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Sylvan, Fox and Deep Ecology: A View from the Continental Shelf

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ABSTRACT: Both Richard Sylvan’s trenchant critique of Deep Ecology and Warwick Fox’s illuminating reinterpretation and defence are presented and appraised. Besides throwing light on the nature and the prospects of the defence of Deep Ecology and of its diverse axiological, epistemological and metaphysical strands, the appraisal discloses the range of normative positions open to those who reject anthropocentrism, of which Deep Ecology is no more than one (and, if Fox’s account of its nature is right, may not be one at all). A position intermediate between Deep Ecology and anthropocentrism is advocated, which has been called by Wayne Sumner “middle-depth environmentalism – a kind of continental shelf between the shallow and deep extremes”.

KEYWORDS: Deep Ecology, impartiality, value-theory, identification, self-realization, biocentrism

My aim is to discuss and sift a key moment in the debate concerning the nature and merits of Deep Ecology. The debate illustrates, among other things, how easily this significant but elusive movement can be misunderstood. Able as is the defence of Deep Ecology which is to be reviewed, the criticisms from the other party in the debate will not turn out all to be based on misunderstandings. At the same time, a survey of the debate will help clarify some of the options available to those who reject the view that only humans or their interests are of independent value or significance, and who are thus open to wider ethical or metaphysical commitments.1

The critique of Deep Ecology to be considered is that of Richard Sylvan (formerly Routley), whose trenchant arguments appeared in two parts in Radical Philosophy,2 although an earlier version, which held out fewer (indeed minimal) prospects for the reconstruction of Deep Ecology, had previously been circulated privately. The defence is Warwick Fox’s essay “Approaching Deep Ecology: A Response to Richard Sylvan’s Critique of Deep Ecology”,3 which has been described by a well-informed observer as “the best explanation and defense of the Deep Ecology position”;4 it is a response which, to say the least, casts Deep Ecology in a new light.
SYLVAN’S CRITIQUE OF DEEP ECOLOGY

On Sylvan’s account, it is over their value theory that the positions of deep and of shallow ecology differ, both from one another, and from the (allegedly dominant) unrestrained position according to which, in the treatment of nature, virtually anything goes. The main division between shallower and deeper views concerns their attitude to the ‘Sole Value Assumption’, the assumption that only human beings have moral standing and that the good or the interests of humans only is intrinsically of value. Shallower views accept this, while deeper views reject it. Sylvan would not deny that, by contrast with the unrestrained view, which allows people to do more or less what they like with the land and the creatures it supports as long as acknowledged rights are not infringed, the so-called shallow position, which calls for care in the conservation of resources and ecosystems for the sake of the interests of future as well as present people, is a useful ally of deep ecology in many environmental conflicts. But in principle it is just as anthropocentric as the unrestrained view, and it cannot be regarded as deep because of its failure to recognize irreducible value in the nonhuman realm.

Sylvan rightly observes about the unrestrained position that it fails to satisfy the requirements of morality by discriminating arbitrarily in matters of time and place, discounting for no good reason future humans certainly, and sometimes distant ones. This places those of us who accept any form of universalizability requirement for moral judgement somewhere further along the shallow-deep spectrum, and effectively forecloses the unrestrained position as an option. It does so conclusively unless we are prepared totally (and arbitrarily) to reject any sacrifice of present interests for the sake of the interests of generations to come.

Often, however, the Sole Value Assumption is rejected, as, for example, by those who acknowledge the moral standing of sentient animals and attach significance to the avoidance of animal suffering. This is already to hold one of the deeper positions, but not yet to be deep. For one may still hold the ‘Greater Value Assumption’. In Sylvan’s first formulation, this is the assumption that “other things being equal, the value of humans is greater than other things”, something which many people (including myself) concerned to avoid discrimination on the basis of species alone would reject; for if the Sole Value Assumption is to be rejected, it is hard to see how systematic bias in all conflicts in favour of the human concerned could cogently be justified. In his second formulation, however, the core of the Greater Value Assumption is that, while “other objects, such as some higher animals, may have irreducible value,… at least for ‘normal’ members of respective species, this value never exceeds that of humans”, a tenet the more obvious interpretations of which I, like many others, should probably accept. The crucial point is that to accept the latter formulation need not involve bias in favour of humans, as it could instead be based on belief in the value of the development and exercise of certain capacities which are in fact found distinctively in normal humans, a value which might be
held to be additional to the value of the development and exercise of the various other capacities which humans share with normal members of many nonhuman species. Among holders of deeper positions, according to Sylvan, those who reject the Greater Value Assumption hold a properly deep position, and those who accept it hold an ‘intermediate’ one.

