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War, Emergency and the Environment: Fiji, 1939–1946

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ABSTRACT

When World War Two broke out, Fiji’s colonial administration assumed emergency powers to marshal the civilian population to produce goods and services for the war effort, particularly the support of American and New Zealand military personnel based there during 1942–43. This context of emergency framed land legislation revision, enabling the government at times to deal in a high-handed manner in resuming Fijian leased land for native reserves, mainly from Indian tenants. The added population and wartime construction placed extensive demands on Fiji’s resources, inducing environmental changes. The government as well as the various racial groups in Fiji were largely unconcerned with this unless the degradation was obvious, threatening the wellbeing of the human population.

KEY WORDS

Fiji, environment, World War Two, legislation, forests, soils.

INTRODUCTION

World War Two had a significant impact on the western Pacific. Historians have concentrated on its social and political effects in Fiji, but none has linked these to changes wrought in the forests, lands and shores and the power the war situation offered the government.¹ The Fijian government, like most others, introduced emergency legislation to assume extensive, if temporary controls over property and persons. As well, legislation, long in the making, to allow the Crown to appropriate land and to establish a controlling trust board over Fijian lands came into being. The interplay between this legislation, emergency
legislation, the opportunities for the government created by the war as well as the
demands of the military affected both the environment and its human inhabitants.

‘Emergency’ legislation was a wartime equivalent of the ‘public good’ or
‘national interest’, often an excuse for forcing unpalatable changes in law and
administration. In peacetime the questions of ‘What public?’ and ‘For whose
good?’ could be contested with considerable vigour by those within and outside
government, even by the limited degree of popular representation which pre-
vailed in colonial Fiji, but in a time of national crisis these issues were less open
to debate. Much of this emergency ethos was transferred to the lasting legislation
of the period as well. Criticism in time of war could be construed at best as
disloyalty and at worst as treason or sedition.

FIJI BEFORE THE WAR

Fiji became a British Crown Colony in 1874 after the collapse of the nascent
indigenous government of King Cakobau. Its cash economy was soon dependant
on sugar-growing, with the Australian Colonial Sugar Refinery (CSR) as a
dominant force, accounting for more than half of Fiji’s annual exports. Between
the 1920s and 1940s, the plantation system gave way to family-based farms. The
growers were predominantly Indians who had arrived from 1879 until 1916
when importation of indentured labour ceased. Most were on leased lands
belonging to CSR, the Fijians or the Crown (the government). Fiji’s other
important crop, copra, was produced mainly by Fijians and some European
planters. Three merchant companies ran the marketing and distribution of goods
and collected most of the copra – Burns Philp, Morris Hedstom, and Brown and
Joske. Most profit these companies made was repatriated to Australia, but the
Fijian administration, though not booming, financed considerable public works
and services through various tariffs, duties and taxes, making Fiji the most viable
colony among the British Pacific Island territories.

Fiji’s need for overseas trade and foreign capital and Britain’s desire to
maintain control with the least resistance produced an alliance between the Fijian
chiefly establishment, government, and the settler capitalists, particularly CSR.
By consolidating chiefs in their superior social positions through a system of
near-indirect rule, the British – represented by the first substantive governor,
Arthur Gordon – largely won the co-operation of the chiefly elite, embodied in
his creation, the Great Council of Chiefs, in governing the Fijians. By limiting
and finally banning land purchase, the government guaranteed Fijians most of
their lands, yet allowed enough to be alienated to establish the sugar industry and
extend it through leasing to non-Fijians, thus ensuring the colony’s economy.
Gordon reasoned that the Fijians needed time to adjust to the incoming modern
world. Proletarianisation could have caused unrest, so the government had
introduced Indians to work the plantations, thus preventing any significant
erosion of the support system of the chiefs within the village-based ‘neo-traditional’ society. By the 1930s the Indian population at around 85,000 was catching up with the Fijian at almost 98,000. Thus, besides chiefly support for the colonial order, this increasing numerical threat bound the Fijian people to the colonial government as guardian of their primacy over the Indians. Yet, by 1937 the Indians as British subjects had won parity of representation with the Fijians and the Europeans in the Legislative Council and were increasing their demands for greater access to land. Growing numbers were replacing Europeans and part-Europeans in the trades and crafts in the towns. The cosy hegemonic nexus of European and Fijian interests was under threat as war loomed.

WARTIME

When war broke out in Europe in late 1939, the Fiji administration was concerned, but saw itself as distant from the conflict. Following the law operating in Britain, it put in place legislation to compensate people for any forced loss of property or earnings occasioned by the war and set up a tribunal to adjudicate disputes. But, except for the construction of airfields that would have a peacetime use anyway, it all seemed a little superfluous. Certainly, expatriate personnel began to volunteer for military service and some imported supplies became scarce, but life went on much as before. Once Japan bombed
Pearl Harbour in December 1941 everything changed. The enemy was now at the door.

The government’s Executive Council became a War Council to control all service matters. It established a Supply and Production Board controlling imports, exports, marketing, works, transport, communication and prices. These arrangements were put in place not simply to deal with anticipated supply problems and local defence, but also to enable Fiji to be utilised as base for the 2nd New Zealand Expeditionary Force and the armed forces of the United States. At the peak of the wartime activity, the number of introduced military personnel in Fiji reached 20,000 among a local population of about 194,000. Though numbers fluctuated, the occupation lasted about five years, but was greatest from late 1942 to 1943. It was concentrated on Viti Levu, mainly in the west near Nadi with some installations near the capital, Suva, in the south-east. The incoming population, almost entirely male, had to be housed, fed, entertained and supported by the civil authorities and population as well as by their own agencies.

FIGURE 2. Principal islands of Fiji
Though both the British and military authorities co-operated to keep allied personnel and local people apart as much as feasible and under different legal regimes,\(^9\) the occupation demanded much of Fiji’s resources, especially land.\(^{10}\)

**LAND**

During the war years, two land laws finally became operable and these were to play a major role in land use and control during and after the war: first, the Crown Acquisition of Lands Ordinance (1940) whereby the Crown could acquire land, freehold or native, for any public purpose, usually with compensation at market rates. In the 1930s, the colony’s population was increasing at 3% annually and needed more services and sites for ‘public purposes’, such as towns, housing, sanitary installations, and communications. The ordinance provided the Crown (that is, the governor) with great discretion in defining ‘public purpose’, providing the British Colonial Office agreed.\(^{11}\) Under war conditions this ordinance could be invoked with ease and less imperial scrutiny. Secondly, also in 1940, after years of discussion, an autonomous Native Lands Trust Board (NLTB) had come into being to protect and manage the interests of the Fijian landowners. Its function was in part to reserve sufficient land for their sole use, unavailable for any lease, but also to meet the increasing demands by the Indians for leased land and a desire for greater certainty of tenure by CSR on behalf of its Indian growers on Fijian land. The administration believed that longer leases and secure tenure would encourage active maintenance of the fertility of the soil.\(^{12}\) The Board was to systematise leasing arrangements between Indians and Fijians that had become irregular, often to the detriment of one of the parties, and to set rents at market value. This was likely to make more Fijian land available for lease and economic development. Existing leases were to stand.\(^{13}\)

Wartime land use involved the siting of structures and the provision of communication facilities by airfields, roads and harbour works. In 1938, as war in Europe loomed, the British Imperial Pacific Defence Council had made plans for aerial defence that included an airforce base at Suva under New Zealand control. Commercial aviation operators too had been assessing Fiji as a staging post between America and Australia and weighing up the relative merits of airfields and seadromes.\(^{14}\) Work on the breakwater at Laucala Bay for seaplanes started in late 1941, but priority was given to airfield construction on land at Nausori.\(^{15}\) The Royal New Zealand Air Force (RNZAF) controlled flight operations there as well as at Laucala Bay.\(^{16}\)

Anticipating the European conflict, the government of Fiji had taken over land for ‘military purposes’ on Viti Levu at Vucimaca, Nausori and at Cawa, Nadi. Much of this land for airfields was owned by or on long lease to CSR and native Fijians respectively, but the lessees were mainly Indian cane farmers.\(^{17}\) CSR agreed to the government’s request to vacate its Nausori land on the east
bank of the Rewa river, relocating its tenants’ houses nearby. The government met the cost of relocation and crops along with an additional £8 for each acre paid to the tenants. By late 1939, gangs of men were working ‘day and night’ on the Nausori field. When the RNZAF required adjacent cane fields at Vucimaca to the south to be destroyed to ‘preserve a field of fire’, the government in March 1942 resumed more land. It extended the Compensation (Defence) legislation in 1940 that guaranteed compensation for land, crops, and housing affected by military occupation and/or alienation. The government paid the Indian tenants at Vucimaca a total of £3413/12/9 during 1939–1942, and CSR for its drains and lease.

