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The deepening crisis of global climate change has increased public awareness of environmental issues and provoked starkly different political responses. We see denial, panic, indifference, mobilization, and oddest of all, attempts to create markets to solve problems created by markets.

On this smoke-obscured battlefield, one thing seems clear. Effective action will need social-science understanding of how environmental change happens and how to deal with it. We do not live in an Anthropocene so much as a Sociocene. Corporations, states, and structures of power and inequality, rather than individual humans, are generating the large-scale environmental effects.

One of the most powerful social structures is the gender order—the social arrangements that construct masculinities and femininities, and produce gendered divisions of labor, wealth, and power.

Feminists in the 1970s saw that environmental issues were connected with gender. The most influential arguments pictured men as naturally dominant, aggressive, and threatening; women as naturally peaceable, nurturing, and environmentally friendly. This, however, contradicted the women’s-liberation argument that gender is socially constructed, and we should remember that alternative view. It is true that many men and influential forms of masculinity are involved in environmental destruction. But not because XY chromosomes mechanically generate bad behavior.

Our understanding of men and masculinities has come a long way in the last 30 years, and we now have a worldwide base of knowledge. It is definitely time to bring this to bear on the understanding of environmental issues and so this special issue of Perspectives is very welcome.
Research has shown the multiplicity of masculinities and their internal complexity—and sometimes, their internal contradictions. The studies in this Perspectives issue add to this rich documentation, showing the making and negotiating of masculinities in very different cultural and economic settings, from Central America to central Africa, to the USA and Japan.

Research has mapped relations between different forms of masculinity: hegemony, marginalization, violence, and fearful avoidance. We understand better that destructive actions—including environmental crime—are not mechanically “caused” by masculinity but are purposive means of achieving valued masculinity.

Achieving masculine status makes sense only in a social context. The top managers of the corporations pouring out greenhouse gases and poisoning river systems are not necessarily doing so from inner evil. Perhaps these men love babies and puppies and would sing in a church choir if only they could find the time. But they are working in an insane elite world that institutionalizes competitive, power-oriented masculinity, and they are doing whatever it takes.

Understanding masculinities also helps our thinking about environmental movements. In my initial research on men’s life histories in Gender and Society, I included environmental activists on the assumption some were trying to change conventional masculinity—and that turned out to be true. Environmental movements are sites of encounter; the Camps for Climate Action, for instance, have incorporated feminist practices. But environmental movements may also reproduce gender hierarchies. As studies in this collection show, this process happens at the level of everyday practice as well as in publicly visible leadership.

Research on masculinities is surprisingly helpful, too, in understanding responses to the environmental movement and its interventions. As this issue concerns the class character of environmental politics, it is of strategic importance. The studies in this special issue about occupational masculinities and the divided interests of working men (see Loomis, for example) are very illuminating. Contemporary authoritarian populism, drawing on environmental denialism, tries hard to mobilize these forces and has had some success.
Yet men have a great deal to contribute to environmental movements, to stabilizing the Sociocene and finding sustainable futures. The research also points to their resources and the diversity of their masculinities. There are hidden histories that need to be told. They include—to blow a local trumpet—the pioneering “Green Bans” imposed by Australian unions in defence of urban environment. There are more possibilities for change than might appear on the surface.

Knowledge about masculinities has been put to good use by antiviolence activism, and in health and educational work. It will be valuable for environmental activism, too. Thanks to the editors and contributors of this special issue for this impressive contribution.

Raewyn Connell
Sydney, 2017
Introduction

*Man and Nature*, written by the American philologist and conservationist George Perkins Marsh in 1864, is widely considered to be one of the earliest texts to analyze the impacts of human civilizations on the biophysical environment. It marked the beginning of a new epoch of conservationism in the United States and inspired subsequent generations of environmentalists the world over. Marsh, as a student of language, would be intrigued to know that, over 150 years later, the word “Man” is no longer used universally to denote the human species as a whole. Critics have argued that the generic use of “Man” historically has hidden all manner of social differences, among them the biological and sociological differences between men and women—as well as among men. “Man” universalizes, both making men the unit of measure and rendering them an unmarked category in narratives about the human species.

Twentieth-century analyses of the human-nature nexus have, since the 1970s at least, been more attendant to human heterogeneity, including race, class/caste, gender, and other forms of difference. In the environmental humanities and social sciences, for example, ecofeminist scholars have produced a great deal of work on the links between femininities and environments, and on women’s involvement in environmental politics and practices. Other scholars have taken up the activist concept of environmental justice, arguing that people of color are disproportionately exposed to health hazards where they live and work—not to mention less likely to live near green spaces, fresh food markets, and other environmental goods. And, most recently, scholars in the field of queer ecology have demonstrated the fraught relationship between environmental movements and LGBTQ people—considering, for example, how the latter have been positioned as “unnatural” in political and religious discourse. Queer ecology scholars have also troubled the binary construction of gender that has traditionally informed ecofeminist (and other) research.

