Lessons from South Africa: War and Wildlife Protection in the Southern Sudan, 1917–1921

JANE CARRUTHERS

Faculty of Arts
University of South Africa
PO Box 392, Pretoria 0001, South Africa

SUMMARY

For a few years at the end of the First World War, James Stevenson-Hamilton, warden of the Kruger National Park in South Africa, was employed in the Sudan civil service. Despite the dissimilar human history and natural environments of South Africa and the Southern Sudan, Stevenson-Hamilton’s experiences in Mongalla province were informed by his professional life in South Africa and his comments on the game protection initiatives in the Sudan at that time are relevant to the modern conservation doctrine of sustainable yield. In the early 1920s Stevenson-Hamilton was responsible for drafting Sudanese game protection legislation which endured for a number of decades.

A comparison between developments in South Africa and the Southern Sudan may appear to be incongruous. Indeed, in many respects it is, for little in either the historical or the modern political experience of these two regions suggests that they have much common. Apart from the fact that they share the same continent, disparities rather than similarities invariably spring to mind. Fundamentally, for example, there are immense discrepancies in the natural environment, geography and climate. The Southern Sudan is landlocked at the upper reaches of the Nile River, natural resources are scarce and fragile and communities are ordered by the riverine regime. The pastoral economy of the area is simple and undifferentiated and the population Nilotic. South Africa, by contrast, has greater environmental variety, more resilient natural resources, a sophisticated economy and a diverse population.

Moreover, the history of the two countries has been dissimilar. Until well into the twentieth century firm government bypassed the Southern Sudan and transhumant pastoralists were largely left to their own affairs. South Africa, on the other hand, has a centuries-old interventionist colonial past. Indigenous communities were systematically conquered by whites trekking inland from the
south until European hegemony was secured by the 1890s. Even when both regions came under British control at the turn of the century, South Africa and the Southern Sudan were subject to different colonial structures. The Southern Sudan was a subordinate segment of an intricate Anglo-Egyptian form of government focused on Mediterranean interests, while South Africa was a self-governing entity with increasingly tenuous attachments to Europe.

Despite these considerable contrasts, however, it was still possible some seventy years ago to have a strong degree of interaction between such disparate parts of the earth. By giving close attention to a common feature – wildlife – this paper elucidates and explores two threads which united South Africa and the Southern Sudan for a short period around the time of the First World War. One of these is general in nature, being British imperialism, the over-arching factor which coupled the two countries together in a political matrix. The other is the particular, a talented and interesting individual – James Stevenson-Hamilton (1867-1957). Apart from the intrinsic interest of pursuing a detailed aspect of imperial administration and biography, this study has relevance for the history of environmental thought, particularly in evaluating the widely held modern belief in sustainable yield. There are thus resonances which impact on modern conservation philosophy and practice, especially matters such as the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES), the current ban on the ivory trade, the value of commercially exploiting natural resources and their allocation among communities, the impact of war on nature conservation and the historical interaction between man and wildlife.

In many respects, South Africa’s early colonial experience of game protection was to provide an example to the rest of Africa. By 1900 occidental game protection formalities in South Africa were well advanced, this despite (and because of) the fact that wild animals were almost everywhere extremely scarce. Access to wildlife was denied to Africans, and race and class had determined how control over natural resources would be allocated. That this had come about, was in part because the process of dispossessing indigenous communities had gone hand-in-hand with the decimation of wildlife. The South African nature conservation experience varied regionally and until 1902 the Transvaal and the Orange Free State retained their independence, and consequently their control over wildlife management.

Formal South African conservation legislation began as early as 1658 when it became evident that the penguin population of the Cape offshore islands was being depleted more quickly than it was reproducing. This and all later injunctions promoting the sustainable yield of wildlife products in the Cape were unsuccessful, principally because people who depended on wildlife for food and income did not temper their predatory behaviour. By the mid-nineteenth century, there was wide-reaching game preservation legislation, including embryonic game reserves, but there was little left to conserve. Access to wildlife was a major
catalyst to exploring the interior and the Orange Free State, the Transvaal and Natal followed the Cape in enacting legislative controls. In the Transvaal, initial decrees aimed to regulate the commercial exploitation of ivory and hides, and once the failure of these conservation efforts had become evident and wildlife ceased to exist at a marketable level, the formation of preservationist reserves began.\(^1\) Game reserves were inaugurated in the Transvaal (from 1895) as an English-inspired sporting ethic became evident. The aim of these protected areas was that in closing certain state land to public access and in actively eradicating ‘vermin’, the desirable wildlife species would multiply for the future enjoyment of sportsmen. Thus, by 1900, ahead of the rest of Africa, a commercial wildlife conservation ethic had been replaced by a sporting preservationist ethic in the Transvaal. The time of protection for aesthetic or ecological reasons was yet to come.

An important imperial conference on African wildlife protection was held in London in 1900.\(^2\) The resulting Convention (which was never ratified) had wide application for the British Empire generally, but not particularly for South Africa, where wildlife destruction, white settlement and general conditions of modernization were so well advanced that many of the provisions were irrelevant. For example, there were no extended tracts of state land suitable for public hunting by that time. In addition, most of the provisions of the Convention concentrated on controlling the exploitation of ivory, the dominant export product from Africa, while the elephant herds of the sub-continent had long since disappeared.

