Chapter 4

ORDERING LANDSCAPES AND “LIVING SPACE” IN THE MIRACLE YEARS, 1956–1966

In the 1957 federal elections, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer’s CDU party and its sister party of Bavaria, the Christian Social Union (CSU), promised “Prosperity for All.” Their campaign slogan came from the title of a book ghostwritten that year for Ludwig Erhard, Federal Minister of Economics and architect of West Germany’s “economic miracle.” The publication called for economic growth to continue unimpeded to produce national wealth that would benefit all citizens. The country’s remarkable recovery was already evident in industrial production, which had more than doubled since 1945.1 Into the 1970s, with the exception of the recession in 1966–1967, West Germany’s annual rate of economic growth surpassed that of other industrialized nations, leaving its economy in third place behind the US and Japan. Yet the liberal economic policies that contributed to postwar prosperity favored industry and commerce. By the mid 1960s, a minority of the population controlled much of the country’s wealth. But few people protested because unemployment was low at 0.5 percent in 1965, and average disposable household incomes rose steadily, quadrupling between 1950 and 1970.2

“Prosperity for All” was a nice campaign promise. But it was a hard one to keep. In general, the country’s expanding urban areas experienced prosperity more than the rural regions. By 1961, roughly one-third of the country’s 56.5 million people lived in cities having more than 100,000 inhabitants; another 46 percent lived in smaller urban areas. At the end of the decade, 45 percent

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of West Germans lived in twenty-four densely populated metropolitan areas, with at least 1,250 people per square kilometer. These conurbations covered 7 percent of the country’s total area. For many urbanites, city life meant the chance to enjoy new levels of prosperity. Average household monthly incomes of blue and white collar workers and the self-employed doubled between 1955 and 1965, and more West Germans owned an automobile—a symbol of affluence. The 500,000 vehicles recorded in 1955 climbed to four million by 1960, an increase that accompanied the spread of low density cities which required people to commute from homes in the suburbs to jobs in the city. By 1961, over 30 percent of all employees commuted to work, compared with 18 percent from a decade earlier.3

These general trends apply less readily to rural regions where the agricultural sector was rapidly shrinking. Between 1949 and 1965, 488,000 small farms of ten hectares or less ceased operation. Over this same period, those employed in agriculture dropped from 23 percent of the working population to 13 percent, or from five million to three million people. In these rural communities, governments struggled to attract modern industries to strengthen their tax base and modernize infrastructure. The story was much the same for the eastern border zone, a forty-kilometer wide area that extended from the Baltic Sea, along the East German and Czechoslovak borders, and then south to Passau. This zone covered 19 percent of West Germany’s total area and was home to 12 percent of the population.4

During the Miracle Years, the Federal Republic was like other nations of Western Europe in strengthening spatial planning (Raumordnung) at all administrative levels in order to address the disparities in infrastructure and economic opportunity. Since the 1930s, industrialized nations from the Soviet Union to the United States placed greater emphasis on centralized planning. In Nazi Germany, the regime had established the Reich Agency for Spatial Planning in 1935 to oversee regional offices throughout Germany and made area research (Raumforschung) a scientific discipline in several universities. In the Old Reich, planners pursued their work pragmatically, but many of their colleagues in the eastern occupied territories used their expertise in developing plans that supported ethnic cleansing. Because the institutional apparatus for spatial planning in the Old Reich remained in place under the Federal Republic, some officials concluded that Raumordnung was little more than a relic of Nazism; others associated it with communist dictatorships. In either case, spatial planning seemed incompatible with a democratic society and free market economy.5

But postwar realities convinced most officials that some degree of centralized planning was needed to restore order to society and the economy. The influx of millions of refugees, the disruption of trade between east and west with the division of the country, and the rapid pace of reconstruction created
a number of challenges that officials hoped to address with effective territorial planning. With the return to economic stability in the 1950s, Raumordnung also promised to lessen the gap between prosperous and poor regions. West Germany’s constitution already mandated a “unity of living standards” across the states (Article 107), a goal that was partly achieved “through federal redistribution” of specific tax revenues to poorer states and through payments from financially wealthier Länder (Baden-Württemberg, Hamburg, and Hesse) to poorer, often more rural ones (Bavaria, Lower Saxony, Rhineland-Palatinate, and Schleswig-Holstein). Guided by the Basic Law’s guarantees of liberty, social equality, and security, postwar planners came to view Raumordnung as a vital policy tool that would enable them to guide the country’s economic development in more rational directions, ultimately preventing the social inequality (and chaos) they feared would result from too much freedom in the economic sphere.

Paradoxically, the constitutional guarantees of liberty, equality, and security were being compromised by the affluence that made more West Germans supportive of their democracy. Beginning in the 1950s, West Germany and other industrialized nations witnessed an accelerated increase in land use, the burning of cheaper fossil fuels, and the pollution of water, soil, and air. The democratization of consumer technology, especially during the 1960s, enabled more people to afford household appliances that saved labor and time, but used more energy and created new environmental problems. Washing machines created mounds of suds on lakes and rivers, the result of new detergents containing phosphates that stimulated plant growth, which in turn fueled a population explosion of oxygen-consuming zooplankton, with negative consequences for aquatic ecosystems. Mass motorization, the increased use of oil for home heating, and the expansion of the petroleum products industry heightened demand for oil. This in turn contributed to more spills and leaking fuel tanks—problems collectively dubbed the “oil plague,” a term newly minted during the 1950s.

As West Germans concentrated less on bread and butter issues and focused more on quality of life concerns, conservationists joined cautionary voices across the political spectrum in linking prosperity to worsening pollution and haphazard development. Engineers responded to these threats to health and well-being by developing new technologies to reduce air pollution, and by cooperating with medical researchers to draft guidelines for air quality and acceptable noise levels in cities and the workplace. For their part, conservationists renewed longstanding hopes to play a partnership role in managing land use. During the Miracle Years, conservationists were forced to modernize their practices by adopting more professional and objective scientific standards. Influenced by the prevailing enthusiasm for rational planning during the 1960s, some cooperated more closely with planners, embracing their progressive,
technocratic ambition to design the places where people lived, worked, and relaxed into ordered spaces where each individual enjoyed health, prosperity, and dignity.\textsuperscript{9}

The most tangible result of this uneasy and unequal alliance between conservationists and planners was the nature park program, a topic that forms an important part of this chapter. When launched in 1956 by VNP chairman, Alfred Toepfer, the nature park program appeared to be an example of “conservation as usual”: a private group teamed up with commissioners to combat the perceived ills of modernity, establishing recreational “oases of calm” in idyllic rural settings to offset the “mechanization” of daily life in “denatured” cities. But as federal and state governments devoted more resources to spatial planning at the end of the 1950s, the nature park program became a planning project overseen by experts who could settle competing claims on space made by multiple parties. Regional planners’ involvement forced conservationists to view nature parks not merely as scenic landscapes for rejuvenation (\textit{Erholungslandschaften}), but as “model landscapes” (\textit{Vorbildslandschaften}) that might illustrate how to use the country’s territory more efficiently and equitably.

The nature park program illustrates in a microcosm what influential conservationists wanted to do on a grander scale through inclusion in territorial planning. Influenced by spatial planners’ goals, and concerned about deteriorating environmental conditions, conservationists warned in the late 1950s and early 1960s that West Germany’s entire “living space” (\textit{Lebensraum}) was at risk. Although tainted, this term conveyed ecological awareness that problems ranging from erosion to pollution to sprawl had cumulative effects that directly threatened public health and the quality of life. Two decades after the Nazi regime waged a genocidal war for living space, prominent conservationists rehabilitated the concept, divorcing “\textit{Lebensraum}” from its geopolitical association and using it to give tangibility and definition to a domestic problem. In naming the problem—a living space endangered by West Germany’s economic success—conservationists asserted their professional expertise in restoring the country’s urban and rural landscapes to ecologically healthier conditions. They believed that by helping design a “more natural” and “orderly” living space, they would assist planners in addressing a larger social challenge, namely protecting the dignity and well-being of each individual.

To increase their leverage in decisions about land use, leading conservationists strengthened university degree programs for landscape planning experts and participated in the creation of the German Council for Land Cultivation (\textit{Deutscher Rat für Landespflege}, or DRL), an elite advisory body that turned landscape planners into political actors. The cultivation of landscape planning professionals contributed to the modernization of state-sponsored \textit{Naturschutz}, yet frequently these new experts were disappointed by their inability to influence planning decisions to the same degree as their counterparts representing
more powerful interests, such as industry, transportation, and agriculture. In
addition, by the late 1960s and early 1970s, professional landscape planners
lost touch with “ordinary” lay activists who found new leadership in public
figures with a more confrontational message and style.