The most current scholarly fixation in the environmental realm, the Anthropocene, or “Age of Man”—a purportedly new geological epoch distinguished by humans’ irreversible mark on the Earth—threatens to undo much of the latter work. (See the RCC Perspectives issues titled *Anthropocene* [2013] and *Whose Anthropocene?* [2016].) For
one thing, the term’s broad sweep ignores differences of caste and class, such as the fact that more privileged people have larger carbon footprints. Moreover, the term has been embraced in ways that replicate racial and gender inequalities. As Kate Raworth observed in a 2014 article in *The Guardian* titled, “Must the Anthropocene Be a Manthropocene?,” the first meeting of the 29-member international Anthropocene Working Group included only one woman and just four people from developing nations. (The number of women was increased to five shortly thereafter, and currently appears to stand at seven out of 37 members.) She points out that “It is more than a little irony here. Leading scientists may have the intellect to recognize that our planetary era is dominated by human activity, but they still seem oblivious to the fact that their own intellectual deliberations are bizarrely dominated by white northern male voices.” (See also Fleming in this volume.) As Raworth suggests, it seems impossible to fully grasp the contours of the Anthropocene without understanding power relations within human societies over time, or how particular cultural values and practices have become barriers to pro-environmental knowledge and action—and, conversely, how pro-environmental knowledge and action can itself replicate unequal power relations.

As we see yet again with the Anthropocene Working Group, men *qua* men, or men’s performance of different masculinities, are almost never objects of critical inquiry in the environmental disciplines. Meanwhile, the concept of “gender,” as far as the environmental humanities and social sciences are concerned, remains largely synonymous with women—thus continuing to leave men categorically unmarked. Indeed, the few available scholarly articles and books that do interrogate connections among men, masculinities, and environment begin with the recognition—and a lament—that there is so little research available. For example, the introduction to the 2004 cultural studies collection *Eco-Man: New Perspectives on Masculinity and Culture* includes editor Mark Allister’s observation, “As I immersed myself in men’s studies, I often wondered where the ‘nature’ was . . . When I next taught environmental literature, I realized that . . . men’s lives in and out of nature were discussed only from an ecofeminist position” (2004, 1). What thus remains under-addressed are the myriad ways in which masculine roles, identities, and practices shape human relationships with the more-than-human world. In short, what do we know about *men* and nature?

Of course, men of all backgrounds figure in local and global environmental histories. And, as Raworth’s essay reminds us, men of particular backgrounds have played
prominent roles as the founders of modern science, the pioneers of settler colonialism, the leaders of the mainstream environmental movement, and the engineers of climate intervention—to name just a few. Indeed, in every society on the planet, those with the most wealth and power to shape and control the natural world—for better or worse—have been men. As a 2017 Oxfam report shows, eight billionaire white men control the same amount of wealth between them as the poorest half of the Earth’s population.

One need only consider the events of the past several years to find evidence of the central role that elite men play in the study, mitigation, marketing, and/or denial of arguably the most pressing environmental problem of this generation: climate change. Opinion poll data from the United States and other rich countries tell us that white male conservative voters are the least likely of any demographic group to be concerned about climate change; meanwhile, they claim higher levels of climate knowledge, while actually knowing less than women and people of color (See McCright and Dunlap 2011). And, most recently, the so-called “toxic masculinity” of newly-elected US president Donald Trump seems deeply entangled with his anti-environmentalist agenda (Sexton 2016). Considering these points, male environmental relations seem more than ripe for greater scholarly attention from environmental humanists and social scientists.

One place such scholars might begin is with the interdisciplinary field of masculinity studies—which, despite the lack of attention to “nature” that Allister notes above, offers several valuable heuristics. For example, masculinity studies scholars have proposed the idea of masculinities as plural, contested, and changing over time. More specifically, the world’s leading masculinities scholar Raewyn Connell, who we invited to write a foreword for this issue, has offered the influential concept of *hegemonic masculinities*: the patterns of values and practices that legitimize certain men’s dominant position in society while subordinating other forms of masculinities and all femininities; this concept enacts some of that marking of categories referenced above.

What we now bring to the discussion, as scholars of gender and environment, is the insight that hegemonic masculinities have been constructed in opposition to nature. Controlling the environment, using it for survival and/or profit, and being resilient in the face of “Mother Nature’s wrath” are well-nigh compulsory traits of normative “true” manhood in Western cultures. As Allister puts it, a “powerful social construction of [contemporary] masculinity [holds] that the way to prove one’s manhood is not to test oneself in nature but to destroy it” (2004, 3). But this is not to say that all mascu-
linities or all men are unavoidably engaged in environmental domination and destruction. Indeed, the social construction to which Allister refers is a distinctly Western one; as one of the essays in this volume shows, for example, resignation and grace in the face of nonhuman nature are considered ideal masculine traits in the context of contemporary Japan (see Kambe).

Despite their diverse disciplinary approaches, the essays in this volume all demonstrate an understanding of concepts such as the unmarked category, hegemonic masculinity, and masculinities as plural, contested, and changing, and they also all demonstrate a desire to imagine new or alternative performances and enactments of masculinities. These essays grew out of an interdisciplinary workshop that we convened at the Rachel Carson Center in February, 2016. The initial idea for the workshop grew out of conversations we had while in residence at the RCC in 2014—in which we mused on the problematic scholarly gaps cited above, and shared insights on masculinities from our respective backgrounds in (eco)feminist theory and environmental politics (MacGregor), and queer theory and queer ecology (Seymour).