The kind of scruple which makes me distinguish between the two formulations lies in my agreement with Donald VanDeVeer that we ought not to save the life of an infant human with Tay-Sachs disease by means of a kidney transplant from a chimpanzee of greater capacities. There does indeed seem to be a strong case for letting be a creature of greater capacities (in some recognizable sense of that admittedly problematic expression), even when we could save the life of a human, and even if the human happens to be related to us. (The infant’s theoretical potential for acquiring greater capacities than the chimpanzee through growing up is beside the point, granted the extremely short life-expectancy of infants with this condition.) So far, then, I might well be uncertain whether I am deep or merely intermediate; and the same uncertainty arises about the position of Peter Singer: Sylvan classifies his Animal Liberation stance as intermediate, and falsely claims that, as to nonhuman animals, “in any playoff with humans, humans win”. I say ‘falsely’ because Singer’s central contention is that like interests should be accorded like consideration, which implies that relatively peripheral interests of humans should receive less consideration than relatively central interests of members of other sentient species.

In order to hold a deep position, it turns out, it is necessary to deny that greater moral significance attaches even to humans of normal capacities than to other creatures. But the form which this denial has taken in the self-styled Deep Ecology Movement is one which Sylvan disowns. The key tenet in Arne Naess’s original statement of the Deep position is, on Sylvan’s account, biospheric egalitarianism, or belief in the equal right of everything alive to live and blossom, where to blossom is to attain or fulfil one’s good. This tenet is, as Sylvan rightly remarks, excessively vulnerable. Thus even if (as I have argued elsewhere but Sylvan would deny) each living creature has irreducible value, it does not follow that all have equal irreducible value. Sylvan, whose eventual aim is to reformulate the value-core of the Deep position, adduces several arguments here, one of which concludes that because Deep Ecologists prize complexity, they cannot consistently accord equal value to complex and simple creatures alike.

It might be replied at this point that Deep Ecologists in fact prize complexity in systems, but find equal value in their members. But this would be to reckon without their characteristic holism, which, as Sylvan proceeds to show, is at odds with biospheric egalitarianism. For, on holistic principles, a forest is itself an organism with intrinsic value just as are its component trees; so, granted egalitarianism, the value of the forest is both equal to that of a tree and, as the forest is made up of trees, many times that of a tree. (I assume here that there are degrees of value; without this assumption, no theory of value will furnish
guidance when things of value are in competition.

I should add that in any case biospheric egalitarianism (which has also been propounded by Paul Taylor\textsuperscript{10}) can be shown to generate strongly counterintuitive judgements. Thus, granted this principle, and other things being equal, when water is scarce, and the small quantity available can be given either to a dying human or to a dying plant, it is indifferent to which it should be given, as there are no further reasons to take into account. Again, if the death of a human would result in a greater number of flourishing lives (e.g. maggots) than the number of lives which the same human being sustains when alive (e.g. intestinal flora), then it would be better for the human being to die. But no system, I maintain, which can yield these judgements can constitute an operative and defensible morality.

As Sylvan observes, Naess has in fact considerably diluted his egalitarianism, allowing, perhaps overgenerously, that “any realistic praxis necessitates some killing, exploitation and suppression”.\textsuperscript{11} (This would be overgenerous because exploitation is necessarily unjustified and so, perhaps, is suppression.) Sylvan’s protest is that if too little of the originally intended force of biospheric egalitarianism is retained, Deep Ecology collapses into intermediate positions such as those of Singer and Attfield\textsuperscript{112}. There is, however, a more trenchant criticism to be made of Naess’ position, namely that until a clear explanation is offered of when it is right to kill, exploit and suppress, it is unclear just what normative position is actually being proposed.