*Protecting Prosperity and Health: The Nature Park Program*

The modernization of West German conservation was not all that evident in
the mid 1950s. As the economy rebounded, conservationists more frequently
billed their work as a social amenity, with a familiar rationale. Their worry that
fast-paced urban living threatened physical and emotional health echoed early
twentieth century critiques of industrial society, which reflected an ambiva-
ence toward modernity and fears about “uprooted,” unruly laboring classes
and youths. Such arguments also sounded like a modified version of claims ad-
vanced in some circles since the early twentieth century that the health of racial
groups was organically linked to the health of their surroundings. But height-
ened concern about unhealthy conditions in the country’s expanding cities also
revealed an understanding of health beyond the absence of disease. Higher
expectations for general well-being were indicative of an improved standard
of living in West Germany and other advanced industrial countries. In addi-
tion, a growing body of medical research linked physical illnesses to unhealthy
conditions in cities, most visibly air pollution. In the 1950s, doctors viewed
worsening air pollution as the number one threat to public health.

But some physicians identified a much larger problem. “[N]ot a day goes
by,” one doctor reported in 1955, “without a number of patients complaining
about the two cardinal ailments of our time: nervousness and chronic fatigue.”
Higher instances of stress-related illness (*Managerkrankheit*) and so-called dis-
eases of civilization (*Zivilizationskrankheiten*)—high blood pressure, heart dis-
ease, and cancer—reported in North American research and observed in their
own patients, convinced some West German physicians that people were “no
longer at home” in the hectic, automated urban environment they had created.
According to Joachim Bodamer, the conservative Catholic neurologist and psy-
chologist whom conservationists often cited, the modern world that humans
made “threatens to be our enemy because our body, mind, and sensory organs
originally were made for another world and can no longer adapt.” Bureaucrati-
ization, mechanization, and the frantic pace of urban life, he argued, caused an
emptiness of the spirit, a loss of individual identity, and an inability to cope with
solitude. To combat this perceived cultural malaise, he prescribed relaxation
in natural surroundings, advice that benefited conservationists by giving their
cause a clear social orientation and by offering medical research that might rein-
force their conservative critique of modern society.
The idea to establish public parks for recreation developed in conjunction with the urban public health movement, which emerged in the mid-nineteenth century. By the twentieth century, laws and constitutions recognized the importance of protecting nature for public well-being, including the RNG, which declared in its preamble that the state had the responsibility to provide “even the poorest citizen his share of the beauties of nature.” Several constitutions of West Germany’s new Länder also obliged the state to establish public parks for recreation. The idea found concrete expression in the early 1910s when the VNP purchased land for three public parks, and later in the 1930s when conservationists set aside large landscape reserves in the Rhine and Mosel valleys. In the early 1950s, the Swabian Alb Society cooperated with conservation commissioners and officials to establish “peaceful oases” closed to automobiles in three counties in the region. At the same time, the German Working Group for Fighting Noise (Deutscher Arbeitsring für Lärmbekämpfung), another broad alliance formed in the early 1950s by doctors, engineers, industrialists, and representatives of tourism, promoted “noise-free areas for relaxation.”

Organizations viewed these measures as a partial antidote for a mounting problem. According to a 1955 poll conducted by the Bielefeld-based Emnid Institute, 41 percent of the people interviewed said that noise disturbed them daily. Nearly a quarter claimed that they suffered physical or emotional harm as a consequence of noise from traffic, industry, airplanes, radios, and youth. Conservationists tended to view noise pollution as a matter of maintaining public order, related only indirectly to their work, but they agreed that fighting the problem was “urgently necessary” in the interest of public health. Thus, they encouraged the creation of “oases of calm” closed to automobiles. Not until the early 1960s was research available to establish a clear link between noise pollution and health. According to the Max Planck Institute for Occupational Physiology, low levels of noise caused psychological reactions, but middle range levels could disrupt normal circulation and contribute to anxiety in some people; higher levels of noise could impair hearing permanently. In response to such findings, the Working Group for Fighting Noise and the Society of German Engineers developed guidelines for acceptable levels of noise, which were used to update the civil code and support new ordinances and laws, including federal legislation in 1965 protecting people from construction noise.

In the 1950s, before guidelines and supporting scientific research were available, conservationists responded to noise and air pollution by setting aside “oases of calm” in the countryside. In June 1956, the VNP captured public attention and government endorsement when Toepfer unveiled a plan to establish “spacious, noise-free nature reserve parks” for “the welfare of those seeking rest and recovery, for the satisfaction of youths who love to hike, and for the best of research and science.” Before an audience that included Federal President Heuss and other dignitaries, Toepfer argued that DM 10 million in support
from the federal government—a mere fraction of the DM 10 billion spent on
defense—was a small price to pay to “promote public health” and to “strengthen
love of the homeland.” West Germany, he emphasized, lagged behind other
densely populated nations such as the Netherlands, Japan, and Great Britain in
providing its hard working urban population with “quiet oases.” A media blitz
packaged the parks as “nature’s treasure trove,” and as “sources of strength” for
people and the economy. In these “landscapes for rejuvenation,” office and fac-
tory workers would stretch their limbs (quietly and orderly), temporarily escape
the pollution that plagued the cities, and return to their jobs fully restored and
ready to work.

Originally Toepfer intended for the VNP and other organizations to purchase
land for approximately six parks and administer them privately (as was the case
with VNP property in the Lüneburg Heath). This modest plan quickly expanded
to include twenty, and then thirty-six potential parks, ruling out land purchases,
but calming farmers’ and foresters’ fears of dispossession. Yet the core of Toepfer’s
socially oriented, conservative vision remained in tact for the time being. A num-
ber of popular scenic areas from the North Sea to the Alps would be preserved
(in a static state) and accessible to the public free of charge. By spending time in
rural landscapes that recalled the country’s preindustrial past and represented its
regional homelands, Toepfer reasoned, urbanites would strengthen their bonds
of loyalty to the new democratic German homeland. For Toepfer and Herbert
Offner, the officer for conservation in the Federal Ministry of Agriculture (BML),
oases of calm would cultivate industrious, dependable citizens who derived moral
and physical strength through quiet, solitary activities in nature. According to
Offner, “[w]hoever in this time of automation has not forgotten to listen to their
inner voice will confirm . . . that immersing one’s self in God’s creation contributes
to a renewal of mental and spiritual powers, strengthens and steels the body, and
heals what is not well. Whoever lives in nature, whoever . . . acts in accordance
with nature . . . will be a well-balanced, peace-loving, more communicative—in
short, better—human being.” Worried that city folk were “wasting” their free
time watching Hollywood films, playing sports, listening to the radio, dancing to
rock and roll, and later, viewing television—preferences confirmed by scholarship
on West Germany’s emerging mass consumer culture—Toepfer hoped that nature
parks would facilitate a presumably more constructive use of leisure time. Setting
aside nature parks, he explained in the conservative daily Die Welt, “involves not
only preserving the scenery of landscapes and the nature of our homeland, but also
cultivating the labor of inhabitants of our major cities, and sensibly shaping leisure
time, more of which will be available to us with increasing prosperity.”

Conservationists were not alone in their paternalistic concern to promote con-
structive use of leisure time. As more West Germans enjoyed their Saturdays off,
and as the average workweek shortened from a high of 49 hours in 1955 to approx-
imately 46 hours at the end of the decade, politicians, clergymen, professionals,
and intellectuals fretted that “the masses” would squander their free time on cheap
(American influenced) entertainment, or engaged in immoral activities. Despite
their worries, however, most West Germans stayed close to home reading, garden-
ing, listening to the radio, and visiting with family and friends. Some also opted to
spend a portion of their leisure time outdoors, as was evidenced by the two million
visitors to the Lüneburg Heath in 1955 and the 20,000 cars parked near Titisee in
the Black Forest on Pentecost in 1957. But as Toepfer pointed out, West Germany
had a limited number of large parks—too few to satisfy the growing demand for
outdoor recreation areas near urban centers. And until the 1960s, few people had
the money and time for long distance weekend getaways. Thus, Toepfer’s plan to
establish several nature parks engaged a pressing social issue by providing factory
and office workers with affordable options for using their leisure time in ways
deemed appropriate.  

Yet the renewed popularity of recreation in nature had its drawbacks. As
in previous decades, conservationists complained about people who trampled
vegetation, pitched tents and fished in unauthorized locations, left trash along
trails, in woods and streams, and disrupted nature’s calm with rowdy activi-
ties, and now transistor radios. Some conservationists feared that nature parks
would only encourage such behavior. To assuage these concerns (which they
sympathized with), Toepfer, Offner, and supportive conservationists informed
critics that parks would be carefully mapped out to improve the management of
tourists, whose numbers only would increase.