However, the London Convention strongly advocated that adequate game reserves be coupled to effective legislation as a two-pronged offensive against wildlife destruction. Under these beneficial imperial attitudes, the system of game reserves in the Transvaal was strengthened and expanded. It is in this connection that an overt imperial link was established in South Africa with the appointment in 1902 of James Stevenson-Hamilton to the post of Warden of the small Sabi Game Reserve in the eastern Transvaal. Although a number of South Africans applied for the position, the job went to a professional British soldier and a member of the Scottish landed gentry. An officer in the 6th Inniskilling Dragoons, Stevenson-Hamilton saw active service in Natal in 1888. However, thereafter, becoming disinclined to the life of a peace-time soldier, he decided to explore Africa, and in 1898 joined a Royal Geographical Society expedition to Barotseland.\(^3\) When war broke out in South Africa in 1899, Stevenson-Hamilton re-joined his regiment. As a man who preferred personal freedom of action, Stevenson-Hamilton had a strong antipathy to a certain type of authoritarianism, and his unpleasant experience of his superior officers during the war precipitated his leaving the army to begin a new profession as an imperial civil servant and administrator. No better opportunities presenting themselves at the time, he accepted the Sabi post in 1902 and he was to remain there until his retirement in 1946 at the age of almost eighty.
During his long career, Stevenson-Hamilton was extremely influential on game protection developments in South Africa, particularly in the evolution of national park philosophy. An able and efficient administrator, he enlarged his area of jurisdiction substantially, imposed para-military order on the game reserves and ensured that he had access to a meaningful power structure. By 1914 the whole of the Eastern Transvaal boundary with Mozambique was a game reserve, and there were other reserves at the Pongola Poort and near Rustenburg. Stevenson-Hamilton’s success in the Transvaal was emulated in the Cape and Natal. But Stevenson-Hamilton was not only an efficient administrator, he was also an obsessive recorder and observer and an intelligent and competent writer. Within a decade of working in the game protection field, he was one of the best respected naturalists in the Empire and a popular author who corresponded with many of the elite of the scientific and hunting fraternity of the day. Moreover, he was a prominent individual in South African and imperial circles and was poised to make a contribution to a fellow member of the Empire – the Sudan.

Positioned at the upper reaches of the White Nile, and largely bypassed by the medieval Arab world, the Sudan was conquered in the early 1820s by Muhammad 'Ali, and brought within the Ottoman Empire. The prospect of gold was the original appeal of the Southern Sudan for Egyptian and other nineteenth century traders, but none was to be found. However, two other natural resources were equally attractive: slaves and ivory. But although the Southern Sudan was Egyptian and part of the Turco-Egyptian sphere of influence, it was not actively governed. Owing to disruptive slavers and traders, forcible Egyptian conscription, Mahdist ideology and a low degree of indigenous control, local intergroup warfare and conditions of general insecurity typified the region. It was these complex and volatile circumstances, together with efforts to curtail the slave trade, which were to bring the Sudan within the orbit of Britain.

At the end of the nineteenth century, with the weakening of the Turkish Empire and the overthrow of the Mahdist state, came a more intense British interest in Egypt and thus, tangentially but importantly, in the Sudan as well. The security of Egypt and the Suez Canal made control of the whole Nile river system imperative, and expanding British influence into this area was accelerated also by the fear that European rivals would intrude. Joint government of the Sudan by Britain and Egypt was instituted. Continual uneasy relations between Britain and Egypt and between Egypt and the Sudan were compounded by the internal hostility between the people of the Northern and Southern Sudan who were brought together in an unhappy political marriage, a condition which endures even today.

The differences between the Southern and Northern Sudan are fundamental. They relate both to environmental and human circumstances and they have a bearing on the wildlife preservation history of the Sudan. Unlike the rest of the country which is arid, the chief environmental determinant of the Southern
Sudan is the Sudd, ‘a dreary dead level of reed and papyrus swamp [extending] to the uttermost horizon with nothing to break its depressing monotony’ as Stevenson-Hamilton expressed it in 1917. The White Nile enters the Sudan at Nimule and after some 150km it reaches a huge, flat clay plain which prevents soil absorption and creates an enormous flooded area, up to a metre deep, filled with abundant supplies of nutritious fish but also with dense floating vegetation which impedes all water-borne traffic for long periods of the year. The ecological impact of the Nile is substantial throughout its length, but in the South unlike the north, the Sudd affected pastoralists rather than cultivators. Live-}

stock was the basis of the southern economy as well as the core of its socio-

political organization. The lifestyle was transhumant; in times of flooding, the
precious long-horned cattle – representing wealth, social obligations and aesthetic and religious assets – were moved onto dubbás, higher sandy outcrops. Without sufficient dry ground to support large numbers of people and livestock, groups fragmented. In the dry season, when the mud, that ‘mass of glutinous porridge’ had been baked by the sun into ‘the consistency of brick’ the pattern was reversed. Larger groupings made use of the more abundant grazing areas and political and social alliances, livestock raids and counter-raids were the consequence. Wildlife, being protected by the Sudd and thus more abundant in the south than in the north, also migrated from high to low ground depending on seasonal conditions.

Unlike the predominantly Arab population of the north, the southern population comprised inter-related groups of Luo people, the Dinka and the Nuer. Many centuries previously they had intruded in small groups into the Southern Sudan, probably seeking pasture-land. Although they eventually came to inhabit a large territory, their vulnerable economy, nomadism, flexible group size, lack of internal cohesion and absence of external threats made centralized institutions unnecessary. The variety in their origins, languages and cultures was reflected also in their complex (and sometimes competing) value systems and religious beliefs.
Until 1903 there was little attempt to govern, or even administer, the inaccessible and climatically disagreeable Southern Sudan. At that time Britain sought to control effectively the whole of the Nile River system because of its impact on the Mediterranean and Anglo-Egyptian sovereignty thus began to manifest itself. Involuntary labour was organised, taxes were levied, provincial and district boundaries were delineated and administrative posts established. British military officers, often employed on a contract basis, formed the upper echelons of the civil service, with Egyptian or northern Sudanese troops at the lower levels. The Southern Sudanese civil service was described as ‘athletic public school boys accustomed to hard work rather than to hard thinking’. Once British government was imposed, however, it was regarded by the pastoralists as no different from that of the preceding Egyptians or Mahdists: it was to be resisted.

