With Germany’s unconditional surrender on 8 May 1945, World War II in Europe ended. Central government in Germany collapsed and the country was divided into four zones of occupation under American, British, French, and Soviet military control. During the first years of the Allied occupation, many Germans suffered to a degree that they had not known during the war when the Nazi regime had had access to abundant natural resources and the spoils of conquest. In the wake of total defeat, Germany lost 25 percent of its prewar territory, surrendering the former provinces of Pomerania, Silesia, and East Prussia, which today form part of Poland and Russia. This transfer of land meant giving up well-stocked forests and productive large farms. In the western zones of occupation under US, British, and French administration, small farms prevailed. But thousands of these land holdings lay in ruins, making it difficult to feed the population adequately. Prolonging the scarcity of food were shortages of fertilizer and horses that hindered planting in the autumn of 1945 and below average harvests over the next few years.

Securing adequate housing posed additional challenges for occupation authorities. An estimated 20 percent of all dwellings in the four zones had been destroyed in the war. In the more industrialized Ruhr and Rhineland, an even larger percentage was lost, in some cases more than 50 percent. To rebuild homes, industry, and railway lines required vast amounts of timber and other raw materials that were in short supply because of territorial losses, reparations obligations, and tensions among the Allies. At the Potsdam Conference in the

Notes for this chapter begin on page 75.
summer of 1945, the Allies agreed that the more densely populated, industrial western zones of Germany would receive shipments of food and timber from the smaller, more agricultural eastern sector under Soviet control. In exchange, the Soviets would take some reparations from industries in the west that had escaped destruction. But mounting tensions between the western Allies and the Soviets over the latter’s excessive reparations disrupted shipments of food and timber to the west. The global scarcity of food and natural resources brought on by years of fighting and by a temporary drop in international trade made it all the more difficult to secure imports needed to provide Germans with a minimum standard of living.

Compounding hardships in the western zones was the steady arrival of thousands upon thousands of refugees. Between 1944 and 1948 thirteen million people—refugees fleeing the Red Army, ethnic Germans brutally expelled from Eastern Europe (some of them only recently resettled in what had been Nazi-occupied territory), and other displaced persons—moved west, ending up in what became the British and American sectors. After taking into account the death toll from the war, the population in the western zones increased from 42 million in 1939 to 47.3 million in 1948, and to 49.3 million by 1950. To feed and house an increased population in shrunken space required the exploitation of limited resources in what some conservationists referred to as “the remains of Germany,” a phrase that conveyed the humiliation and regret they felt over the loss of East Prussia in particular, territory once settled by Germans but now under Polish and Soviet control and famous for its bison, birds, lakes, forests, and estates.

But Germans were not alone in having to exploit natural resources that were inaccessible or in short supply in the aftermath of war. The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) was established in October 1945 to alleviate the global food crisis and to cope with the distribution of natural resources. Around the world, famine, drought, erosion, and population growth in developing countries compelled conservationists in industrialized nations to issue moralizing, neo-Malthusian warnings about societies’ need to respect nature’s limits. For conservationists in the western zones of occupied Germany, the importance of heeding this counsel seemed especially urgent.

This chapter examines how conservationists grappled with what they perceived to be the most pressing problem of the occupation and early years of the Federal Republic, namely, the accelerated increase in demand for natural resources, first to restore stability and then to fuel economic prosperity. In a time of upheaval, conservationists looked to the mixed legacy they had inherited from the past to navigate their way into an uncertain future. With limited interruption, those involved in state-sponsored preservation continued on in their posts, reflecting little on their support for the Nazi regime. They used the RNG and the administrative apparatus it provided to pick up where they had left off, only slowly altering their views of nature and how and why it needed protection.
Initially, preservation groups struggled to resume their activities, but they, too, soon carried on much as before, pledging to protect “nature of the homeland . . . one of [our] most valuable possessions.”

At a time when overt nationalism was taboo, conservationists advocated protecting nature-as-Heimat—one of Germany’s “most valuable possessions”—hoping thereby to aid in reconstructing a positive national identity. Protecting nature, they believed, would anchor the displaced and the disillusioned to a homeland that had remained untainted by the Nazi past and that provided fertile ground for cultivating patriotic citizens. Although the changing language of Heimat remained an important part of conservationists’ discourse through the 1950s, they relied more and more on utilitarian arguments that stressed the role of Naturschutz in guiding the use of land and natural resources, a reform in the works since the late 1920s and made more pressing in the 1930s when Göring introduced the Four Year Plan to mobilize the economy for war.

Again under the occupation, reasons of state and the economy, as determined in important ways by the Allied powers, forced conservationists to emphasize the economic significance of their work. Convinced that Germany’s economic revival was essential to the recovery of the rest of Europe, and eager to reduce the financial burden on American and British taxpayers funding the occupation, the US introduced aid to the western sectors through the Marshall Plan in 1947. As the future economic and political orientation of postwar Germany increased tensions between the western Allies and the Soviets, western Germany witnessed its rapid transformation from defeated enemy to Cold War ally. In 1948, the US, British, and French permitted Germans in their zones to write a constitution and instituted currency reform that contributed to economic stability eventually. In June 1949, one month after Stalin ended his eleven month blockade of West Berlin in protest of economic and political unity in the western zones, the Federal Republic of Germany was established as a democracy oriented toward the capitalist West. The country’s first chancellor (1949–1963), Konrad Adenauer, the Catholic Rhinelander and former Cologne mayor, and his party, the newly formed anti-Marxist, non-denominational Christian Democratic Union (CDU), sought to recover from the Nazi past less by confronting it than by pursuing policies designed to secure the Federal Republic’s place in the western block of nations. In 1951, West Germany joined France, Italy, and the Benelux countries in founding the European Coal and Steel Community, an organization that marked the first step toward the economic integration of Western Europe. By the early 1950s, West Germany’s economy showed signs of recovery, growing 8 percent annually for the rest of the decade, due to many factors, among them increased international trade, limited permanent wartime damage to the infrastructure of businesses, policies encouraging investment in industry, and a large supply of skilled workers, including former refugees. In 1955, when the occupation officially ended, West Germany gained full sovereignty and joined NATO, a democratic ally in the fight against communism.
But what did West Germany’s rapid economic recovery and rehabilitation of its international reputation mean for conservation? In the simplest of terms, these significant changes contributed to an accelerated increase in land, water, and energy use, which threatened nature and underscored conservationists’ inability to respond adequately. The same was true, of course, in communist East Germany. Yet in West Germany, closer cooperation with the US, Britain, and France also contributed to what scholars cautiously refer to as “Westernization,” a complicated process involving cultural transfers, which included respect for democratic institutions and the protection of basic rights. The development of democratic institutions opened up several avenues for reforming conservation. Forced by necessity to change, commissioners began to professionalize their work. New national and regional alliances emerged to protect threatened forests, water, landscapes, and wildlife, broadening the base of support for Naturschutz somewhat and contributing to the revival of civic life in the conservative political climate of Adenauer’s Germany.

Re-forming the “Green Front”: Reconstructing Official Conservation

At the end of the war, the future looked bleak for the institution that had occupied a prominent place in the administration of preservation in Nazi Germany, the Reich Agency for Nature Protection. After fleeing west in February 1945 to escape the advancing Red Army, the agency’s small staff settled in the Lüneburg Heath, converting a barrack into a make-shift office and resuming operations in what became the British zone of occupation. Just weeks after the end of the war, Hans Klose, the agency’s director, gloomily predicted that “[n]o matter how the borders of the future Germany will be drawn, one thing remains certain: as never before the German people will be ‘a people without space.’” Reflecting lingering anxieties about implementation of the punitive Morgenthau Plan, which would have deindustrialized the country, but left it with more agricultural land in the East, Klose feared a “Chinaization of the land” as Germans were forced to cultivate what arable areas remained to feed an expanding population in shrunken space. Small plots of intensively used farmland stripped of hedges, trees, and wildlife—empty of features that gave landscapes their unique charm—would deprive his countrymen of a homeland, “which the German just simply needs.” For Klose, still in the grip of the state he had served for a decade if not wholly embraced, this völkisch language captured the reversal of fortunes caused by the defeat of Nazism and the collapse of its vision for a thousand year Reich. In the wreckage of National Socialism, Germans were living with less space, not more, on land that might no longer look “German,” but barren, degraded, and “Asiatic.”
Although Klose had been prominent in conservation during the Third Reich, he had little difficulty with denazification because he never joined the Nazi party and avoided ideological extremism in his administrative post. He also ended up in the British zone where the process was more lenient. Though he passed muster, he did not escape accusations that he was a Nazi sympathizer. According to Klose’s own description, he was “a good democrat,” just as the monarchists in England. Perhaps more revealing of his nationalist, conservative political views was the bronze bust of Kaiser William II that adorned his office in the heath. A secondary school master by training, Klose had worked alongside Hugo Conwentz in the 1910s. In 1922, he was passed over as director of the Prussian Agency for the Care of Natural Monuments in favor of Walther Schoenichen, a decision Klose resented as he considered himself Conwentz’s rightful heir. But when Schoenichen fell out of favor with higher-ups in the Reich Forest Office in 1938 and was forced into early retirement at 62, Klose replaced him as head of the agency. To Klose’s immense irritation, after the war Schoenichen used his dismissal to claim he was a victim of National Socialism, rather than the supporter he was widely known to have been. In another example of what some West Germans referred to as the “restoration” of former Nazis, Schoenichen received a professorship at Braunschweig Technical University in 1950. Six years later, just prior to his death, he received the Federal Distinguished Service Medal for his scientific contributions.

