s, the Native Land Court was “established with the stated objective of ‘encourag[ing] the extinction of [native] proprietary customs’.”15 The Court’s purpose was to ascertain Maori title, before transforming it into a derivative of English tenure, thereby facilitating its private sale.16 There followed mutually reinforcing revolutions in tenure and ownership, which reduced the share of Maori-owned land in the North Island from 95 percent in 1844, to 26 in 1900 and 6 percent today.17 This decline in Maori land ownership was concomitant with conflicts over sovereignty, which collectively led to war during the 1860s, with subsequent processes of confiscation and repression thereafter resulting in the presently disparate social position of Maori. It is unrealistic to assume that current management of resources can be divorced from these colonial legacies, and it is no surprise that Maori actively contest resource management in the present.

These aspects of New Zealand history are widely known, but associated attitudes to Maori governance, cultural organisation and preferred forms of management have received less attention. Whether through such euphemisms for assimilation as the ‘amalgamation’ of the 1800s or the ‘integration’ of the 1950s and 1960s, and even within the ‘biculturalism’ of the period since the mid-1980s, Maori approaches to social provision and organisation have been demonised. Maori pacifist communities, which were grounded in collective traditions of land use and resources, were forcibly disbanded because of their departure from the individualistic norms of the colonial economy.18 Indigenous knowledge and educational systems and the Maori language itself were alienated within a predominately monocultural education system.19 The Tohunga Suppression Act (1907) and the indicatively titled Quackery Prevention Act (1908) criminalised Maori herbalism and other methods and agents of traditional healthcare.20 Tohunga are Maori experts in their particular field, but they were disqualified as illegitimate shaman. In pre-European times, they were responsible for such ecological functions as assessing the condition of resource stocks and declaring them open for harvest. This and other cases highlight the relationship between prejudice towards cultural institutions and monocultural impediments to traditional resource management.

The failure to implement tino rangatiratanga and to accept institutional pluralism is best exemplified in Crown encroachments upon Maori administration of their land.21 During the twentieth century, two conflicting trends were manifest within policies for Maori resource regulation. First, there have been attempts to develop a hybrid tenure which respects customary administration and collective ownership, while simultaneously conforming to English title.
This is most apparent in the development of land trusts and incorporations, wherein large areas of Maori land were consolidated under sub-tribal management committees. Second, legislative interventions have reduced the independence of these committees, requiring owners to seek Maori Land Court approval for minor alterations to resource use. This paternalism emerged as an attempt to slow the demise of customary land, but now represents distrust in the competence of Maori institutions to manage their resources and suspicion about the ‘unruly communism’ of collective ownership. The Crown’s sanctioning of incorporations may be seen as a concession to Maori traditions, but a Eurocentric determination that ‘Everybody’s land is nobody’s land’ has prevailed, and Maori institutions have scarcely been tolerated.

Representatives of Maori land incorporations often participate in consultative processes for resource management. The paternalism that influences Maori land management is correspondingly transposed to Maori engagement in planning. Environmental grievances that have been presented to the Waitangi Tribunal focus on hegemonic disregard for preferred environments and species, and on the Crown’s strident interpretation of its presumed sovereignty to construct environmental policy in the public good. Maori have contested vigorously this assertion, arguing that it represents a poorly contextualised reading of Article I of the English version of the Treaty. Such interpretations have left no space for Maori autonomy in the regulation of their own resources and, until recently, there have been few provisions for Maori participation in public decision-making. In particular, traditional forms of planning have been disregarded or actively suppressed, and customary resource law has not been recognised in New Zealand to the same extent as in such comparable countries as Australia and Canada. New Zealand history is devoid of evidence of institutional trust in Maori or their chosen means of governance.

Paralleling the paternalistic attitude to Maori competencies in land administration, environmentalists have steadfastly contested Maori conservation credentials. This contestation has been cited as a principal reason for the stalled progress of co-management in New Zealand, and for obstruction of cultural harvesting rights. Furthermore, when colonial land transformation had reduced significantly the extent of indigenous habitat on non-Maori land, such Eurocentric ideals as ‘preservationism’ targeted the relative scarcity value in forests and resources on Maori land, reducing them to unrealisable assets. In outcome, Maori have effectively been excluded from both the planning system and use of their traditional resources.

Academic analysis of these and other relationships between Maori and the environmental establishment have focussed on competing environmental ‘world views’ as an explanation of conflict. Such analyses have resurrected problematic motifs of the ecologically noble savage, which are counter-productive to the goals of indigenous self-determination. The relativistic preoccupation with world views has also tended to reify difference, abstracting environmental
conflict from associated social and historical processes. Moreover, these unproblematic explanations for environmental conflict often fail to determine the locally and temporally specific reasons for Maori grievances.