Toepfer’s attempt to lay down rules for “orderly conduct” in the nature parks
revealed a paternalistic desire to guide the uninitiated in experiencing nature
properly, i.e., according to the preferences of a veteran Wandervogel who nostalgi-
cally recalled solitary nature walks that encouraged introspection and cultivated
self-discipline and self-reliance. But his old fashioned concern for order also ex-
pressed a need to balance preservation with public recreation more effectively, a
challenge that accompanied democratized access to the outdoors. Nature park
supporters were confident, however, that disruptive visitors could be controlled
in landscapes that would be transformed into well-ordered “natural” spaces that
inspired disciplined conduct and served as a model for social harmony. Yet the
specter of unruly urbanites flocking to areas designated as nature parks, and
invading tranquil forests and quiet villages, compelled some communities and
forestry officials to resist the program, especially in Baden-Württemberg where
the first nature park was erected only in the early 1970s.

In general, however, the nature park program found widespread support
among federal, state, and local leaders, irrespective of political party. To ensure
the program’s success, Toepfer turned to government agencies that could balance
competing claims on land by agriculture, industry, the military, recreation, and
communities seeking to expand their economic base. Thus, he worked closely
with Offner and Theodor Sonnemann, state secretary (1949–1961) to Federal
Minister of Agriculture, Heinrich Lübke (CDU). Three federal institutes helped determine the location of parks and prepared general guidelines for the states to use in erecting them: the Federal Agency for Nature Protection and Landscape Care (BANL) under the BML; and the Federal Agency for Regional Geography and the Institute for Regional Planning, both under the Ministry of the Interior (BMI). Between 1957 and 1963, twenty-six parks encompassing over 15,000 square kilometers were established across the country, primarily in the heavily industrialized northern states of North Rhine-Westphalia, Hamburg, and Hesse. By the mid 1970s, Bavaria had the most parks with a total of fifteen. Two decades after the program began, over fifty nature parks had been erected on 15.6 percent (38,828 square kilometers) of the total area of the Federal Republic. By the time of unification in 1990, the former West Germany had sixty-four nature parks covering 22 percent of its territory, a much greater percentage than neighboring France, which in the 1990s had thirty-three similar parks covering 11 percent of its (larger) territory.

Behind this picture of cooperation and success were disagreements over the parks’ primary purpose. In keeping with the VNP’s traditional emphasis on preservation, publicity initially stated that the parks would give equal attention to recreation and stringent preservation. But Toepfer quickly retreated from this position because of protests from farmers and foresters who feared restrictions on the use of their property, and under pressure from Offner, a forester by training. Indicative of the mindset that delayed West Germany’s establishment of national parks and large, stringently protected reserves like other European countries (including heavily populated ones), Offner maintained that “[i]n our densely populated fatherland every square meter of ground serves an economic purpose. A synthesis between nature protection and economics must be found that—with good will on both sides—will not cause any difficulties.” Thus, park advocates struck a compromise: they placed few restrictions on traditional economic uses in the nature parks. When property owners continued to raise objections, park promoters reminded them of their responsibilities to the public weal, including making their property accessible. In turn, Toepfer assured them, visitors would respect the rights of landowners by being “considerate, quiet, and tidy.”

In the first two years of the program, those involved in the research, design, and implementation of the parks remained uncertain about what to call them. BANL Director Gert Kragh, and Toepfer on occasion, referred to them as “national parks” to justify public funding and to convey that these scenic landscapes formed the core of the country’s natural heritage. But Kragh also hoped that conservation commissioners might oversee the administration of the new “national” parks, and thus qualify to receive government salaries and increase their leverage in decisions about land use. Interest in calling the areas “national parks” also reflected considerable activity in the 1950s and 1960s to erect national parks in Europe and elsewhere, and eagerness on the part of West
Germans to conform to western models in protecting nature as a tourist attraction. But the national park designation would have been inappropriate for what West Germans were planning. The areas to be set aside were large relative to the size of the country, but most would be administered by private bodies, not the state, as was expected in national parks. In addition, all of the areas had been influenced by farming or forestry, traditional uses that continued with few restrictions in nature parks. Moreover, the parks did very little to protect nature, one of the core objectives of national parks. It was Offner who found a solution, recommending that West Germany follow the example of Sweden where large recreation areas that permitted some economic use were called “nature parks.”

This designation, too, caught fire from critics who argued that it conjured images of “amusement parks,” not “peaceful oases,” or who justifiably noted that “protection” (Schutz) was absent from the term (and would be from the parks as well). Because of limited attention to preservation, conservation commissioners grew critical of the program. They were especially annoyed when officials not responsible for conservation drafted ordinances for the new nature parks that weakened the protection of existing reserves now included in the parks. They also worried that with so much publicity devoted to nature parks, other responsibilities associated with conservation would receive less government funding.

Because of conservation commissioners’ misgivings, Toepfer and Offner preferred working with regional planners and thus turned to them in 1959 for an appraisal of the VNP’s evolving proposal. When Toepfer first went public with the nature park idea, he was responding to the so-called diseases of civilization—a more up to date version of criticisms of modernity. But planners challenged Toepfer’s understanding of nature parks as the antithesis of “denatured” cities, viewing them instead as extensions of urban areas. “We have a form of existence [today],” the planner Gerhard Isbary argued, “in which work and recreation . . . are inseparable parts of a whole . . . we need rejuvenation outdoors for total rehabilitation of our personality.” Regional planners especially took issue with Toepfer’s backward looking vision to preserve idyllic landscapes from the inevitability of social and economic change. Although there was a decisive social orientation to his plan to make the country’s most popular landscapes accessible to the public free of charge, it overlooked the plight of rural inhabitants whose agrarian way of life was becoming a thing of the past. From the institute’s point of view, nature parks were not natural landscapes needing protection in a static state, but spaces requiring reorganization and design. “In a time of intense structural transformation of society and the economy,” planners asserted, “the idea of preservation is no longer adequate . . . For people of the present, landscapes of the present must be designed, so that the inhabitants of the city find beauty, satisfaction, peace and relaxation, and the country dweller makes a good living.”

Toward this end, planners proposed establishing nature parks in less economically developed areas of the Federal Republic, which were experiencing population
loss as people left struggling small farms behind and migrated to cities in search of better paying jobs. The guiding hand of experts would transform poor rural areas into attractive “model landscapes” (Vorbildlandschaften) that would demonstrate how to use the country’s territory more equitably and efficiently.\textsuperscript{46} The institute referred to nature parks as “model landscapes,” not because they fulfilled an ideal of a scenic area with little sign of development, but because they would serve as the building blocks of spatial planning. In theory, “model landscapes” would reduce sprawl, provide recreation areas for the well-being of an industrious urban labor force, and improve economic conditions in the rural areas designated as nature parks.\textsuperscript{47} Literally speaking, planners sought to “order the space” (Ordnung des Raumes) in which people conducted their daily lives, ultimately to improve the quality of life for all of the country’s inhabitants.

But shaping nature parks into model landscapes was a difficult goal to achieve because of inadequate funding for planning and long term maintenance and because of the economic priorities of local governments.\textsuperscript{48} Until 1962, the federal government provided the bulk of funding to establish nature parks, after which the states, communities, and legal sponsors assumed a greater share of the burden of financing new parks and paying for the upkeep of existing ones. And it was a burden because most communities and sponsors lacked the means to adequately fund comprehensive planning for and constant oversight over the parks.\textsuperscript{49} State conservation and planning offices laid the groundwork for the parks, but sponsor organizations at the local level assumed the work of establishing and maintaining them.\textsuperscript{50} The majority of sponsors were registered private associations, with members including local communities, private organizations, firms, and individuals. Other sponsors took the form of public associations, wherein several communities united for the purpose of running a park (Zweckverband).\textsuperscript{51} In 1963, nature park sponsors formed the Association of German Nature Parks (Verband Deutscher Naturparkträger, VDN) with Toepfer as president.