Scholars have examined the continued influence in the Federal Republic of landscape architects who had been prominent in the Third Reich, such as Konrad Meyer and Heinrich Wiepking-Jürgensmann, both of whom went on to occupy posts at the Technical University of Hanover. They have also noted the continued involvement in conservation activities of people like Alwin Seifert and Hans Schwenkel (whose commitment to Nazism had been “practically fanatical” according to Klose, but whose postwar influence was limited). But what about the fate of rank-and-file volunteer commissioners (Beauftragten)? Initially the future prospects for commissioners looked grim. Unknown numbers had died during the war or remained in POW camps, while others were detained by occupation officials during denazification. Writing in 1946, Klose remarked that weeding out commissioners with a compromised past made the situation for preservation in most districts “so critical that one can view the future only with considerable mistrust.” Despite the upheaval associated with denazification, those involved with official conservation eventually resumed their work with a high degree of continuity that was typical among German civil servants.

While writing references for colleagues undergoing denazification, Klose worked tirelessly with the cranky zoologist, Herbert Ecke, to preserve the Reich Agency, his mentor’s legacy and the institution he viewed as central to preserving uniformity in conservation. The many statements Klose composed between 1945 and 1952 to convince British occupation authorities and German political
leaders at the federal and state levels that the institute was essential left a paper trail of evidence of official conservation’s shift from cultural and pedagogical emphases to economic and planning priorities associated with landscape care.\textsuperscript{15} This change, in the works since the 1920s and 1930s, was made more expedient after 1946 and 1947 when the western Allies adopted a more lenient policy toward Germany, one that prioritized economic recovery.\textsuperscript{16} In response, Klose stressed the importance of conservation in guiding the use of land and resources to prevent their exploitation. He especially hoped this line of reasoning would ensure the continued existence at the federal level of the Reich Agency—a measure opposed by several state governments (Bavaria in particular). Klose’s efforts eventually paid off. Effective as of January 1953, the former Reich Agency became the Federal Institute for Nature Protection and Landscape Care (\textit{Bundesanstalt für Naturschutz und Landschaftspflege}, or BANL), lodged in the Ministry of Agriculture (BML). The association with agriculture and forestry continued the administrative change forced through by Hermann Göring in 1935, which ended up marginalizing preservation. The continuation of this arrangement in the Federal Republic revealed an awareness of the economic aspects of conservation, yet it paradoxically encouraged a reductionist reading of “\textit{Naturschutz}” as narrow preservation, an activity that seemed less significant than maximizing production in the rural economy.\textsuperscript{17}

To pursue conservation in its expanded dimensions required strengthening its legal foundations. At the very least, it meant preserving gains made with the Reich Nature Protection Law of 1935. The RNG was never lifted officially in any of the four zones. British authorities recognized (and praised) it in 1946 after deleting authoritarian sections like those permitting the confiscation of property. This part of the RNG was invalidated through Article 14 of West Germany’s constitution, the Basic Law, which required compensation for expropriating property.\textsuperscript{18} Under the Federal Republic, the RNG remained in place as national legislation until 1958 when the Constitutional Court ruled that its comprehensive provisions in effect at the federal level violated the Basic Law, which gave the states primary authority for \textit{Naturschutz}. Although the RNG had been progressive when introduced, several states amended it to better protect and renature landscapes that were being more intensively exploited to support the country’s economic rebound.\textsuperscript{19}

A significant change in the administration of conservation occurred when the Basic Law gave the states primary responsibility for \textit{Naturschutz}. Conservation was just one of many areas affected by West Germany’s federal structure, which was designed to serve as a corrective to the concentration of power at the center under National Socialism. The delicate balance of authority between the federal and state governments provided for in the constitution contributed to the Federal Republic’s long term political stability. Klose, however, opposed refederalizing conservation, insisting that central control was
necessary for administrative uniformity. He railed against the “contagion” of federalism that had “infected” West German political leaders intent on giving the states control over the protection of nature—a responsibility that had been theirs historically because of the view that Naturschutz was a cultural and scientific enterprise. In a compromise, the Basic Law listed nature protection, landscape care, hunting, water management, and regional planning under Article 75, which specified areas of concurrent jurisdiction. Under this arrangement, the states had primary responsibility to legislate these matters, but the federal government could pass general guideline laws. It did so for conservation only in 1976.

Confronted with states’ rights advocates who wanted to refederalize Naturschutz, Klose nostalgically recalled the latter half of the 1930s as the “high point” for conservation when central control seemed secure. But his recollections were misleading for they implied that progress in preserving nature between 1935 and 1939 had resulted from greater centralization. More often gains had been made through informal liaisons with influential Nazis and by applying, or using the threat of, paragraph 24 of the RNG, which permitted officials to confiscate property without compensation. Klose also overestimated the benefits of central government oversight. In doing so, he overlooked the advantages that groups have when decisions about resources are made closer to the site of use, a point illustrated in the chapter case studies.

Contrary to Klose’s fears, state-sponsored conservation in West Germany was not weakened by refederalization. Rather, one of the greatest institutional hindrances to effective Naturschutz prior to the 1970s was that most officials adhered to the narrow view of conservation as a cultural and scientific matter. Rarely did they associate it also with planning the use of land and resources. Consequently, state governments separated Naturschutz from Landschaftspflege administratively, pigeonholing offices for Naturschutz either in ministries of culture or agriculture—or, less common but more promising, in interior ministries—where conservation officials lacked influence and an overarching perspective on resource use that was essential in guiding economic development.

In 1954, after nearly a decade of lobbying to preserve the legal and administrative foundations of conservation, a weary Klose retired at 74. His replacement, Gert Kragh (1911–1986), came to the director’s post determined to make landscape care more scientific and central to official conservation, to the chagrin of some preservationists. This pastor’s son and former member of the back-to-nature youth movement studied landscape and garden design at the University of Berlin between 1933 and 1937, working with Professor Reinhold Tüxen, the prominent plant sociologist, and Professor Heinrich Wiepking-Jürgensmann, the landscape architect who served under Himmler in the occupied Eastern territories. In the late 1930s, Kragh prepared vegetation maps for the Autobahn and managed Hanover Province’s Naturschutz agency, where he opposed
Seifert’s maneuvers to undermine local preservationists. Enlisted in the war, he served with an anti-aircraft artillery unit developing camouflage for fortifications on the western front and then on all fronts after being transferred to the navy. Kragh was exonerated for his wartime activities during denazification.

As state conservation commissioner for Lower Saxony in the early 1950s and BANL director from 1954 until 1962, Kragh was instrumental in reviving landscape care, emphasizing that its planning competencies would help guide the economic recovery that everyone wanted. By pairing “Naturschutz” and “Landschaftspflege” more intentionally than in the past, Kragh signaled his desire to end the unconstructive competition between preservationists and landscape architects in hopes of strengthening the work of both. He was silent about the wartime fortunes of landscape architects who tested a racialized version of their craft in the East. But Kragh was not very different from other Germans at the time in remembering the Third Reich as a “normal” dictatorship, not a genocidal one.

After 1945, he and other conservationists rededicated themselves to the task of protecting and designing landscapes, ultimately to fulfill their vision for a Germany that would be strong again economically, yet still scenic and worthy of being called a homeland. But during reconstruction they struggled just to cope with classical preservation.

West Germany’s approximately 560 honorary commissioners functioned as the “eyes and ears” of the conservation bureaucracy. Their abundant written records reveal a lot about the self-image of those involved in state-sponsored conservation and document how they tried to institutionalize and professionalize their efforts. Since the 1920s, commissioners worked to broaden Naturschutz beyond “passive” preservation to include comprehensive land use planning, but coping with this added responsibility required more than they could deliver with their limited numbers, volunteer status, and chronic lack of funds. Commissioners fretted about recruiting younger replacements, and indeed, well into the 1960s they tended to name men from the generation of 1900 to the honorary posts, often through an informal system of personal patronage that prized idealism and selfless devotion to the “green cause” more than expertise.

They also lacked adequate financial support, particularly during the early years of the occupation. Otto Kraus, state commissioner for Bavaria until 1967, recalled the barrack that served as his temporary office and the financial support that came in small amounts from a Munich businessman. Gert Kragh operated Lower Saxony’s conservation agency out of his home between 1949 and the early 1950s, and his replacement, Ernst Preising, did the same. Conditions improved slightly as the economy recovered. Local commissioners in the district of Lüneburg, for example, reported in 1956 that their annual allowance to defray the cost of travel, telephone, postage and other expenses increased from the DM 100 that had been standard for years to between DM 600 and DM 1,000. To some extent, limited funding reflected budgetary constraints of the
lean postwar years. But it also stemmed from a misperception among officials that conservation was a cultural affair which could be carried out as an avocation by volunteers.

Although the RNG gave commissioners the responsibility for managing independent agencies advising conservation offices at the state, district, and county levels, and assured them a voice in public hearings over development projects, the law gave them little authority, a complaint voiced since the RNG’s passage. Because some state commissioners, and most at district and local levels, served as volunteers well into the 1960s, they struggled to handle what amounted to a full-time job in addition to their occupation, typically as a teacher, forester, landscape architect, or engineer. Commissioners belonged to the professional middle class, but their occupational backgrounds rarely equipped them to address the range of problems they faced at an accelerated pace in the boom years. No wonder, then, that throughout the 1950s, they claimed it was time to shed their image as “well-intentioned members of a beautification club” and transform themselves into uniformly trained professionals employed fulltime by the state.