In 1906 the southern province of Mongalla was established, and between 1909 and 1910 it came to mark the tribal boundary between the Dinka and the Nuer of the Upper Nile Province. In an already complex situation, a defined border and what seemed to be overt Mongalla support for the Dinka, made effective government even more difficult as resistance surfaced. These conditions nurtured dissension between Dinka and Nuer groups and small-scale
revolts became widespread. Regular punitive expeditions did little to calm serious outbreaks such as that which took place in 1910.18

Because the Sudd restricted communications, apart from the forays of traders the Southern Sudan had been an isolated region with a generally self-sufficient indigenous economy. Increased governmental control at the beginning of the twentieth century caused it to become a drain on the national treasury and ways were sought by which to generate revenue from it. Ivory exploitation was the obvious source.19 At the time, the area still abounded in elephant20 which were protected by the Sudd and also by the fact that the pastoralist Luo people were neither hunters or traders. The Sudanese government aimed to create a sound market for ivory at Khartoum to entice trading away from Mombasa, and therefore declared ivory a government monopoly in 1903, although the following year permits were granted to private traders. This scheme shortly began to achieve its object: ivory exports from the Sudan increased from 15 tons in 1901 (with a value of £E7,925) to 125 tons in 1913 (with a value of £E113,236).21 Soon ivory was a major revenue producer for the Sudan and in Mongalla province alone (principally around Bor) some three thousand elephant were slaughtered each year.22 The elephant population came to serve two functions; ivory was profitable for the government, and elephant hunting proved an attraction for British and Egyptian officials, who could enjoy the hunting experience while selling off the ivory to augment their low salaries.23

The critical importance of ivory brought the Southern Sudan into the international wildlife conservation arena. As has been mentioned, the London conference of 1900 was held to direct the process of protectionism in colonial Africa. The conference was important in marking the start of international co-operation in nature conservation, today perhaps one of the most influential global lobbies. In the Sudan, British enthusiasm for game-saving soon manifested itself. The Preservation of Wild Animals’ Ordinance was drafted in 1901, which, among other provisions, divided wildlife into ‘classes’ affording different conservation status to each, protected females and young animals, closed certain districts to hunting and regulated licences. Significantly, unlike South Africa, a distinction was made between ‘natives of the Sudan’ – which included civil servants stationed in the country – and visitors, more privileges being accorded to the former. A large game reserve, some 40,000 sq.m. bounded by the Blue and White Nile, the Sobat River and the Ethiopian boundary, was established by this Ordinance.24 Two years later there was a fresh ordinance, which retained the distinction between ‘natives’ of the Sudan and visitors but made other minor changes. The area of the White Nile Reserve was maintained and more definitively described, but was divided into two, north and south of a line joining Kaka and Famaka.25 In 1908 further amendments followed, the most substantial of which was the declaration that the northern portion of the White Nile Reserve was a ‘sanctuary’, while the southern portion was a ‘reserve for game’. The
distinction was finely drawn. In a sanctuary, only ‘native’ residents or licensed officials resident in the sanctuary were allowed to hunt, while in a reserve, ‘natives’, officials and permit holders from elsewhere in the Sudan were also allowed to do so. In addition, a ‘sanctuary’ for Nubian Ibex was declared in parts of the Red Sea Province.26 The underlying principle that access to wildlife was reserved, in the first instance for the pleasure and profit of natives and officials rather than itinerants was entrenched, and this was also a hallmark of succeeding amendments in 1911 and 1915.

This far-reaching legislation, together with the appointment of A.L. Butler as Game Superintendent,27 would seem to indicate convincing official support for the protectionist programme. However, there were tensions and contradictions from the outset, and these of a sufficiently serious nature to bring into being a powerful British voluntary organization, the Society for the Protection of the Wild Fauna of the Empire. The major quandary imperial conservationists had was with the virtually unbridled hunting liberty of white officials in the Sudan. ‘Natives’ generally captured wildlife by unsophisticated methods, and many indigenous communities in the Sudan were not hunters by tradition, so the field was thus left open to officials. When the minimum weight for exportable ivory was reduced in the Sudan from 14kg to 5kg,28 and when, in 1903, Lord Cromer objected to proposals for a game reserve in the Senna district,29 there was an outcry in Britain. Moreover, Cromer had taken issue with prominent preservationist writer Edward North Buxton who, in his book Two African Trips, had criticised Cromer for the lax administration of the game laws and for allowing hunting within a protected area. As Buxton expressed it, ‘Personally I should say that a sanctuary where people are allowed to shoot is a contradiction in terms. A vestal virgin should not be allowed to have, even two or three, lovers. It is a reserve with a reservation and experience shows that such reservations are fatal to it as a harbour for game.’30 In order to pressurise the imperial government to put the rein on officials like Cromer, Buxton formed the Society for the Preservation of the Wild Fauna of the Empire and took the matter up at the highest levels of government. He saw some justification in Cromer’s argument that officials had ‘to live a very hard and solitary life in a most trying climate’ and that they therefore deserved a ‘return for the excellent and very arduous services rendered’ by way of special hunting privileges. But Buxton’s rebuttal was that the limits of reasonable hunting privileges were being over-ridden when officials were allowed to hunt in game reserves, and that the interests of wildlife, rather than officials, should be the first concern of the Game Department.31