In October 1941, before the Japanese entered the war, the government declared an area of about five square miles between the Nadi and Sabeto (Malika) rivers ‘for military’ purposes, to secure the perimeters of the airstrip being constructed. This paved the way for any resumption of land and relocation of population. In 1941–1942, the government took more land in the Nadi area from Fijians as well as European and Indian freeholders. In 1946, after the war’s end, its last acquisitions were from lessees to extend the airfield perimeter. The Nadi land taken amounted to over 1500 acres, much of it cane land in good tilth. Chinese gardeners on leased land also lost 85 acres of crops.

This process did not always pass unopposed. In late 1943, the government had wanted five acres of uncultivated land at Sabeto for a United States military cemetery. CSR had this land on a 99-year lease from the Fijians at 5/- a year. Though CSR was co-operative, the Fijian owners refused the government’s offer of £25 to purchase, demanding £200, so the government invoked the Crown Acquisition of Land Ordinance (1940), even though the Ordinance did not cover native land alienated for use by a foreign power. CSR lost the use of the land and the Crown resumed it from the Fijians.

In 1941–43, there were problems in expediting compensation payments in the Nadi area and suffering and even destitution for some displaced Indians who had nowhere else to go. The government managed to settle all except a few small claims within six months of alienation. No Fijians claimed compensation for ‘large areas’ of land resumed in the five square mile zone and the government gave none, the rationale being that the unproductive land was ‘covered with vaivai, ivi trees, guava, etc’. However, the government paid for any loss of rent or crops on leased land on the same scale as the Indians. The American forces had wanted the entire five square miles zone around the Nadi airfield evacuated, but the government resisted because of the social dislocation this would have caused in addition to the problems it was already having relocating people from the lands under installations there and south around Navakai. Cost and the loss of food and cane production were other factors putting a brake on wholesale resumption. In the Nadi–Navakai area, compensation was at £10 per acre ‘for loss of crops and disturbance’ alone and totalled £98,000.
FIGURE 3. Nadi aerodrome and environs
If the fate of these lands leased from Fijians is traced, rather than their immediate compensation value, the colonial government’s negative bias towards its Indian subjects vis-à-vis the Fijians becomes apparent. When, in June 1942, land was needed for the Navakai airfield at Narewa, near Nadi, the Director of Lands under the Defence Regulations (1939) took it from Indians south of Nabutei. He paid £1,865/4/5, not only in compensation for loss of crops, buildings and disturbance, but also for the lessee’s interest. Many of these leases had unexpired terms of ‘about 25 years’. These were to be transferred to the Native Lands Trust Board (NLTB) for reservation for Fijians and for new leases under resubdivision. From its inception in 1940 until 1 January 1946, the Board was located within and assisted by the Department of Lands. Under the 1940 Native Lands Trust Ordinance, reserves supposedly were to be proclaimed only after inquiries by Fijian leader and member of the War Council, Ratu Lala Sukuna, and local advisory committees which included Indian representation, but Sukuna alone examined most of reserve claims in this area. Yet, in his own words, the Director of Lands, saw and seized the opportunity of getting these lands back so that they could be made available for the native owners, without having to wait up to 20 years or so. The Fijian war effort warranted some sympathetic consideration of this sort. This process was not confined to the Nadi area, but also involved cane land to the north at Vuda point containing 54 leases wanted for a US tank farm, as well as land in Rewa. Though the original lessees were compensated, there was ‘no guarantee given that they would be returned’ by the NLTB even if not required for reservation and certainly not on the original terms. When the draft legislation to establish the NLTB had been scrutinised in Britain in 1939, the Colonial Office believed that it ‘would not affect the Indian leases’ as cane land under lease ‘will never be included in any ‘native reserve’. Reservation proved a protracted operation taking 27 years instead of the estimated two, with the NLTB taking over leases of 10% of land that had been producing cane. In many cases, as late as the early 1960s, these former cane lands remained ‘unoccupied or occupied under temporary licenses for growing seasonal crops or rearing cattle’, much to the anger of land-hungry Indian growers. They questioned the government’s contention that, The redisplay of land which has been relinquished for military purposes presents an opportunity for doing something on a better scale than previously.... The powerful CSR carried more weight than illiterate Indian tenants. Some land resumed in the Navakai-Narewa area had been subleased by CSR from the Crown, holding it on behalf of the Fijian owners. The area of the airfields, 187 acres, was covered with compacted gravel that would have cost almost £7 an acre to restore to good tilth, a total of £1,226. CSR offered to waive the costs if they were reallocated the lease for 49 years, costs the government would have to meet...
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if the land reverted to the NLTB. CSR was also anxious to obtain compensation for the loss of its tramlines at Sikituru and Navakai for military construction. In total, CSR estimated its losses at over £10,000, making up part of the £98,000 paid to Nadi claimants.40

It was not only Indian tenants who lost land. By 1942 Fiji was receiving Allied planes mainly from New Caledonia, Solomons and New Hebrides, also from the United States and New Zealand, and there was concern about the transmission of insect pests to and through Fiji. The Health Department feared the introduction of mosquito-borne malaria and even yellow fever.41 Because of problems in enforcing treatment of swamps on private property within one-mile radius of the Nadi airfield hangars, the department urged government control of this land, mainly on the northern perimeter. While the government’s finance committee considered whether or not occupiers could be legally compelled to allow chemical spraying of the swamps or whether the government should force the sale, the Director of Lands offered to buy these and other lands within the perimeter which the government already had taken for the military occupation. Some owners agreed to terms, but one, Ram Narain, refused the government’s offer of £16 per acre and wanted £40. His solicitor argued that with the watertight control that the NLTB now had over Fijian lands, ‘they have ceased to have any value in the Colony’, thus ‘freehold lands have soared in value’.42 In this case, the government invoked the Crown Acquisition of Land Ordinance (1940), but reached agreement of £25 an acre before court action. When it tried to reach agreement with the Kennedy family, leasing from the Martin estate, following compulsory acquisition of land then under the tarmac, the matter went to court to decide compensation.

But Ram Narain’s solicitor was right and the government knew it. It wanted other perimeter lands in mid February 1946 – after the war was over – because the Nadi field seemed the likely site of a new international airport. And the government rushed these acquisitions through, including land it was already renting, to escape the lapse of the Defence regulations in late February 1946, allowing government occupancy. There were doubts about the government’s legal position regarding taking possession of such land thereafter. Moreover, to defer purchase until the aerodrome plan was finalised would almost certainly have meant increased expenditure as land values were expected to rise. If the government had to give back land it was merely occupying under rental and/or compensation, it would have to restore such land to its original condition at considerable cost.43

The government, however, restored freehold land that had been acquired by compulsion where it had no justifiable public use for it. In 1947, it returned Ram Narain’s freehold along with compensation for restoration.44 It had occupied and then purchased land from CSR at Drassa, Lautoka, for an additional military airfield in 1942. Part of this airfield was native land. After the war, the government allowed CSR to repurchase its 16 acres.45 The company wanted to
lease the rest of the land from the NLTB, but as ‘thousands of yards of gravel were deposited on it’, the native owners could get only a nominal rental while the company rehabilitated the land. The NLTB was successful in its compensation claims to the government for lost earnings. Thus, the ‘emergency’ had proved an inconvenience for CSR, a bonus for the NLTB and a colonial reward for the Fijian war effort, but a displacement for the Indians involved. This ‘special opportunity’ also enabled the Crown to alienate land for the public good – as the government interpreted it – with greater ease than in peacetime.