A modest beginning in the professionalization of conservation occurred in October 1947 when Klose convened twenty-four commissioners and other individuals from the western zones in a castle on the Wupper River to establish the Working Association of German Commissioners for Nature Protection and Landscape Care (Arbeitsgemeinschaft Deutscher Beauftragter für Natur­schutz und Landschaftspflege, or ABN). In 1957, the ABN’s yearly gathering was designated German Conservation Day, which recalled annual meetings from previous decades that brought together commissioners, officials, and representatives of preservation groups. By meeting regularly, publishing congress proceedings, and sponsoring workshops on legislation and scientific research, the ABN helped commissioners forge a collective identity as professionals with a shared agenda. The reemergence in 1951 of the BANL-edited journal, Natur­schutz und Landschaftspflege, a publication that served as the voice of official conservation, further united “the green front” of “comrades” in “fighting” for what many considered to be a selfless moral cause. In the 1950s, the publication resembled a voluntary association newspaper with its poems and honor roll, but by the 1960s its professional layout and technical articles on topics ranging from species preservation to renaturing mining pits reflected the development of conservation into a highly diversified scientific field. Only in the 1970s did states replace agencies with government positions staffed by experts, a transition that did not pass without conflict. These new professionals prided themselves in their scientific, “objective,” and rational approach to problems, and overlooked the cultural aspects of conservation, which they felt their predecessors had stressed to a fault.

Despite legal and institutional obstacles, commissioners scored modest successes. Under the occupation, they urged state governments to include
conservation in their constitutions and rebuilt archives of laws, ordinances, and maps lost during the war. They inventoried reserves and species under protection and took stock of what had survived the recent conflict. Although numbers do not convey how effectively areas were preserved, at the end of the 1950s when reliable figures were available, West Germany recorded an estimated 750 nature reserves, 3,800 larger, less stringently protected landscape reserves (Landschaftsschutzgebiete), and 38,000 natural monuments. Yet many of these had been under protection before 1945. Nonetheless, commissioners prevented a decline in their numbers. By the mid 1960s, the country reported 868 reserves, 5,930 protected landscapes, and around 40,000 natural monuments. Together these areas covered approximately 32,000 square kilometers, or 13 percent of the territory of the Federal Republic, an impressive accomplishment when one considers that by the early 1960s, 8.3 percent of the territory was used for industry, the military, housing, highways, railways, and airports. Yet preservation was like the proverbial finger-in-the-dike, wholly inadequate to stop the flood of economic growth that in the 1950s swallowed up over 60 hectares each day for settlement.\textsuperscript{37}

Against the backdrop of accelerated land and resource use, commissioners' efforts to protect the beauty of regional landscapes appeared to be little more than quaint reminders of turn of the century preservation. They teamed up with private groups to oppose the careless placement of billboards along highways and in the countryside. In southern Germany, they fought against the “contagious spread” of cable cars on mountains, justifying their opposition by contrasting unfit urbanites, pocket radios in hand, with their ideal visitor, the introspective, solitary climber.\textsuperscript{38} But often their cautious protests ended in compromise. In the mid 1950s, for example, Bavarian conservationists failed to block the installation of a cable car on Jenner Mountain in the middle of the Königsee nature reserve because they caved in to local authorities that pledged to leave other peaks in the area alone. It was apparent that this promise contained hollow words when local officials targeted the nearby Watzmann in the 1960s.\textsuperscript{39} Eventually this peak was spared, accessible only on foot to visitors in Berchtesgaden National Park, which conservationists helped establish in 1978.

In publications, exhibits, public lectures, and radio programs, commissioners insisted on the need to protect the entire “household of the landscape.” Yet they faced tremendous obstacles in conserving its “principle components,” especially soil and water, which were being exploited at an increased tempo to support reconstruction, economic recovery, and the integration of thirteen million people forced to migrate west. As the commissioner in Hanover Province during the occupation, Gert Kragh had been right in 1945 in predicting that the “loss of living space” would require “inner colonization” to accommodate refugees who ended up in the western zones.\textsuperscript{40} In the first postwar decade, Silesians and Pomeranians found a new Heimat in the remnant high moors of northwestern Germany that
were being plowed into settlements. In Bavaria, Hesse, Lower Saxony, and Schleswig-Holstein, where extensive land reclamation was underway to accommodate refugees, commissioners urged restraint in cultivating moors and draining bogs—the “regeneration cells” of landscapes, they explained—and helped to educate farmers about the role of wetlands in controlling erosion and protecting the groundwater supply.

They also took part in drafting the land consolidation law of 1953 (Flurbereinigungsgesetz), the first piece of legislation to require landscape plans in conjunction with agricultural reforms merging small holdings to create larger, more productive farms that could be worked by heavy machinery. As these changes began in earnest in the late 1950s and 1960s, commissioners like Wolfgang Haber (1925–), later an internationally respected ecologist, cooperated with state ministries of agriculture to successfully convince farmers to plant shelterbelts for erosion control and to preserve hedges as a natural means of pest control. But measures like these did little to lessen the environmental harm that accompanied the mechanization of agriculture in West Germany and elsewhere in Europe as these nations strove to be competitive against major producers such as Argentina, Canada, and the US. As Ernst Rudorff had warned decades earlier, hedge removal caused species decline and soil erosion, and more irrigation added yet another stress on water supplies. Moreover, increased use of pesticides and artificial fertilizer containing nitrates and other chemicals ended up in the groundwater.

Although commissioners did not ignore the obvious problem of water pollution from farming and industry (it had been visible for years), their primary concern was to reduce the threat that land reclamation, river regulation, and dam construction posed to regional supplies. In southern Germany, commissioners were unprepared for the spate of new dam projects promising to provide energy and drinking water to meet the country’s rapidly rising demand for both. In 1949, state conservation commissioner Otto Kraus reported that more than seventy dams were in the planning stages in Bavaria alone. In a dozen instances in the 1950s and 1960s, he and other conservationists blocked or altered construction plans in the state. More often than not, however, commissioners and private groups caused only delays in, or modifications to, the dam projects of their more powerful opponents, the utility companies and the diverse groups who supported them. One dam they failed to block was among the country’s largest, the Rosshaupten Dam on Bavaria’s Upper Lech, completed in 1954. When opposing these hydroprojects, commissioners lost credibility by pointing to nuclear energy as a less invasive alternative. Yet their proposal reflected having witnessed over several decades the adverse consequences of hydrodams, as well as the search by each generation for a clean source of fuel.

In confronting the variety of threats to nature during the hard times of the occupation and the more hopeful years of economic recovery, commissioners
continued to view their activities as a form of moral instruction that would inoculate people, the youth in particular, against the ills of modern civilization, be it totalitarianism, materialism, apathy, or alienation. “Either we regard the green cause as a source of strength for clearing away the rubble in cities and souls of men,” longtime district commissioner in the Catholic Rhineland and former Nazi Party member, Wilhelm Lienenkämper said, “or we give the spiritual confusion of our times free rein.”

Embracing a conservative idealism in the tradition of Schiller, Kragh insisted in 1947 that the youth of the occupation, who grew up experiencing nature’s abundance, would develop into citizens with a “deeply felt love of the homeland” and with the “primordial [ursprünglich] creative strength” necessary to “dutifully serve their countrymen and fatherland in their chosen profession.” This new generation, he asserted, would be able to “master the future.” Implicit in Kragh’s commentary was a belief that immersion in nature and love of Heimat would give youth the inner strength they needed to overcome the resignation of the times and contribute to Germany’s (organic) renewal.

In the early years of the Federal Republic, when the economy recovered, commissioners did not lack this idealism and moral certitude, but they complained more frequently about the “step-mother treatment” they received from “utility fanatics” who regarded conservation as “a foolish matter for visionaries alienated from reality and the present.” Yet contrary to conservationists’ complaint about being ignored, they had the support of several national and state leaders irrespective of political party, among them Federal President Theodor Heuss (FDP), Interior Minister Robert Lehr (CDU), Bundestag President Eugen Gerstenmaier (CDU), and minister-presidents Karl Arnold (North Rhine-Westphalia, CDU), Hinrich Wilhelm Kopf (Lower Saxony, SPD) and Wilhelm Hoegner (Bavaria, SPD). True, support from these high profile men was often more generalized and verbal than specific and activist. But their promotion of conservation suggests that it was viewed as a noble cause that transcended party politics. This also was the case elsewhere in western Europe where royalty often led conservation initiatives, most notably Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands and Prince Philip, Duke of Edinburgh.

Complaints about being unheard and experiencing repeated setbacks were voiced by preservationists in earlier times and continue to be expressed by environmentalists today. They communicate the desire to attract public attention to problems that seem pressing and sometimes immense, as well as frustration about the means available for addressing those problems. Konrad Buchwald, state conservation commissioner for Baden-Württemberg from 1955 until 1960, likened commissioners to fire fighters racing in vain to put out fires that already had burned. Working through the conservation bureaucracy, rushing from one local licensing hearing to another, commissioners were helpless to prevent “an area the size of a medium farm” from being “lost” each day to new industries, homes, and roads.
Confronted with accelerated land use, commissioners made exaggerated claims and moral judgments to lend a sense of urgency to their cause. In doing so, they acquired a reputation for being uncompromising, elitist, old fashioned, and overly sentimental. Much as their predecessors had done, commissioners—and conservationists, in general—described the scenic landscapes they were trying to protect by using adjectives that suggested moral purity, such as “pristine” or “primeval.” By contrast, they ascribed corrupting influences to nature’s adversaries—technology, industry, and excessive materialism—to name the most frequently mentioned abstract threats. As a group more acutely aware of the human influences on nature than most of their fellow Germans, conservationists knew that the areas they defended were not untouched. As in earlier times, they used these terms in reference to landscapes that seemed to exhibit a harmonious blending of nature and human use, such as farming or small scale wine growing. In doing so, they expressed fear of even more intrusive changes to these intensively used landscapes if seemingly ubiquitous foes were not reined in. In addition, however, their choice of words was a rhetorical ploy designed to give their argument moral weight in what one conservationist described as a David against Goliath battle against more powerful opponents.