Tension between preservation and extraction was to continue in the Sudan. The region’s abundant wildlife populations were a great attraction and the area was highly favoured by the affluent hunting fraternity who, despite the legal difficulties for visitors, seem to have had no difficulty in obtaining special hunting permits from Butler’s department. The pleasures of hunting in the Sudan at this time were outlined in 1905 by G.L. Harrison, an American who spent two
weeks travelling by camel. On Butler’s advice, he hunted in the Dinder area, accompanied by a former slave who had been educated in England. Harrison set the veld ablaze in order to shoot roan antelope, waterbuck, topi, Tora hartebeest, Soemmerring’s gazelle, elephant, leopard, lion and hippopotamus, and a number of his trophies were Rowland Ward records. Harrison displayed the general prejudices of his time regarding politics and racism, denigrating both hungry servants and hunter-gatherers. He left the less enjoyable aspects of the hunt to his servants, who skinned heads and cleaned and dissected dead animals, and who carried out all the domestic chores, including cooking, cleaning the silver and napery and even – to Harrison’s delight at their appreciation of polite niceties – removing the salt and pepper from the table after the main course had been served. He alleged that he ‘of course’ kept to the game laws, but he was absolutely alone.32

Between pleasure, business and widespread poaching,33 game protection legislation became merely notional, and Butler had no problem with the ‘selective application of the game laws’.34 Famous visitors included Teddy Roosevelt in 1909-1910,35 and Abel Chapman, author of *Savage Sudan; Its Wild Tribes, Big-Game and Bird-Life*, among other publications.36

Such was the state of game protection in the Sudan in 1914 at the outbreak of the First World War. Although the Sudan was not enmeshed in active hostilities, the war was a watershed for the country because of its connection with Egypt and therefore with Turkey.37 Having annexed Egypt when war broke out, Britain was obliged also to intervene in the Sudan in an effort to administer ‘a country of doubtful loyalty’.38 Active government was intensified as local resistance increased and resident British officials left to join the war. It was in this connection that Stevenson-Hamilton came onto the Southern Sudanese scene in 1917.

This was not Stevenson-Hamilton’s first visit to the Sudan, however. In 1910 he had proceeded from South Africa to England on a visit, but went overland through East Africa on a hunting expedition, making his way from Kenya into the Sudan before travelling through Egypt to London. By that time, he was (as has been explained) well-entrenched in his position as warden of the Sabi and Singwitsi Game Reserves and enjoyed an international reputation in wildlife protection circles. Stevenson-Hamilton’s journal of his visit to East Africa records his distaste for the hunting ethics of upper-class hunters in the area. He states that Winston Churchill, for instance, sat on the cowcatcher of a train and ‘blazed at everything he saw’.39 He also expounded on the East African settler ethic, referring to the colonists as ‘a most turbulent and contumacious crowd. No one cares a hang for anything except exploiting the country for his own individual benefit. They want the game laws suspended and trade in hides and horns ... permitted ... it is dreadful to know that people of British race can think thus.’40 Moreover, he had nothing polite to say of the local British officials,
denigrating the low pedigree of Major Ross (Acting Game Ranger in A.B. Percival’s absence) and, more importantly, experiencing the corrupt practices of the Game Department. When he learnt that officials hunted within game reserves, Stevenson-Hamilton was appalled: ‘this matter of the violation of an elephant sanctuary on the part of officials of the country seems remarkable to say that least of it!’ He had not been exposed to such anti-protectionist behaviour and attitudes in South Africa for many years.

Despite the mosquitoes which he did not like, Stevenson-Hamilton obtained a good – though hasty – general impression of the Sudan, commenting that Mongalla was a ‘nice town’, populated by well-paid officials. He spent almost three weeks journeying up the Nile by steamer and was soon on his way to England. In this short acquaintance, ‘the spell of the Nile’ as Buxton put it, was to influence his desire for a second and longer visit when the opportunity arose during the First World War.

When ‘Armageddon’, as he called it, erupted in 1914, Stevenson-Hamilton did not plan to get to the Southern Sudan. Initially he was invited by the South African government to form a local intelligence unit, but refused, believing his ties to Britain and to his cavalry regiment to be paramount; ‘I would much rather go home and soldier’ he wrote. As it happened, his decision proved to be a mistake. On reaching England he discovered that the prominent position he believed he should occupy in his old regiment had been filled, his presence was unnecessary and he was virtually ignored. He found that the best he could do to contribute to the war under these circumstances was to join the Egyptian Expeditionary Force and he saw active service at Gallipoli. Thereafter, in April 1916, he was given an administrative assignment in Cairo, which he detested – ‘this job is a pure wash-out. Watching for officers breaking the rules’. He disliked also the heat, the animosity between the British and the Egyptian armies and the officers to whom he reported, considering them ignorant and ‘notoriously unimaginative, which is, of course, our national failing’. An unpleasant confrontation with his superiors ensued because, in Stevenson-Hamilton’s opinion, his disdain for the ‘Great Ones of the Earth’ upset them and he would not ‘lick their boots’. With the help of R.C.R. Owen, whom he had met in Mongalla in 1910, he arranged a secondment to the Egyptian army for work in the Sudan civil service. He was to be the temporary Inspector at Bor from 1917 to 1919 and, for a short period, he acted as Governor of Mongalla province.

On the way southwards by river steamer, Stevenson-Hamilton reflected that the northern Sudanese countryside was ‘beastly’, the company unexciting, and the noises and delays irritating. He did, however, like C.H. Stigand, the famous big-game hunter who was Governor of Mongalla province, who was ‘interesting and helpful, if not encouraging’. His first impression of Mongalla was that there was an ‘extraordinary amount of eyewash. Everything seems to be done to impress the outside world ... and Red Tape here seems to attain its apex’. He quickly evaluated the agricultural potential of the region, declaring that ‘under
a less bureaucratic government, it should soon be a rich and self-supporting country'.

His final destination was Bor, humid and hot, ‘about the limits, swamp and mosquitoes ... the Sabi is a health resort compared to the swamps of the upper Nile’. Stevenson-Hamilton soon explored his surroundings, noting the abundance of wildlife, meeting other officials and uncovering the complex political, bureaucratic and geographical landscapes as well as encountering the indigenous pastoralists whose customs and history he at once began to collect and record.