The government acquired other parcels of land for military purposes around Suva. Prior to the war, because of housing shortage and health problems, the government and the Town Board had been seeking further land in the Samabula area ‘for the development of the Indian suburban settlement’ and a ‘model suburban village’ for those Fijians who had been able to gain exemption (galala) from village communal duties. Under the war emergency, the government negotiated the purchase of two freehold blocks at market value at Samabula from

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**FIGURE 4. Military zone around Suva**
Dwarra Singh and other Indians (Block A) and from the Seventh Day Adventist mission (Block B) for military camps. When the war was over in 1945 most of block B reverted to the SDA church. Block A, the former Indian land, was surveyed, subdivided into approximately 120 housing lots, and provided with roads, water, electricity and sewerage. It was initially offered on lease to Fijian ex-servicemen, as very few Indians had enlisted. The Fijians took up only five lots; the rest went to Indians selected by ballot. When the government wanted land at Flagstaff, Suva, for the Fijian military and a battery the Roman Catholic Church exchanged some of their lands there for five acres of Crown land at Tamavua. After the war, the government also subdivided the Flagstaff land for leasing to the growing numbers of the urban ‘labouring class, that is, cooks, shop assistants, etc’. While the government favoured the Fijians in the rural sector by acquiring leased cane land for possible reservation by the NLTB, its primary concern in Suva was to provide small lots for Indian householders by subdivision of its acquired lands and was supported in this by the Indian leader, Vishnu Deo.

This reflected a revival of the old multiracial polity. In the late 1930s and 1940s, Sukuna led a campaign to revitalise Fijian communal society based on consolidated villages using local and reserve land for cash-crop production, echoing the nineteenth-century protective policies of Gordon. Along with the creation of the Fijian Affairs Board in 1944 that effectively gave Fijians a separate administration under the colonial umbrella, Fijian paramountcy seemed assured. To balance this, the increasing number of landless Indians were absorbed into the urban business and service sector as well as the agricultural sector, facilitated, it was hoped, by the leasehold system run by the NLTB. Fiji’s ‘three-legged stool’, to use Sukuna’s phrase, of European capital, Indian labour and Fijian land seemed once again on a firm footing.

**FORESTS**

Fijians held 83% of the land when the war broke out in 1939. Forested land comprised about 51% of the total land area or 52%, if the mangrove forests were included. As early as 1877, a visiting colonial forester had recommended government control over forests both for protection and production, but successive governors until the late 1930s resisted this, partly because it would mean depriving Fijians of their rights to control their own resources, which would almost certainly provoke resistance. At the outbreak of the war, the Fijians retained ownership of 90%–99% of these forests, though the Crown claimed the land below the high water mark, holding 50,000 acres of mangrove forests. From 1913, the government created a few reserves, about 1.4% of the land, for water catchments and to protect the steep hillsides of inland Taveuni. The Crown had obtained only about 0.5% of the inland forests through purchase or extinction of
the mataqali which, under the colonial reading of Fijian custom, had been deemed to be the land-holding unit in 1914. The contracts between millers, usually Europeans, cutters, often Indians, and local owners produced sawn timber for local use from native lands. There was much wastage through cutting the log into small lengths for hauling to a mill, although, on Vanua Levu, Fijians did pit-sawing that produced longer, more valuable timber lengths. There was not much good accessible timber available. With considerable alacrity, Fijians in the first two decades of the nineteenth century had offered their valuable sandalwood (Santalum yasi) to itinerant traders. This and best timber around the coast and along rivers had long been cut out when the government eventually set up a Forestry Department in 1938. The major logging and milling company, the Fiji Kauri Timber and Land Company operated in inland Viti Levu at Nadarivatu on Crown land. Even here, the government was cautious. Although it had unfettered title to this land, it gave the former owners two pence out of the eight pence per 100 superficial feet paid by the loggers to government, a quarter of the royalties because ‘the Fijians have always been troublesome...in this matter and the 2d [two pence] was given to them to keep them quiet’.

FIGURE 5. Domestic production of wood, 1939–1946
The company in the late 1930s annually produced about 2.9 million superficial feet of timber, mainly kauri (*Agathis vitiensis*) and about a quarter of this went to Australia. Imports, mainly of Oregon pine from Canada and hardwoods from Australia, came to almost 7.5 million superfeet. Poor milling and the high cost of extraction meant that local milled timber cost the consumer about the same as the imported article. For some purposes, the imported timber was superior.

Increased demand for both local and imported timber commenced in late 1941 mainly for military construction, but shortage of shipping and enemy naval operations cut imports. For 1942 and 1943, the annual sawn timber imports were about half the pre-war average. Foreseeing demand, the government had banned all export of timber in 1941 under the emergency regulations operating until 1946, although processed timber cases (mainly *kauvula, Endospermum* sp.) filled with fruit left the country. The government declared sawmilling a protected industry and sought boosted production. In spite of old machinery and lack of spare parts and skilled staff, a handful of European-operated mills produced more timber in 1942 and 1943 than ever before. In late 1942 Nadarivatu mill was
producing 10,000 board feet daily. The pit-sawing output on Vanua Levu ceased, however, as Fijian men pursued more lucrative employment opportunities. Local production more than doubled, making good the import deficit. When Britain entered the war, the fledgling Forestry Department had its budget cut to the level of ‘mere maintenance’. As the war spread, it had to turn its attention from the preliminary survey of the forest resources, possible forest reserves and selective regeneration, to facilitating the cutting and collection of poles and fuel for military purposes. It controlled the allocation of sawn timber, but, by late 1942, the demand was so great that the understaffed department could no longer cope, the military often undertaking pole cutting via direct negotiation with the owners. Over-cutting certainly occurred within the Nadarivatu concession on Crown land, over which the Department had no control because of a lease agreement operative until 1948. A decade earlier, so the Director of the Lands Department and the Governor believed, logging here had ‘played its part’ in increasing flooding of the Rewa, Sigatoka and Ba rivers, but they could do nothing. Little record of poles cut could be kept during the war, but, in 1942 alone, an estimated 5 to 10 million lineal feet of ‘round’ timber (poles) were cut with no royalties accruing to government, as well as 269,707 lineal feet under licence, mainly from the mangroves. This represented a considerable loss of revenue to the Department, estimated at between £1,100 and £5,500 by the end of 1942 alone, which the Colonial Office had wanted to be used ‘to make good the loss of forest capital after the war’.

These poles went into the construction of camps as well as ‘revetments, corduroy roads, temporary bridges and culverts’. Firewood came mainly from the mangrove forests, cut under licence from the Department. Shortage of casewood for fruit resulted in the use of timbers such as *kaudamu* (*Myristica* sp.) from Vanua Levu, despite the higher cost of handling. Overall production of all forms of locally grown wood reached a maximum wartime output of 3,050,000 cubic feet in 1943. Timber was not the only forest product needed for the war effort. The military constructed *bure* (Fijian houses), using reeds and thatch, for personnel and utilised large quantities of bamboo, mainly collected in south-east Viti Levu. In Serua province, the district officer aroused a ‘missionary spirit’ to organise net making for camouflage. The people left off their copra making, collected the bark of the *vau* (*Hibiscus tiliaceus*) for this, producing, with the aid of adjacent regions of Veivatulo and Wainikoroiluva, enough to cover almost 80 acres (32.3 hectares) by mid 1942.