What Sylvan proposes to salvage from biospheric egalitarianism is the principle of biospecies impartiality, a principle forbidding the favouring of members of any one species simply on the basis of the species that it is. Such discrimination, he maintains, is to be rejected on the same grounds as preclude discrimination on the basis of class. Now some philosophers have maintained that species-membership is unlike the various grounds of discrimination which are usually regarded as arbitrary ones, sex, colour, creed etc., because it reflects significant differences. But here I should respond, with Sylvan, that where there are relevant differences, discrimination is to be justified on the basis of those very differences, and not on just plain species-membership. (This, indeed, is why I can accept the second formulation of the Greater Value Assumption, the one which concerns normal humans with normal human faculties, but not the first, which lacks this qualification, and thus requires discrimination against all nonhumans in favour of human vegetables too.) Thus I should wish to uphold the fragment which Sylvan salvages from the wreckage of the value-core of Deep Ecology, even though he does so to avoid it collapsing into an intermediate position such as my own.

Sylvan, however, proceeds to reject capacities as a basis for discrimination, partly on the grounds that capacities are insufficient to guarantee performance. He might well also maintain that the kind of discrimination which I should favour in some circumstances on the count of the possession of understanding and self-awareness betokens lack of depth. Yet, I maintain, creatures \textit{should} sometimes
be treated differently in the light of whether or not they have capacities for understanding and for self-awareness. So if biospecies impartiality forbids discrimination between living creatures not only on the basis of species but also on the basis of capacities such as that for self-awareness, then it is a much stronger principle than it at first seems, and much less deserving of support.

Sylvan also belabours Deep Ecologists such as Naess and Sessions for mistakenly adhering to biocentrism, the belief that all and only living creatures (or their states and activities) are intrinsically valuable. For, he holds, not all life is valuable at all, and much that is not alive is valuable. Deep Ecologists, he remarks, try to avoid this difficulty by stretching the term ‘life’ beyond its ordinary biological use to rivers, rocks, landscapes and ecosystems, and by then claiming that all these things have a right to survive and blossom. (As Fox has pointed out in another paper, Naess and George Sessions are quite explicit about the breadth of their sense of ‘life’.) But these claims involve category mistakes, and are unacceptable. Rather, biocentrism should be abandoned, concludes Sylvan; the value of some of the same items can then be recognized because of their diversity, complexity or richness.

Sylvan’s reformulation may well better express what some Deep Ecologists have really intended than biocentrism does. But the trouble is that a case needs to be made out for the intrinsic value of diversity, complexity and (if it is different from these) richness. These qualities would seem to be valuable not intrinsically or as such but rather for their instrumental value in upholding natural systems and their living constituents, and also through the aesthetic appreciation which they afford to human and other observers (a kind of value which is observer-dependent in a way that intrinsic value is not). Sylvan does certainly present arguments why Christians and others should accept the value of the natural world as it was before life appeared. But neither God’s finding the world good (according to Genesis) as it at that stage was, nor the fact that scientific-minded people arrive at the same judgement, need actually indicate that it was or is held valuable in any senses beyond being aesthetically beautiful and conducive to the support of life. (Besides questioning Sylvan’s supplementation of the biocentric theory of value, I should also question his denial of any value in the lives of some living creatures, at any rate where they have a good of their own. However, this is not the place to go over a case argued elsewhere.)

Sylvan further accuses Naess of advocating self-realization as the ground of the value of diversity, complexity and richness, and making its maximization his ultimate principle. To this he replies that many items of value cannot realize themselves, not being alive (but see my previous remarks on this), and also that agents have no obligation to maximize value but rather an obligation to satisize it, that is, not to bring into being as much value as possible, but rather to bring into being enough. There is, I should suggest, some reason for sympathy with at any rate the spirit of this point, as also with Sylvan’s strictures on a value theory which apparently could only apply to creatures which are conscious and thus
have selves to realize, though there is not the space to go into details here. If Sylvan represents Naess and the others aright, anyone who harbours such sympathies is at least in some ways closer to his own position, which he calls Deep-Green Theory, than to the position of Deep Ecology. But it is a big ‘if’.