Yet along with these shrill sounding assertions, conservationists increasingly relied on economic and scientific arguments which carried more weight in postwar political decision making. Scholars investigating the fortunes of landscape architects after 1945 also note this scientificization, and maintain that it was motivated at least partly by a desire to distance the profession from its ideological excesses during the Nazi period. By adopting a more rational, scientific approach, these scholars conclude, some landscape architects successfully modernized and reformed their field without having to confront wrongs of the past. But this interpretation does not readily apply to conservationists outside of the profession of landscape architecture because it implies feelings of guilt, which a majority of conservationists did not openly harbor, and it suggests a degree of influence during the Third Reich that conservationists rarely had, despite their best efforts. It seems most likely that postwar conservationists used scientific and economic arguments more frequently to stay in step with international trends and to have greater leverage in decisions affecting the use of land and natural resources. By expressing their views in quantifiable terms, commissioners hoped to present themselves more convincingly as “neutral” experts in conservation affairs.

With some effect, commissioners emphasized the economic benefits of scientifically based conservation. Relying on ecological insights associated with plant geography since the 1920s, Gert Kragh noted that “[e]very landscape has a certain reserve of energy,” or “biotic potential,” which is determined by water supply, soil condition, and local climate, and measurable by an inventory of plant and animal communities. According to Kragh, landscape care involved preserving, and where possible, increasing the land’s “biotic potential” to support long
term economic uses. Bavaria’s state commissioner Otto Kraus arrived at a similar conclusion when he defined a biologically healthy landscape as one capable of supporting appropriate economic uses over the long term, while renewing itself and remaining a beautiful Heimat. Such explanations were similar to those expressed by their American contemporary, Aldo Leopold, whose land ethic asserted that “[a] thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise.”

A common theme in the writings of conservationists in North America and parts of Europe since the 1920s was that of land health, a concept that referred to a landscape’s capacity for regeneration. Diagnosing the health of landscapes meant relying on ecological assumptions of plant geographers who viewed land as an organism that exhibited signs either of wellness and balance or sickness and imbalance (often depending upon human economic practices). This view of nature was static and based on aesthetic judgments that were inherently subjective: if an area looked attractive, it was assumed to be in ecologically good health as well. Although the notion of land health had been distorted under National Socialism by some who equated it with the primordial native soil of the racially pure Volksgemeinschaft, in the 1950s commissioners relied even more on the idea of wellness to improve scientific methods of evaluation. Increasingly they understood their primary objective to be preserving and revitalizing the health of landscapes, more so than protecting nature-as-Heimat. But like all scientific approaches, this one reflected ideological assumptions, in this case a social conservatism that continued to associate cities with disease and imbalance and countryside with health and wholeness.

Yet conservationists’ emphasis on wellness encouraged more interaction with professionals in other fields who shared an interest in health, be it of people or the economy. Over time, the emphasis on health weakened the perceptual divide between humans and nature, and between urban and rural, enabling conservation to seem more central in addressing social problems. This was apparent in 1955 when commissioners gathered in the industrial city of Düsseldorf for the annual ABN conference that was organized around the theme of “Nature and Economy.” At the meeting conservationists claimed a role for themselves in guiding economic recovery by pledging to protect and restore the health of landscapes where West Germans “worked, lived, and relaxed.” Reflecting the importance assigned to economic arguments, they defined land health in terms of a landscape’s productive capacity, but also in terms of its ability to provide physical and emotional healing for industrious people experiencing stress in the workplace. Accordingly, they declared their intention to set aside recreation areas in rural settings where the country’s rising urban population might be restored to health and full productivity, a subject examined in chapter 4. With the adoption of the metaphor of health, commissioners claimed the right to participate in restoring health not only to landscapes, but also to people and the economy—all without abandoning their conservative critique of modern civilization.
The Revival of Private Conservation Groups

In the difficult years of the occupation, Germany’s impressive array of preservation groups established around the turn of the century struggled to resume their work, fighting against apathy, financial limitations, and in many cases, a tainted reputation from the recent past. After experiencing a drop in membership at war’s end, many witnessed modest increases by the mid 1950s, though not until the 1970s did they achieve prewar numbers. As they had in the past, these organizations worked closely with commissioners and officials, often blurring the distinction between public and private. They relied on a reserved style of protest and a hierarchical structure in pursuit of traditional goals, turned to the state for financial aid, and depended upon publicly prominent individuals and independently wealthy people to serve as patrons or in leadership positions. However top heavy their structure and conservative their rhetoric, existing groups and several new “working associations” contributed to the return of civil society in West Germany.

After the war Germany’s largest conservation organization, the German League for Bird Protection (DBV), found its offices in Munich, Stuttgart, and Berlin in ruins and its membership down by 50 percent. The DBV had enthusiastically supported the Nazi regime at least outwardly, changed its bylaws in 1934 to exclude non-Germans, and watched its membership climb to 55,000 by 1943, an increase aided by Göring’s directive in 1938 to consolidate bird protection societies under the league. After receiving official sanction by occupation authorities in 1946, the DBV unanimously elected Hermann Hähnle, son of Lina Hähnle, to serve as president. The organization continued to rely on low membership dues, the wealth of its leadership, and government subsidies (DM 20,000 per year from the federal government in the 1950s) to protect more than 200 bird sanctuaries it had established over the years through land purchases and leases. In the late 1940s, when its local chapters in the Soviet zone were subsumed under a mass organization for cultural affairs, the DBV lost several reserves to the GDR regime. In West Germany the DBV recruited new members gradually, surpassing the wartime high only in 1965 when membership reached 57,000, an increase attributed to its endorsement of Rachel Carson’s controversial best-seller, Silent Spring (1962).

It is not surprising that long-standing organizations avoided making significant reforms in their structure and agenda in the 1950s when most people preferred a return to stability and familiar activities. This was the case also for the Bavarian League for Nature Protection. In the 1920s, the league claimed 10,000 members, climbing to 28,000 just before World War II. Less conformist than the DBV, the league nonetheless had named a local Nazi as its “protector” and tailored its message to fit official ideology. Into the 1960s, the league still struggled to attract members to add to the 15,000 it had retained. It continued
to be led by civil servants and relied on state government subsidies (DM 10,000 annually in the 1950s) to buy land for reserves.\textsuperscript{60}

These few examples illustrate continuities in the postwar era with earlier activities of preservation groups. A closer examination of two organizations—the Nature Park Society (\textit{Verein Naturschutzpark}, or VNP), founded in 1909, and the Association for the Protection of the German Forest (\textit{Schutzgemeinschaft Deutscher Wald}, or SDW), established in 1947—underscores constancy in conservation groups’ conservative rhetoric and their reliance on social and political elites for patronage. In protecting the Lüneburg Heath, one of Germany’s prized nature reserves, and “the German forest” against foreign occupiers in the late 1940s and early 1950s, the VNP and the new SDW nationalized nature, cultivating a green patriotism that might aid in the country’s organic revival. It would be misleading, however, to imply that nature was nationalized to the same degree in every case when protecting nature intersected with protesting foreign occupiers. In the mid 1950s, for example, when locals, scientists, preservationists, and youth protested the British Royal Air Force’s use of Knechtsand in the Wattenmeer as a bombing range, they emphasized that the schelducks, which congregated on the large sandbank during the summer to moult, belonged not to Germans, but to all of humanity. The area, they argued, ought to become a symbol of freedom and peace, not military defense.\textsuperscript{61} It is difficult to imagine such an argument during the early years of the occupation when many Germans felt victimized, ashamed, and defensive. Yet a closer look at the activities of the VNP and the SDW uncovers a gradual process of reform as these groups, too, sought to define their place in a new polity.

\section*{Liberating the Lüneburg Heath, a “Besieged” Homeland Landscape}

In the autumn of 1945, British and Canadian occupation forces seized over 3,000 hectares of land in the Lüneburg Heath nature reserve to use as a military training area, and began detonating mines and explosives planted there by Germans during the war. The following spring they started conducting maneuvers in the southern part of the reserve, moving as far north as the quaint village of Wilsede, Wilsede Mountain, and Hannibal’s Grave—some of the most scenic spots owned by the VNP.\textsuperscript{62} The conversion of one of Germany’s largest reserves into a training ground for an army of occupation angered conservationists, but no doubt also reminded them of how the area had been treated by the Nazis. The protected parts of the Lüneburg Heath became the first Reich nature reserve in 1935, and were to be elevated to the status of a national park after the war. In 1942, however, the regime began building a hospital in the middle of the nature park owned by the VNP, and planted mines and explosives in the central and
southern sections of the reserve. Plans to lay down a small airfield, drill for oil, and transform Wilsede Mountain into a fortress with anti-aircraft towers did not materialize.\textsuperscript{63}

A century earlier, few would have considered the Lüneburg Heath worthy of preservation. Until the 1800s, this low lying plain between Hamburg and Hanover seemed little more than a desolate wasteland. Once the Lüneburg Heath was rediscovered as scenic countryside exhibiting a harmonious blend of nature and traditional farming, local homeland preservationists collected donations to purchase land and protect it from private developers. Their efforts merged with those of the VNP whose members wanted to establish three large reserves representative of Germany’s lowland, upland, and alpine landscapes as an alternative to the larger national parks in the United States.\textsuperscript{64} By 1918, the VNP had purchased 3,400 hectares in the heath. After these encouraging beginnings, VNP members who supported National Socialism prevailed in the 1930s, dissolving the volunteer heath watch initiated by socialist youth and changing the charter in 1939 to exclude Jews from membership.\textsuperscript{65}