There is no doubt that cross-cultural tensions in divergent objectives, methods and agents of planning have contributed to the historical distrust between Maori and Pakeha (European New Zealanders). Maori assertions of sustainable use as the proper goal for environmental management have confronted preservationist ideals and exclusionary management, particularly with regard to biological harvests. The legitimate authority for kaitiakitanga – Maori resource management – cannot be divorced from genealogical traditions which ascribe a managerial role to particular individuals, rather than to ‘objective’, detached planners or experts. Kaitiakitanga cannot, therefore, ‘be interpreted as simply an ethic whose relevance is found only in relation to the biophysical environment’. Yet, neoliberal, scientistic and objectivist logics in New Zealand’s Resource Management Act (1991) abstract ecology and planning from community and history. Likewise, entrenched aesthetic traditions conflict with the ideological centrality of land as a basis for development and mana whenua – authority over the land – in Maori culture. Keenan summarises the relative significance of environmental issues for Maori in Taranaki. He confirms that there was ‘disappointment and anger at the loss of traditional food sources, fouling of clean water, and blatant disregard of tapu [sacred] sites’. Historically, however, and perhaps in opposition to the priorities of some environmentalists, ‘maintaining mana whenua’ was the ‘paramount’ concern of his ancestors. These tensions are important, but it is argued here that a full understanding of institutional distrust can only be gained through deeper analysis of the historical interplay between (Maori) resource owners and (largely Pakeha) resource managers.

ENVIRONMENTAL ANDIDEOLOGICAL CONTEXTS
FOR AFFORESTATION AT MANGATU

State afforestation at Mangatu highlights the impact of institutional distrust on Maori self-determination. It also demonstrates the interaction of many colonial processes: land loss, ecological transformation, socio-political dislocation and cultural homogenisation. The link between catchment control and colonial development has been confirmed in research on irrigation projects, dam development, and retention of water conservation forests in national parks. Because of the requisite scale of its landscape modifications, catchment management often leads to social dislocation and reflects the economic imperatives of hegemonic interests. In New Zealand, the politics of catchment management has been an enduring theme of geographical research. Protection of agricultural investments dominated national legislation for catchment management and,
reflecting rather than resolving the ‘war on nature’, water and soil conservation was advanced because it ‘performed both a social welfare and economic management function’. Counter-measures to the local ‘war on nature’ prejudicially affected the Maori owners of Mangatu Blocks 1, 3 and 4 Incorporated, even though they supported the basic principles of catchment control.

FIGURE 1. Mangatu forest in relation to the Waipaoa catchment.
Deforestation and erosion

Prior to colonisation, Maori cleared the Poverty Bay flats of their indigenous forest cover, but forests in the headwaters of the Waipaoa were retained (Figure 1).\(^{38}\) By the late 1880s, however, the principal iwi (tribe) of the upland area – Te Aitanga-a-Mahaki – had lost most of its low altitude lands through Crown confiscation and predatory acquisition.\(^{39}\) As a response to resultant poverty, the iwi attempted to develop land in the Waipaoa headwaters. These attempts were conducted under indigenous models of collective governance which proved incompatible with Pakeha systems of tenure, finance and administration.\(^{40}\) As a consequence of loan defaults and commercial insolvencies, Te Aitanga-a-Mahaki steadily lost control of the upper Waipaoa. Some blocks were placed under statutory management, while others were leased or sold to Pakeha to service debt.\(^{41}\)

Between 1890 and 1920, Pakeha land managers burnt and cleared most of the indigenous forest in the upper catchment as preparation for pasture.\(^{42}\) The district is subject to extreme rainfall events and the underlying geology is unstable, especially the zone of crushed argillite which is depicted in Figure 1. The regulatory functions of the forest lapsed with its removal, and the subsequent afforestation project represents an attempt to restore balance within geomorphic

FIGURE 2. The Tarndale slip, Te Weraroa Stream and their fan, the latter of which extends into the valley of the Waipaoa River (flowing from right to left).
processes. The environmental outcomes of deforestation were experienced as an unprecedented acceleration in erosion and deposition, and an increased frequency of downstream floods. The Tarndale slip (Figure 2) and other gullies which opened after 1930 symbolise the scale of these processes, but erosion was more damaging as an imperceptible and cumulative loss of soil from open farmland. The resultant channel reduction and infilling of the river valleys wrought destruction on Maori communities, as is strikingly illustrated in Figure 3. It was the impact of expensive flood damage on Pakeha farmers and settlements in the lower catchment, however, which attracted popular attention, leading to fervent petitions for catchment control.

The area had been recommended for afforestation as early as 1920, but the initial response to accelerated deterioration in the Waipaoa catchment was downstream river control rather than management of the headwaters. In the early 1950s, a flood control scheme was constructed to protect agricultural land on the Poverty Bay flats. The scheme protected against high water flows, and stop-banking and straightening of the river coerced it to degrade its channel. However, the prospect of continued erosion in the upper catchment, and hence aggradation in the lower reaches of the valley, jeopardised its long-term effectiveness. In 1956, it was determined that unless the flow of sediment into the Waipaoa was reduced, the flood control scheme would lose its effectiveness after 30 years.