Ideally, local officials were to draft detailed plans for nature parks within the context of state level territorial plans. In the first decade of the program, however, parks came into being as a result of initiatives at the local level before sufficient planning had been done to manage the parks in conjunction with surrounding areas. In fact, during the 1960s, 80 percent of the funding for nature parks was spent not on long-range planning, but on trails, parking lots, restrooms, campgrounds, and other structures.\textsuperscript{52} Nature parks themselves were organized in three zones to manage the flow of visitors and to serve up an ideal of nature that was clean, ordered, well-furnished, and ready for mass consumption. The outermost area, designed to handle the heaviest impact from tourists, included parking lots, campgrounds, picnic areas, hostels, hotels, gas stations, concessions, and public restrooms, and in some cases, entire vacation villages. Within the core of the parks were benches, lookout towers, hiking, biking, and horseback riding trails, and paths where visitors could learn about flora and fauna. To ensure that
people could relax and move about freely, the parks were to be at least 200 square kilometers. But the size varied, from 38 square kilometers (Harburger Berge, Hamburg) to 2,908 square kilometers (Altmühltal, Bavaria).53

The first new nature park, Hoher Vogelsberg in central Hesse, was established in 1958 to serve as a recreation area for the Rhine-Main region. Though situated in an area experiencing a decline in agriculture, little was done to ensure that the park might ease locals’ transition to a service-oriented economy. The park’s legal sponsor lacked funds to hire experts who might have drafted plans to help attract appropriate businesses and services. Instead, the limited money available was spent primarily on recreational facilities. By 1971, Hoher Vogelsberg recorded forty pensions, three hostels, four ski lifts, one stable, a small wildlife reserve, three campgrounds, over 90 kilometers of hiking trails, and nearly thirty parking lots for 1,500 automobiles. Just over 1 percent of this 385 square kilometer park was stringently protected.54

Because of the lack of planning prior to establishing Hoher Vogelsberg, most states later required sponsors to provide evidence that they had a concrete landscape plan to follow before they were eligible to receive funding.55 A park better planned in relation to the surrounding area was Rothaargebirge, established in North Rhine-Westphalia in 1963. Extensive planning prior to and after the opening of the park took into account that the area was making the transition from a farming economy to one based on tourism. But this park, too, was first and foremost a recreation area, with sixty-two ski lifts, over 100 small parking lots to accommodate 2,500 automobiles, nine playgrounds, over 1,400 kilometers of hiking trails, seven youth hostels, and forty pensions. Less than one percent of the 1,130 square kilometer park was stringently protected.56

The nature park program epitomizes the partially green compromises reached during the Miracle Years. Nature parks responded to consumer demand for recreation areas and helped local economies by stimulating tourism. But the program led the public to believe that steps were being taken to protect nature without restricting economic growth. As conservationists had predicted, preservation was rarely effective in nature parks because their ordinances prioritized recreation and placed few restrictions on forestry and farming or on the settlement of new industry. Some found their sentiments aptly expressed by a conservation commissioner in Aachen who concluded in the late 1960s that many of the parks were threatening nature in their attempt to provide an assortment of recreational activities to satisfy ever diversifying expectations, from “fairytale forests” to mini-golf courses. Partly because of inadequate concern for protecting nature, a vocal minority of conservationists forged ahead with plans to establish West Germany’s first national park where stringent preservation would be a priority, the subject of chapter 7.57

Despite disappointments with the program, commissioners’ participation in setting up nature parks contributed to reforms in the states’ outdated approach
to conservation. By conceptualizing nature parks as a planning challenge, some commissioners joined a growing body of experts shaping decisions about land use and regional development. Viewing nature parks as an aspect of territorial planning elevated the importance of conservation, yet simultaneously subordinated it to broader, more abstract planning decisions. To the frustration of conservationists, planners seemed to consider nature to be little more than “green space” that could be arranged on a map, as part of a larger process of rationally ordering economic development to distribute the fruits of prosperity more evenly among the population. Indicative of the excessive rationalism that pervaded expert planning, by the late 1960s those involved in establishing recreation areas devised a system that allowed them to quantify “objectively” the recreational value of an area, for example, by measuring the distance between meadows and forests or the length of shores. That the parks had more to do with spatial planning than with conservation is indicated by the fact that “nature park” first became a legal category in federal and state laws for territorial planning passed in the 1960s.  

Modernizing and Professionalizing Conservation

During the Miracle Years, conservationists were most concerned about the steady replacement of fertile landscapes with industrialized farms and urban sprawl. Those involved with official conservation hoped to correct this undesirable development by drafting legally binding landscape plans (for areas with few inhabitants) and land use plans (for areas that included settlements) in cooperation with regional planners. As their work overlapped more frequently with planners—most clearly through the nature park program—they joined these experts in linking urban and rural landscapes, conceptualizing them as unified space needing better planning, order, and design.  

Enthused about the possibilities for strengthening conservation by assuming a partnership role in spatial planning, BANL Director Gert Kragh organized the 1959 German Conservation Day around the theme “order in the landscape, order of space.” His move was an attempt to improve communication between commissioners and planners who were at odds over the goals of the nature park program. Another reason for the conference focus was a cost cutting proposal to unite the BANL with the Institute for Spatial Planning in the BMI. The merger did not take place, though as Kragh noted, it might have strengthened the agency by giving it the overarching perspective needed not only to plan nature parks, but also to advise ministries in water management, pollution abatement, and nuclear waste removal.  

In many ways the 1959 annual conference showed state-sponsored conservation at a crossroads. The keynote speaker, Erich Dittrich, Director of the Institute for Spatial Planning, challenged commissioners to abandon cherished
assumptions about their work and adopt a more modern, technocratic perspective. For starters, the concept “landscape,” defined as “countryside” in the RNG, needed to be expanded to reflect the spread of industry, housing, and transportation into what had been countryside. Conservation must not halt where the country meets the city, Dittrich insisted, because that boundary was less clear. Just as urban planners viewed the city in its relationship to the surrounding area and the entire region, conservationists likewise needed to consider their work in connection with urban centers and with people’s needs foremost in mind. Like planners in other industrialized nations at the time, Dittrich believed that regional planning could impose a rational, more harmonious order upon society. Through spatial planning, the state would create the agreed upon conditions for order in the spaces where people conducted their daily lives, ultimately guaranteeing social equality, freedom, and security.61

Kragh accepted the challenge of participating in this ambitious undertaking, explaining to skeptical colleagues that while regional planners refereed competing social, political, economic uses of space, conservationists would be there with plans that defended the landscape, ensuring that it remained healthy for citizens’ well-being. A “healthy landscape,” he clarified, underscoring the economic and recreational value of nature, was one with its “household” in balance and capable of maximum productivity over the long term. But it also was one free of pollution harmful to human health and with the potential to heal people physically, emotionally, and spiritually. For Kragh and other reformers, an ecologically “healthy landscape” looked little different from the landscape ideal that preservationists of previous decades had embraced. It was a patchwork of fertile fields and open meadows, of orchards and parcels of forest with diverse green hues, all stitched together by rows of hedges on a backing with rolling hills. But unlike their predecessors who had envisioned a harmonious blending of nature and technology—of rural tradition and modern engineering—Kragh and other reformers viewed vanishing rural areas as cultural landscapes needing protection from additional intrusions by technology. Disagreeing with the planners, they viewed countryside as space that needed to be preserved in a static state, much like smaller scale nature reserves, to offset the country’s highly engineered landscapes that were rapidly increasing in number. Yet Kragh did not omit conurbations from his reform agenda, for even mechanized cityscapes could be made “more natural” and healthier with parks, gardens, forests, and cleaner air and water.62

According to Kragh, the science of ecology offered the most accurate means of assessing the health of rural and urban landscapes. After inventorying soil, vegetation, bodies of water, and terrain of a specific area, plans would indicate where legally protected reserves existed or ought to be established, where new development projects could be tolerated, and what kind of measures would be needed to restore an ecologically healthy order to places harmed by exploitative use. These plans would be presented at licensing hearings for construction
projects or would aid officials in developing strategies for balancing conservation and economic growth.  

A vocal minority of commissioners resisted Kragh’s timely reform initiative that aimed to professionalize and securely institutionalize conservation. By August 1959, around thirty commissioners had formed the “Bayreuth Circle” opposing the agenda. Led by 70-year-old Carl Duve, long-time commissioner for Hamburg, the group insisted in outdated fashion that their primary duty involved “fulfilling and securing Germans’ longing for primeval nature.” Those who felt inspired to protect nature, Duve argued, were individuals who understood that the “dynamism of the natural creative force” could not be grasped using statistics, scientific facts, or abstract plans. “[A] one-sided specialized education” in landscape planning, they maintained, did not automatically qualify people to serve as fulltime commissioners. It was no substitute for idealism, they implied. The Bayreuth Circle dissolved in a matter of months, but deserves mentioning because it captured the faint echo of a dying voice in landscape care.