The man who led the VNP from 1942 until 1953, Hans Domizlaff, was a cantankerous artist who made his money in industrial design. According to the \textit{Gauleiter} of East Hanover who recommended him for the chairmanship, Domizlaff’s “relations with the Führer” made him appear “to be the right man.”\textsuperscript{66} But Domizlaff experienced more failure than success in trying to protect VNP property from the misuses noted earlier. Arrested by the British in August 1945, he spent the next several months in detention. After Domizlaff’s two year struggle through denazification, VNP members tried to oust him, faulting him for being “an autocrat—exactly in a Nazi sense” and of treating VNP land as his private domain.\textsuperscript{67} His racial views and authoritarian style contributed to a drop in the organization’s membership from 5,000 in 1945 to 2,000 in the early 1950s. Using the organization’s journal, he spouted off völkisch claims, insisting, for example, that protecting nature of the homeland was the only way to “save the nation from otherwise unavoidable biological degeneration.”\textsuperscript{68} Working largely alone, he tackled the VNP’s main challenge: protecting the heath from British forces conducting maneuvers in what a sympathetic reporter described as the “only jewel of untouched nature in the North German lowland.”\textsuperscript{69}

The natural beauty of the heath mattered little to the western powers as Cold War tensions mounted. In 1945, the British and Canadians had moved into the heath as an army of occupation, but after the establishment of the Federal Republic and the formation of NATO in 1949, they remained in the country as the alliance’s forward troops, poised to stop the spread of communism. The sparsely populated Lüneburg Heath came into question for military training because theorists considered this vast plain in north central Germany a likely site for a Soviet launched attack. When the Korean War broke out in 1950, heightening fears about a growing communist menace, the area assumed even more
strategic significance. Especially before the controversial reestablishment of a national army in 1955, few West Germans doubted the need for foreign forces on their soil to protect them from communist neighbors. But area residents wondered why Britain’s Rhine Army could not make due with designated training spaces near, but not in, the Lüneburg Heath nature reserve, such as Fallingbostel, Munster, and Bergen. Indeed, by the early 1950s, the British Rhine Army had an estimated 60,000 hectares in the area at its disposal for training, but not all of it was suitable for use. Only in 1953, for example, was Munster cleared of mines planted by the Wehrmacht, and in some other designated areas, West Germans had planted trees for timber harvesting, limiting the amount of land for tank exercises.\textsuperscript{70}

When the size of British and other NATO forces in the heath increased in 1952, Domizlaff appealed to Interior Minister Robert Lehr (CDU) to use his influence with the chancellery to prevent further damage in the reserve. But officials were intent on avoiding the embarrassment of West Germans protesting NATO forces at a time when diplomatic discussions were going on (in vain as it turned out) to create a European Defense Community, which was to include West German troops.\textsuperscript{71} Weary of Domizlaff’s one-man show, VNP members finally replaced him in December 1953, electing the multi-millionaire Hamburg entrepreneur, Alfred Toepfer, to the top office and pacifying Domizlaff with the title of honorary president.

In Toepfer (1894–1993), a VNP member for twenty-six years, the organization found an able leader with a murky past. Toepfer was a former Wandervogel, World War I veteran, and member of the Märker Free Corps, one of many paramilitary groups the weak coalition government of the early Weimar Republic had used to quell leftist revolutionary activities. Toepfer started his import/export firm in 1919 and saw it grow to be the largest business of its kind in the Federal Republic. He leaned toward the far right politically, yet avoided party politics (including the NSDAP), preferring to be “an eclectic pragmatist.” Arrested in 1937 on suspicion of tax evasion, Toepfer spent a year in confinement. After his release, he served in France as a captain in the army. When the war ended, the British arrested him, suspecting that his wealth concealed Nazi assets. Those suspicions were proved wrong and he was released in 1947.\textsuperscript{72}

The election of this well-connected businessman and philanthropist enabled the VNP to pursue its traditional goals with a more up-to-date, though still conservative, message. Toepfer increased VNP membership and secured the return of its park in Austria, Hohe Tauern, property the Allies had considered an “enemy asset.” On VNP property, Toepfer used his wealth to create an open air Heimat museum of sorts that reflected his vision of an ideal landscape, one without cars or visible power lines (he had them buried), but with open spaces and scenic vistas, horse-drawn wagons, grazing sheep, and architecture that imitated regional styles.\textsuperscript{73}
By the time Toepfer took over as chairman, British forces had withdrawn from the most scenic spots owned by the VNP, but half of its property continued to be torn up by daily military exercises.\textsuperscript{74} To defend the heath against the defenders of Western Europe, Toepfer worked methodically and persistently through official channels to garner support of district and state officials, legislators, and federal security officer, Theodor Blank. In June 1954, he hosted fifty journalists from the region on a tour in horse-drawn wagons through the well-preserved eastern part of the park and the desert-like sections of the western area. With reporters in tow, he ventured through the Munster training area to dispel British fears that the danger of mines remained. His strategy to garner media coverage worked to some extent, as newspaper headlines declared that “Europe’s largest nature monument” was becoming “scorched earth” because British tanks “continued their fatal work of destruction.”\textsuperscript{75} But neither sympathetic press coverage, resolutions by conservationists, major questions in the \textit{Bundestag}, nor pressure on British officials by the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) had much effect.\textsuperscript{76}

What produced results were student protests and a change in West Germany’s sovereignty. In July 1955, just after the Federal Republic gained full sovereignty and joined NATO, Blank, now Federal Defense Minister, assured the \textit{Bundestag} that the British would not use the heath for training to the extent allowed previously. With West Germany negotiating as an equal partner now, a compromise would be reached.\textsuperscript{77} Nearly a year later, the British withdrew from 600 hectares of the prized flat land in the reserve and most of the Canadian troops pulled out entirely. This retreat was triggered by fears that protests by German youth might end in sabotage. During the night of 23 June 1956, SPD \textit{Bundestag} Deputy Herbert Wehner told over one thousand students that their torches burned as a sign of peace and understanding among peoples. The Federal Republic, he declared, was not a colony, but a sovereign entity.\textsuperscript{78} Students’ use of fire in this and other protests like Knechtsand recalled its historical use in the youth movement, including at its famous gathering at the Hoher Meißner in Hesse in 1913. Yet fire had also burned as a symbol of freedom and autonomy in Germany’s national unity movement of the previous century. Area newspapers glorified the demand by German youth to “liberate the homeland” and their appeal to end “the humiliation and destruction inflicted on us by foreign troops.”\textsuperscript{79}

Another three years passed, however, before West German and British governments set the boundary of the Rhine Army’s training area. The 1959 Soltau-Lüneburg Agreement gave the British access to a 345 square kilometer area from Soltau to Lüneburg. Within this training space, several “red zones” were created for intensive tank use, two of them within the Lüneburg Heath reserve. Together these two areas encompassed 1,800 hectares, 1,600 of which were VNP owned. In 1994, with the Cold War over, the two red zones were returned to the VNP and the process of renaturing the desert-like land began.\textsuperscript{80}
In protesting the presence of foreign troops in the Lüneburg Heath in the mid 1950s, conservationists, students, politicians, and reporters referred to the nature reserve as a “national park,” making it a symbol of national autonomy. As they sought to liberate this “colonial possession”—this homeland besieged by foreign forces—activists found a legitimate avenue for expressing feelings of national pride and asserting West Germany’s new status as a fully sovereign nation. Yet protecting nature in this instance also provided a way to demonstrate the Federal Republic’s commitment to international cooperation. As Blank and Wehner made clear in their public statements, opposing Britain’s use of a nature reserve for military training was a legitimate expression of sovereignty, and did not lessen West Germany’s desire to find a place among the community of nations.

It is not entirely clear if those who expressed national pride in this case did so because they felt an attachment to the Federal Republic as a nation-state or to the idea of an autonomous German nation. Scholars who have examined the process of constructing national identity after 1945 explain that in the 1950s and 1960s, few West Germans developed strong emotional ties to the Federal Republic, a political entity they viewed as a temporary arrangement until reunification. It was more common for them to convey a muted sense of pride in their country by focusing on its economic success. Indeed, in a very tangible way the Lüneburg Heath became a space in which West Germans could express pride in their prosperity. “The five-day week will come,” Toepfer predicted in the mid 1950s, and “industrious people” wanting relaxation but not a long drive would need access to “peaceful oases” in nature. In 1956, the VNP chairman went public with his plan to address rising demand for recreation areas, using the preindustrial landscape he designed in the Lüneburg Heath as a model for new nature parks that he hoped to establish across the country, a subject explored in chapter 4.

**Defending the “German Forest”**

The adverse effects of the country’s rapid economic recovery contributed to the formation of several new alliances to defend nature and curb pollution. In the 1950s and 1960s, building coalitions at the local, regional, and increasingly national levels was a widespread, common strategy, one that continued the reserved style of protest employed by preservationists in the first decades of the century. In the 1950s alone, there were local and regional campaigns against air and water pollution in the Ruhr and the Saar; against hydroprojects in southern Germany; against canalizing the Mosel and Neckar Rivers; against expanding airports in Frankfurt, Munich, and Stuttgart; and against confiscating nature reserves for military purposes, among other protests. (Only in the late 1960s did road construction spark opposition.) In general, the citizens who formed ad hoc local and regional alliances exhibited greater flexibility in their actions than
members of conservation organizations, who shied away from public protest. Both groups of people, however, used a range of tactics in hopes of achieving narrow goals. They drafted resolutions, circulated petitions, staged rallies, lobbied parliamentarians, commissioned reports by experts, filed suits in administrative courts, and lobbied officials and politicians. But because their ultimate goal involved reaching a consensus among the parties involved, they viewed public protest as a last resort—an attitude illustrated in chapter 3.83

Among the oldest nationwide postwar alliances was the Association for the Protection of the German Forest (SDW), formed in 1947 as an act of protest against the Allied occupation for overcutting timber. As a result of postwar territorial adjustments, Germany surrendered 25 percent of its forested land, which dropped from 12,675,000 hectares in 1937 to 9,585,000 hectares in 1946, when the Allies began an extensive forest inventory of the four zones.84 Even though Germany had imported timber since the mid 1800s, the Allies adopted a policy of “full exploitation” in the first two years of the occupation, felling 200 percent of annual growth to destroy the “war potential of German forests” and to meet the unprecedented demand for timber.85 Wood was needed for reconstruction in Germany and in countries ravaged by the war, and was essential for repairing pit-props, truck beds, and miners’ houses so that the mining of coal could resume. Timber also was needed for export to help Germans meet reparations obligations and to generate revenue to pay for badly needed imports.86