A control programme for the headwaters of the Waipaoa was conceived at a time of transition in the discipline of catchment management. Debris dams, sediment retards and other physical obstructions had previously been employed to reduce the flow of sediment into rivers. A soil survey of 1952 concluded that the actively eroding gullies of the headwaters were the primary source of sediment in the Waipaoa River, and this confined the scope of initial attempts to control erosion to engineered solutions and isolated tree planting. Protection forestry was conceived locally as a series of ad hoc impediments to massive erosion in gullies, but the intended application of afforestation progressively became more widespread. Over time, the emphasis in catchment control pedagogy shifted to dewatering of headwater lands through afforestation, which increases the interception of precipitation and the transpiration of soil moisture, reducing the percolation of water into the soil horizons where slips originate. It also slows the rate of water transfer to rivers and tributary streams, thereby rendering the peak of floodwaters later, lower and more manageable.

The Poverty Bay Catchment Board (PBCB) was locally responsible for management of erosion and flooding. With the prospect of land purchases and other significant investments for afforestation, however, the Board had neither the mandate nor the resources to advance independently a protection forest at Mangatu. In 1955 it appealed to its authorising agency – the Soil Conservation and Rivers Control Council (SCRCC) – to manage the preparation of and negotiations for a protection plan. The SCRCC assembled a panel of experts, which adopted as its first task the clarification of the extent of crushed argillites
FIGURE 3. Impact of aggradation on the wharenui (meeting house) at Pakowhai Pa (Maori village), near the confluence of the Mangatu and Waipaoa rivers. 1960 above and 2002 below.
in the Waipaoa headwaters. That panel accepted the findings of the 1952 survey which had accounted for 13,000 hectares of argillite, but contended that only 5,700 hectares required active control. The panel did not provide an extensive justification for focusing on this smaller area. Significantly, most of that area was Maori-owned and profitably farmed, representing the larger remnants of the ancestral lands of Te Aitanga-a-Mahaki. Pakeha were the principal owners of the remaining 7,300 hectares. Arguing that ‘[v]egetatively, the most complete protection that can be given is a forest cover’, the panel recommended the comprehensive afforestation of the 5,700 hectares. It made only ambiguous recommendations for the remaining areas of crushed argillite. Nonetheless, the initial response of Mangatu Blocks to the panel report was favourable. It considered planting its own protection-production forest on the land, and investigated available subsidies for this purpose. The PBCB encouraged this response, but Crown departments subsequently persuaded the Board to dismiss the owners’ proposals.

The representation of Maori landowners as ‘bad farmers’

During the 1950s, local agriculture experienced a profound restructuring, with a reduction in on-farm labour, out-migration and a concentration in farm ownership. These changes and associated social outcomes focused attention to the impact of land stability and flooding on the marginal costs of farming, with mitigation of these environmental problems seen as an economic and social necessity. Debates about afforestation were contemporaneous with these changes and they became inter-meshed with public concern about falling rates of agricultural production and the economic future of the district. In this context, Maori and their attitude to land retention were seen as impediments to the necessary task of erosion control and the dilemmas of catchment management were progressively represented as ‘the Maori land problem’.

Te Aitanga-a-Mahaki was also concerned about these economic, demographic and environmental transformations, especially because rural to urban migration was higher for the Maori population of the east coast than it was for Pakeha. Accordingly, records of meetings of the assembled owners highlight a central goal in the management of their land: maintenance of economically viable farms to sustain their local communities, binding them to their ancestral lands. The Chair of Mangatu Blocks ‘stated that, while it appreciated the [Poverty Bay] community need, the Incorporation was primarily preoccupied with farming’. In this respect, initial disputes did reflect a fundamental difference in outlook between a Pakeha system of environmental management, which sought control of one site to benefit downstream communities, and the tribal desire to sustain local communities. At first, the owners were sceptical about the need to afforest so much land, but they came to accept the need for
broad-scale afforestation if it could be proved that this would be profitable.62 Consistently, they articulated their main preference as retention of the land and its management in their own control, and contended that, with Crown support, this should not inhibit any afforestation proposals.63 Of significance to the argument of this paper, the focal point for conflict increasingly became who (agent) should manage these lands and not how (method) or why (objectives) they were managed.

With a change in government in 1957, implementation of the panel report became stalled in political inertia, leading to anxiety for downstream landowners. Local farmers petitioned the PBCB and, in turn, it implored the SCRCC and parliament to coercively effect the panel’s recommendations.64 Farmers dominated the membership of the PBCB, and its connections to the farming community inevitably framed the purpose, scope and evolution of the resultant scheme. Consequently, debate about afforestation in the upper catchment emphasised benefits to downstream landowners:

[I]t cannot be too strongly emphasised that the benefit to be derived from this sort of planting in so far as erosion control is concerned is predominantly an off-site benefit. The immediate loss to the farmer of the acres involved in gullying and its attendant slumping is not great considering the total size of the holdings concerned; far more serious is the effect of erosion debris accumulating in the streams and rivers downstream of this boundary.65

The comprehensive alienation of profitable Maori land in the headwaters was thereby validated on the basis of the common good benefits for the mainly Pakeha farmers on the Poverty Bay flats.