DEEP ECOLOGY ACCORDING TO FOX

It is the claim of Warwick Fox, an assiduous interpreter of the Deep Ecology literature, that Sylvan has mischaracterized the core of Deep Ecology, which is not, at least primarily, concerned with ethics or with axiology at all. Through numerous quotations from Sessions, Naess, Bill Devall and other Deep Ecology writers, Fox attempts to demonstrate that the main emphasis of Deep Ecology is neither ethical nor axiological, but metaphysical, and that the remarks of Deep Ecologists about the value of nonhuman nature rather serve to express the characteristic attitudes which will be adopted by those who go along with the metaphysical teaching than to constitute the central thrust of the Movement. Thus Sylvan’s arguments to the effect that none of the philosophical or religious bases put forward by Naess actually support the value-core, and that there is some tension between the value-core and these bases, are largely beside the point. Indeed the proponents of Deep Ecology often deny that their position is a contribution to value-theory at all, and resist the assumption that ecophilosophy must or should be pursued through value-theory or through ethics.

Fox’s interpretation certainly constitutes one plausible reading of the literature. Assuredly Sessions, Naess and Devall sometimes employ the language of biocentrism and of biospherical egalitarianism, and others who would profess ecological depth, such as J. Baird Callicott, often concentrate on value-theory, its applications and its status, though with a rather different particular value-theory from the egalitarianism of Naess and Taylor. But, as Sylvan from time to time admits, the central theorists use this language much less often and much more sketchily than might be expected of their supposed core-theory. Again, the disclaimers on the part of the main pundits of any belief in the effectiveness or even the importance of ethical teaching, and of any desire to propound principles rather than general attitudes, strongly support the interpretation of Fox rather than that of Sylvan: at the same time Taylor and Callicott may well be regarded by the central theorists as unorthodox allies rather than as central figures, and as deep with a small rather than a capital ‘d’, or perhaps, in the case of Taylor, as too individualist to be deep at all. (But to be fair, Naess is anything but preoccupied with orthodoxy, and favours letting-be in the matter of other people’s adoption of their own beliefs and practice, just as in the matter of wild creatures living their own lives.)

But what, if Fox’s denials are accepted, are the central positive teachings of Deep Ecology? To follow Fox’s account, the central tenets include a total-field
or relational view of reality, denying various classical dualisms and facilitating in ourselves as subjects ecological consciousness and identification with nonhuman nature; an enlarged conception of the self, such that the world is seen as part of the self; and an emphasis on self-realization, granted this enlarged conception of the self, such that any diminution of natural entities becomes a diminution of oneself, and such that self-love comes to involve care for the world as for oneself. (There are some interesting parallels in some of this with the Romanticism attacked in the Preface of Hegel’s *Phenomenology*, though as Fox points out, his affiliations, and those of Deep Ecology in general, are not primarily idealist (p. 16).)

The vision of reality which all this expresses issues, according to Fox, in practical concern for self-defence and self-realization (in the enlarged sense of ‘self’), in a simpler and less ecologically stressful quality of life and in an ideal spiritual state of being, all of which reinforce, in turn, the central vision of reality. Fox summarizes the entire approach of Deep Ecology as proceeding from the ‘hypotheses’ that the self can grow and is as comprehensive as its identifications, and the ‘norm’ that “The ideal state of being is one that sustains the widest and deepest possible identification and, hence, sense of Self” (pp. 86-7), but he does so without in any way retracting or de-emphasizing the Deep Ecology view of reality in general.

If this account is accepted, it becomes clearer how various religious positions may be supposed to strengthen attitudes such as those couched in the terms of biospherical egalitarianism, and at the same time why precise ethical and axiological principles are inessential. It also emerges how Deep Ecologists can seek to derive the value of diversity, complexity and richness from self-realization (i.e. the self-realization, perhaps, of the biosphere and of all its species and of their members) without laying themselves open to Sylvan’s various objections; and how their forays into talk about values-in-nature and of its ideological bases could mislead a logician and ethicist such as Sylvan about the character of their overall position.

Now it may well be that an enlarged concern for the nonhuman world is sometimes evoked by this set of ideas, as indeed could an enlarged concern for humanity be by none too different a set. But this does not immunize these ideas, together with those derived from them by Deep Ecologists, from criticisms such as Sylvan’s, any more than biospherical egalitarianism is exempted from scrutiny through being inessential, or through not being intended too literally or too seriously. (As Eric Katz has commented, if the language of biospherical egalitarianism does not express a specific axiological theory but merely an attitude, that of the rejection of anthropocentrism, then it is intellectual double-talk. For the words employed, as Katz implies, mean much more than their users would allow that they say.)