The forests that Germans rallied to protect during the occupation were the product of scientific management over two centuries. In the early 1800s, German foresters had responded to a shift in demand from hardwood for fuel to soft woods for timber and pulpwood by planting fast-growing evergreen species. Scientific management resulted in higher yields of commercial timber over the short run, but eventually created forests that were 70 percent evergreen (spruce and pine with some larch and fir) and 30 percent deciduous (largely beech and oak). These industrial forests gradually declined in productivity because of an increase in the acidity of the soil, which made trees susceptible to damage by windfall and insects and discouraged growth of vegetation on the forest floor. In response, foresters in the 1910s began planting some oak, beech and other hardwoods with different root systems and heights, increasing productivity and allowing foresters to cut no more timber than that which reached maturity each year. The Nazi regime deviated from this practice, ordering foresters to cut 150 percent of annual growth beginning in 1935. Though overcutting occurred each year, this goal was never reached.87 By 1945, Germany’s forests were overused, but to a degree disputed because reliable forest statistics had not been kept since 1938 and the most detailed inventory dated from the 1920s. In general, the country’s forests survived the war in better shape than initially feared; around 6 percent of forested land in all four zones existed as clear-cuts, an amount not unusual after a major war.88
Nonetheless, Germans in the western zones complained bitterly about excessive over-cutting, casting themselves in the role of the victim of National Socialism and an exploitative occupation. Resentment over timber cutting was limited in the American sector, because it had the most forested land of all four zones (3,516,000 hectares) and US authorities gave Germans some control over harvesting and distribution. The French, in charge of 1,480,000 hectares of forest, caused uproar with their methods of extracting timber. After singling out stands near roadsides to be clear-cut (where transport would be easiest but more visible and shocking to passersby), they auctioned off lots to foreign firms who allegedly resold the wood at a higher price on the world market. Foreign companies came with their own laborers, sequestered homes, offices, and schools, and clear-cut the stands they had purchased, charging expenses to Germans in the zone. But the Soviets were the most rapacious, clear-cutting the best-stocked imperial forests as reparations, failing to replant, and forcing foresters to cut trees with crude tools and near-starvation rations. Between 1945 and 1949, the Soviets hauled away thirteen years of forest growth.

Germans and foreign observers assumed that in the western zones the French were the most exploitive, but between 1946 and 1948 overcutting in the British zone was more severe. To oversee timber harvesting the British created the North German Timber Control (NGTC), one of many control boards the British established to manage industries in their zone. Typically NGTC set up camp in the center of a forested area, then hired displaced persons, occupation soldiers, and workers from German firms to clear-cut the surrounding woods. German forest service officials could recommend procedures, but British officers often ignored them. Germans in the British zone had formed ad hoc groups in 1945 to prevent deforestation by Germans scrambling for wood. But the first organized protest developed in the spring of 1946 when the newly formed Zonal Advisory Council (Zonenbeirat), a body representing state and local governments, political parties, and unions, appointed a committee to study deforestation. Several members later played a leading role in SDW. The committee conceded that overcutting in the current crisis was unavoidable, but faulted the British for excessive harvests and the NGTC for indiscriminate clear-cutting and trampling edible vegetation so critical in a time of food shortages. The British Control Commission’s standard reply to these kinds of complaints was that overcutting in its zone did not match the heavy losses inflicted on Britain’s stock of trees in fighting two world wars. After exploiting the natural resources of other countries during WWII, Germans should expect that their forests would be overused temporarily. In November 1946, the British began “Operation Woodpecker,” dispatching three thousand soldiers armed with axes to fell trees in the Harz Mountains and Lüneburg Heath. By January 1947, 26,545 tons of wood had been exported to England for reconstruction.
In this chilling winter, German conservationists and foresters heightened their criticism of the “purely businessman focus” of the British Military Government, warning in exhibits, lectures, and letters to officials about the long term dangers of clear-cutting.95 Kurt Borchers, forester and district conservation commissioner for Braunschweig, conceded that Germany “must make sacrifices for the events of the past.” But there was no justification for Allied exploitation of Germany’s forests, a shortsighted policy, he argued, that exacerbated erosion, disrupted microclimates, and contributed to the kind of extreme flooding that northern Germany had recently witnessed.96 Expressing exaggerated alarm, Gert Kragh, Hanover Province’s conservation commissioner, stated in a program over Radio Bremen that Allied policies limiting coal supplies and requiring the use of good wood for fuel seemed driven by the desire “to destroy the German landscape, the German economy, and the German people.” Delivering these comments in January 1947, during one of Europe’s most brutally cold winters in half a century, Kragh conveyed the sentiments of other Germans who objected to the “dismantling” of forests and took up the protest out of sense of victimhood and patriotism.97

Similar responses were expressed by minister-presidents of state governments in all four zones when they gathered in June 1947 in Munich to discuss pressing economic issues. According to Bavaria’s Minister of Agriculture, Dr. Josef Baumgartner (Bavaria Party) “the slaughter of German forests . . . and the exploitation of timber reserves that have been tended for decades” was a “catastrophe.” The National Socialist regime had begun an “irresponsible exploitation” of Germany’s forests, and Allied powers were continuing it at a rate that would hinder the economic recovery of Germany and Europe. The extent of overcutting in the western zones, he and other political leaders alleged, struggling for moral ground, violated the 1907 Hague Convention, which limited the amount of raw materials victors could extract from another country.98 In explaining why such complaints fell on deaf ears, Borchers concluded that the Allied powers lacked the attachment to forests that Germans had cultivated over generations through sound forestry and through sagas, poetry, and music inspired by the woods.99

Though resentful of overcutting, Germans could not ignore that in August 1947, timber exports had produced an estimated $10 million in credit—second only to coal. A new level of industry plan from August 1947 called for increased production in the merged British and American zones, enabling more coal to be extracted from the Ruhr. Even though less timber was being cut and Germans gained more control over felling and distribution, in the British zone harvests for 1948 were to remain high, at 250 percent of annual growth.100 Frustrated by the slow response of the occupying powers, prominent members of the British Zonal Advisory Council initiated a “people’s movement” from above, establishing the Society for the Protection of the German Forest (SDW) in December 1947. In his opening remarks to 800 Germans representing state
governments, forestry, and conservation, the pre-selected SDW president Robert Lehr (CDU) appealed to the “sense of justice of the English people.”\textsuperscript{101} “The Nuremberg Trials,” he stated, “have revealed that the victors consider it to be a grave offense if an occupying power exhausts the economic potential of an occupied country for its own ends without regard for international law,” namely the 1907 Hague Convention.\textsuperscript{102} But moralizing by the SDW had little effect on British timber harvesting practices.

The United States’ more lenient economic policy toward Germany evident in the Marshall Plan announced in 1947 was more decisive. US Military Governor General Lucius Clay criticized British harvest projections for 1947–1948, citing US forestry experts who considered it “more akin to reparations than to a sound economic proposal.” Reflecting State Department policy, the US Military Government insisted that “All future felling in the bi-zonal area should be carried out in accordance with sound practices bearing in mind Germany’s export responsibilities as a country receiving United States aid.”\textsuperscript{103} In 1948, the British dissolved the NGTC and replaced it with a body controlled jointly with the US. Direct timber harvesting by the occupying powers ceased in 1949 and rapid reforestation began.

Though Germans had limited influence on the Allies’ plans for felling timber, the SDW seized the opportunity to shape how its own people viewed the forests and the occupation policies that called for exploiting them. In general, the SDW functioned as an educational arm of the forest service. It relied on public figures to lead state chapters that emerged between 1948 and 1949, first in the British and American zones and later in the French.\textsuperscript{104} In exhibits, lectures, publications, and films, chapters emphasized the economic and ecological significance of well-tended forests, but also reminded people of what SDW literature described as an enduring cultural bond between the forest and Volk.\textsuperscript{105} In September 1948, North Rhine-Westphalia’s chapter opened an exhibit in Essen, “The Forest—Our Fate,” informing 115,000 visitors—50,000 of them youth—about the forest as a living community, as lungs that purified the air of industrial cities, and as the “the true homeland landscape” of the German soul.\textsuperscript{106} The SDW journal Grünes Blatt (later Unser Wald) first published by North Rhine-Westphalia after currency reform, declared the organization’s intention to become a “people’s movement” that would “rebuild our forest . . . in the interest of our economy, culture, and the continued existence of our people.” But SDW’s “main task,” the article stated, was to strengthen Germans’ “intuitive and spiritual bond to the forest.”\textsuperscript{107} Typical of SDW publications at the time, one book claimed that “life without the forest is unthinkable for us [Germans] not only for economic reasons . . . But above all, because our . . . spiritual existence swings in rhythm with it.”\textsuperscript{108}

Some SDW members were constantly on the road and over the radio generating awareness about the ecological functions of forests and the urgent need
for reforestation. In over 400 lectures and articles, Erich Hornsmann urged his audiences to plant trees and shrubs, warning that powerful cultures in ancient times had declined in status after devastating the land, forests, and water supply that sustained them. To foster idealism among the youth after the horrors of the Nazi past, SDW chapters enlisted girls and boys to help reforest the homeland—initially with fast-growing evergreen species (pine and spruce). This organic rebuilding was symbolically linked to the country’s economic revival when West Germany minted its new currency: the 50 pfennig coin bore the imprint of a barefoot woman planting an oak seedling, a tree considered to be authentically German, despite being an importation.