By 1959, Pakeha agitation for comprehensive catchment management was targeted extra-locally through the print media, with attempts to emphasise purported inefficiencies in Maori farming. This media campaign was principally contested in a distant, though nationally distributed, Auckland newspaper which published a special series on the land management problems of the east coast.66 Not coincidentally, this series commenced at the time of negotiations for land purchase with the Mangatu owners. A common exhortation in the articles was that Maori were unable to farm to European standards:

[T]he practice and principles of farming do not come easily to the Maori…Often the Maori has not yet acquired the confidence of the European in agricultural management, and sheep farming may appear too much like big business.67

Prominent leaders in Poverty Bay endorsed this bigotry. The Mayor of Gisborne City, for example, argued that Maori should surrender their land to more responsible land users:

They are the greatest landowners. Because the land belongs to the Maori, we feel the Maori must belong to the land. The remedy is to face up to the fact that land
brings obligations as well as rights. Anyone not farming properly should give way to someone who can.68

In the same article, the local member of parliament was equally vehement in his attack on Maori land use, concluding his commentary with a statement that, ‘Any land not being fully used by Maori or Pakeha is a sin.’ The context of the statement suggests that Maori and not Pakeha farmers were the target of his critique.

This ideological offensive incorporated contradictory discourses: protagonists argued simultaneously for increased agricultural production and erosion control; the common theme of Maori wastage of land was ironic. An increase in stocking rates in the hill country would have accelerated erosional processes, thereby threatening agricultural productivity through deterioration of soil resources and downstream flooding. Yet, any land which was not developed to the fullest extent was considered to be ‘lying idle’. Land instability was a problem for Maori and Pakeha farmers, but this reality was overlooked in the haste to identify a simple justification for state intervention. Likewise, the debate was ahistorical and failed to acknowledge that Maori landowners were seldom responsible for removal of forest cover and, therefore, they were not necessarily accountable for erosion on their properties.

Legitimate evidence of poor Maori land management was sometimes identified, but such evidence was not presented in its proper context. The difficulty of obtaining development capital for Maori land in collective ownership has been extensively documented.69 In public discourse, however, low productivity, erosion and other problems on Maori land were attributed to cultural disposition rather than to structural underdevelopment. Government officials also subscribed to these views,70 as is highlighted in a contemporary assessment of local land use. The geophysical and historical factors that led to erosion were acknowledged in this assessment, but they were considered secondary to matters of race:

All these reasons are valid but the most important of all is the personal factor. With some notable exceptions the Maori has yet to become a good farmer under present day conditions…Many Maoris seem to lack some essential attribute for a business of this type. They do not generally show the needed ability to plan ahead and budget for essential requirements such as maintenance, topdressing, and stock replacement. They are usually good workers but not good managers [my emphasis].71

In direct refutation of this view, Mangatu Blocks comprised the largest farming enterprise in New Zealand at that time and it remained profitable, despite the colonial and ecological contexts. While examples of good management of Maori land were readily available, they received no attention in the media nor in the associated Crown policy documents.
In official and media representations, proposed solutions for erosion also incorporated this base paternalism and overt racism. One supporter of afforestation wrote approvingly that, ‘Counties can begin actions to have Maori land leased where the property is badly farmed, weed-infested or unoccupied.’

Collective ownership of Maori land was also spuriously identified as a cause of erosion. A committee of Crown departments, which had been appointed to investigate the ‘problems on Maori land’, contended that the only appropriate form of tenure was single title. It was ‘of the opinion that the time has arrived when the position of all Maori owned land should be thoroughly investigated with the object of having it placed on the same basis as European land’.

Alternatively, it was suggested that a ‘lasting solution will probably lie largely with the Maori himself. Mediocre farmers may have to accept a greater measure of European supervision.’ This paternalistic submission reflected Pakeha distrust of Maori as agri-environmental managers and of their institutions of governance.

‘CONFISCATION UNDER A DIFFERENT NAME’

Crown officials favoured the purchase rather than joint management of Mangatu lands, ostensibly because the long-term nature of the project required long-term control. This was unlikely to have been the only reason for this preference, however, because it was not vigorously pursued on equivalent Pakeha land. The Crown had accepted the spurious media and PBCB condemnation of Maori as poor guardians of the environment. The false depictions of Maori as both cause of land instability and a recalcitrant minority who were resistant to the common good requirement of erosion control determined a narrow range of alternatives which were subsequently offered to them.

Targeting of Maori land for afforestation

Prior to government approval of afforestation, the Prime Minister assured that ‘the Maori people would receive exactly the same consideration as other people concerned’. Nevertheless, Mangatu Blocks appear to have been targeted for public acquisition and afforestation beyond the level of attention directed to similar properties in the upper Waipaoa. Mangatu Blocks were located centrally within the zone of crushed argillite, but PBCB soil surveys concluded that erosion rates on Maori land were consistent with neighbouring Pakeha stations.

Yet, the Chair of the PBCB declared to central government that ‘it was in the native blocks that the most serious erosion was taking place’. Correspondingly, the Board’s soil conservator recommended long-term control on all Maori land, arguing that ‘control measures will have to be extensive and far reaching and will involve a change of the present pastoral land use’. Comparable Pakeha
properties were subject to different recommendations.