But the real task of soldier-administrators in the Southern Sudan at this critical time involved pacifying the region. War conditions and a looming Egyptian nationalist effort demanded thorough British control over the ever more strategically and economically important Sudan. Accomplishing this degree of jurisdiction in the south meant quelling resistance and putting an end to the endemic intergroup conflict. A number of complex factors created these conditions of ongoing violence, but the formal government response was never to understand them and tackle them constructively through effective policy. In essence, there was no policy except to impose order by ruthlessly suppressing all resistance. The official view was that the ‘pacification of the Southern Sudan was forced on the government by the turbulence of the people themselves’. Despite close ties between Dinka and Nuer, their obsession with livestock and resistance to authority led – as it did in many other parts of Africa – to conflict over cattle ownership and access to pasture. In addition, Anglo-Egyptian interference had upset indigenous conflict resolution strategies and this exacerbated the situation.

Stevenson-Hamilton was active in containing these eruptions of violence, and in promoting ‘law and order’. From February to May 1917 he joined the Lau-Nuer patrol; in May 1918 he raided the Atwot Dinkas; in July that year he ‘peacefully penetrated’ the Gaweir Nuer country and in May 1919 he ‘punished’ the Aiwil clan of the Alit-Twi Dinka. All this was accomplished during years of exceptional Nile flooding, which made travel extremely difficult and complicated the confiscation or appropriation of livestock. It has been noted that the majority of Southern Sudanese officials – like Stevenson-Hamilton – were not blood-thirsty people, and that many had a high moral code. Stevenson-Hamilton was shocked by an incident in which a number of captives died after being confined in a tiny hut, commenting ‘the Black Hole of Calcutta was no worse and these are the kind of officials one has to work with here’. He liked the soldiering aspect of his job, the excitement of the outdoor life in Africa and the opportunity to learn about a new area and people. Other officials, like Stigand for example, preferred ‘forests and mountains’ to the ‘endless flat plains of impossible going’. Stevenson-Hamilton immersed himself in the politics of the area, and was a sufficiently experienced administrator to identify the conflicting civil and military interests in the area, the intractability of the Dinka-Nuer rivalry and the faulty policy towards it. He corresponded with many officials to improve the situation, but to no avail.
For Stevenson-Hamilton, understandably, the greatest satisfaction he gained from living in the Southern Sudan was its abundant wildlife. He maximised every hunting opportunity which came his way, and even regarded his ‘raid’ and ‘punishment’ expeditions as chances to obtain game. He killed Nile lechwe, white-eared kob, Tora hartebeest, tiang (topi), Mongalla gazelle (a race of Thomson’s gazelle) and many other species. As he did not shoot game species for pleasure in the Sabi Game Reserve, it was a novelty for him to hunt while on duty. But the particularly rewarding new experience was that he had access to elephant, which were almost extinct in southern Africa at this time. The conditions under which elephant were hunted in the Southern Sudan were laborious. For example, Stevenson-Hamilton records manoeuvring the canoe for ‘several hours among the swamps, through trees, reeds and papyrus’ before spotting ‘eight bulls, all standing immersed up to their bellies in water’. On another occasion he took off his boots and ‘waded in. It was hard work as I had to wade all the time through liquid mud over my knees, with many water holes into which I repeatedly fell, and three wide channels to cross waist deep’. As a resident officer, he took advantage of the wartime provision which doubled the elephant ration for each £6 licence holder from two to four, and sold the ivory profitably. Not surprisingly, the large specimens had almost all gone and the animals he killed had small tusks – about 40lbs to 60lbs. Indeed, in this ‘free-booting’ period of wartime, many underweight tusks went from the Sudan to French colonies where the regulations were more lax, while large tusks came into the Sudan because higher prices were paid there.
As far as elephant conservation was concerned, the dangers inherent in government manipulation of the ivory trade and the trader permit system soon became apparent to Stevenson-Hamilton. After a short while at Mongalla he came to realise that Owen was extraordinarily corrupt, illegally providing his friends with elephant permits and thus contributing substantially to the depletion of the herds. After Owen’s retirement in January 1918, more of his illicit operations came to light, indeed, Stevenson-Hamilton considered that the whole province was Owen’s private fief, ‘running on elephant profits’.73

As soon as he had arrived in the Southern Sudan, Stevenson-Hamilton became active in game preservation matters. As was his custom in South Africa, he kept meticulous observations on the wildlife he encountered (including birds, reptiles and fish), noting favoured ranges and habitats, the relative abundance or scarcity of certain species, and morphological and colour variations.74 He also studied the legislation applicable in the Sudan, corresponding with Stigand on the issue in 1917. ‘What do you think of game preservation in the Sudan!!!’, asked Stigand. ‘The Game destruction dept has recently been handed over to the deforestation department but it was no better before.’75

Owing to the enormous cultural and developmental gulfs between the two countries, the issues facing wildlife conservation in the Southern Sudan were very different from those which Stevenson-Hamilton knew in South Africa. In the Southern Sudan, unlike South Africa, dispossessing people of land for wildlife was not an issue, nor was large-scale poaching. In South Africa, the principle of inviolate game reserves was well established, and thanks to Stevenson-Hamilton’s efforts, these had a strong administrative infrastructure and the full support of the legal system. Nature protection in South Africa was growing in national importance, and notions that wildlife was an asset, an aesthetic or cultural ‘heritage’ rather than a marketable commodity, were fast gaining ground among whites. By contrast, new conservationist ideology had not penetrated into the Southern Sudan. There were still great expanses of state land which supported large herds, and sustainable exploitation (centred on the high value of ivory) rather than protection remained the dominant philosophy. Governmental support for game protection was far less in the Sudan than in South Africa, where the Prime Minister’s office was well disposed to the programme and, indeed, was in the forefront of fresh initiatives despite the war. In the Sudan, in 1914 when A.L. Butler retired from the Game Preservation Department, he was not replaced:76 wildlife preservation became moribund and the department was subsumed into the Forestry Department.