With government funds, SDW chapters sponsored an annual “Day of the Tree,” a nationwide event modeled after Arbor Day in the US and instituted in countries worldwide upon the recommendation of the FAO. In cities and towns throughout West Germany, public officials kicked off a day of celebration that featured planting trees, singing and dancing to folk songs, and viewing exhibits about the economic, ecological, and recreational value of forests. On the first Day of the Tree in 1952, the new “protector” of SDW, Federal President Theodor Heuss (1949-1959, FDP), planted a tree in the garden of the university in the West German capital, Bonn. Other officials used the event to foster a positive national identity, one supposedly rooted in nature and sustained by the cultural heritage that grew out of it. In his speech, Lehr claimed that “Germans have always been connected to the forest in a... heartfelt way... Customs, ways of thinking, character—yes, our soul is deeply anchored in the forest, in the homeland of fairy tales and sagas.” When Chancellor Adenauer addressed the West Berlin chapter of SDW in 1953, he, too, invoked the forest as a symbol of national identity and political stability, declaring that the German forest “is... deeply tied to the German essence... Whoever loves the German forest also loves an orderly political system. But he loves something more—he also loves the German homeland out of the depths of [his] soul.”

In their organized protest and public awareness campaign, prominent officials who led SDW chapters referred to the many distinct regional forests as one unified “German forest,” expressing a desire for national unity that presumably was rooted in nature and linked to a better, distant past, immortalized and idealized in the country’s cultural traditions. But they also believed that conserving the forest was essential in securing Germany’s identity as an economically stable country in the future. Contrary to the conservative rhetoric about a mystical link between forest and Volk, however, it seems that Germans’ tie to the forest was not so deeply anchored. According to a 1955 poll of approximately 2,000 people conducted by the Allensbach Institute, 55 percent responded they did not visit the forests often and another 11 percent indicated they had not been to the forests in years. Not presumed mystical ties to the forests, but visible harm to
them by worsening pollution generated more support for protecting the nation’s woodlands after the mid 1950s, in particular by advocating clean air laws and challenging the free reign of industry.\textsuperscript{115}

Democratizing Conservation and Building New National Alliances

Few conservation organizations were as explicit in nationalizing nature and naturalizing nationalism as the VNP and the SDW, because they did not directly confront the Allied occupation. More typical of several new national alliances was the aim to educate the public about \textit{Naturschutz} in its many dimensions and to improve conservation legislation through the democratic process. Measuring the public impact of alliances’ pedagogical initiatives, in particular, is difficult. So, too, is determining the size of their following. Frequently alliances uniting several organizations claimed to represent thousands of people who shared a moral concern to protect helpless nature and the common good from the ills of modern civilization. But their supporters probably were not as numerous as they maintained. Yet as recent scholarship emphasizes, precisely because these new national alliances lacked a natural clientele like traditional lobby organizations, they could claim to represent the common good.\textsuperscript{116}

The largest new umbrella organization, the German Conservation Ring (\textit{Deutscher Naturschutzring}, or DNR) was established in 1950 at the annual ABN congress by Klose and others who wanted to prevent the state from monopolizing preservation as it had during the Third Reich. The coalition was built on a tradition from the 1920s when the Nature Preservation Ring Berlin-Brandenburg had been created, an organization that Klose had chaired. He acknowledged that the DNR’s member groups, which included “nature preservers” and “nature users,” would sometimes disagree on issues. This did not prevent him from hoping that the new alliance would function as an “emergency association,” responding to controversial matters on short notice and wielding political influence like the country’s larger, more powerful lobby organizations representing labor and industry. But this ambitious goal was unrealistic because conservation still lacked strong institutional and financial support.\textsuperscript{117}

At the founding meeting of the DNR, Dr. Hans Krieg (1888–1970), Munich zoology professor and director of Bavaria’s Natural Sciences Collection, was elected president (to Klose’s chagrin because Krieg had shown lukewarm support for the BANL, an institute with Prussian roots). The DNR proved to be a loyal supporter of the agency and adopted much of the agenda of official conservation as its own. By 1952 the alliance claimed sixty-one member organizations representing 760,000 people, an inflated estimate that overlooked
individuals’ membership in more than one DNR-affiliated group. In the organization’s early years limited funds from membership dues restricted its influence primarily to Bavaria. (Only in 1973 was the main office moved from Munich to the capital, Bonn).  

Continuing Naturenschutz organizations’ traditional emphasis on pedagogy, the DNR was most active in educating the public about the importance of conservation. In publications and lectures, Krieg admonished contemporaries who seemed “enslaved” by the idea of progress for failing to see that conservation was about preserving a source of inspiration and moral truth. But, he emphasized, conservationists’ concern to ensure “harmony in the landscape” had become a “vital” economic issue as erosion, large scale fish kills, and major disruptions in the water supply indicated. The energetic DNR business manager and student of Krieg, Wolfgang Engelhardt (1922–2006), called for disciplinary action against officials who failed to enforce conservation measures, and drafted guidelines (adopted by West German ministers of culture in 1952) for improving biology instruction at all education levels. A key player in postwar conservation and one of West Germany’s representatives to the IUCN, Engelhardt tried to distance “modern Naturenschutz” from the “sentimental and useless complaints about lost natural beauty” and associate it more clearly with ecology and “rigorous scientific form.”

Conservative, moralizing rhetoric remained a part of Naturenschutz discourse into the 1970s, but was already muted in the 1950s as the base of support for conservation broadened somewhat, and economic and scientific arguments became expected in public debate. The Alliance for the Protection of Germany’s Waters (Vereinigung Deutscher Gewässerschutz), formed in 1951 by Dr. Karl Imhoff, a pioneer in scientific water management, captured the modern sounding voice of postwar conservation with its emphasis on economic efficiency and health.Uniting groups representing fishermen, hunters, industry, and tourism, the alliance claimed to speak for one million people concerned about the water supply. As Erich Hornsmann warned in the first of the alliance’s many publications, water had become a “scarce commodity” as greater demand outpaced an increasingly polluted and falling supply. Indeed, consumption had risen dramatically in the late 1940s with the influx of refugees and the revival of industry. Yet during reconstruction, governments emphasized urban and industrial renewal, leaving little money for installing treatment facilities in numbers needed to handle the rapid rise in use. And the groundwater supply was down because extensive land reclamation and river rectification drained water from the soil that should have absorbed it like a sponge. To meet the demand for water required drawing from surface waters that were growing more polluted with industrial, agricultural, and household effluents, oil, and radiation. Water pollution was becoming a costly, well-publicized problem, threatening the profitability of tourism and some industries and compromising the livelihood of commercial fishermen.
(Between 1949 and 1952, over one hundred major fish kills occurred each year.) Using ties to political leaders, the alliance helped draft federal laws to manage the water supply (1957), to require manufacturers to produce biodegradable detergents (1961), and to control oil pollution, a problem that worsened as West Germany’s petroleum use increased. In the early 1960s, coal still supplied 75 percent of the country’s total energy needs, but oil covered 21 percent, bringing more spills, leaking fuel tanks, and poisoned groundwater.122

The organization that deserves the most credit for passing conservation and environmental legislation is the non-partisan Interparliamentary Working Association for a Sustainable Economy (Interparlamentarische Arbeitsgemeinschaft für eine naturgemäße Wirtschaft, or IPA). Formed in 1952 by fifty federal and state parliamentarians who were involved in or abreast of international developments in conservation, the IPA attracted an additional 250 members by 1964 with its goal of promoting stewardship of natural resources in tandem with economic development. Expressing an environmental consciousness ahead of its time, the IPA warned that disruptions in the balance of the “household of nature” potentially threatened public health and the quality of life of future generations. Assigning a new, universal significance to conservation that contrasted sharply with older, yet still common, nationalistic and morally conservative arguments, IPA literature cautioned that careless exploitation of natural resources put freedom, justice, and peace at risk. In fulfilling what the IPA described as a “political duty” to “secure the natural foundations of life,” members took the lead in drafting the Land Consolidation Law (1953), the Water Management Law (1957), the Clean Air Maintenance Law (1959), and the law requiring biodegradable detergents (1961).123

These examples suffice to illustrate the range of organizations that claimed responsibility for conservation in postwar West Germany. While some remained nationalistic in their aims (such as the VNP and SDW), others were more pragmatic (like the Conservation Ring and the Alliance for the Protection of Germany’s Waters). A lesser number was like the IPA, guided by a universal concern to protect peace and freedom in pursuing pragmatic legal reform. The revival of old groups and the emergence of several new alliances in the late 1940s and early 1950s refutes the claim that Naturschutz was too tarnished by National Socialism to find support in the Federal Republic and it ensured that no group would monopolize conservation.

Yet the conservation leadership was dominated by a small circle of well connected social and political elites until the late 1960s.124 The bank executive Georg Fahrbach (FDP) presided over several hiking organizations, founded a giant merger of six mass organizations for hiking and preservation, and served for years on the DNR executive committee.125 The multi-millionaire Alfred Toepfer chaired the VNP, assumed a position on the DNR executive committee, and sat on the German Council for Land Cultivation, a body discussed in chapter 4.
The younger Wolfgang Burhenne (1924– ) was cofounder of the progressive alliance for wildlife protection (\textit{Schutzgemeinschaft Deutsches Wild}), served for years as the Secretary General of the IPA, went on to play a key role in the IUCN in legal affairs, helped establish the World Wildlife Fund in 1961, and later served on the DNR executive committee (as a rather disgruntled member).\textsuperscript{126} This tendency of old and new groups to rely on a few well connected people to make most of the decisions and work behind the scenes to secure officials’ support is not surprising for the generation of 1900, which received much of its political education under authoritarian systems and associated democracy with the unstable Weimar Republic. Nor was it out of place in the conservative political climate of the times. In the absence of a mass following, leading conservationists pursued a practical strategy by cultivating close ties to the state. In the process, they strengthened support for \textit{Naturschutz}. In the case of individuals such as Burhenne and Engelhardt, they also assured West Germany’s participation in international conservation.\textsuperscript{127} Despite a lack of broad participation by members, the freedom of organizational leaders to participate in the public sphere of West Germany’s restored democracy ensured the continuation of conservation after 1945 and contributed in some measure to the revival of civic life.