The Pakeha farms which contributed some land to the Mangatu State Forest – Tawhiti and Waipaoa stations – were encouraged to experiment with erosion barriers while continuing to manage their properties as farms. These properties were located within and alongside the crushed argillite zone. In contradistinction to its strategy for comparable Maori land, the PBCB acted on behalf of the Pakeha owners in an attempt to maintain the viability of their farms. It requested SCRCC subsidies for engineered protective works and advocated for the preservation of farming activities well into the 1970s. Erosion on Waipaoa Station was comparable to adjacent land within Mangatu Blocks, but negotiations between its owners and government officials were stalled while the PBCB voluntarily produced reports on the economic benefits of engineered solutions and on the possibility of maintaining pastoral farming on the land. The mere production of these reports is indicative of patronage which was not extended to Maori landowners. Ultimately, calls from some government officials for more of Waipaoa Station to be afforested were not fulfilled, confirming that a more flexible approach had been taken with its owners.

Targeting of Maori land for afforestation was also achieved through manipulation of official deputations. Before hearing submissions on the Waipaoa catchment, Prime Minister Nash inspected the area in May 1959. The PBCB predetermined the focus of this visit through carefully worded submissions:

The attachment of the Maori owners to their land is sympathetically understood, as is their reluctance to suffer disturbance to farming operations which even a stage-by-stage acquisition will involve, but with our knowledge of the erosion problem and of its impact on farming, the board would be failing in its duty if it did not plainly state its opinion that the owners’ interests will be served best by selling the land to the Crown before its value diminishes any further. Eurocentric justifications about market value quickly surpassed the token recognition of Maori customary values. It was assumed that Maori would want to sell their land if it could be proved that land values were threatened. Consequently, there was no attempt to provide for the cultural attachments of the owners to their ancestral lands, and the recognition of customary values was superficial. In the same letter, the PBCB stated openly that its main concern was ‘the purpose of preventing aggradation of the Waipaoa river and so protecting its valley and plain’. It forewarned the Prime Minister that ‘Maori owners could be reluctant to part with their land’, further restricting the scope of Nash’s reconnaissance to Maori land management. Most of the Prime Minister’s time was consumed with that issue, and he spent little time with Pakeha owners, who did not face the pressure of executive petition.
Negotiations for land purchase

Dialogue on land sale commenced with vigour after Nash’s inspection, and the owners assembled to discuss this prospect in February 1960, with a unanimous decision against selling: ‘No owner present at the meeting wished to have it charged against them that he had been a party to the sale of ancestral lands.’ This refusal to sell was not an explicit rejection of afforestation, but rather it reflected the landowners’ desire to manage independently their own afforestation scheme. From the records of the discussion, it appears that the majority agreed with the need to afforest at least some land. The local Commissioner of Crown Lands (CCL) met with the Mangatu management committee in March 1960. The committee disputed the targeting of Maori land, the lack of Crown consultation, and the science, claims and objectivity of the PBCB. It unambiguously asserted the aspiration to retain the land yet also participate in afforestation, either through a lease arrangement or through a joint venture with the New Zealand Forest Service (NZFS).

The CCL was stubbornly inflexible in response to these proposals, excluding all options which did not include the alienation of land, and declaring that a lease would not provide the NZFS with satisfactory levels of control. Only ten years later, the Crown actively promoted leasehold arrangements as the best option for increasing landowner participation in a conservation forestry scheme for the region, suggesting that such arrangements were feasible. The CCL and the NZFS summarily dismissed the option of Maori managing their own forestry project, suggesting that the owners could not afford the costs of afforestation. The Forests Act (1949) contained provision for financing the Incorporation’s entry into forestry, but the NZFS would not accept ‘the inherent risks of this type of venture on Maori land’. A detailed explication of these risks was not provided. It is notable that during the 1980s and 1990s, Mangatu Blocks engaged in extensive conservation forestry projects – both independently and in joint ventures – and these have been ecologically and financially successful.

Ambiguity about the expected ratio of protection to production forestry was also infused within the Crown’s negotiation strategy. Ministerial briefing notes stipulated that Mangatu was intended to be a mixed forest, with half designated for production, and ‘the other half purely protection forest in which cutting would not be permitted’. At the 1960 annual meeting of Mangatu owners, the CCL was questioned again about the possibility of a joint venture with the NZFS. He replied that such a venture was not rational because:

Any profit would be very small and a long time in coming... The intention was to establish a protection forest not a productive one, and milling if any would be on a small scale with little profit. Land was to be purchased to provide it with a cover of vegetation. It was a pity the forest cover was ever removed and having learnt the lesson, any new forest would be taken careful care of and not removed again. A protection forest was to be established and the land was not being
purchased for the sake of buying land. There was a grave and firm purpose
behind it all.\textsuperscript{96}

If the owners had known of the impending profit which would later be taken from
Mangatu Forest, they may have argued more ardently for a collaborative venture.