The high demand for sawn timber continued after the withdrawal of the armed forces in 1945 because of paucity of imports, deferred civilian needs and increasing urban migration. Towards the end of the war, firewood had become so scarce in western Viti Levu that returned Fijian labourers in the Yasawas were cutting wood to send across to Lautoka for sale in 1946. The Forestry Department could control cutting in forests on Fijian land to the extent of
selective logging, but saw considerable forest capital of Fiji go into defending the country. One small achievement, from the Department’s point of view, was the introduction of a regulation to stop the export of makandre or kauri gum in 1940. This was used in varnishes, mostly in the USA, providing a source of cash for Fijians in Vanua Levu and in Serua and Namosi districts of Viti Levu. As the increased logging of kauri in Vanua Levu during the war demonstrated, ‘the promiscuous tapping of these trees for gum’ had induced rot, making the tree valueless. Yet, in the eyes of the Fijians including the chiefs, this loss of income from gum gathering ‘in the public interest’, as Sukuna ironically called it, was considerable and resented.

FOOD

Just as the land afforded a timber harvest so too did it other cash and subsistence crops. Sugar and copra were the staple cash crops before the war, but other food crops were also exported: bananas and citrus as well as pineapples, watermelon, mangoes, green ginger, tomatoes and yams, destined principally for New Zealand. Most grew along the coast or beside the main rivers. From the outbreak of the war in 1939, the Agriculture Department had encouraged increased local food production, but once the Japanese thrust into the Pacific began, urgency replaced encouragement. By guaranteeing prices for unlimited quantities of food in late 1941, at first applied to the Fijian staples of dalo (Colocasia esculenta), kumala (Ipomoea batatas) and yams (Dioscorea spp.), but by August 1942 extended to certain types of ‘European’ vegetables and fruit, the government provided security for growers to risk expanded production. At peak demand in mid 1943, a monthly average of over 1,000,000 lbs (453.6 tonnes) of local fruit and vegetables went to the military alone. Apart from subsistence needs, most fruit and vegetables produced by local growers, including more than 20% of the banana crop, went to the military until late 1944. Throughout 1944 and early 1945 considerable quantities were exported, but mainly to forward areas, particularly to hospitals. Although the resumptions near Nadi took much potential pineapple land out of cultivation, demand was so high that the CSR cannery saw its entire production sold in Fiji. In 1944–1945, as this land reverted to the CSR, they planted more while the tinned pineapple went to New Zealand mainly for its forces overseas.

Increased crop production along with the Indian staple of rice had been facilitated by native Fijians exempted from village communal duties and by CSR allowing its Indian tenants to plant rice in their fallow cane plots and CSR’s ‘marginal’ lands, a concession in relation to the tenanted lands which the company was never to rescind because of increased militancy among Indian farmer unions. It is not possible to estimate the total acreage brought into food production, but rice-planted land increased from 16,400 acres in 1938 to an all
time high of about 28,900, producing around 15,458 tons in 1944, with about 30% on non-cane land leased by Indians from Fijians. Before the war most rice had been imported from Burma. A fixed price was imposed, less to guarantee production than to control rising prices. Locally, the demand was so great by 1941 that considerable quantities were being sold on the black market at higher prices. Accessible land was so desperately needed for crops that the government prevailed upon the NLTB for use of some of the newly reserved native land under short-term licence. This irked many, including Sukuna, because the Fijians, the people for whom the reserves were meant ‘for the production of native food crops’, were fighting the war or in labour units while the Indians had failed to answer ‘the call’, yet were ‘benefiting from a spate of foreign capital... and from the sale of produce that the Government has so far not found the means of controlling’. And haste to seize this profitable opportunity often produced cultivation methods that were ‘inefficient and wasteful’.

Of the fruit sold to the military, the Fijians grew about 85%, the Chinese and Indians about 12% with the rest from CSR’s pineapple estates. Indians supplied about 45% of the vegetables, the Chinese 35% and the Fijians 20%. The Fijians supplied 90% of the root crops. Because of transport limitations, the bulk of the wartime production came from south and west Viti Levu, though Vanua Levu produced about 17% of the rice (padi) and was self-sufficient, and other islands such as Kadavu and Beqa produced large quantities of cabbages. Almost four tonnes of tapioca (*Manihot esculenta*) ended up as starch for the uniforms of the United States forces during 1943–1944. The Agriculture Department which organised small growers and co-ordinated seed-distribution, collection, bulking, transportation and marketing of the produce, delivered to the military 10,530,463 lbs (4,777 tonnes) in 1942 valued at £66,000 and 15,524,596 lbs (7,042 tonnes) valued at £90,000 the following year. This fell to 8,637,153 lbs (3,918 tonnes) at £68,000 in 1944, besides fruit that went to the forward area. Under the auspices of the department, many Fijian growers, particularly around Nausori and Tailevu, as well as some Indians, formed co-operatives for vegetable marketing in 1942, practical examples for the formal establishment of the co-operative movement in 1947.

On marginal and fallow cane land the demands of crops almost certainly saw a drop in soil fertility. Except for intervention by CSR with its tenants, Indian farmers, pressed by their growing population on limited leased land, were notorious for working ‘the land to death’ and for lack of erosion control, evinced in tilling up and down hill. Wartime exigencies meant that the Agriculture Department’s education programme for soil conservation had to be postponed. Pasture was also being heavily grazed to increase beef, milk and butter fat output for military demand.

These lands too deteriorated mainly because of lack of pasture improvement and weed control, despite sporadic allocation of Fijian military and labour personnel in late 1943 to eradicate weeds, including Solanum, Urena burr and...
guava on Tailevu dairy farms. The increasing prevalence of ‘rank vegetation’ also increased the habitat for the imported mongoose. It preyed on chickens, so valued for their fresh eggs which sold to civilians and Americans at four shillings a dozen regulated price and twice that on the black market, so the government increased the bounty on mongoose tails. 83

Agriculture suffered from a shortage of fertilisers. Coral sand was used to supply lime and some small farmers incorporated green manures into the soil, but neglected to maximise animal manure use. CSR received all the very limited imports of fertilisers (sulphate of ammonia and superphosphate), as sugar was deemed an essential industry.

Before Fiji entered the war it had been self-supporting in pork and butter, ghee, milk, and dripping. Livestock were in good general health. As the military swelled in numbers pork production soared to meet demand. The Agriculture Department actively assisted through its Pig Fattening Scheme introduced in 1942 at the Lami rubbish dump, west of Suva and at the Nasinu agricultural experiment station. Supplied with swill from the military camps, this was scaled down in 1944 as the camps closed.

In the war years, cattle stock declined as beasts were killed to capture the big money offered on the open and black market. Even draught animals were slaughtered. The application of Defence Regulations in 1941 to forbid the slaughter of cows less than eight years and cattle under three retarded legal killing, but in the Nadi area the Indians often ignored this. So great was the demand that European planters began rounding up the 2,000 wild cattle in the Taveuni mountains for sale in Suva, thus probably reducing the damage these big hoofed beasts did to the understorey of the forest edge. The taste for meat reinforced by the example of the military and the availability of paid work, expanded so much that the government banned sales for two days weekly in early 1942. Because of depleted pastures, over-stocking and poor husbandry, however, the average carcass weight had fallen by over a third on pre-war animals. This meant an increase in the number killed in the immediate post-war years to produce the equivalent of pre-war output, which failed to satisfy the greater demand. Though the Agriculture Department was able to maintain the numbers of good breeding bulls to replenish the national herd, after the war Fiji had to import butter and ghee for years. Lack of labour had also contributed to this deterioration of stock and land, as fences, drains and pastures were not maintained. Nor was this immediately remedied post-war, as, for example, wire-fencing material remained scarce. 84 However, the horse, though of a breed too light for draught purposes, multiplied in numbers as ‘war-gained wealth’ and American influence increased the popularity of horseracing. 85

Seeking additional forms of entertainment, the Americans frequented Suva and the dusty towns in eastern Viti Levu – except for off-limits areas. 86 Cafes and food stalls opened. Complaints of adulterated and contaminated food, particularly milk and ice cream, led to a joint effort by local authorities and the
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Americans to license food vendors and fine offenders. As a result of the same co-operation there was very little increase in infectious diseases in the colony, despite the overcrowding due to housing shortage in some settlements. Gonorrhoea flared up towards the close of 1944 as Fijian troops returned to the colony from the Solomons, but venereal disease was not a major civilian problem.