After World War II, the generation of 1900 that stayed on to shape postwar conservation clung to the belief that the condition of Germany’s landscapes directly affected the spiritual and physical health of their countrymen. A few, like former VNP chairman Hans Domizlaff and former conservation commissioner Hans Schwenkel, still linked preservation to racial hygiene, but they found themselves marginalized. More common was the continued use of biologisms, as in the arguments of SDW leaders who claimed that Germans’ spiritual essence and respected intellectual heritage were intricately connected to the forest. It therefore followed that protecting “the German forest” would preserve the nation’s cultural roots and secure its economic future.

Conservationists also continued to advocate the protection of nature-as-an-idealized-\textit{Heimat}. Yet the image of homeland they sought to protect underwent subtle change. Initially, they fought to protect a \textit{Heimat} that presumably had remained “pure” and that provided fertile ground for cultivating patriotic citizens for a nation-in-waiting. As material conditions improved somewhat and environmental problems worsened in the 1950s, the \textit{Heimat} they wanted to defend was not only prosperous and modern but scenic, healthy, and reminiscent of cherished traditions. However flexible the \textit{Heimat} idea had shown itself to be, postwar conservationists resisted the subordination of \textit{Naturschutz} to \textit{Heimatschutz}, fearing that the broad cultural agenda of the latter would dilute efforts to limit the exploitation of land and natural resources, their greatest worry.\textsuperscript{128}

The emphasis that the western Allies and German political leaders placed on economic recovery forced conservationists to adjust their goals and rhetoric
to reflect this overriding concern. Those associated with state-sponsored conservation led the way in developing a more flexible response to the challenge of managing the country’s resources and landscapes, conveying their goals by pairing “Naturschutz” with “Landschaftspflege” more intentionally than in the past. Accordingly, conservationists came to view themselves less as protectors and designers of homeland landscapes and more as stewards of land health, charged with protecting healthy landscapes and doctoring biologically sick ones—all in the interest of public wellness and economic prosperity. Yet even this presumably more rational approach to conservation was undergirded by a familiar cultural conservatism.

Without ignoring the ecological insights of preservationists of previous decades, one can view the 1950s as an important stage in the ecologization of Naturschutz, not only in West Germany, but internationally as well. This change is not surprising after a global conflict that caused critical shortages of natural resources around the world, prolonging human misery, and slowing economic recovery. WWII made the interconnectedness of humans and nature, and nature and economies obvious. In West Germany, ecologization also was evident in the emergence of new alliances whose diverse member groups understood that harm to one part of nature affected the larger “household,” as well as their economic and recreational interests. But one should not assume that ecological arguments carried more weight in public debate in the 1950s, especially when ecology was still not a widely respected science in West Germany. Unlike their North American cohorts who thought ecology provided an objective means of understanding and managing nature, West German ecologists contended that nature could not be understood in purely scientific terms. Partly for this reason, the scientific community regarded ecology as methodologically suspect. Reinforcing the point, the prominent German ecologist Wolfgang Haber recalled that his professor discouraged him from studying ecology because it had little prestige; he pursued biology, chemistry, and geography instead. Furthermore, the compartmentalization of conservation in state ministries of culture, agriculture, or the interior meant that officials responsible for Naturschutz had difficulty appreciating the holistic perspective of ecological arguments. In general, West German officials and the public viewed Naturschutz as a cultural activity, a notion reinforced by conservationists’ pedagogical activities that, ironically, tried to educate people about the expanded scope of caring for nature.

It is tempting to conclude that conservation was not overly successful in West Germany in the 1940s and 1950s. Although it acquired support from several new alliances and prominent public figures, it still lacked strong institutional and financial support and remained a minority cause with a rather narrow base and with influence primarily at the local and regional levels. And the social conservatives who dominated the leadership won few new converts with their elitist sounding message that preached against excessive materialism, the arrogance of
technology, and contemporaries’ alienation from nature. Although these familiar lamentations were right at home in the paternalistic climate of Adenauer’s Germany, they failed to resonate with most people who only had begun to sample the fruits of prosperity. Yet as recent studies have shown, examining developments on the regional level where preservation had its traditional base of support reveals a more promising picture of early postwar conservation. In the following case study from the Black Forest, social conservatives united thousands of supporters in an alliance to protect nature-as-Heimat, forcing a utility company to beat a small retreat and reach a partially green compromise.

Notes


17. On Hans Klose’s struggle to preserve the former Reich Agency despite budgetary constraints and states’ rights advocates see Klose, *Fünfzig Jahre*, 44–46; Klose’s correspondences in BAK B 245/238; Klose to Ministerialrat Gustav Mitzschke (Hesse), 11 October 1950, BAK B 245/253; Klose to Carl Kraemer, 8 February 1951, BAK B 245/252. On competition between the Federal Ministry of Agriculture and the Federal Ministry of the Interior for authority over conservation in the early 1950s see BAK B 245/247, especially Klose to Federal Ministry of Agriculture, 27 June 1950, BAK B 245/247 and Federal Minister of the
Defending Nature under the Allied Occupation, 1945–1955


23. Mrass, Organization, 64. In five of the eleven states, conservation was housed in the ministry of culture. In Bavaria and Bremen, it was under the ministry of the interior. In Schleswig–Holstein and Hesse, the ministry of agriculture had oversight, and in North Rhine-Westphalia and West Berlin, the ministry for public works was responsible.

24. Gert Kragh to Hans Klose, 1 October 1946; Klose to Kragh, 9 October 1946, both in BAK B 245/153.


26. Gert Kragh to Minister of Culture, Lower Saxony, 3 September 1953, BAK B 245/153; Engels, Naturpolitik, 53. More extensive on West Germans’ memories of the Nazi past is Herf, Divided Memory, chapters 7–8.


32. Lekan, "Regional Planning," in Brüggemeier, Cioc, and Zeller, How Green, 91; Bergmeier, Umwelthgeschichte, chap. 3.
35. The BANL journal, first published as Naturschutz in 1922, ceased publication in 1944. In 1953 the title was changed to Natur und Landschaft. See Engels, Naturpolitik, 47, 63–64.
41. Blackbourn, Conquest, 325.
57. Mitman, “In Search of Health,” 184–89; Herbert Offner, opening remarks, Verhandlungen (1955): 22–24; Mrass, Organisation, 8; Wey, Umweltpolitik, 198; Körner, Theorie, 99ff. Engels, Naturpolitik, 86–93, is skeptical of the view that landscape care was modernized by these economic and scientific emphases.
Erich Künstler, 1 February 1947, both in BAK B 245/252. See also Herbert Ecke, “Truppenübungen in Naturschutzgebieten,” Verhandlungen (1949): 46–48; and clippings in BAK B 245/83.

63. On plans for a national park see Lutz Heck (Reich Forest Office) to Carl Duve, 31 March 1942, Verein Naturschutzpark Archive, Niederhaverbeck, Lüneburg Heath, binder labeled “VNP Landschaftspflege/Einzelverfahren, Bereisungen” (hereafter VNP Archive, “VNP Landschaftspflege/Einzelverfahren, Bereisungen”). On plans to drill for oil see Reich Forest Master (Göring) to President, District of Lüneburg, 6 January 1940; Hans Klose to Reich Forest Master, 10 February 1940, both in BAK B 245/82. Wartime developments are discussed in Hans Domizlaff, “Die volkpsychologische Dringlichkeit des Naturschutzproblems,” Naturschutz 25, no. 3 (1944): 39; Domizlaff, editorial, Naturschutzparke (December 1947): 2.


66. Gauleiter Telschow to Walther Keller [honorary VNP president, publisher of Kosmos], 3 January 1942, BAK B 245/82.

67. On denazification see Domizlaff, editorial, Naturschutzpark (December 1947): 3–4; Dominick, Environmental Movement, 120; Goerke to Heinz Appel, 1 November 1947, BAK B 245/83. On efforts to remove Domizlaff and adopt a more democratic charter see BAK B 245/83.


71. Max Kochskämper to Hans Domizlaff, 4 June 1952, BAK B 245/83.


78. An enthusiastic communist in the 1920s, Wehner later settled on the conservative side of the West German SPD, leading the party in supporting the Godesberg Program of 1959, which abandoned revolutionary rhetoric for a more moderate stance.


83. Dominick, Environmental Movement, 134–35, 144, 169–79; Brüggemeier, Tschernobyl, 194; Bergmeier, Umweltgeschichte, chap. 3; Rommelspacher, “Zwischen Heimatschutz und Umweltprotest,” 75–84; Uekötter, Rauchplage, 410; Zeller, Straße, 286. On styles of activism see Engels, Naturpolitik, chap. 4.


88. OMGUS, German Forest Resources Survey (1 October 1948): 2, 6–7; Nelson, Cold War Ecology, 43.


90. Institut für Besatzungsfragen, Einwirkung, 105.


125. Georg Fahrbach, a former member of the back-to-nature youth movement, presided over the Swabian Alb Society, the German Youth Hostel Enterprise, and the League of German Mountaineering and Hiking Societies. In 1952, he and Karl Arnold (CDU), Minister-President of North Rhine-Westphalia (1949–1956) and head of the German *Heimat* League, formed the Working Association of German *Heimat*, Hiking, and Conservation Organizations (including the DNR). On Hans Klose and Hans Krieg’s criticisms of the merger see BAK B 245/235.