Held over two days, the workshop brought together female and male academics, writers, artists, and activists from four continents. Together, we explored the connections between masculinities and environmental change in the past, in contemporary societies, and in visions of the future. The workshop opened with a Friday evening public event at LMU Munich that drew over 50 people. The keynote address by Martin Hultman (Department of Thematic Studies—Technology and Social Change, Linköping University, Sweden) provided an overview of what is known and unknown about the men-nature nexus, as well as a compelling argument for why more work is needed to understand and respond to links between masculine privilege and ecological destruction. “Men are a big part of the environmental problem,” he declared, “especially white, wealthy, middle-aged men who travel too much, eat too much meat, and live in energy-intensive buildings.” He concluded that “[w]e need to make men a marked category as well as creating a possible exit politics for men who want to change.” The public event also featured two contributions that, in their respective articulation of LG-BTQ identity and destabilization of traditional gender roles, exemplify the concerns of queer ecology: a memoir reading from Alex Carr Johnson and an art installation from Munich-based artist Nicola von Thurn. These contributions, included in this volume, also demonstrate how artists, and not just scholars and activists, are engaging with
questions of masculinity and nature. After a Saturday of workshop presentations and discussion, we ended with closing remarks from Paula-Irene Villa (Department of Sociology, LMU) and a participants’ trip to the Deutsches Museum’s trailblazing exhibit, *Welcome to the Anthropocene: The Earth in Our Hands*.

The essays in this volume represent much—though, for reasons of space, unfortunately not all—of these workshop activities.

We hope that this issue of *Perspectives* will prompt further interdisciplinary, intersectional discussions in the environmental humanities and social sciences on gender relations and identities, and on men and masculinities in particular.

We wish to thank all of our participants and everyone at the Rachel Carson Center for their support and hard work, especially directors Christof Mauch and Helmut Trischler and staff members Carmen Dines, Stephanie Hood, Franz Langer, Annka Liepold, Samantha Rothbart, and Katie Ritson. We also wish to thank Mattias Moosburger from the LMU Center for Ethics for helping us book the perfect room for our public event (complete with big busts of dead white male philosophers). Nicole Seymour wishes to thank California State University, Fullerton for a Research, Scholarship, and Creative Activity (RSCA) Incentive Grant that funded both her participation in the workshop and student research assistance from Angel Duran, Jaime Govier, Amber Morell, and Emily Robles. Sherilyn MacGregor would like to thank the Sustainable Consumption Institute at the University of Manchester for supporting her involvement in this project.
Further Reading


Representing Disaster with Resignation and Nostalgia: Japanese Men’s Responses to the 2011 Earthquake

On 11 March 2011, Japan was rocked by 9.0-magnitude earthquake that caused a devastating tsunami and the subsequent accidents at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in northeast Japan. On 13 March 2011, Prime Minister Naoto Kan sent a televised message to the nation, stating, “Japan is facing its worst crisis in the 65 years since the war” (McCurry 2011). And when a country faces a crisis, masculinity can often play a key role in public discourse. For example, President George W. Bush and the United States media employed a masculine ideology of strength and dominance in the aftermath of 9/11 (Coe et al. 2007). As gender and sexuality theorist Todd Reeser (2010) writes, “A nation that has suffered . . . may use images of masculinity to revitalize or revirilize itself” (189). In this process, “masculinity and nationalism function as curative panaceas for each other,” which, in turn, helps men lessen their “anxiety about being [men]” (189).

This essay explores work by Japanese male intellectuals and writers after the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011. It is my contention that their writings, interviews, and speeches about the impacts of the disaster on the Japanese landscape, and the nation’s response both reflect their gender-specific (masculine) emotions and anxieties and employ ideals that assuage those anxieties. The first ideal is a masculine virtue called aki-rame (resignation), which is about a disengagement of the masculine self. This ideal is connected to mujō (impermanence), the ostensibly unique Japanese aesthetic sensibility and perception of nature. The other ideal is nostalgia: a longing for a remote past, a means of escaping from the here and now. Each ideal is different from the other, but both entail an attempt by the masculine self to escape from the crisis of the present. The following sections will discuss how Japanese male intellectuals and writers express these cultural and masculine ideals. In so doing, I make some original—albeit provisional—observations about the connections between masculinity and nation in the Japanese context.
**Akirame, Mujō, and Nature**

*Mujō* signifies that “all the phenomena and relationships we experience in our daily lives are bound to disappear with time” (LaFleur 1983, 5). Seiichi Takeuchi (2011) claims that *mujō* has become a unique ethnic worldview of the Japanese, shaped by experiences of various natural disasters as well as by observations that nature changes from season to season and hour to hour. This idea is often expressed symbolically in Japanese literature. For example, since medieval times, references to cherry blossoms, morning glories, foam on the water, and dew—all very short-lived, natural things—have been well-worn devices (Hirano 2012). Seeing nature as impermanent helps lessen anxiety because it involves both disengaging oneself from crisis (e.g., natural disasters), and idealizing nature as an aesthetic object. In other words, thinking of nature’s beauty makes it seem less violent and scary.