With so much wartime traffic from all directions, the chances of introducing pests to Fiji were high. Both the colonial administration and the forces took extensive precautions on ships and planes to prevent the introduction of mosquitoes that hosted malaria and yellow fever. This became even more a concern when Fijian military units returned from the Solomons area where they had contracted malaria, as those infected could provide a source for any introduced Anopheles vector. Planes escaped other quarantine measures. The Agriculture Department attributed an outbreak of canine distemper in western Viti Levu to dogs brought in on a plane by Americans. Few new insect and weed pests seemed to have been introduced – Fiji had already been invaded with many in the preceding 150 years of contact with the West. The Department caught its first white cabbage butterfly at Suva wharf in 1943 and banned cabbages and cauliflower imports, though the military received theirs, much to the annoyance of the civilian Europeans who noted wryly that insects, of course, ‘would not dream of entering the country in the bosom of a military cabbage’.

HUMAN RESOURCES AND EXPORT PRODUCTION

The war altered the distribution of labour. Copra prices had been at an all-time low during the Depression. Fijians worked harder to produce 60% of the copra to meet their needs, while many European planters had been reduced to living off the land as their plantations became weed-infested. Poor prices from 1939 and opportunities for wartime employment for Fijian producers saw village and plantation copra production fall. Fijians and Indians found working for the ‘Yankee dollar’ more profitable than near-subsistence work in villages and smallholdings. The occupation, for most civilians, ‘brought …an era of prosperity heretofore unknown’. By early 1943, there were 15,000 to 22,000 Fijian men away from their communities in the military or working as labour so the bulk of the subsistence planting in the outer islands fell to the women, youths and old men.

When the call had gone out from the government for volunteers, Fijians freely offered and soon distinguished themselves in battle in the Solomons. The ‘politically-conscious’ Indians did not care to offer for military service unless they received the same wage and conditions as the white man, an assertive anti-colonial act, but one which, in the close world of the chiefly Fijian-British colonial government alliance, cost them the good opinion of most Fijians and
Europeans for decades. Many found employment in the American military hospitals and about 930 in the service laundries alone – often after leaving wage labour with CSR which complained to government of the shortage. Even with this diversion of Indian manpower in addition to between 30%–40% of the male Fijian population to military-related employment, the government called for still more. In mid 1942 the governor had considered conscription, but this seemed unlikely to increase the labour force. Sukuna, who toured extensively throughout the islands for recruits, agreed. However, by mid 1943, the Japanese retreat in the Solomons saw a corresponding slackening of manpower demand, but it was late 1946 before Fijians were in their villages, producing copra. Even so, the full potential of plantations could not be realised immediately because of the weeds that had taken hold.

The concept of a guaranteed price for food found a counterpart in the copra industry, marking a significant change. Prior to February 1942, planters had sold copra to the merchant companies such as Burns Philp. Village-produced green copra ended up with the same merchants, but usually through Chinese or Indian middlemen. In February 1942, the government instituted a grading system and became the buyer, although the companies acted as agents. In 1943 the British Ministry of Food, through the Fiji Supply and Production Board, with company agents, purchased all the copra destined for Canada, the United States and Britain. The Japanese advance in colonial south-east Asia meant the Allied powers lost their main source of copra. Where once the Pacific had been a relatively minor producer, it suddenly became virtually the sole source and the price reflected this at £16 to £18 a ton in Fiji in 1943–1944, even when fixed well below market price to benefit the allied war effort. Nonetheless, this was a dramatic increase in the pre-war price of £6, but the money actually paid to the Fijians, although proportionately greater than pre-war, was much less because of estimated shrinkage, transportation and handling costs. Thus, when the price was £18 a ton for dried copra at the ports of Suva and Levuka, the Fijian obtained about £8 for his green copra. The continuing world shortage of vegetable oils meant the arrangements with the Ministry of Food, which hinged on a guaranteed price, became entrenched with the establishment of a Copra Board in 1948. A new nine-year contract the following year gave a fixed price of £53 a ton with a 10% leeway negotiable annually. This laid the basis for greater returns for and involvement of Fijians in the industry and, though not obviating the merchant companies, reduced their ability to manipulate prices to their advantage.

Sugar was another matter. When the European war broke out in 1939, CSR increased its plantings to supply sugar to Britain. However, the increased demand for food and materials during the occupation plus shortage of shipping dramatically drove up the cost of living in Fiji, with CSR’s Indian growers feeling the pinch most because the company’s cane payments lagged far behind in value. With justification the growers struck in July 1943 for higher payments,
but after seven long months could not afford to stay out. The cane crop suffered, as indeed did the reputation of the Indians among other sections of the community for striking in wartime. This decline in production was not solely because of labour issues; in Nadi alone, CSR claimed in 1942 land resumptions had cost it 35,000 tons (35,561.75 tonnes) of cane annually and by 1944 over 5,000 acres of about 94,000 total of cane-producing land had been lost to wartime needs.

SHORES, SEAS, AND RIVERS

The war effort demanded more than land for installations and crops. Although Fiji was outside the combat zone, it did not escape bombing – at least by its allies. A practice target for the New Zealanders was the reef fronting Lauca Bay, off Suva Point for night runs once or twice a month from July 1941. It was only in late 1943 that the local resort of Makuluva, south of Lauca Point, on the seaward side of Nuklau island was again opened to the public in daylight, but the much-used passages between it and Nuklau and the mainland remained off-limits. Other target areas were the waters three miles east of Kiuva in Bau in south-eastern Viti Levu and Bird Island (Cakau ni Sici) between Yanuca and Yarawa east in the Beqa group. The practice bombing even hit the odd whale. Fishermen and others from Serua and Namosi on south Viti Levu with rights to forage on Bird Island were warned it was off-limits, but its ecological significance for avian species was not considered. In the west, ground forces had used Nadi Bay as an air firing and homing range until mid 1942, but the establishment of the Navakai airfield forced a move to the seas off the mouth of the Nadi River. However, there, certain ‘sandy delta islands’ carried coconuts of the coastal villagers and compensation would be due to these people. Before this was needed the American airforce decided the site was too close to the mainland and so it was abandoned. Soon after the war ended ammunition and surplus bombs were dumped and supposedly exploded off Savuna Reef, at Moturiki Island, near Ovalau, yet several bombs later surfaced in shallow waters nearby. Although the Americans cleared their minefields away by November 1944, there were accidental explosions due to storms or whale activity. In all the sites affected, damage done to marine, reef and estuarine ecology was neither considered nor assessed subsequently.

The fishery resource seems to have had less demand put on it initially because of the internment of the major commercial suppliers, Japanese fishermen, and the shortage of equipment, fuel, manpower and the ban on movement of boats and canoes by night. A few local individuals, Messrs A. McCowan, D. Reimenschneider, Emberson and Terry, cobbled together equipment and by 1943 fished intermittently. The military caterers absorbed much of what was caught, so the market at Suva and Lautoka was unsatisfied. Fijian fishermen, lacking ice boxes, fished mainly inshore and so could only supply their local
communities. No record was kept of catches by naval vessels, so stocks were probably heavily fished. The Fijians also garnered the reefs and islets for cats’ eye shell and tortoiseshell that the Indians bought to make souvenirs for the servicemen. After the war ended Indian agents were still filling extensive orders to the USA.