In this context of ambiguity and prejudice, the negotiations were extended
beyond the timeframe of public expectation, and the media campaign against the
Incorporation persisted throughout this period. The owners’ rejection of sale was
reported unsympathetically in the local media as being ‘far removed from the
true interests of the majority’ and ‘a blow to the hopes and aspirations of the
region’.\textsuperscript{97} From early 1960, the cabal of vested interests on the Poverty Bay flats
remonstrated for the Crown to compulsorily acquire the Maori land. Publicly,
Crown officials rejected this alternative, but in inter-agency correspondence
public works takings were considered inevitable.\textsuperscript{98} With palpable menace, the
CCL notified the owners of the likelihood of this outcome if they did not
voluntarily relinquish their land.\textsuperscript{99} The spectre of compulsory acquisition beset
these exchanges from their commencement, and it is not surprising that the
Incorporation perceived the negotiations as inequitable and calculated. Pakeha
owners were not threatened with compulsory acquisition.

Compulsory acquisition may appear to have been an objectionable scenario
for the owners, but they preferred this outcome to a negotiated sale.\textsuperscript{100} Con-
fronted with the prospect of continued erosion and the inflexible attitude of the
Crown to private afforestation, the owners were compelled to accept the
likelihood of land alienation. The preference for compulsory acquisition re-
lected the expectation of receiving a higher price for the land. It also provided
an opportunity to remove the burden of accountability from the conscience of the
management committee, reflecting the solemnity of the decision to alienate any
remaining land:

The land had been leased over a long period of years to Pakehas and only a few
years ago it had come back to the owners. And now, the Pakehas want it back
to plant trees on. Too much land was being taken to stop erosion. The land
should be taken compulsorily so that the generations to come could not point a
finger at their ancestors.\textsuperscript{101}

The trauma of voluntary alienation of ancestral land after 120 years of
involuntary land loss induced the politics of withdrawal amongst the manage-
ment committee. In retrospect, one can empathise with this resigned acceptance
of an irresolvable predicament, but at the time there were evidently few who were
sensitive to the position of the Incorporation. The prospect of lessening the
management committee’s answerability through compulsory acquisition was
set aside, and Crown negotiators pressed steadfastly for a negotiated sale.

After the Incorporation again confirmed its opposition to sale, the Minister
of Forests initiated a meeting in June 1960. Accounting for the valuation process
to be employed if the owners conceded, the Minister suggested that, ‘You will not be broken for figures when it comes to substantiating your claim.’ In reply, a representative of the Incorporation evocatively ‘made reference to the sentimental value of the land, which could not be reimbursed with cold cash’. The cultural significance of ancestral lands can never be fully compensated, but the Crown nevertheless attempted to buy its way into an afforestation scheme. With no remaining alternatives, the assembled owners authorised the sale of the land in October 1960. When negotiating the vending price, the Incorporation qualified its decision to sell: ‘residents on the Poverty Bay flats were to receive the benefits of afforestation; the owners could not in any way be called willing sellers; and, while there was a need for some form of erosion control, the urgency of this matter did not justify the alienation of Maori land.’ There is veracity in the contention which had been conveyed to the local CCL that the sale of Mangatu lands had been ‘confiscation under a different name’.

CONCLUSION: AFTER DISTRUSTR

Local and national ideology circumscribed the negotiations between the Crown and the Mangatu owners. Government agencies were persuaded to intervene in the region on the basis of the PBCB’s account of the erosion problem. The PBCB responded to geomorphic changes in the catchment, but it did not function in a socio-political vacuum: rather, it reacted to the predisposed opinions of its constituency. Inaccurate and sometimes overtly racist depictions of Maori as inferior land managers strongly conditioned these actions and a distrust in Maori approaches to land management was unremitting. As a result, Maori lands were targeted unreasonably for afforestation, and Maori landowners were not offered the same alternatives as Pakeha in the upper catchment. The owners were coerced to decide between voluntary sale or the involuntary appropriation of their ancestral lands, but their historical success as farmers should have warranted their consideration as stakeholders in catchment afforestation. Institutional bias prejudicially influenced Te Aitanga-a-Mahaki and its desire for self-determination, and also precluded the opportunity to foster partnership between local government and landowners.

After the planting of the Mangatu State Forest (Figure 4), it became apparent that erosion control on the East coast was a more substantial undertaking than catchment management in one river system. In 1967, a government task force on land instability determined that 140 000 hectares of hill country in the region should ideally be designated for conservation forestry. Although the negotiating strategies, range of methods, and attitudes to joint management of Maori land were more flexible than in the case of Mangatu, less than one quarter of the target for planting was achieved. The legacy of mistrust from the Mangatu negotiations was partly responsible for this failure. Generally, the Gisborne
District Council – the successor to the PBCB – has enjoyed neither a good relationship nor managerial legitimacy with local Maori.\textsuperscript{107}

The outcomes of state afforestation at Mangatu highlight the challenges to the institutional turn in planning theory. Ultimately, the conflict was not about objectives for environmental management, nor approaches to satisfying those objectives. The management committee of Mangatu Blocks accepted the need for erosion control and, as long as it could retain some profit from the land, it also accepted conservation forestry as the method of management. The desire of Te Aitanga-a-Mahaki to obtain collective sustenance and preserve mana whenua from their ancestral lands diverged philosophically with the Crown’s desire to manage the land ‘in the common good’. Yet, in contradistinction to the dominant interpretations of environmental conflict between Maori and Pakeha, this was not the issue which defined the failure to negotiate a culturally appropriate resolution. Rather, the primary basis for disagreement was about who would manage the land, and which institutions had the requisite managerial credentials.