These processes are linked to the feeling of *akirame* (resignation). *Akirame* “is traditionally valued primarily as a masculine virtue” because it accompanies “an aesthetic quality of manly grace or being *isagiyoshi*” (Taketomo 1988, 262). Yasuhiro Taketomo writes that *akirame* “can hardly be attained through willpower or suppression alone” but “requires cogent, though unconscious, participation in the processes of denial, isolation of affect, intellectualization, and repression” (263). After the 2011 earthquake, Japanese male intellectuals and writers expressed their feelings of *akirame* toward its disastrous consequences by invoking *mujō*. For example, in an interview entitled “Oime wo wasureta Nihonjin” (The Japanese who forgot their indebtedness), from a collection of interviews entitled *Shinsaigo no kotoba* (Words after the earthquake), religious scholar Tetsuo Yamaori (2012) describes his visit to some disaster-hit areas in Tōhoku one month after the earthquake. He notes that it was like hell, with dead bodies littering the sea, but then adds:

> However, at the same time, I found the beauty of nature under a cloudless sky: raging waves were gone and the sea became very calm and looked so beautiful, as if nothing had happened. I thought then that nature in the Japanese islands has an antithetical, double-faced character. One is a face with a terribly destructive force. The other is a face of beauty, as if it is holding our hearts to its bosom. While nature is a threat to us, it is eternally beautiful when it is calm and quiet. For thousands of years, our ancestors have lived in and with this double-faced character of nature. (119–120, my translation)
Here, Yamaori implies that the devastation caused by the natural disaster leads to despair at first, but then the beauty of nature brings *akirame* to him. Moreover, the transitory character of nature captured here—its ability to move from violent to beautiful—constitutes *mujō*.

Writing after the earthquake, novelists such as Natsuki Ikezawa expressed the feeling of *akirame* specifically through references to cherry blossoms. For example, in *Haru wo urandarishinai* (I don’t begrudge the spring), he writes:

> We often use the term *akirameru* or “to resign.” ... If something happens which is out of our control, we recognize it as an obvious fact, accept its fate, and abandon any further efforts. [Thus] we have become masters of *akirame*. That is why we love cherry blossoms; once the period of blossoming comes, the only thing they can do is to scatter. Although [cherry blossoms] know this destiny, they still show us beautiful blossoms. (2011, 60, my translation)

Ikezawa does not try to describe the beauty of cherry blossoms; rather, he uses cherry blossoms as a metaphor to show *mujō*, or the perishability of nature, as well as the aesthetic and cultural ideal of the Japanese male to be resigned. Similarly, Haruki Murakami’s 2011 acceptance speech for the International Catalunya Prize directly referenced the horrors of the earthquake, then turned to a meditation on impermanence and beauty:

> The *mujō* perspective that all things must pass away can be understood as a resigned worldview. From such a perspective, even if humans struggle against the natural flow, that effort will be in vain in the end. But even in the midst of such resignation, the Japanese are able to actively discover sources of true beauty. In the case of nature, for example, we take pleasure from cherry blossoms in spring, from the fireflies in summer and from the crimson foliage in autumn. . . . Before our eyes, evanescent cherry blossoms scatter, the fireflies’ will-o’-the-wisp vanishes, and the bright autumn leaves are snatched away. . . . Oddly, it brings us a certain peace of mind that the height of beauty passes and fades away. Whether or not that spiritual perspective has been influenced by those natural catastrophes of Japan is beyond my understanding. Nevertheless, we have . . . overcome those catastrophes as a group and it is clear we have carried on in our lives. Perhaps those experiences have influenced our aesthetic sensibility.¹

¹ The speech was delivered in Japanese and translated into English by Emanuel Pastreich.
Although people suffer from natural disasters everywhere in the world, Murakami regards the Japanese and their culture as unique in relying on the notion of mujō; he also invokes the masculine virtue of akirame, finding something positive and beautiful in something as negative and violent as natural disaster.

**Nostalgia and Nuclear Energy**

Another way that Japanese writers and other public figures assuage masculine anxiety is through nostalgia. Nostalgia, or longing for a remote past, can be seen as a means of escaping from the here and now: “a temporal as well as spatial sense of dislocation” (Nosco 1990, 3). Traditionally in Asian cultures, the idealized condition has been situated in the past (e.g., nostalgia) rather than in the future (e.g., utopia), as has often been characteristic of North American and European thought (Nosco 1990). Dislocating oneself from the present lessens masculine anxiety because “[w]hen one is dissatisfied with one’s immediate situation, it can be a comforting exercise to imagine and construct a more pleasing idealized environment” (Nosco 1990, 4).