However, despite a low local profile, the international protectionist fraternity recognised the contribution which Stevenson-Hamilton could make while he was in the Southern Sudan. He was, in fact, toying with the idea of remaining in North Africa, believing that his work in South Africa had been accomplished and that, under a rising tide of Afrikaner nationalism, his position in the Transvaal was no longer secure.77 In 1919 the Zoological Society of London supported his
as yet tentative plan to stay on in the Southern Sudan as game warden. Of special interest at the time was Stevenson-Hamilton’s innovative scheme to make the enterprise self-funding and less dependent on state money and control. He proposed capturing immature animals and nursing them in suitable localities before transporting them to zoological gardens and private collections throughout the world. Stevenson-Hamilton had once proposed such a scheme in the Transvaal, but nothing had come of it. However, there were a number of reasons which indicated that the scheme could operate viably from the Sudan. It was close to Europe, where the war had adversely affected zoological gardens. Stevenson-Hamilton could offer expertise in rearing captive animals, and in training ancillary staff. Moreover, prices at the time were attractively high, each young hippopotamus fetching £1000, and giraffe, elephant and rhinoceros in the region of £500.78

Stevenson-Hamilton also had ideas about modifying the ivory trade, the corrupting power of which he had personally experienced. While in the Sudan, he worked on an article (under the rather obvious nom de plume ‘Sabi’) which appeared in 1921 in the Journal of the Preservation of the Fauna of the Empire, entitled ‘The preservation of the African elephant’. Blaming Europeans for the elephant slaughter, he recognized the value of the 1900 Convention in assuaging consciences and trying to regulate elephant destruction. But he had no compunction in criticising the British colonies in Africa for upholding protectionist laws only when convenient and for using ivory extraction as a political tool. He spoke out strongly against unsporting and cruel methods of killing these ‘formidable denizens’, particularly that of ‘ring-fencing’. He predicted that the uncontrolled desire for ivory, facilitated by official neglect and avarice, would result in the extinction of elephant in Africa. His proposal was to ‘impede’, if not actually ‘fend off this destruction’ by adequate and well policed elephant sanctuaries, by regulating the size of slaughtered elephant and by closely monitoring licences. And he had learnt at first hand the vagaries of official attitudes towards licences. At the end of the war, no longer needing to attract people into its service, the Sudan government reverted to its earlier policy of rationing licensees to only two elephant each year and not four. However, Stevenson-Hamilton noted with dismay that financial and political pressures had seen this policy reversed and the number raised again to four. He came out strongly in favour of sustainable yield, employing arguments which are still heard today: ‘To kill the goose that lays the golden eggs... should not appeal to the educated financier... The need is pressing, let us act while there is still time.’ He advocated that ivory extraction should be an international issue and managed at Imperial, not local, level.79

In the event, Stevenson-Hamilton did not remain in the Sudan. He returned to South Africa in March 1920, and was surprised to find wildlife protection matters there equally depressing. In the warden’s absence, the Rustenburg Game Reserve had been abolished and the Transvaal game reserves of the Eastern
Transvaal had been seriously neglected by the incompetent Acting Warden. Administrative matters were in a shambles, white staff had been reduced and control over African staff and poachers had been lost. What little infrastructural development there was, by way of roads and buildings, had not been maintained. And at an ideological level, although the 1918 Transvaal Game Reserves Commission had reported favourably on transforming the game reserves into a national park along American lines, 1921 marked a interval of concerted efforts by private landowners and competing government departments to sabotage the recommendation. In addition, after a dormant period of more than twenty years tsetse fly had recurred in Natal and a nagana epidemic was decimating livestock. A number of game reserves in South Africa were consequently de-proclaimed, and wildlife extermination actively supported by government. When added to Stevenson-Hamilton’s fear that with approaching Afrikaner domination would come the loosening of the imperial connection which he considered so valuable, for him, it was not an encouraging scenario.

So disheartened was Stevenson-Hamilton by these developments that he explored the possibility of leaving Africa and returning to live in Britain, perhaps taking work with the Zoological Society. But before this could come about, on the basis of his experience, he was asked to present new legislation for consideration by the Sudan government. In Khartoum in November 1921, under the designation ‘Superintendent Game Preservation Department’, he did so. He prefaced his legislation with a literature study, which demonstrated that over the past seventy years, all wildlife species in the Sudan had been drastically reduced. A similar process of extermination had occurred in the late nineteenth century in South Africa and North America and was much regretted by both countries. To terminate this similar process in the Sudan, he advocated effective action against illicit hunting and government corruption. A change of attitude was needed too, so that officials in the Sudan would come to realise that game legislation was not just ‘a little bit of humour on the part of the Government, not really intended to be observed, and seldom to be considered, except to abuse when their circumvention happens to be impossible’. He also warned against continually re-formulating legislation (as had been done in the Sudan) for this created the impression that legal sanction was vacillating and pliable. Moreover, sound scientific studies were needed in order that legislation take direct account of what was most beneficial for wildlife. Stevenson-Hamilton advocated, in addition, that new legislation should make the ivory trade a government monopoly in order to obviate the use of the trade for purposes of bribery.

Given his South African background of successful strict game reserves, it was almost inevitable that Stevenson-Hamilton would propose that more land be set aside for wildlife in the Sudan. To some extent, he proposed retaining the two-tier system of ‘sanctuaries’ and ‘game reserves’, but he defined them differently. Sanctuaries would be wilderness or witness areas, carefully selected, strictly controlled, few in number, inaccessible to any member of the public and under
the jurisdiction of the central government. Game reserves would form the lower tier and they would be a more flexible and less permanent conservation tool, which could be used, depending on local conditions, for hunting purposes. Stevenson-Hamilton also suggested including in the legislation strict curtailment of ‘native’ hunting as well as official hunting, recognising that the former had become tainted by the use of modern weapons, and a category of Royal Game, which could not be killed under any circumstances. Another South African idea which he incorporated, was that justice should be executed locally, rather than at some remote capital city, in order that crimes were seen to be brought swiftly to court.