Arguments of the Bayreuth Circle also offer evidence of the friction that Kragh and other reformers caused when they tried to modernize conservation by taking on additional planning responsibilities, a move that made nature’s care more reliant on ecology, yet also more abstract and technocratic. Kragh’s colleague and second chairman of the ABN, Otto Kraus, a proponent of scientifically based preservation, concluded that Kragh should step down as chair because his recommendations seemed overly reliant on abstract planning. (Kragh himself was not fond of planners’ tendency to refer to nature and landscapes as “green space.”) In 1962, Kragh left the BANL for a position with the Landscape Association Rhineland (Landschaftsverband Rheinland) in Cologne-Deutz, one of a growing number of planning organizations to emerge outside of the conservation bureaucracy. The BANL remained under the Federal Ministry of Agriculture where it merged with the Institute for Vegetation Science (Vegetationskunde) in 1962, forming the Federal Institute for Vegetation Science, Nature Conservation, and Landscape Care (hereafter BAVNL). Beginning in the mid 1960s, the institute became more research oriented, a telltale sign of the scientification of state-sponsored conservation, which increasingly set it apart from private organizations. The BAVNL went on to complete several studies for federal ministries, among the most important an ecological assessment of “Strains on the Landscape,” published in 1969 as an early state of the environment report.

But state-sponsored conservation was slow to change because there still were too few qualified people to take on responsibilities associated with land use planning, a weakness highlighted in chapter 5, a case study on canalizing the Mosel River. Most state-level conservation commissioners were employed fulltime by the 1960s, but those at the district and local levels continued to hold honorary posts into the 1970s when their agencies were replaced with bureaucratic positions occupied by experts. At the local level, where important decisions
about economic development were made, few commissioners had professional training qualifying them to assist with land use planning. In the 1960s, of West Germany’s 575 local commissioners, forty-one percent (235) had a background in pedagogy. Foresters represented the next highest group at 18 percent (104), followed by civil servants at 13 percent (77), and garden architects at 12 percent (69). Moreover, in 1967 roughly one-third of local commissioners were over sixty-five; a few were over eighty.69

Cultivating a younger generation of professionals to take on expanded planning responsibilities required updating training programs at technical schools and universities.70 And here the Miracle Years witnessed noteworthy achievements, thanks to the efforts of individuals like Konrad Buchwald (1914–2003), another veteran of the back-to-nature youth movement, a former state conservation commissioner, and a self-described proponent of ecology from the right. As Director of the Institute for Landscape Care and Conservation at the Technical University of Hanover (1960–1979), Buchwald was instrumental in strengthening existing programs in the mid 1960s to better reflect the range of competencies a new generation of professional landscape planners would need to fill the growing number of jobs with government planning, construction, and transportation offices, and in the private sector. In addition to general courses in chemistry, biology, botany, and physics, there were specialized ones in fields ranging from soils, hydrology, and meteorology, to animal ecology and synecology. Because human beings were at the center of all efforts to develop and conserve the landscape, Buchwald argued, students needed exposure to human ecology, sociology, public health, urban planning, and architecture, as well as the legal foundations of regional and land use planning. After completing exams and a thesis, the candidate earned a masters degree in horticulture and entered a two year probationary period.71 To be sure, “horticulture” was an inadequate designation for a program with such breadth. But the label serves as a reminder of the influence that garden and landscape architecture traditionally had on conservation in Germany and elsewhere in Europe, where hybrid landscapes sculpted by human use were the object of protection and design. This degree program was but one of many that were eventually instituted in technical schools and universities to cultivate experts who could approach decisions about conservation and land use from a holistic perspective, one grounded in the social and natural sciences.

In search of a label that would express the broad range of competencies associated with the new class of professional landscape planners, Buchwald dusted off the concept “Landespflege,” which literally means “land cultivation,” and gave it a more precise definition. “Land cultivation,” he explained, had three dimensions: the preservation of species, biotopes, and rural landscapes (in his view, the embodiment of ecologically healthy land); the greening of urban areas; and the ecological restoration of land adversely affected by economic uses. A term with roots in the Enlightenment, “land cultivation” came to be associated with state planning on
a grand scale during the Third Reich when landscape architects used it to express
their ambitious racial plan for total planning authority in transforming land in the
East into a living space that would sustain the Aryan race. In the Federal Republic,
“land cultivation” remained a technical term used in diverse ways by professionals
with training in landscape architecture. During the 1960s, however, the practice of
Landespflege as outlined more precisely by Buchwald served as the primary vehicle
for modernizing state-sponsored conservation by linking it to spatial planning and
giving it clear ecological underpinnings. According to Buchwald, insights from
ecology—the science concerned with the reciprocal relationship between animals,
plants, and their surroundings—were needed to come to terms with the threat-
ened “environment” (Umwelt) of human beings. But no science, including ecology
with all of its branches, is value neutral.

In theory and in practice, ecologized Landespflege expressed the social conser-
vatism of its principle proponent. A conservative at heart, Buchwald still fretted
in the early 1960s that too many people took early retirement because of health
problems stemming from lost spiritual ties to nature and from living in the “de-
natured urban environment.” Never before, he argued, had humans made such
demands on “their living space, the landscape.” In less than a generation, the hu-
man created world of managed forests, mechanized farms, high rises, suburbs,
industrial complexes, airports, highways, and rail networks had been layered
more thickly over the natural world, rapidly replacing it, creating out of a “near-
natural environment” an “artificial Ersatz world” which threatened physical and
emotional health. And there was ample evidence to support these views in new
research by the Max Planck Institute for Occupational Physiology, which linked
illnesses to pollution and hectic work environments and in official reports, such
as one by the US Outdoor Recreation Commission, which emphasized nature’s
therapeutic value. But if humans had built these unhealthy surroundings, Buch-
wald asserted, expressing tempered optimism about technocratic solutions, pro-
fessional landscape planners could restore them to a “more natural” order and
ensure that a “life of dignity remained possible.” Such views indicate that Buch-
wald’s vision for modernizing conservation contained not only conservative ele-
ments, but progressive ones as well. His agenda was progressive in its concern
to protect individual dignity, but paternalistic in its conviction that only expert
planners could impose a presumably more rational, natural, and healthy order
on the environment for the benefit of the masses.

**Toward the Protection of “Living Space”**

Whether socially conservative or politically liberal, a number of influential
West Germans reached a consensus in the late 1950s and early 1960s that the
country’s agglomerations where a near majority of the population lived had
become “disordered,” unhealthy, and a threat to individual dignity. Efforts to control urban pollution in the Federal Republic have been examined in numerous articles and books, and thus do not need a detailed discussion here. Suffice it to say that the boom years were a time of unprecedented media coverage and legislative activity aimed at mitigating worsening pollution. The Federal Republic was not alone in focusing on pollution control in the late 1950s and early 1960s, passing laws to manage the water supply (1957), to maintain clean air (1959), and belatedly to ban DDT (1972), eight years after Rachel Carson’s *Silent Spring* appeared in translation and quickly became a top ten best seller in West Germany. Increased concern throughout the industrialized world about pollution and the quality of life in cities reflected a tendency in these countries to shift attention to the negative aspects of prosperity after a period of steady economic growth. This had been the case also in the 1890s and the 1920s. In addition, however, a more affluent population with higher expectations for the good life had grown less tolerant of pollution.

Moreover, threats to the water supply and air pollution had increased to the extent that they could not be ignored without compromising public health. To note some of the more glaring examples, the country’s largest lake, Lake Constance, was dying from industrial effluents and untreated sewage that had tipped its ecosystem out of balance, compromising its recreational value and its ability to supply communities with drinking water. Plans in the 1960s to lay an oil pipeline along the Austrian side of the lake and to build a shipping canal connecting Lake Constance to the Rhine at Basel were abandoned in the face of determined opposition from conservationists and city governments, such as Stuttgart which tapped into the lake for their water supplies. The Rhine registered the impact of an even longer period of exploitative use by riparian states. Over several decades, chemical industries and the hydroelectric, petroleum, and nuclear companies they relied on, had reduced the river to “one long ‘sacrificed stretch’” that was declared “near-dead” in the mid 1970s. Despite water management laws, West Germany’s rivers, lakes, and coasts grew more polluted until the trend began to be reversed in the 1970s.