The Americans brought excellent plumbing and engineers with them, but in the hills behind Suva, their training camps threatened the quality of the water supply. In late 1943, troops were camping near Wairua above the town reservoir. They had dug latrines, left behind rubbish, muddied the pipes and shot holes in the main water conduit. Government liaison with the American forces solved the difficulty before any serious epidemic resulted. However, a military laundry at Nausori also endangered water purity. The semi-tidal Rewa river was the water source for the Nausori community when its rainwater tanks ran dry. The Americans with some government engineering assistance planned to build a laundry for the needs of 10,000 men, including hospital linen – a daily intake and effluent of about 22,000 gallons. Both the Board of Health and the local Indian community only learned of this when construction was underway. The intake at the Nausori airfield was likely to be polluted too as the US authorities planned to discharge the washing effluent into the ‘shallow sluggish side of the river’. The Board’s intervention finally produced a better design, incorporating a sump, a cassion well and a French drain to take advantage of the tidal action of the river.

Another issue of resource use was the taking of gravel by the military from riverbeds for roads and airfields. In the pre-colonial era, Cakobau’s government had reserved land below the high tide mark as common property of the Fijians. The new colonial government in 1878 reserved ‘foreshore’ from alienation, the intention being to retain this as common property – an access to lagoon and estuarine sea food – for the Fijians who had for generations gleaned there. Incorporated in law in 1880 and also applied to the beds of rivers and streams to allow ‘public’ access, this concept of common property, that is, of the Fijians, widened to become Crown land, subtly moving the ownership from the Fijians to the government representing the entire population of Fiji. In practice, usage before the war saw two patterns: first, the Crown (the Director of Public Works) assumed the right to take away any gravel for the purpose of construction and repair of roads, providing reasonable compensation was made to the owner for the material and for any damage done; and second, the Crown assumed the right to take coral sand from reefs and sandbars from below the high water mark, although it sought leases from Fijians for rights above this mark. For years, CSR had been taking coral sand ‘for manuring purposes’ ostensibly from various sites below the mark with government permission, without charge. Other contractors in the 1930s seemed to have helped themselves to sand ‘without asking’, above the high water mark, yet the government had not acted. Though in 1933 the government reserved the right to charge CSR a farthing (0.25 of a
penny or around 0.20 cents) per cubic yard of coral sand, it accepted the company’s reasoning that it should get the sand for nothing because it benefited the colony. The amount of coral sand taken was considerable, about 30,000 tons yearly, and the company’s profits were consistently repatriated to Australia, so Fijians and indeed the colony received minimal benefits. This continued through the war years. As well, new gravel quarries were added to the existing eight in Viti Levu and production increased by a third, from around 62,556 cubic yards in 1938 to about 84,000 in 1942.

The government, however, had received no direct payment from the military for any gravel. It paid all compensation and other wartime expense from its own funds and loans from Britain and New Zealand. Britain eventually forgave most of the wartime debts, but environmental impact, other than on arable or pasture land, had not been included in costing. The taking of sand and other material from the foreshore was done virtually as the military decided on both Crown and native lands.

CONSEQUENCES AND CONCLUSIONS

Fiji had seen no armed conflict, but it did not escape environmental change as a result of wartime emergency. That emergency gave wings to long-considered land-related legislation of 1940 to an extent unimaginable in peacetime. Despite compensation, the government forced many Indian tenants to surrender their leases for military purposes and then transferred them to the NLTB, circumventing the normal requirement of the running of the term. Thus, the NLTB started off with a substantial deposit in its land bank for reserves in western Viti Levu. Some of these former cane lands went out of production for years while their future was decided. Using a combination of emergency regulations and the Crown Acquisition of Land Ordinance, the government held, then acquired freehold land for ‘public use’ such as the international airfield and for residential areas in Suva. It could have done the same after the war under the 1940 legislation, but by then market forces would have forced up land prices held down by wartime price control.

The NLTB legislation affirming Fijian land ownership and the establishment of the Fijian Affairs Board softened, if not concealed, the privileged position CSR had enjoyed for so long in access to natural and human resources as well as the failure, in part, of the colonial government as trustee for Fijian interests once the ‘public’ came to include large capitalist ventures and their small time Indian growers.

Foreshore and forest deteriorated during the war. The government permitted the removal of sand and other ‘foreshore’ material without any assessment of the impact this could have had and continued to do so until the early 1950s. A considerable amount of the forest capital was lost with some recompense to
Fijians, but little to the colony, much to the chagrin of the Forestry Department. The use of local timber returned to the levels of wartime in the early 1950s as construction expanded and exceeded them by the mid 1960s. As well as attempting to conserve the timber resource after the war, the Forestry Department renewed its efforts to extend the forest estate beyond the mangroves, reforest land and to control soil deterioration and erosion though legislation in 1950, but had to lease Fijian land to do so – a slow and expensive process, that retarded significant achievements into the 1960s.

Soils probably eroded and leached more than before the war because of the extent of timber felling, but this was never measured. The wartime deterioration of soil on farms and pastures was of greater immediate visibility because so many depended on them for survival, with the Governor expressing his dismay in late 1944, at ‘the erosion, over-stocking and bad agricultural practices’ he saw throughout Viti Levu. As a consequence of this and steadily increasing demands on the land, the government appointed its first soils conservation officer attached to the Department of Agriculture in 1949, with the first systematic soil survey begun in 1952, but declined to establish a wider authority to control the use of natural resources, including rivers and minerals. Protection of the forests to aid soil fertility and to prevent erosion was not seriously considered until the early 1960s.

In wartime, however, criticism for soil degradation focussed on the poor husbandry of the Indians. They were ideal scapegoats because their behaviour as strikers, shirkers of military service and opportunistic traders, even black marketeers, brought them contempt in European and Fijian eyes. The Indians’ ability to improve their soil and pasture care was circumscribed by their increasing numbers on insufficient land on short uncertain leases. So, their apparent short-sightedness in land use was as much a question of economics, of basic survival, as of folly. Even the fallow field principle of cane rotation formerly required of Indian tenants by CSR had fallen victim to this, as well as the company’s unwillingness to pay a more equitable price for its cane. In this way, the fertility of Fiji’s soil and its coral sand subsidised CSR’s profits expatriated to Australia, as did the less quantifiable surplus value of the Indian grower’s labour.

The intensification of agricultural and livestock production for sale had taxed soils and forest and depleted the national herd. Every resource now had a cash value attached to it. From the late 1870s monetisation of the economy had began slowly with the introduction of a poll tax and indentured Indian labour, but it was the strong subsistence economy that afforded Fijians their livelihood. The war economy introduced new demands throughout the islands, opening most Fijians to the possibilities of regular cash cropping, wage labour, and small business, along with established rent collection in mainly cane areas. Culturally, Fijian mental landscapes altered so that cash value superseded the use value of natural resources; the ephemeral occupation providing the catalyst for a formerly
gradual change. This wartime momentum continued as ‘development’ became the catch-cry of post-war colonial administrators in Fiji and beyond. The lands and seas would be expected to produce more and for an increasing population.

Monetisation permeated the multi-racial society. One feature common to Fiji’s wartime legislation was the concept that cash can compensate loss. While reciprocity and compensatory mechanisms were integral to Fijian social relations, the law reinforced the notion that everything was a commodity and had a price in money. Perhaps this explains why cash compensation became so entrenched in Fiji environmental and resource legislation after independence in 1970 whereby often a traditional fishing or foraging right of inestimable value, was alienated from future generations by a money settlement.

Colonial forest and agriculture advisers had often considerable awareness of ecological linkages and environmental change, but the government applied little of this unless such change was likely to interfere in the immediate future with human well-being and social order, as the record during the war shows. The contemporary political and economic context framed its perception. Its behaviour was thus of the same order as the Indian farmer trying to maximise returns in the short to mid term. Damage to faunal habitat and the ecology of the forest, foreshore, rivers and reefs was not a consideration and certainly not assessed systematically, unless such alteration was likely to upset Fijian sensibilities. And these sensibilities were often more to do with their use rights for immediate economic purposes within the social and kinship nexus, rather than long-term resource sustainability, as attitudes to the forest demonstrated. The three peoples of Fiji had more in common in the way they used their environment than they perhaps realised.