While the writers mentioned above expressed their akirame toward the earthquake and tsunami, they never showed akirame toward the Fukushima nuclear power plant accidents, regarding them as “human-made” disasters as opposed to “natural” disasters. In turn, they expressed their discontent with nuclear energy, blamed relevant authorities, and/or even regarded the Fukushima crisis as a consequence of westernized civilization. In their criticism, they imagined and constructed a more pleasing environment in the past and idealized “the real Japan, uncontaminated by Western, industrial, capitalistic influences” (Moon 1997, 229). For example, Sōkyū Gen’yū (2011) writes:

> I believe that one of the reasons such a terrible accident happened [in Fukushima] was that Japanese perception of nature had become westernized. With the development of science and technology, we mistakenly began to believe that nature is something that can/should be conquered. However, our/ the Japanese relationship with nature was not supposed be like this. (68, my translation)²

² Gen’yū follows geophysicist and natural scientist Torahiko Terada’s (1935) argument regarding the difference between the Western approach to nature (which is to conquer nature for the sake of civilization) and the unique Japanese attitude to nature (working together with/in nature).
Gen’yū then insists that we go back to working together with/in nature instead of conquering nature for the sake of civilization. Similarly, Ikezawa (2011) calls for a return to nature when he imagines a scene without nuclear power plants:

We live with nature’s blessings—sunshine, wind—free of hardship. We no longer live in high buildings . . . We work in offices close to our homes. Our homes have vegetable gardens. Perhaps, there is even a windmill nearby. (97, my translation)

Although Ikezawa imagines a future, the scene above seems to be a nostalgic idealization of village life or rural Japan that is positioned as “symbolically nearer to nature and natural goodness” (Moon 1997, 229).

The idealized past that Murakami imagines in his acceptance speech is different from that of Gen’yū and Ikezawa. He asks why the country would rely on nuclear energy given that “the Japanese people are the only people in history to experience the blast of an atomic bomb” (2011). He poses the following questions:

How could something like this [nuclear crisis] happen? That strong rejection of nuclear technology that we embraced for so many years after the war . . . where did it go? What was it that so completely undermined and distorted the peaceful and prosperous society that previously we had sought for so consistently?

Then he answers: “The cause is simple: ‘efficiency.’ The nuclear reactor is a highly efficient system for generating electricity according to the arguments of the electric power company.” He reminds us: “[A]s we rushed down the path of economic development, we were swayed by that simple standard of ‘efficiency.’ We lost sight of that important alternative course that lay before us.” The idealized pasts that Gen’yū, Ikezawa, and Murakami imagine may not be the same, but they share some important characteristics: the pre-Western, pre-industrialized, pre-capitalist Japanese civilization without nuclear power plants. Longing for this remote past, and in so doing reflecting their critique of nuclear energy, helps lessen masculine anxiety.

It is important to note that none of the intellectuals and writers above expresses their anxiety explicitly. Rather, we can recognize their attempts to escape from the crisis of the present and to assuage masculine anxiety through their reliance on culturally
unique ideals such as akirame, mujō, and isagiyoshi (manly grace), as well as nostalgia. In his discussion of masculinity and the nation, Reeser (2010) admits that “placing the constructs of the nation and masculinity together is . . . a risky proposition since they do not always buttress each other or operate smoothly in parallel” (188–89). More than five years have passed since the 2011 earthquake and, as far as I know, no other Japanese scholars have discussed the connection between nation and masculinity, as I have attempted to do here. However, Reeser adds, if we can find the “analogies and connections” between these two constructs, we will be able to identify “an underlying anxiety about the nation, about masculinity, or both” (189). Indeed, this essay might make for a risky proposal but it also shows the importance of taking that risk.
Further Reading


Excuse Us, While We Fix the Sky: WEIRD Supermen and Climate Engineering

As the alarm over global warming spreads, a radical idea is taking hold. An emerging breed of so-called “geoengineers” thinks that voluntary compliance with emissions reductions is highly unlikely and that invasive techniques to cool the planet will be necessary. Shoot sulfates or reflective nanoparticles into the upper atmosphere, turning the blue sky milky white. Make the clouds thicker and brighter. Fertilize the oceans to stimulate massive algae blooms that turn the blue seas soupy green. Suck CO\textsubscript{2} out of the air with hundreds of thousands of giant, artificial trees. Store the captured CO\textsubscript{2} safely underground or in the oceans for millennia. While these proposals for climate engineering seem edgy and exciting, they are often fraught with hubris, test the limits of scientific, technological, and institutional possibility, and tend to overlook the political, ethical, and social consequences of managing the world’s climate.

Weather control, especially rainmaking, has traditionally been practiced by women across world cultures. But for the past two centuries, surrounded by an aura of science and technology, nearly 100 percent of those proposing such interventions have been men.

To be more precise, advocates of climate engineering, with very few exceptions, are Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic (WEIRD) males with superman complexes (Henrich et al. 2010). Their views are shortsighted, dangerous, and “barking mad” (Pierehumbert 2015). This is a bold claim, and I make it intentionally to be provocative. But it is also based on my recent experience as a coauthor of two US National Academy of Sciences reports: “Climate Intervention: Reflecting Sunlight to Cool Earth” and “Climate Intervention: Carbon Dioxide Removal and Reliable Sequestration,” both published in 2015. Historical support for this contention comes from my book, Fixing the Sky: The Checkered History of Weather and Climate Control (Fleming 2010).

The literature on gender and environment is vast, but the analytical literature on masculinity is much thinner, with works specifically on masculinity and science and mas-
culinity and the environment thinner still.¹ Traditionally, most histories of science and technology have engaged with the accomplishments of elite men, treating them as a normative, dominant, unmarked social category, but recent treatments of traditionally male-dominated fields are more socially sensitive and are at least taking note of female accomplishments while asking: Why did male scientists think the way they did? (see, for example, Fleming 2016). What drives their quest to control nature, the climate, to fix the sky? Informed by feminist readings of the roots of the masculinist domination of nature in Baconian scientific ideals, my aim here is to give a brief sketch of the current state of male-dominated climate engineering proposals (specifically solar radiation management) and to provoke among environmental humanities and social science scholars an urgently needed, critical discussion of the gendered (read: masculine) nature of climate intervention.