Slightly more hopeful were efforts to reduce air pollution, a problem that had grown intolerable in the 1950s in the Ruhr, prompting organized protests from city governments and educated middle class citizens who formed local emergency alliances in cities like Duisburg, Essen, and Bochum. At the end of the decade, some citizens ratcheted up the pressure on polluters and lawmakers by bringing charges against industrial firms. In addition, in 1961, West Berlin mayor Willy Brandt (SPD) made air quality and public health central issues in his unsuccessful campaign against Adenauer for the chancellor’s post. Seeking support from the eight million voters in the Ruhr, Brandt called for “blue skies” over the industrial region, justifying the novel focus of his political campaign with research linking air pollution to higher instances of cancer. The
winning CDU/CSU parties trivialized the “blue skies” slogan, even though that year 1.5 million tons of particulate matter rained on the Ruhr and four million tons of sulfur dioxide put over 400 square kilometers of forest in the region at risk.\textsuperscript{80} By the mid 1960s, air quality actually improved somewhat because of new laws, federal emissions guidelines (issued in 1964), and better technologies. The installation of electric filters in industry in the Ruhr reduced particulate matter (dust decreased from 310,000 tons in 1963 to 245,000 tons in 1968) and higher smokestacks distributed sulfur dioxide in lower concentrations, though without reducing the amount of gas emitted. But these measures did not address the growing threat from motor vehicles emitting lead and carbon monoxide.\textsuperscript{81}

The challenge facing advanced industrial societies such as West Germany involved more than fighting pollution in the urban environment. According to the liberal Süddeutsche Zeitung, 10 percent of the country was built over with homes, industry, highways, rail networks, and airports, or saturated with “the waste of civilization” in the form of pollution, toxins, and garbage. And it seemed as if the hunger for space would not subside because every year an area the size of Munich was converted into a city or road.\textsuperscript{82} By the mid 1960s, West Germany had over three thousand kilometers of highway, more than nearly all other western European nations combined, and second behind the US.\textsuperscript{83} The face of the countryside, too, was changing radically as land consolidation accelerated under pressure to compete within the European Economic Community (EEC) and in the global marketplace. Researchers with the BANL reported in 1961 that each day in West Germany, 60 hectares of farmland (primarily holdings of 10 hectares or less) went out of production, replaced by new homes, industries, or roads, or by large scale farming operations run by fewer people. Rationalized agriculture meant that more food could be produced on less land. Yet it also meant more monocultures and fewer plant and animal species, more heavy machinery that compacted the soil, and heavier applications of pesticides and fertilizers that poisoned drinking water with excess nitrogen and phosphorus.\textsuperscript{84}

But some of the statistics bandied about at the time were misleading. If 10 percent of West German territory was covered by settlement (an area that corresponded to the country’s two dozen urban concentrations), then around 90 percent was not. According to regional planners writing in the late 1970s, 84 percent of the country’s “economic space” existed in the form of forests or farmland, in their estimation “a remarkably high proportion for a densely populated industrial state.”\textsuperscript{85} Furthermore, not all of the farms that fell out of production became a factory, road, or housing settlement. Without underestimating the dramatic changes effected by the crisis in agriculture (like that in mining occurring simultaneously as West Germans and other Europeans shifted to oil as a cheaper source of fuel), it is important to point out that some farmland was “recycled” back into use as forests or recreation areas. Similarly, abandoned
Ordering Landscapes and "Living Space" in the Miracle Years, 1956–1966

Gravel pits, mines, and harbors became the focus of renaturing projects in and near metropolitan areas. But in the face of rapid, exploitative land use, these efforts seemed insignificant. As the crisis in agriculture transformed the countryside at a dizzying pace and polluted cities spread outward, conservationists viewed urban and rural areas as unified "living space" needing better planning, order, and design.

The most promising and democratic vision for addressing the cumulative problems that seemed to threaten West Germans' "living space" was expressed in the Green Charter of Mainau, an often cited document made public in 1961 by the Swedish-born nobleman, Graf Lennart Bernadotte, President of the German Horticulture Society. In the latter 1950s, Bernadotte convened a series of roundtable discussions, or "Green Parliaments," on the Island of Mainau on Lake Constance attended by prominent individuals in government, science, and culture to examine threats to nature and public health. Eager to convert roundtable talks into a concrete reform program, Bernadotte organized a commission that included some of the country's most influential conservationists from the field of landscape architecture, including Buchwald and Kragh, to draw up a charter of principles that would serve as the "green" conscience of the nation.

Unveiled in June, the Green Charter declared that "[t]he basic foundations of our life have fallen into danger because vital elements of nature are being dirtied, poisoned and destroyed." The document asserted that the "dignity of human beings is threatened where his natural environment (Umwelt) is damaged." Grounded in Articles 1, 2, and 14 of the Basic Law, which guaranteed the protection of human dignity, liberty, and the right of inheritance respectively, the charter insisted that a "healthy living space" in city and country was a basic inviolable human right. "For the sake of human beings," the twelve demands of the charter called for regional planning at all levels of government to consider the natural conditions of an area, and for landscape plans to guide the construction of housing, industries, and transportation in all communities. It demanded public access to mountains, lakes, rivers, forests, and scenic landscapes, and adequate space for recreation in and near cities. Because the "living space" was already damaged, however, the charter called for more effective soil and water conservation to restore "a healthy household in nature" and insisted that measures should be taken to repair unavoidable intrusions from mining and construction. Realizing these goals, the charter emphasized, required more research, better laws, heightened public awareness through improvements in education, and "a readjustment in thinking by the entire population."

The Green Charter did not mark a bold departure from current practices, but the consolidation of years of work by many. Since the mid 1950s, for example, federal and state governments had worked together to improve spatial planning. The year the charter was published, the federal government issued a comprehensive spatial planning report, which pledged to make the Basic Law's
guarantees of liberty, equality, and security the basis for territorial planning. In conjunction with the nature park program, the BANL worked to make legally binding land use plans an integral part of regional planning, and private organizations and state and federal officials had begun to set aside “green spaces” for public recreation. The charter’s reference to sustainable agriculture reflected the federal government’s “Green Plan,” which appropriated funds to encourage farmers to plant shelterbelts to control erosion. For nearly a decade, organizations like the DNR and the ABN had demanded better instruction in the biological sciences. Finally, since its founding in the early 1950s, the IPA had taken the lead in passing laws to control pollution and practice conservation in tandem with development.

To transform the charter’s ambitious principles into deeds, in 1962 Bernadotte convinced Federal President Lübke (1959–1969, CDU) to serve as the official patron of the German Council for Land Cultivation (Deutscher Rat für Landespflege, or DRL). The DRL was a body of publicly prominent individuals who weighed in on controversial proposals such as the Upper Rhine canal and the establishment of the country’s first national park in the Bavarian Forest, two projects it opposed. The council’s membership, which fluctuated between eleven and fourteen members in its early years, initially included men who overwhelmingly came from the generation born in the late Wilhelmine Empire. Several also had helped draft the charter (leaving some private conservation groups to grumble about the preponderance of landscape architects). In addition to Bernadotte, the council included Buchwald, IPA chairman Otto Schmidt, Professor Erich Kühn, a specialist in urban and land use planning at the Technical University in Aachen, federal constitutional court justice Erwin Stein, and Theodor Sonnemann, former state secretary in the federal agriculture ministry and the new president of the Raiffeisenverband, a league representing farmers’ interests. In 1963, Alfred Toepfer came on board as did Gerhard Olschowy, later director of the BAVNL (1964–1976). The country’s leading ecologist, Wolfgang Haber, joined the elite group in 1980, serving as the council’s speaker from 1991 until 2003. Like so many other conservation initiatives in Germany, the DRL united private and public efforts, an arrangement that gave it semi-official status and increased its influence, primarily in the 1960s while Lübke remained in office. (Lübke resigned in 1969 after it was proven that he had drafted plans for concentration camps.) The DRL’s relations with subsequent federal presidents would never be so close, nor would it acquire the political clout its founder desired.

Some historians question the significance of the DRL, arguing that it did little to alter public consciousness or political institutions. Yet the council deserves attention because it is an example of professional landscape planners functioning as political experts to address societal concerns. Contrary to the DRL’s claim to be an independent body offering objective assessments of issues for the common good, however, it was a self-selected group of men that tended
to view problems from the narrow perspective of landscape planning and was not immune to trumping the views of locals with the opinions of nationally known specialists who reflected the council’s preferences. The DRL espoused a conservatism that was evident in its political strategy. In the words of one recent study, it was “conservative, harmonizing, [and] elitist” in presuming to know what was best for the public good, yet also “progressive [and] technocratic” in relying on the authority of specialists to sway public opinion on issues that ranged from managing solid waste to balancing tourism and preservation in the Bavarian Alps.  

Partly because of the Green Charter’s association with a nobleman and an exclusive circle of government officials and experts, its democratic vision did not produce public outcry or inspire protests. And yet the document left an important legacy in maintaining that “individual and . . . political freedom can unfold only in a living space with healthy conditions for existence,” an assertion that made healthy surroundings an inviolable human right. It affirmed that having a space in which one could live with dignity and realize one’s potential was fundamental to an improved quality of life. Moreover, the emphasis on protecting humanity’s living space expressed recognition of the need to confront vast new problems threatening West Germans in whatever space they lived—in the countryside or the city.  

In contrast to some old guard conservationists who continued to presume that urbanites needed to flee the city for the countryside on occasion to restore their sense of well-being, the charter (if not all DRL members) viewed the city as an environment in which the individual could find fulfillment. In addition, it expressed a vision for placing conservation on the same level as, not subordinate to, economic development. Finally, the charter brought together problems that heretofore had been considered independently, prompting conservationists to demand administrative reforms.