ABBREVIATIONS

AJ Agricultural Journal of Fiji.
ARFD Annual Report, Forestry Department, Fiji.
ARAD Annual Report, Agriculture Department, Fiji.
ARMD Annual Report, Medical Department, Fiji.
CO Colonial Office, Britain, microfilms held at New Zealand National Archives, Wellington.
CP Council Paper, Fiji Legislative Council.
CPa College Park, Maryland, United States
CSO Chief Secretary’s Office, records located at National Archives of Fiji, Suva, Fiji.
CSR Colonial Sugar Refinery
FT Fiji Times (Suva)
LC Legislative Council
NARA National Archives and Records Administration, United States of America.
NOTES

I am grateful for comments on an earlier draft of this paper made by Barbara Brookes, Jacqui Leckie, Dorothy Shineberg and Darryl McIntyre. Any errors are mine. I wish to thank the University of Otago for its support for my work in the national archives and records of Fiji, Britain, New Zealand and the United States in 1997–1999. My thanks go to Bill Mooney for his work on the maps.


2 I have followed the convention of the 1930s–1940s of calling these people Indians.


10 Unlike most other island bases, the United States records of their occupation of Fiji are almost non-existent. (Pers.com. Kathy O’Connor, archivist NARA, SB, Nov. 1999 and
Lloyd, *Land Policy in Fiji*, pp. 253–263. The Ordinance also made existing practice uniform. For certain categories of public purpose, the Crown could take Fijian land, but no more than 1/20 of any holding of one mataqali (land-holding social unit). All freehold land emanated from Crown grant and had been subject to this reservation in favour of the Crown from the early days of the colony.

Debates of the Legislative Council, 22 Feb. 1940, pp. 98, 103, 105, 112. CSR in part was behind this, as good husbandry of the soil would maintain incomes, so preventing grower demands for increased cane prices from the milling company. (Moynagh, *Brown or white*, pp. 139–142.)

Moynagh, *Brown or White*, pp. 84–91, 92–101; Gillion, *The Fiji Indians*, pp. 188–192; Lal, *Broken Waves*, pp. 134–135. The other purpose of this Ordinance of 1940 was to clarify which lands were open for lease to Indians. The task of the Board was to enforce this Ordinance. In the 1940s, it consisted of the Governor, three ex-officio members, the Secretary for Fijian Affairs, (in the 1940s, Lala Sukuna), the Director of Agriculture, the Director of Lands, the Conservator of Forests, and, by the 1960s, seven others appointed by the governor, no fewer than five of whom had to be selected from a group of seven presented by the Fijian Council of Chiefs. Three of the Fijians were unofficial members of the native membership of the Legislative Council. (CSO F37/420/2 Pt1: Minutes of the NLTB, 1940–1949; Burns et al., ‘Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the natural resources and population trends of the colony of Fiji’, 1959, CP 1, Legislative Council, 1960.)


CSO CF3/17: Acting Air Sec. to ?, 8 Aug. 1941 and encls.


CSO F37/187; *Pacific Islands Monthly*, 15 Sept. 1938, p.6. The freehold title of the main block of Vucimaca land remained with CSR that leased the land to the government at a shilling per annum for 99 years. (CSO F37/187 Pt 1: Director of Lands to Colonial Sec., 12 Jan 1948.)

CSO F11/71/2: Director of Lands to Colonial Sec., 20 July 1942.


CSO F115/71/1: Financial Sec. to Colonial Sec., 12 May 1942.

F115/71/2: Director of Lands to Colonial Sec., 20 July 1942; CSO F37/187 Pt 1: Director of Lands to Colonial Sec., 12 Jan 1948. Some of this compensation was supplied by the RNZAF, under an arrangement between New Zealand and Fiji. See below.


CSO F115/71/1: Chan to Colonial Sec., 2 July 1942.
24 CSO F37/210 Pt 1: Order, 2 Oct. 1941, Kennedy to Colonial Sec., 25 Nov. 1942; CSO F115/173/1: Director of Lands to Chief Sec., 23 Oct 1943 and encls. Technically, the land had to be taken under a wider interpretation of the definition of ‘public purpose’ as the dead were already buried. (CO 83/237/85336: Mitchell to Sec. of State, 27 Oct. 1945 and encls.) The bodies were later disinterred for burial elsewhere.


26 CSO F37/292 Pt 1: Director of Lands, Notes 13 Nov. 1946. The botanical names are respectively, *Serianthes vitiensis* (*Leucaena glauca* is also called vaivai), *Inocarpus edulis*, and *Psidium guayana*.

27 CSO F37/292 Pt 1: Director of Lands, Notes, 30 Dec. 1946

28 CSO F37/210 Pt 1: Charlton, Director of Lands to Colonial Sec., 27 Feb. 1942

29 CSO F115/71/2: Director of Lands to the Colonial Sec., 20 July 1942.

30 CSO F115/71/2: Notes 28 Jan. 1943; CSO CF115/28: Director of Lands to Chief Sec., 28 Dec. 1942. Lal does not mention the efforts made by the colonial government to compensate for the loss to displaced individuals, particularly the Indian tenants, incurred by its emergency measures (Lal, Broken Waves, pp. 108–143).

31 CSO F32/187 Pt1: Burkhurst to NLTB, 11 Oct. 1944.

32 ‘Lands and Survey’, CP 23, Legislative Council, 1941; CSO 37/420/1 Pt 1; DC, Western to Colonial Sec., 26 Feb. 1941; Fiji Royal Gazette, 1941, 21 Mar. 1941, p. 166; CSO F32/187 Pt1: Burkhurst to NLTB, 11 Oct. 1944; CSO F37/292 pt 1: Director of Lands to Sec. of Financial Affairs, 6 Mar. 1945; Michael Moynagh, ‘Land Tenure on Fiji’s Cane Districts Since the 1920s’, *Journal of Pacific History*, Vol. 13, Nos 1–2, 1978, p. 61; Gillion, The Fiji Indians, p. 192. Sukuna was Oxford-educated and was decorated by the French in World War One; he also had chiefly connections. He became a member of the Legislative Council in 1937.

33 CSO F37/292 pt 1: Notes on file, Director of Lands [Buckhurst], 13 Nov. 1946. Cf. Brij Lal who discusses European approbation for the Fijian war effort and the indirect rewards for this – at least for those who, like Sukuna, wanted to see the old order retained. Lal, however, makes no mention of this use of the emergency war legislation by the colonial government to abrogate long leases to Indians to further the reservation by the NLTB (*Broken Waves*, pp. 117–120,134–139).


35 CSO F37/210/1: Acting Colonial Sec. to Sharma, 20 Mar 1952. Of the 54 leases at Vuda point, only 24 were returned to their Indian tenants after the war as leases of the NLTB. (CSO F37/292/1: Director of Lands to Colonial Sec., 29 Jan. 1949).

36 CO 83/227/85044: Note, 14 July 1939.

37 Moynagh, *Brown or White*, pp. 195–196

38 CSO F37/292 Pt. 2: Question by the Indian Member for the Southern Division, 23 Nov. 1951, Legislative Council.

39 CSO F37/249: Gent to Governor, 27 Oct. 1943.

40 CSO F115/71/3: CSR to Colonial Sec., 17 Apr. 1946. This land appears not to have gone back to CSR at the time.
The yellow fever vector, *Aëdes aegypti*, was found in Fiji.

Land values did rise, see CSO F37/339: Colonial Sec. to Director of Lands, 2 Jan. 1958 and encls.

This Flagstaff land was known as the Abydos block; CO 83/243/85500/2: Gov. to Sec. of State, 26 June 1946; Howlett, (compiler), *The History of the Fiji Military Forces*, p. 25.