* * *

Since the seventeenth century, the expectation that increasing knowledge would lead to new technologies “for the common good” has been widely applied to all scientific fields, including, notably, meteorology and climatology. For several centuries, planners, politicians, scientists, and soldiers have proposed schemes for the purposeful manipulation of weather and climate, usually for commercial or military purposes. In the dedication to The Great Instauration (1620), Sir Francis Bacon (1561–1626) encouraged his “wisest and most learned” patron, James I, to regenerate and restore the sciences. Bacon’s program involved “collecting and perfecting” natural and experimental histories to ground philosophy and the sciences “on the solid foundation of experience of every kind” (Bacon in Spedding et al. 1990, 23–24). His wide-ranging catalog of particular histories included aerial and oceanic topics that are relevant here: lightning, wind, clouds, showers, snow, fog, floods, heat, drought, and ebb and flow of the sea. The ultimate goal was to replace Aristotelian natural philosophy—with the proximate goal dedicated to rapid progress in science and technology, and eventual control of nature.

¹ See, for example, Meade and Wiesner-Hanks (2004). There are important exceptions regarding scholarship on the scientific revolution and the masculine domination of nature, nearly all of which are written by feminist academics. See for example Evelyn Fox Keller (1985) and Carolyn Merchant (1990). Handelman and Allister (2004) link men’s studies and ecocriticism in a collection of interdisciplinary essays.
In *New Atlantis* (1624), Bacon describes the scientists of Solomon’s House practicing both observation and manipulation of the weather: “We have high towers . . . for the view of divers meteors—as winds, rain, snow, hail, and some of the fiery meteors also. And upon them in some places are dwellings of hermits, whom we visit sometimes and instruct what to observe . . . and engines for multiplying and enforcing of winds to set also on divers motions” (399). In great experimental spaces, researchers imitate and demonstrate natural meteors such as snow, hail, rain, thunder, lightning, and “some artificial rains of bodies and not of water” (400). Three so-called mystery men are in charge of expanding the repertoire of practices not yet brought into the arts, and three pioneers or miners try new experiments “such as themselves think good” (410); that is, they manipulate nature without further review or oversight, a task requiring perfect virtue and vision in the experimentalist. Bacon was conversant with a venerable humanistic tradition that divided history into three parts—ancient, medieval, and modern—but his valuation of the three eras was asymmetric. He granted grudging respect to the ancients, denigrated the Middle Ages, and elevated modern accomplishments to equal or soon-to-be-greater status than those of antiquity. For Bacon, the rise of modern science was due to “the true method of experience . . . commencing . . . with experience duly ordered and digested, not bungling or erratic, and from it educing axioms, and from established axioms, again new experiments” (115). “New discoveries,” Bacon argued, “must be sought from the light of nature, not fetched back out of the darkness of antiquity” (154). He elaborated at length, of course, on his new method, the important point being that, in his view, the sciences were about to enter a period of great fertility because of his new method. Bacon’s communitarian campaign was taken over by innumerable practitioners in the seventeenth century. His greatest legacy, without doubt, was institutional, in that his outlook was absorbed by the Royal Society of London and by many other scientific societies that dominate the field to this day.
Bacon has long been known as both the founder (father) of the scientific method and as a chauvinist and misogynist who excluded women from the study of nature (Merchant 1980). He employed sexualized language to describe what a “new science” should look like. He claimed that the goddess of wisdom Minerva was born straight from Jupiter’s head, without female conception. For Bacon, knowledge is masculine power over nature, and “science is a chaste and lawful marriage between Mind and Nature that will bind Nature to man’s service and make her his slave.” Nature’s enslaved children include natural resources—mineral, vegetable, animal—and other humans, i.e., everything. In his fragmentary essay, “The Masculine Birth of Time” (1603), Bacon called for a “blessed race of Hermes and Supermen” who could “hound,” “conquer and subdue Nature,” “shake her to her foundations,” and “storm and occupy her castles and strongholds” (Fox-Keller 1985, 48–54). Today’s Baconian “Supermen” are the weather and climate engineers.

* * *

Armed with alarmist rhetoric about climate change and with military metaphors about climate engineering, those suggesting geoengineering research with the potential for full-scale deployment can sometimes be heard as proposing lifeboats for a sinking planet that has been torpedoed by the effluvia of modern civilization. In my experience, it is often difficult to differentiate the reasonable scientists who are concerned about climate change (of which there are many) from those who are deluded by the notion that technology alone can be its silver bullet solution. Noah Bonnheim (2011) contextualizes the complicated issue of geoengineering by exploring the similarities between geoengineers and a different, if fictional, breed of planetary saviors—comic book superheroes. He examines the archetype and psychological appeal of the hero as delineated by Sigmund Freud, Otto Rank, Carl Jung, Joseph Campbell, and others. There are scientists—typically ultra-alpha males—who advocate geoengineering because they believe that climate change is a planetary emergency that cannot be addressed adequately by conventional methods. These geoengineers, seemingly in the role of illustrious warriors, have declared war on the destructive forces of global warming to save the planet from disaster. The military metaphor is literal, evoking military mindsets and military equipment. One popular method proposed to deliver aerosols into the stratosphere is firing rockets or cannons at the sky. By suggesting that they can create super-technologies to control global climate and avert catastrophic climate change, these geoengineers pre-
sent themselves as heroic saviors of a dying planet.