At the time when Stevenson-Hamilton was outlining his suggestions for improving wildlife protection in the Sudan he, like many others at the time, was groping towards a new direction for game reserves or sanctuaries. To some extent, this was a result of the National Park philosophy of the United States, but African conservationists like Stevenson-Hamilton did not believe that the United States model could merely be imposed on Africa. Not only were the origins and aims of national parks and game reserves different, but the fact that commercially viable wildlife still existed in Africa (unlike the United States) complicated the position. Stevenson-Hamilton, for example, doubted whether the public of Africa (whether indigenous communities, settlers or visitors) would flock to view wildlife when they could still, in fact, kill it and sell it. But if the visitor aspect of national parks was still unattractive, the idea of public control was not, for it had been clearly shown in South Africa that decentralised control of protected areas rendered them vulnerable to de-proclamation.

Thus attached to Stevenson-Hamilton’s general legislative outline, was his special report on ‘Game Sanctuaries’ which incorporated some aspects of national park philosophy while drawing on his South African background. After living in the Sudan, Stevenson-Hamilton appreciated that his ideas on this subject would probably not meet with official favour, so he did not press for their immediate establishment. He did, however, believe that they would, in time, become imperative protectionist institutions and that guidelines from his South Africa experience would be useful. The practical issues of sanctuaries were detailed, and Stevenson-Hamilton suggested that two areas of the country would be particularly suitable: the upper course of the Dinder River and an area around Amadi in Mongalla. He advocated strong central government control of Sudanese sanctuaries, so that, like Yellowstone National Park in the United States, they would be ‘the property of the country as a whole’. In 1922 new game preservation legislation in the Sudan came into effect. Stevenson-Hamilton’s suggestion of a category of Royal Game was incorporated, specially protecting both species of rhinoceros. The game reserve system was expanded, five areas being declared.

But Stevenson-Hamilton was not at hand to implement the changes, having returned to South Africa once more in March 1922. Circumstances had not much
brightened for him and in 1922 his gloomy article appeared in *The Journal of the Society for the Preservation of the Fauna of the Empire*, entitled ‘Empire Fauna in 1922’. Here Stevenson-Hamilton made explicit the link between game protection and imperial values. He noted a ‘general slump’ in wildlife interest, which he attributed to the ‘slackening of the fibres of civilization owing to the late war’. Reviewing different countries in turn, including the Sudan and South Africa, Stevenson-Hamilton seems to have considered the Sudan a lost cause, because British officials did not take protection seriously and previously high moral standards applying to wildlife were being abandoned. ‘It makes one almost fear that all that was best in British sport perished in the war’, he wrote.

In East Africa, conditions, he declared, were even worse, the game legislation there being designed specifically to exterminate all wildlife as quickly as possible. Even South Africa provided no solace, with the resurgence of tsetse fly, wildlife destruction in Zululand, the virtual extinction of the Addo elephant and heavy poaching around game reserves.

Stevenson-Hamilton never visited the Sudan again after 1921 and the nature conservation paths between the two countries diverged. South Africa, increasingly unencumbered by imperial considerations, went its own way. In 1926, Stevenson-Hamilton achieved the establishment of the Kruger National Park, which, before long and not always in a manner to his liking, became the premier eco-tourist attraction of the country. By the mid-1930s South Africa had a sturdy network of national parks along American lines and their political value to the government was conspicuous. Stevenson-Hamilton personally became alienated from the hierarchy which was imposed on him, but bowed before it, principally because he so greatly enjoyed his work. He continued to write and to study wildlife, but his international contribution lessened, and he was not permitted to attend the international conferences of the 1930s. In many respects, from being the catalyst for innovative wildlife protection advancements, he began to fall somewhat behind by the 1940s, always advocating a laisser-faire and simple approach, and thus misunderstanding the power and the nature of the new science of ecology.

While South Africa detached itself from many international organizations after the 1930s, the Sudan took a different trajectory, remaining a colony and thus firmly within the British Empire until 1955. In its case, international intervention was increasingly seen as an effective conservation tool, and world-wide committees and monitoring structures were advocated. In 1931, 1933 and 1938 three conferences were held in Europe at which the national park ideal was promoted very forcibly. The 1938 conference held in London, a follow-up of the 1900 conference, proved to be particularly significant for the Sudan, which still had no national parks (it had nine protected areas) at the time, and in 1939 established even more, upgrading two reserves, Southern and Dinder, to national park status.
Stevenson-Hamilton’s prediction that the extinction of the elephant was imminent in the Sudan proved to be unfounded in the medium term and even by 1937 elephant slaughter in the region could still be regarded as a ‘war’.92 The annual take-off of ivory was huge: for example, 3,145kg in 1939, 890kg in 1941 and an incredible 12,680kg in 1947. Elephant ‘control’, or culling, in the Southern Sudan was a regular routine carried out by Sudanese officials, and almost every year three hundred elephant met their fate in this way. Apart from elephant, however, other species generally also declined steadily. The official response to this was that which had been suggested by Stevenson-Hamilton, more protected areas were declared and policing staff increased. Visitor access was planned for the Southern Park, for the Nimule Reserve and for Dinder, the latter being regarded as comparable to Serengeti.93

The issue of ivory extraction from Africa has in more recent years once again become prominent in international conservation circles. While the numbers of elephant in central and north Africa has steadily declined since the 1920s, by contrast, the numbers in southern Africa have increased exponentially because of strict protective measures and close wildlife management strategies. While southern African countries initially fought the CITES ban on the ivory trade by arguing that sustainable extraction was commercially and environmentally desirable, international opinion has favoured the strictest preservationist measures. It can be seen from the comparison above that these arguments have been part of the conservationist discourse for almost a century and that a generally agreed resolution of the issue has still not become possible.