For a study of the conversion of the *mataqali*, a unit of social organisation within Fijian society to the landholding unit see Peter France, *The Charter of the Land: Custom and Colonisation in Fiji*, Oxford, 1969.
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59 ‘Forest Department’, CP 15, Legislative Council, 1941.
60 CSO F32/10 Interview between the Governor and Conservator, and minute, 11 Nov. 1931. (The Director of the Lands Department acted as conservator.) More recent research has shown that even forest-covered lands on Viti Levu are susceptible to landslides due to heavy and extensive rainfall experienced during cyclones. Thus not all erosion is anthropogenic (Patrick D. Nunn, ‘Recent environmental change on Pacific islands’, The Geographical Journal, Vol. 156, part 2, July 1990, pp. 132–133).
61 ARFD, 1938–1944, Legislative Council 1939–1945; ‘British Empire Forestry Conference: Empire Forests and the War, Statement relating to the Colony of Fiji’, p. 8. There was only one trained forestry officer, an expatriate, on full time duties from 1942, the rest having joined the Armed Forces (‘Statement relating to the Colony of Fiji’, p. 30).
64 ‘British Empire Forestry Conference: Empire Forests and the War, Statement relating to the Colony of Fiji’, Suva, 1947, pp. 11–12. The Department used various formulae to convert timber logs, pit-sawn timber, round wood, firewood and charcoal to equivalent round timber cubic feet. See, for details, ARFD, 1950, Legislative Council, 1951.
66 CSO F115/79/1: Officer in Charge to Chief Sec., 9 June 1942.
70 CSO CF32/3: Notes, Ratu Sukuna, 13 July 1948.
73 Moynagh, Brown or White, p. 157.
75 CSO F37/195/7: Note on file, Sukuna, Licence over Native Reserves, 29 July 1943 and enclosures. See also CSO F37/420/2 Pt 1: Minutes of the NLTB, 12 Sept. 1942, 1 Nov. 1943.


ARAD 1943, Legislative Council, 1944. In normal years the local market in fruit and vegetables was worth about £40,000 to Fijian growers (Stanner, *The South Seas in Transition.*, p. 222).


FT, 22 July 1942, 29 Apr. 1943; ARAD 1943, Legislative Council, 1944.


ARM 1943, Legislative Council, 1944.

ARM 1944, Legislative Council, 1945.

Council, 1944; ARMD, 1944, Legislative Council, 1945; ARAD 1942, Legislative Council, 1943; ARAD 1943, Legislative Council, 1944.

91 ARAD 1943, Legislative Council, 1944.


93 ARAD 1943, Legislative Council, 1944.

94 FT, 10 June 1943, p. 4.


96 NARA Cpa RG 313: Entry 183, Alfred Potts, ‘Historical narrative, Fiji Islands’, Administration Historical Appendices, History 34, 6 Nov. 1945, p. 30.

97 ‘Report on Manpower’ CP 17, Legislative Council, 1942; CSO CF36/13: Governor to Sec. of State, 29 July 1942, Sukuna to Director, 12 Mar. 1943, Ellis, Fijian Manpower, 8 Mar. 1943; ARAD 1939–1944, Legislative Council, 1940–1945. See also CSO F62/303: Annual report, Northern District, 1946. £100 sterling = £110.75 Fijian. (Shephard, The Sugar Industry, p. 5.). There were twenty shillings (20/-) in a pound, twelve pence (12d) in a shilling.

98 Howlett, (compiler), The History of the Fiji Military Forces; Ravuvu, Fijians at War, passim.

99 CO 83/238/12 : Trafford-Smith, minutes, 10 Aug. 1942 and enclosures; Scarr, Fiji, pp. 146; Lal, Broken Waves; p. 113; Ravuvu, Fijians at War, pp. 8–9.

100 CSO CF36/13: Governor to Sec. of State, 29 July 1942, Sukuna to Director, 12 Mar. 1943, Ellis, Fijian Manpower, 8 Mar. 1943; Report on Indian Manpower survey, 24 April 1943; FT, 16 Jan., 6 May 1943; CSO F115/71: W. Burrows, ‘A report on the Fiji census’, CP 42, Legislative Council, 1936; ARAD 1946, Legislative Council, 1947; Howlett, (compiler), The History of the Fiji Military Forces, p. 35. Stanner claims that the numbers of Fijians involved amounted to 10% of the total Fijian population, but this was only for those in the armed services and the labour corps (Stanner, The South Seas in Transition, p. 197).

101 Stockdale, Report, p. 25; WPHC CF33/6 vols 1–10; ARAD 1941–46, Legislative Council, 1942–1947. An earlier wartime scheme designed to give relief to copra producers in the South West Pacific, the Pacific Marketing Board, had not solved the problems of transportation, poor quality copra, and Australian disinterest when the Pacific War began. This Board gladly handed over to the British Ministry of Food early in 1942.


104 WPHC CF33/6 vol. 11; ARAD 1948, Legislative Council, 1949.


106 Reeve, On Fiji Soil, p. 231.

108 CSO F37/210, Pt 1: CSR to Colonial Secretary, 2 Sept. 1942; Shephard, *The Sugar Industry*, p. 38. Only about 3% of the acreage was cultivated by the company itself, the rest by tenants and contractors.

109 CSO F37/233/7: Commander Royal Navy to Colonial Sec., 21 June 1943. Permission from the local land-holding unit, mataqali Naisogodaveta, and the local leader, the Buli Rewa, does not appear to have been sought until 1958 when the RNZAF wanted to resume practice as in the war years. No compensation was given until then (CSO F8/134 Pt 2: Commander, Central Div. to Colonial Sec., 8 Feb. 1958 and encls).


111 CSO F8/134: Colonial Sec. to DC Western, 22 June 1942 and encls.


115 CSO F8/174: District Medical Officer to Colonial Sec., 3 Feb. 1943 and encls.

116 CSO F8/174: Director of Public Works to Colonial Sec., 5 Nov. 1943.


118 See Rivers and Streams Ordinance, Cap 123, Fiji, 1880.

119 See Roads Ordinance, Cap. 208, Fiji.

120 CSO F37/72/4: Commissioner of Lands to Colonial Sec., 1 Dec. 1933.

121 CSO F37/72/4: Notes, 1 Dec., 1933; Irving to Colonial Sec., 2 Dec. 1933.


124 Following on the Lend-lease agreement of 1941 between Britain and USA, New Zealand and the USA signed a similar agreement in September 1942 by which each promised reciprocal aid. New Zealand included the compensation it paid relating to airfield construction in Fiji in its claim against the USA and a certain amount of reciprocal aid passed between Fiji as a British colony, and the USA. For wartime expenditure of about 5 million pounds, the Fijian administration had borrowed more than 2.2 million pounds from the Imperial British treasury, borrowed 768,000 pounds from New Zealand and raised about 1.94 million itself. Fiji’s debt to Britain was waived in 1948. Fiji repaid New Zealand at 50,000 pounds a year for ten years, while the New Zealand government agreed to meet all expenditure on air defence by the RNZAF based at Laucala Bay for ten years. (J. V. T. Baker, *The New Zealand People at War: War Economy*, Wellington, 1965. pp. 2, 77–78, 144, 377–385, 519, 526–527; CSO F115/71/2, Notes, 28 Jan. 1943; CSO F37/210 Pt 1: Governor to Prime Minister, 18 Mar. 1942; CO 83/240/85104/1: Draft note for the New Zealand mission, 1946 and enclosures; Pacific Islands Monthly, July 1948,
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125 See for example, NASA SB RG 338, Entry 44463, Construction Executive Committee, Fiji, 11 Nov. 1942; CSO F37/72/12: Director of Public Works to Director of Lands, 27 June 1952 and notes.


128 Debates of the Legislative Council, 22 Sept. 1944, p. 121.


130 Tax in cash rather than kind was introduced in 1913, ‘as money was in free circulation’ (Report of Native Department, 1912, CP 27, Legislative Council, 1913).