Not long after the charter was publicized, DNR President Hans Krieg complained to a Bundestag deputy that the present organization of official conservation, with its lack of funding and qualified personnel would amount to “pitiful piecework” when confronted with the daunting challenge ahead: the “protection of living space.” To ensure a holistic approach in tackling this problem, Krieg proposed the establishment of a new ministry for living space (Lebensraum) with departments for species preservation, pesticide control, water and air purity, and landscapes (which, he explained, included parks and reserves, social hygiene, and climate). Adenauer did not establish a ministry for protecting living space or for spatial planning (as Kragh had suggested), but he did create a new Ministry for Health Affairs in 1961, which was responsible for air, noise, and water pollution, along with public health.

To contemporary readers, it appears that Krieg was appealing for an environment ministry, but his and other conservationists’ choice of terminology was odd, for “Lebensraum” was a concept with a troubled past. In the early twentieth century,
plant geographers had used “living space” to refer to a niche that supported a community of plants (*Lebensgemeinschaft*). Some preservationists applied these scientific insights in commentaries on homeland landscapes, suggesting that the natural geography of a particular place played a key role in shaping its human occupants, in some cases approaching geographic determinism. During the 1930s and 1940s, *Lebensraum* had come to be associated with the primordial soil from which a racially pure *Volk* would be sustained and uplifted.\(^{101}\) In the latter 1950s, conservationists rehabilitated the concept, suppressing its association with the expansionist, genocidal policies of the Nazi regime and using it to capture their sense of alarm about the rapid loss of space that remained fertile, scenic, and pollution free. How, they implied, could people living in such unhealthy surroundings continue to prosper economically, culturally, and physically? Such concerns sounded uncomfortably similar to those expressed by some landscape architects during the Nazi era, who had claimed that the German *Volk*, with its “biological origins in nature,” needed “healthy” scenic landscapes to remain racially pure and physically robust.\(^{102}\) Yet such racialized understandings of the relationship between humans and nature do not appear in conservationists’ statements from the 1950s and 1960s. Nor is there evidence that conservationists even considered using their appeal to safeguard *Lebensraum* as a mask for discriminating against the growing number of non-Germans living within their borders. (Between 1960 and the early 1970s, the Federal Republic’s population of foreign guest workers from southern Europe and Turkey increased from 279,000 to around two million.\(^{103}\))

In its most basic scientific definition, *Lebensraum* means “habit,” but it also implies an understanding of the reciprocal relationship between a species and its surroundings—in this case the human species. Unlike familiar terms such as “*Naturschutz*” and “*Landschaftspflege*,” the concept of a threatened “living space” gave tangibility to conservationists’ fear that people had constructed an environment which had become so engineered—so denatured—that it threatened their health and compromised their quality of life. Reflecting these changes in human surroundings, “nature” was displaced somewhat in conservationists’ discourse by the more abstract and versatile concept “space” (*Raum*). This discursive shift was significant, for it expressed a weakening of the mental association of “nature” with scenic rural landscapes, and opened up the possibility for seeing urban areas as “natural” to their human occupants.

Conservationists’ concern to protect *Lebensraum* was reinforced by federal and state government efforts to implement spatial planning (*Raumordnung*). It also appears to have reached a crescendo in 1961, the year the Berlin Wall went up, making reunification with East Germany seem more remote. The increased use of “living space” was perhaps, on some level, if not a conscious one, an expression of some conservationists’ attempts to come to terms with the Federal Republic’s eastern political boundary. Their near obsession with a loss of space
after WWII had, by the Miracle Years, shifted to a concern about the lack of order in the increasingly urban, industrial space that remained theirs to shape. A film produced by the Federal Ministry of Agriculture in the mid 1960s captures this change in perception. Entitled “Landscape, our Living Space,” footage documented how an increase in population, wealth, and wants consumed more and more land for housing, industry, and transportation. To compete in the EEC and global market, less land was farmed more intensively, exhausting the soil while leaving other tracts fallow. The consequences of disorderly development were evident in stinking lakes, dead rivers, poisoned soil, smog and constant noise, and gravel pits that became garbage dumps filled with the waste of consumer society. But, the film emphasized, “[w]e suffer less from a lack of space than from a lack of order in this space.”

Before the term “environment” (Umwelt) was popularized around 1970 and environment ministries were established, West German officials attempted to address interrelated threats to human surroundings as a whole by establishing public health ministries and strengthening spatial planning at all administrative levels. In 1965, after a decade of work, the Federal Spatial Planning Act was passed, establishing general guidelines for imposing order on the future development of the entire country. The law stipulated that land use plans were to include measures to protect nature, maintain clean air and water, protect the public against noise, and set aside spaces for recreation. The Länder, which had primary jurisdiction over spatial planning as they did for conservation and water management, were responsible for drafting statewide territorial plans, working closely with lower level officials to meet local needs. Communities had the final say in planning decisions that affected them directly—in general a desirable arrangement. But too often during the economic boom years local leaders were more concerned to attract revenue-generating industries for the short term than to conserve resources and protect public health over the long term. But the basic premise of postwar Raumordnung—to promote constitutional guarantees of liberty, social equality, and security—had taken root in public consciousness, arguably as part of a larger process in West Germany of “internalizing democratic values.” These democratic ideals served as a rallying point for early advocates of environmental protection (Umweltschutz).

During the Miracle Years noise, air, and water pollution, sprawl and exploitative land use rapidly changed the face of cityscapes and countryside, capturing unprecedented attention in the media, political campaigns, opinion polls, and stirring concern among more diverse groups of society. As historian Raymond Dominick maintained some years ago, the environmental movement of the 1970s did not emerge suddenly, but “grew gradually out of strong antecedents,” including those of the 1950s and 1960s. During these years, the West German government enacted federal guideline laws to manage the water supply, reduce air pollution, and consider conservation in the context of spatial planning. The
states, which had primary jurisdiction over these areas, passed more substantive legislation, though implementation varied in effectiveness. The Federal Ministry of Health Affairs, established in 1961, assumed responsibility for air, noise, and water pollution, but no specific office or ministry existed at the federal or state level to administer threats to human surroundings as a whole. After several months of close attention to pollution, sprawl, and related environmental problems, media coverage temporarily leveled off in the mid 1960s. Public interest waned and new crises erupted over the outdated education system and the mining industry. In addition, some grew frustrated over the cost of reducing pollution, while others concluded that threats to “living space” were being managed through diverse measures, from establishing nature parks to investing in new technologies for controlling pollution.107

In the late 1950s and early 1960s, when environmental conditions deteriorated perceptibly, conservationists found themselves at a crossroads. To prevent marginalization, individuals such as Kragh, Buchwald, and Bernadotte modernized Naturschutz by strengthening its institutional foundations and by engaging some of the most pressing social issues of the Miracle Years. Through participation in the nature park program, for example, conservationists helped address public health concerns and spatial planning challenges, though rarely to the extent they desired. By improving university degree programs for professional landscape planners, Buchwald and others ensured that experts employed full-time in the bureaucracy eventually replaced honorary conservation commissioners. Armed with specialized scientific knowledge, these new professionals hoped to have greater leverage than their idealistic predecessors in political decisions about the use of resources and space. There is some truth to the charge that landscape planners like Buchwald hoped to transform their field into a discipline with significant planning authority. Privileged by their scientific expertise, they expected to play a leading role in spatial planning, not merely a supporting one. As professional landscape planners, they would set the ground rules for using resources and space, determining whether or not those uses conformed to their conservative ideal of healthy landscapes and of healthy living. But this “claim to power” was ultimately incompatible with democracy.108

While this argument rings true to a degree, it is overstated. When viewed in the context of the 1960s—a decade marked by euphoria over rational planning across the industrialized world—landscape planners’ bid for greater influence is understandable. Their ambitions also reflected the desire to set ecological considerations on equal footing with economic ones, a goal that required increasing landscape planners’ political leverage vis-à-vis other powerful interests, most notably industry, the military, and agriculture. Spatial planning laws of the 1960s marked only the first step in this direction. But what of conservationists’ commitment to democratic ideals? Although conservationists were like other social conservatives in remaining skeptical of mass democracy, the Green Charter of
Mainau stands as a clear statement of their support for constitutional guarantees of liberty, security, and individual dignity.\textsuperscript{109}