NOTES

2 For details see Blue Book Cd3189, Correspondence relating to the preservation of wild animals in Africa, 1906; PRO [Public Record Office, London] FO367, FO2/181.
5 R. Oliver and A. Atmore, Africa Since 1800 (Cambridge, 1967), pp.73-83.
10 S-HA [Stevenson-Hamilton Archives, Fairholm, Lanarkshire], ‘The Sudd’.
15 Daly, *Empire on the Nile*, pp.133-134.
16 Holt and Daly, *History of the Sudan*, pp.120-123.
18 In *Sudan Notes and Records*, 11, 1928, ‘The name Mongalla’, it is suggested that the name should perhaps have been ‘Mongarra’. See also D.H. Johnson, ‘Judicial regulation and administrative control; customary law and the Nuer, 1898-1954’, *Journal of African History*, 27, 1986; Collins, *Land Beyond the Rivers*, p.179; Daly, *Empire on the Nile*, pp.142-147.
19 Barbour, *Republic of the Sudan*, p.244; Daly, *Empire on the Nile*, p.149.
21 Daly, *Empire on the Nile*, p.149; see table p.458.
27 A.L. Butler never gained an international reputation. His only publication was *Brief Notes for Identifying the Game Animals of the Sudan* (Sudan Government, n.d.); Daly, *Empire on the Nile*, p.68.
32 G.L. Harrison, *Sudan Wild Life and Sport: Dinder 1905* (Khartoum, n.d.)
33 Collins, *Land Beyond the Rivers*, pp.157-158.
34 Daly, *Empire on the Nile*, pp.224-225.
Chapman was a prolific writer on wildlife matters; see for example, *Memories of Fourscore Years Less Two, 1851-1929* (London, 1930), pp.117-126. He claimed to have been the founder of the Kruger National Park on the basis of a report which he wrote in 1899.


Buxton, *Two African Trips*, p.46.

S-HA Journal 3 August 1914; 21 August 1914.


For details see Johnson, ‘Tribal boundaries and border wars’.


He began to learn Arabic and contemplated writing a book about the Southern Sudan. See his article ‘The Dinka Country’.

S-HA, Stigand to Stevenson-Hamilton, 8 May 1917.

S-HA, Sudan correspondence, Journal 18 January, 1918, 4 April 1918; see also Johnson, ‘Tribal boundaries and border wars’.

He made a point of learning their indigenous names and also learnt Arabic.
71 S-HA, ‘Successful elephant hunts, Sudan 1917 to 1919’.
72 MacKenzie, Empire of Nature, pp.154-155; Daly, Empire on the Nile, p.72.
73 S-HA, Journal January-February 1918, passim; Daly, Empire on the Nile, pp.150-151.
74 S-HA, Notes.
75 S-HA, Stigand to Stevenson-Hamilton, 8 May 1917.
76 Sabi, ‘Empire fauna in 1922’, p.38.
82 S-HA, ‘Game sanctuaries’, 4 December 1921.
83 C.W. Hobley, ‘The London Convention of 1900’, Journal of the Society for the Preservation of the Fauna of the Empire, New Series 20, August 1933, 1. Bounded on north by the Rijaf-Aba road, east by Nile, west by Congo. This was, however, believed to have been cancelled, being replaced by 200 sq. m. along the eastern bank of the Nile and bounded on the south by a road running east from Rijaf and on the west by a road from Mongalla to Ngala – Mongalla Reserve.
87 Carruthers, Kruger National Park, chapters 4 and 6.
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91 Special Publication of the American Committee for International Wildlife Protection vol. 1 no. 3, African Game Protection, 1933. These were: complete sanctuary 403 sq.m. Sinkat-Erkowit district; in Berber and Khartoum provinces, complete sanctuary of 300 sq.m.; a complete reserve near the Abyssinian border of 1000 sq.m.; complete reserve of 4,000 sq.m., the White Nile Reserve; complete reserve of 200 sq.m. in Mongalla, Ngala-Ngala district; and complete reserve 315 sq.m. in Laruka district, Lokila Rest House.


93 For details, see Cmd 8097 1939-41; 8098 1942-44; 7581 1946, 7835 1947; 8181 1948; 9798 1950-1951; 9841 1951-1952. For details of these and later developments, see also Second International Conference for the Protection of the Fauna and Flora of Africa London May 1938, Final Act (London, 1938) and Union Internationale pour la Conservation de la Nature et de ses Ressources, Liste des Nations Unies des Parcs Nationaux et Reserves Analougues, 1967, at which time there were nine protected areas:

1939 Southern National Park: 1,600,000ha. total protection; 12 personnel, insufficient.

1935 Dinder National Park: 650,000ha. total protection; 40 people, extra game officers.


1939 Sabaloka Game Reserve
1939 Mbarizunga Game Reserve
1939 Bire Kpatua Game Reserve
1939 Tokar Game Reserve
1939 Rahad Game Reserve
1939 Mongalla Game Reserve
Zeraf GR 675,000 ha sitatunga 1939
Namutina GR 1939
Bengaigai GR 1939
Buma GR 1960
Shambe GR 1935
Badigeru GR 1935
Juba GR 1939
Ashana GR 1939
Fanyikang GR 1939

Some smaller reserves were, however, abolished, this being the fate during 1951 and 1952 of Lokila, Fan Ashir and Jevel Kathengor.

See also H.D. Nelson et al, Area Handbook for the Democratic Republic of Sudan