This suggests that the new institutionalism in environmental management stands in opposition to the reality of colonial history. The solvents of institutional trust are embedded in historical-material processes, just as they are functionally connected to the contemporary social formation, so those solvents are not

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{mangatu_forest_1971.jpg}
\caption{The maturing Mangatu Forest in 1971.}
\end{figure}
superficial. These findings do not, however, diminish the value of management strategies that propose to enhance institutional trust, social eco-capital and environmental citizenship. Rather, it is concluded that there must be realistic expectations for the new institutional perspectives. Mistrust accumulates through time, so strategies to counteract the historicity of institutional (dis)trust may have a return time which exceeds other forms of environmental management. Public and indigenous peoples’ resistance to those strategies may reflect historical conditions rather than the intrinsic merits of institutional approaches. To succeed in confronting a colonial past, however, social eco-capital and other such approaches will require genuine devolution and institutional pluralism in respect of the agents of management.

Epilogue

Two cases from the recent history of Mangatu complete its historical sequence: use of the forest for commercial harvesting and the land for Treaty of Waitangi settlement. By 1970, the one-to-one ratio of production to protection forests was seldom raised in official correspondence, and soil stabilisation was alluded to as a ‘secondary role’. The intended use was no longer a matter for debate: ‘Since the forests are clearly for production we can hardly shelter behind the protection aspect any longer.’ It appears that some had always considered Mangatu a production forest, endorsing the ‘protection aspect’ to gain the support of the SCRCC and to conceal commercial intentions during negotiations with landowners. In 1991, when the plantations were nearing maturity, the government sold the cutting rights to private capital. The sensitivity of harvest location, extent and methods to the geological context has been criticised, with harvested areas reflecting accessibility rather than the pattern of erosion. The rhetoric of equivalence in protection and production has been consigned to environmental history, even though reckless deforestation had radically distorted that history one hundred years earlier.

The Waitangi Tribunal heard evidence on the acquisition of Mangatu Blocks and other local grievances during 2002. It is likely that the Tribunal will recommend the return of the land to Te Aitanga-a-Mahaki. Government policy for Treaty of Waitangi settlements supports the use of Crown land assets in reparation and there are few other Crown assets in the region. Given the potential for upstream harvesting to revive debate about environmental conditions on the Poverty Bay flats, there is no certainty that the iwi will be permitted to use the land as compensation for lost resources and economic opportunity. Such use may once again be conditional on the trust of Pakeha and their attitudes to Maori governance and institutions.
NOTES

8 In this context, institutions are broadly defined to incorporate all modes, methods and agents of social regulation, including public and private networks, the bonds of commonality in purpose, and ideological restraint through cultural and communal discipline.
14 This article is derived from research for one set of Tribunal hearings – Wai 814: the combined claim for the Gisborne Inquiry District. The author acknowledges the funding of the Crown Forestry Rental Trust (Auckland UniServices Contract 7814) and the friendship, support and courage of the claimants from Turanganui-a-Kiwa. Refer to B. Coombes, *Ecological Impacts and Planning History: an Environmental History of the Turanganui-a-Kiwa Casebook Area* (Wellington: Crown Forestry Rental Trust, 2000).
17 The North Island is quantified because that is where the bulk of the Maori population lived, but equally rapid land loss occurred in the South Island. Refer to: A. Ward, *An Unsettled History: Treaty Claims in New Zealand Today* (Wellington: Bridget Williams Books, 1999), 162–6.
29 Research for the Treaty of Waitangi claim to indigenous flora and fauna (WAI 262) has provided many new insights into the exclusionary and prejudicial effects of colonial and current systems of resource management. Refer, in particular, to: C. Marr, R. Hodge and B. White, ‘Crown Laws, Policies, and Practices in Relation to Flora and Fauna, 1840–
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32 Gillespie, ‘Environmental Politics’.


37 M.M. Roche, ‘“The Land We Have We Must Hold”. Soil Erosion and Soil Conservation in Late 19th and 20th Century New Zealand’, Journal of Historical Geography 23 (1997): 447–58, 447.


41 Secretary, Mangatu Blocks 1, 3 & 4 Inc., 17 Jan. 1958, Department of Maori Affairs files on Mangatu 1,3 & 4, Wellington Branch National Archives, MA Mangatu W.