Influenced by policy makers’ attention to spatial planning, leading conservationists came to view urban and rural landscapes as a unified living space, one increasingly at risk and—critical for a more democratic outlook—a threat to individual dignity. Yet they, like government officials, remained unclear about the role that citizens should play in planning the development of their communities. The institutionalization and scientification of landscape planning widened the gap between experts and “ordinary” citizens, the former relying on presumably objective knowledge to make decisions for the public good and the latter often prioritizing personal experience. The new German Council for Land Cultivation, for example, assumed that an alliance of professional landscape planners and social and political elites could wield influence at the highest levels of government, remaining above partisan politics while implementing an ambitious vision expressed in the Green Charter—without the participation of citizens who were its central concern. This is not an entirely unusual development in contemporary politics where technocratic expertise exists in tension with democratic decision making.\textsuperscript{110} But as Vilma Sturm, an editor for the conservative \textit{Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung}, wrote in 1966, citizens needed to take more responsibility for a “green environment” by holding political leaders accountable for development decisions, demanding fewer kilometers of highway, and reducing the amount of trash they generated.\textsuperscript{111} In the latter 1960s, a minority of West Germans were increasingly angry over their exclusion from planning decisions adversely affecting the quality of life in their communities.\textsuperscript{112} By then, they were more willing to respond to appeals like Sturm’s and the one made in 1966 by Bernhard Grzimek, the DNR president (1963–1968) and popular television personality making his debut as a charismatic and confrontational leader in West German conservation: “We all live in a democracy [where] public opinion matters.” Rather than look to him to take action on their behalf, Grzimek urged supporters, “do something yourself. Have civil courage.”\textsuperscript{113}

Grzimek issued this challenge in increasingly turbulent times. In 1966, economic recession, growing dissent from an emerging New Left, and increased support in state parliamentary elections for a right-wing neo-Nazi party convinced political leaders that a strong, stable government was essential. As support for Chancellor Ludwig Erhard (1963–1966) collapsed, the CDU/CSU formed a coalition government in November 1966 with the other major party, the Social Democrats. The former Nazi, Kurt Georg Kiesinger (CDU) became Chancellor and the anti-Nazi Willy Brandt (SPD) served as Foreign Minister. But the Grand Coalition (1966–1969) left some West Germans feeling as though they had no means to express dissent within the political system. This view was strongest among the younger generation who had come of age in an affluent society and had grown increasingly critical of the wartime generation.
which seemed to have become too comfortable, complacent, and conservative. Encouraged by the emergence across the industrialized world of a counterculture opposed to consumerism, war, and conformity, and by expanded access to universities (which were overcrowded and had outdated curricula and authoritarian professors), West German students, supported by leftist intellectuals, insisted that only “extraparliamentary opposition” (Außerparlamentarische Opposition, or APO)—activism outside of traditional political institutions—would challenge the status quo. Students’ sensational public protests, the sharp tone of their leftist anti-establishment rhetoric, and their fundamental questioning of modern industrialism left an indelible mark on the political culture in which environmental reforms of the 1970s were debated and implemented, a topic picked up again in chapter 6.114

Notes

2. Berghahn, Modern Germany, 226–28; Fulbrook, Divided Nation, 183–84.


19. At the time, West Germany had an average population density of about 200 people per square kilometer and no national parks. Great Britain had 208 people per square kilometer and ten national parks, all established in the 1950s. Japan, with 232 people per square kilometer, boasted seventeen national parks by the mid 1950s, two erected in 1955. The
Netherlands, with 308 people per square kilometer, had three national parks at the time. See the UN List of Protected Areas at <http://www.wcmc.org.uk/protected_areas/UN_list/index.htm.> (accessed 8 August 2001).

21. There are over fifty newspaper clippings covering Toepfer’s public announcement in the VDN Archive, Niederhaverbeck, Lüneburg Heath, binder entitled “Neue Naturparke. Die einzelnen Gebiete und Presse, 1956.” “Schatzkammer der Natur,” and “Naturschutzparke—Kraftquellen unseres Volkes,” two films produced in 1956 by Eugen Schuhmacher to promote the program, are available in the VNP Archive.


41. Gert Kragh to Alfred Toepfer, 18 February 1957; Kragh to Toepfer, 1 March 1957, both in VDN Archive, “Schriftwechsel mit den Bundesanstalten 1957”; Egon Selchow to Kragh, 7 October 1958, VDN Archive, “Schriftwechsel mit Institut für Landeskunde und BANL, 1.1.58-1.9.61.”


45. Erich Dittrich, “Der Ordnungsgedanke der Landschaft und die Wirklichkeit,” Verhandlungen (1959): 127. See also Dittrich to Alfred Toepfer, 10 September 1959; Toepfer to Institute for Regional Planning, 25 August 1959, both in VDN Archive, “Bundesbehörde und Anstalten.”


48. Theodor Sonnemann, “Der Naturschutz- und Naturparkgedanke in der Sicht der Raumordnung,” Naturschutzparke, no. 27 (October 1962): 1–6, esp. 5; Alfred Toepfer, “Naturschutz,
In 1957, the federal government provided DM 250,000, but increased this amount to DM 900,000 the following year. Between 1959 and 1966, federal funding for nature parks and other recreation areas fluctuated between DM 1,350,000 and DM 1,800,000. Federal support fell after the 1966–1967 recession. Between 1967 and 1970, appropriations ranged from DM 752,000 to DM 809,000. Between 1956 and 1959, the states spent DM 307,000 on nature parks, but their contributions increased steadily, reaching DM 7,132,000 in 1975 (roughly equal to the federal government’s outlay for recreation areas that year.) Third party contributions grew from DM 350,000 in 1957 to DM 11,677,000 in 1975, or roughly 44 percent of the total expenditures for nature parks. See Koeppel and Mrass, “Natur- und Nationalparke,” in Olschowy, Natur- und Umweltschutz, 807; Koeppel, “20 Jahre Naturparkprogramm—Finanzierung und aktueller Entwicklungszustand,” N & L 51, no. 5 (1976): 130–36.


54. Hanstein, Entwicklung, 64–65; Nickel and Mrass, “Entwicklungsstand der Naturparke,” N & L 48, no. 6 (1973): 168–69. The size of the park is based on figures from 1975. There is no indication of how much land in the park was protected in the form of nature reserves at that time, so figures from the early 1990s are used. See VDN, “Naturparkliste. Stand Januar 1992,” in author’s possession.


60. Director of the Institute for Regional Planning (Erich Dittrich) to Dr. Keßler, Federal Ministry of the Interior, 17 April 1959, copy in BAK, Federal Ministry of Agriculture (B 116)/10831 (hereafter BAK B 116/10831).


64. Carl Duve (for the Bayreuth Circle) to conservation commissioners, August 1959, VDN Archive, “Schriftwechsel mit Institut für Landeskunde und BANL, 1.1.58-1.9.61.”


68. Buchwald, “Zukunftsaufgaben,” Verhandlungen (1957): 36; Mrass, Organisation, table 24; Engels, Naturpolitik, 46. State commissioners in Rheinland-Palatinate, Schleswig-Holstein, and Bremen still held honorary posts. District commissioners were employed fulltime in Baden-Württemberg (with four) and North Rhine-Westphalia (with six). In Bavaria, three of seven district commissioners had fulltime positions. Figures for district commissioners in Saarland, Schleswig-Holstein, Hamburg, Bremen, and West Berlin are unavailable.


74. Buchwald, Zukunft des Menschen, 8, 15, 41.

75. See for example Brüggemeier, Tschernobyl; Brüggemeier and Rommelspacher, Blauer Himmel; Dominick, Environmental Movement; Wey, Umweltpolitik; Uekötter, Rauchplage; Kluge and Schramm, Wasserlöhe; Mangun, Environmental Policy.


77. Dominick, Environmental Movement, 183–87; McCormick, Reclaiming Paradise, 49.


88. Several studies mention the charter, including Bergmeier, Umwelthgeschichte, 15–16; Brüggemeier, Tschernobyl, 200–201; Dominick, Environmental Movement, 144–46; Hermand, Grüne Utopien, 129; Oberkrome, “Deutsche Heimat,” 438–35; Wey, Umweltpolitik, 169–70; most extensively, Engels, Naturpolitik, chap. 3.


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93. Engels, Naturpolitik, 139–43.

94. Wey, Umweltpolitik, 170.

95. Engels, Naturpolitik, 139–54, quote from p. 152.

96. Engels, Naturpolitik, 149.


98. Engels, Naturpolitik, 131–35; Bergmeier, Umweltgeschichte, 15–16.


101. Lekan, Imagining, 114–16, 244–47.

102. Lekan, Imagining, 244.

103. Berghahn, Modern Germany, 227.


106. On West Germans’ gradual acceptance of democracy see Jarausch, Recivilizing Germans, 139–47, quote from p. 139.


109. Compare Engels, Naturpolitik, 135, 142–43, 149. Engels concludes that drafters of the charter referenced the Basic Law primarily as a tactical move to associate their agenda with high politics.