Climate engineering—or more accurately climate intervention—involves a set of wildly speculative claims about controlling the planetary environment in response to global climate change (NRCNA 2015). It is an exceedingly dangerous discourse involving heavy-handed interventions to “fix the sky.” Climate engineering is no longer merely rhetorical. It is currently seeking respectability within national and international environmental policy circles, which are also male dominated. What is to be done? I argue that discussion and decision making regarding climate intervention need to include both interdisciplinary (including the humanities and social sciences) and gender-critical perspectives involving a broad and inclusive array of international and intergenerational participants. In fact, the field’s current lack of diversity indicates that some of the most critical questions have probably not even been posed. For example, what gendered assumptions inform the practice? How would climate engineering alter fundamental human relationships with nature? How is climate engineering perceived in different cultures? Who will make decisions on behalf of the planet? How should any “losers” be compensated and how would any nonmarket goods, which may be irreplaceable, be valued? Is this even the right framing? A large-scale environmental technological fix framed as a response to undesired climate change could be seen as an act imposed on the multitude by the will of the few, for the primary benefit of those already in power. Many would undoubtedly interpret it as a hostile or an aggressive act. Isn’t climate engineering in the category of “Western male solutions to global problems”?

Here are my final conclusions: The two fetishes of the weather and climate interventionists do not work. Silver iodide can be used to intervene in a cloud, but it does not convey to scientists the power to control the cloud, to dictate when and where it will rain, or when the cloud will dissipate. Computer models, an even greater fetish, do not predict the future. Meteorologists can emulate weather conditions in their computer models for no more than five to seven days in advance. This is the so-called chaotic limit introduced by Ed Lorenz. Regarding climate models, the so-called infinite forecast provided by general circulation models returns no information at all about specific conditions but generates the statistical features of an unperturbed climate system. There is indeed no way to forecast the future with any specificity (Fleming 2016, 226). Joni Mitchell was right: “We really don’t know clouds (or climate) at all.” How can we wrest the future of the planet from the hands of WEIRD, barking mad, and poten-
tially dangerous men with superhero complexes? We can begin by treating them as a marked category.

Further Reading


Of Storms, Floods, and Flying Sharks: The Extreme Weather Hero in Contemporary American Culture

When channel-hopping through Saturday’s prime time TV programs, looking through recent literary best seller lists, or browsing the latest movie releases, it does not take long before you encounter (frequently American-produced) stories that are set against the backdrop of spectacular weather disasters: storms, floods, blizzards, and, in some cases, even hilarious peculiarities such as flying sharks. In the very same narratives, you also often meet the extreme weather hero, a figure who knows exactly how to defy even the angriest outbursts of “nature,” keep cool, and save his community from harm, transforming chaos and turmoil into stability and security. Not surprisingly, this heroic idol tends to be a young, white, heterosexual man in prime athletic shape. As increased awareness of the devastating impact of human-induced climate change permeates societies all around the globe, more and more popular culture texts featuring extreme weather events—commonly known as climate fiction or “cli-fi”—are being published (Leikam and Leyda 2017). Due to their sensational plots and emotional thrills, they are being disseminated, appropriated, and emulated worldwide. In the following, I will briefly lay out why the study of these often highly commodified narratives fills current research gaps in the humanities. Then, I will analyze the disaster parody *Sharknado* (2013) as a case study, in order to show how its representation of the extreme weather hero exposes many of the subtle (and not so subtle) underlying assumptions framing our imaginations about environmental crises and the ways in which masculinity is decisively entangled with them.
Seriously, Why Study Sharknado?

With the pervasive increase in the cultural production of climate change narratives, scholarship in the humanities has recently started to embrace the relevance of storytelling and the emotional impact the vicarious experience of fictional scenarios has on our environmental imaginations—i.e., our conceptual beliefs of how humans and their natural environment are currently entangled and, more importantly, how social and environmental interrelations ought to develop in the future. Yet, the gist of this research has exclusively looked at the stories’ green agenda in isolation and neglected social concerns such as gender roles, perpetuating a long-held belief that social and environmental challenges exist independently from each other. So far, the academic studies that actually have addressed the important connection between gender constructions and their import for environmental politics, practices, and imaginations have—as Nicole Seymour and Sherilyn MacGregor point out in their introduction to this Perspectives issue—largely been limited to discussions of “women.” As a result, apart from a few pioneering examples, there has not yet been an academic endeavor that systematically and profoundly researches the intersection of masculinity and the environment, particularly its theoretical conceptualization, aesthetic representation, and the involvement of masculinity in causing real and imagined environmental crises and bringing about their solutions.