THE HISTORICITY OF INSTITUTIONAL TRUST

48 A.D. Todd, Chief Engineer, PBCB, to Chair, PBCB, 3 Mar. 1956, Waipaoa River Flood Control Scheme – General Series, Archives of Gisborne District Council, PBCB 2/19.
50 D.J. Hamilton and H.H. Kelman, Soil Conservation Survey of Waipaoa River Catchment, Poverty Bay (Wellington: Ministry of Works, 1952); Todd to Chair, PBCB, 13 Apr. 1954, Pullar Papers, Gisborne Museum and Arts Centre.
51 J.B. Hair, Chairman, PBCB, 30 Mar. 1959, PBCB MB.
54 ‘Report of the Special Panel to Consider Erosion Control in the Waipaoa Catchment’, 8 Feb. 1956, NZFS Files on Mangatu Forest, Wellington Branch National Archives, F1 1/7/6/1.
55 Panel Report, 2.
56 D. Metzers, Soil Conservator, PBCB, to Soil Conservation Committee, PBCB, 31 May 1956, PBCB MB.
60 The author has not researched the full records of the Incorporation, but has seen a great number of its minutes of meetings where they appear in other archives. Refer also to Rose, Te Aitanga a Mahaki Land and Irwin and Ruru, Mangatu.
61 A.M. Moore, District Forest Ranger, NZFS, to Director-General (D-G) of Forests, 6 Jun. 1956, F1 1/7/6/1.
62 ‘Minutes of the Committee of Management, Mangatu Incorporation, at Gisborne’, 26 Jun. 1956, PBCB 21/10. The Committee was confronted with conflicting opinions about the profitability of this type of afforestation: the PBCB recommended it to them because it was likely to be profitable; the NZFS did not.
63 A.M. Moore to D-G of Forests, 6 Jun. 1956, F1 1/7/6/1.
64 The Public Works Act 1928 contained many such provisions, but the more likely legislative basis for compulsory acquisition was the Soil Conservation and Rivers Control Act 1941. A 1959 amendment (NZ Statutes 1959, No. 48) to that act provided for wide ranging powers in respect of changing the title and use of land (ss 34 and 35).
65 Todd to Soil Conservation Committee, PBCB, 5 Aug. 1958, PBCB MB.
The *New Zealand Herald*. Auckland – see inset, fig. 1 – is New Zealand’s largest city. These newspaper accounts and other such local boosterism are preserved in, East Coast Lands: Deterioration of Maori lands, Archives of Gisborne District Council, PBCB 5/18.


The Hunn Report of 1960, which is cited above, is perhaps the best indication that these attitudes to Maori land were widespread amongst government officials.

Lands and Survey, *The Land Utilisation Survey*.


*New Zealand Herald*, 1 Jul. 1959, 4.

Minister of Lands to Minister of Works, 5 Nov. 1959, Department of Lands and Survey files on Mangatu Blocks 1,3&4 Inc., Auckland Branch of National Archives, BANF 5694/86b.


Metzers, to Soil Conservation Committee, PBCB, 10 Apr. 1956, PBCB MB.

Hair to Prime Minister W. Nash, 19 May 1959, PBCB MB.

Metzers to Soil Conservation Committee, PBCB, 31 May 1956, PBCB MB.

Refer to fig. 1. As mentioned above, however, the Hamilton and Kelman report of 1952 delineated a much larger area of crushed argillite (13000 ha) than the panel of experts in 1955 (5700 ha). Nonetheless, many European properties contributed to the sediment which entered the Waipaoa system.


Director, National Water and Soil Conservation Organization, to Secretary, PBCB, 3 Feb. 1971, PBCB U1/145.

Mangatu Blocks, Tawhiti Station and Waipoa Station respectively contributed 3407, 2293 and 1301 hectares (Allsop, *The Story of Mangatu*, 28). About half of the Mangatu State Forest was therefore Maori land, but much more than half of the crushed argillite zone, as identified in 1952, was in Pakeha ownership.

Hair to Nash, 19 May 1959, PBCB MB.

Hair to Nash, 19 May 1959, PBCB MB.


CCL Gisborne to D-G Lands, 1 Mar. 1960, BANF 5694/86b.

The NZFS was a government department which managed Crown indigenous and exotic forests. Under s 64 of the Forests Act 1949, the NZFS was permitted to finance, develop and manage private forests, and there were associated subsidisation and leaseholding
provisions. When the application of s 64 was first proposed to the owners in 1956, they were diffident about this possibility. However, this reaction should be seen in the context of uncertainty. At that stage, it was not known whether afforestation should be a fragmented or comprehensive response across the catchment.

92 The East Coast Project. Reeves, Chairman, PBCB, to Prime Minister Holyoake, 25 Jun. 1971, PBCB 21/10.
93 A.R. Entrican, Director of Forestry, to D-G Lands. 8 Apr. 1960, AADY w3564 6/2/108. Representatives of the NZFS and the Lands Department also rejected a land exchange proposal which was favoured by the Incorporation.
94 Irwin and Ruru, ‘Mangatu’.
95 ‘Information Document to Minister of Maori Affairs’, 4 May 1959, MA Mangatu W.
98 D-G Lands to CCL Gisborne, 22 Apr. 1960, BANF 5694/86b. New Zealand has an extensive history of public works takings of Maori land. However, compulsory acquisition had encountered public resistance throughout the 1950s, and it was not likely to have been authorised for acquisition of Mangatu land.
100 Gardiner to Minister of Lands, 4 May 1960, BANF 5694/86b.
104 Gardiner to CCL, Gisborne, 7 Nov. 1960, BANF 5694/86b.
107 This was particularly evident in Gisborne claims before the Waitangi Tribunal during 2001–2002. Refer to Coombes, Ecological Impacts.
109 District Conservator to Regional Conservator, NZFS Rotorua, 9 Mar. 1973, NZFS files on East Coast Afforestation Project, Auckland Branch National Archives, BAFK 1466/3c.