Thus when Sylvan (in face of an earlier account of Deep Ecology supplied by Fox) denies that all relationships are constitutive of the related parties, he is
surely right, since otherwise the parties could not be identified independently of
the relationship, something which even Deep Ecologists have to presuppose in
order to talk of it and them. Although Fox maintains that it is their being in some
relationship or other which is essential to individuals rather than their being in
specific relationships, his acceptance that if individuals A and B were differently
related they would not be the same things (p.16) substantially vindicates
Sylvan’s criticism.

Again, when Fox attempts to claim that the Copenhagen interpretation of
quantum mechanics is the only defensible one, and to base on it the claim that
the overall ontology disclosed by modern science is “inextricably linked to the
consciousness of the observer” (a claim recently endorsed by Callicott, who
supposes it to break down the distinction between observers and objects of
observation in general), and when Sylvan rejects all this, it is hard to disagree
with him. Even the claim ascribed to Roger Walsh that the known universe is
inextricably linked with consciousness, by reference to which Fox explains
himself (p. 26), is only plausible insofar as it concerns the universe as object of
consciousness, rather than the universe as an independent system, some aspects
of which happen to be known from time to time. And Fox’s further claim
(ascribed to Heisenberg), that all that can be known is the relationship between
the observer and the observed, itself presupposes that both observers and
observed can be identified (and thus known) independently of that relationship,
and so undermines itself.

As Fox proceeds to point out, identification with the natural world is possible
without a belief in the identity of self and world; when one person identifies with
another, she or he need not believe that their identities have totally merged. Yet
if belief in the identity of self and world is no longer in question, it may be asked
under what belief the activity or process of identification takes place; for
assuredly some belief has to be involved. A recognition that one interacts with
the world seems inadequate for identification in any robust sense, as does the
shaky belief that one’s welfare is bound up with its welfare for more than a few
decades; indeed nothing is likely to suffice short of the belief that there are
reasons to preserve and care for it, which, at least in my vocabulary, is equivalent
to saying that it is of value. But if this is so, then the questions discussed earlier
of whether and why it is of value assume once again a fundamental significance
for Deep Ecology, alongside the importance which they have for everyone
anywhere on the deep-shallow spectrum. The need for a specific axiology cannot
be shirked if actions and policies are to be satisfactorily formed and guided, or
if the overall theory is to have more than just a negative content.

Even if the posture of deep identification with the natural world is a coherent
possibility, it is not the only attitude which can generate care for nature or a sense
of responsibility towards it. At least as appropriate is the contrasting attitude of
wonder and respect for nature’s otherness, as has been pointed out by Peter
Reed, or again the socially informed sense of stewardship commended by
Murray Bookchin, and, in somewhat different terms, by myself. Thus even if the pursuit of deep identification can be reconciled with the intactness of the identifying subject’s individuality, this form of consciousness is clearly dispensable, granted the possibility of alternative attitudes with a corresponding role, and its distinctive desirability is thus open to question.

Again, a stress on the self-realization of the biosphere (if this is one of the intended kinds of self-realization) is at least as vulnerable as the claim that one can (in some strong sense) identify with it, and again as the claim that it has a self to realize (though it should be remarked that Fox would probably deny that this kind of holism is central to Deep Ecology). For even if, as the Gaia hypothesis requires, the biosphere should be regarded as a living organism, it is implausible that it is a conscious one. One possible interpretation of the claim that we should promote the self-realization of the biosphere is that we should maximize its stability, beauty, and integrity. But this maximization would be a far cry from any self-realization of our own; and, if made the sole basis of obligation, is fundamentally incompatible with biospherical egalitarianism. Indeed it risks the kind of totalitarianism of Callicott’s early work, in which, rather than each living creature being of irreducible value, no individual has a value which is more than instrumental. Callicott has, however, now discarded that position, while George Sessions rejects fascist interpretations of Deep Ecology, and favours a holistic ethic which nevertheless respects the integrity of all individuals, whether human or nonhuman.

Sylvan, further, is surely right to counsel rejection of extreme holism, whether of the totalitarian kind just mentioned, which would subordinate all individuals to the biosphere, or of the metaphysical kind which he ascribes to Deep Ecology, and which would deny individuals all autonomy and all independent existence, and would therewith deny the biosphere all diversity. In its place Sylvan sets up moderate holism, the thesis that “certain qualities... applying to wholes do not dissolve to qualities of the individual components”. For his part, Fox maintains that Deep Ecologists believe in the relative autonomy of individuals, and thus do not adhere to extreme holism. But their total-field conception of reality, which represents each thing as constituted by its relations to everything else, in fact implies that nothing can be conceived except in relation to everything else and to the whole, and thus belittles both individuality and the value of individuals too, even if it does not deny diversity, as Sylvan seems to think.

By contrast, Sylvan’s moderate holism (a holism of qualities rather than of substance) is at first sight acceptable enough; consider, for example, the constitutional powers of a parliament, which are clearly irreducible to powers of individuals. But it is less clearly acceptable when Sylvan’s key example of qualities which are irreducible is remarked: notably ‘value’. The implicit suggestion here seems to be that the value of ecosystems is irreducible; but more of an argument would be needed before such a claim could be accepted. It is
probably because of my scepticism over even moderate holism in axiology that I am finally discovered to be intermediate rather than deep. But (a) if scepticism about moderate holism in axiology is a sufficient condition of being intermediate, then some better arguments are needed to persuade people not to be intermediate; and (b) if this really is a sufficient condition of being intermediate, then there need be no correlation after all between being intermediate and accepting the Greater Value Assumption, and Sylvan’s apparently useful distinction between deep and intermediate positions forfeits the clarity which it seemed to have.

If, however, as Deep Ecology texts sometimes suggest, what is valued is the self-realization of each and every creature, future creatures included, and this in a sense which does not require that the creature be conscious, but which involves rather the development of the capacities of a creature proper to its kind, then there is surely much more to be said for it. Many kinds of creature flourish, as Rodman has pointed out, in ways which bear few parallels to the flourishing of humans; yet, as Scherer has observed, most people would recognize more value in a world of such creatures than in one lacking life altogether, even if none of them were conscious. But this is to argue for the reinstatement of biocentrism, and to move away from Sylvan’s Deep Green territory in at least the general direction of Deep Ecology, though without its version of holism or its vision of reality, without its stress on identification and without even lip-service being paid to biospheric egalitarianism. It is also, as Wayne Sumner points out in a review, to part company with Peter Singer’s confinement of moral standing to the sentient. Hence Sumner writes of “Attfield’s middle-depth environmentalism – a kind of continental shelf between the shallow and deep extremes”. There is room, in fact, for a judicious intermediate position of the kind just depicted. There is certainly no need to apologize for being discriminating about depth.

NOTES

1 Including the position which I have defended in Attfield 1991 and elsewhere.
2 Sylvan 1985.
3 Fox 1986.
4 Thus Eric Katz (1989) at p. 268.
5 The universalizability requirement for moral judgement forbids treating differently relevantly similar cases, such as many future interests and present interests unquestionably are, on pain of having no moral position at all.
6 Both formulations appear in column one of Part I, p. 6.
7 See VanDeVeer 1979, p.65 and p.77, n.15; and Attfield 1991, p. 179.
8 Sylvan 1985, Part I, p.6, column one.
9 This is, for example, the central thesis of Practical Ethics (1979).
Surprisingly Sylvan represents me as restricting the valuable to human concerns, which belies my every belief and argument on the subject. The basis for such an ascription entirely eludes me.

For a fuller account of obligation and supererogation, see Attfield 1987, chapter 7.

For Callicott’s case, see Callicott 1985. For a telling critique of the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, see Hodgson 1984.

The phrase omitted from the passage cited in note 25 is “value in particular”; the full text makes it clear that the main example which Sylvan has in mind is value, and more specifically the value of ‘wholes’ such as ecosystems. The complete passage runs: “It is enough that certain qualities, value in particular, applying to wholes, do not dissolve to qualities of the individual components.” Sylvan 1985, Part II, p.10, column two.

See the passage cited in note 20, and also Naess 1986, at p. 14.

Sylvan has further (1991) responded to Fox, while Fox (1990) has further rejected Sylvan’s critique and more amply expounded his own position. This is not the appropriate place to comment further on this burgeoning controversy. Fox’s book has already been reviewed in Environmental Values by Talbot (1992).

REFERENCES