Given the recent wealth of climate change narratives in the commercial mainstream, this lack of research into the nexus of masculinities and the environment is all the more troubling. In many disciplines, serious academic engagement with (American) popular culture has long been dismissed by many on account of the latter’s high degree of commodification and its strict adherence to rigid genre conventions. Yet, as scholars such as Nöel Sturgeon (2009) and Nicole Seymour (2013) have convincingly argued, American popular cultures are powerful sites to turn to when researching dominant environmental narratives and related cultural ideologies since they perform powerful cultural and environmental work.

Out of the multiplicity of different types of masculinities, narratives of extreme weather tend to particularly celebrate so-called “hegemonic” masculinities as the normative ideal. Following R. W. Connell (1990), hegemonic masculinity is understood as a highly desirable and “culturally idealised [rather than statistically prevalent and common] form
of masculine character” (83), whose “exaltation stabilizes a structure of dominance and oppression in the gender order as a whole” (94). As with all other kinds of masculinities, hegemonic masculinities are not bound to a biological sex, but are conventionally associated with men. They are historically contingent, depend on cultural emplacement, emerge in complex relations to other gender constructions, and need to be discussed in ways that recognize their intersection with other identity formations such as ethnicity, class, and age, to name but a few. Thus, the exploration of masculinities in extreme weather narratives grants deep insight into how American popular cultures imagine the nexus of gender, nature, and power in the United States.

**Extreme Weather and Hegemonic Masculinity in Sharknado (2013)**

Anthony C. Ferrante’s 2013 film *Sharknado* serves as an example of how American popular cultures typically frame extreme weather crises. *Sharknado* is a blatant and self-ironic parody of a disaster film that features many of the paradigmatic rhetorical scripts, visual iconographies, and genre conventions (such as the rhetoric of weather hyperbole and the staging of extreme weather as media spectacle). Deliberately styled as a B-movie, and indulging in its tacky special effects, the film tells the story of a giant global-warming induced supercluster of tornadoes that is able to lift sharks *en masse*
out of the ocean near Los Angeles (where they have gathered in large numbers due to global warming) and drop them over the city, where they kill hundreds of people. When the film was first broadcast on the Syfy Channel, the audience delighted in the cheesy combination of sharks and tornadoes, engaging in an unprecedented amount of Twitter activity that was soon termed a “Twitternado.” The film’s enormous popularity is evidenced by repeated TV and movie theater showings, an increasing number of sequels—Sharknado 2: The Second One (2014), Sharknado 3: Oh Hell No! (2015), and Sharknado: The 4th Awakens (2016), with a fifth installment and a documentary about the film already in the making—and a growing number of American celebrities (e.g., Michelle Bachmann, Elvis Duran, David Hasselhoff) willing to play themselves on screen.

In keeping with the tendency of popular culture parodies to lampoon the stock elements of the genres or texts in question, Sharknado stars an emblematic extreme weather hero who saves his family and, ultimately, the entire city of LA. As a young, white, heterosexual, extremely physically fit, and courageous male, protagonist Finley “the Fin” Shepard (Ian Ziering) exemplifies many of the conventional traits of the extreme weather hero. Since all hegemonic masculinities are influenced by their cultural emplacement, the American extreme weather hero also embodies popular national ideologies. His Franklinian moral integrity and rags-to-riches entrepreneurial spirit, for instance, are indicated by his proprietorship of a small business: he owns a bar at the beach and treats his staff and regulars like friends. Fin has made his passion, surfing, his profession and, as an at least one-time world champion in his field, he has acquired the status of a “surf legend” at his relatively young age. Through the numerous hours Fin spends surfing and at the beach every day, he has acquired intimate knowledge of the weather, the ocean, and wave dynamics and has developed a great respect for the powers of nature. It is specifically this cognitive and affective bond to nature that enables him to fulfill his role as extreme weather hero and save others. His supposed close connection to nature is also spotlighted in the film through Fin’s status as a caring father—the prototype of masculinity (Meuser 2006, 55)—who follows what is portrayed as his “natural” instinct to save his offspring in the case of disaster.

Since hegemonic masculinities are not absolute but relative, fluid, and dependent on historical, cultural, political, economic, and environmental contexts, as Connell and Messerschmidt have aptly demonstrated (2005), none of Fin’s character traits is a priori hegemonic. When the storm sets in, however, Fin lives up to his last name, Shepard
(a homophone of the paradigmatic shepherd who takes care of his “flock”), and develops a heroic agency that affirms the types of masculinity he performs as hegemonic. Taking his most immediate friends with him (a female bartender named Nova, a surfer buddy from Australia, and one of his older regulars), his first reaction to the extreme weather is to reunite his nuclear family, first driving to his ex-wife and daughter and then retrieving his son. Fin only succeeds in arriving at his ex-wife April’s place by violently and aggressively butchering sharks with more or less elaborate weapons and by cleverly dodging waves and storm twisters. Over the course of the movie, this battle between man and extreme weather intensifies: Fin and his son finally resort to the use of technological gadgets, first blowing up single twisters and, finally, the larger supercell with a car that they convert into a giant bomb. It is important to note that Fin and his teenage son do not only lead this venture, they also enjoy the violence, destruction, and aggression.

Unlike other members of his small group, Fin manages to navigate the chaotic, flooded streets of LA without being killed thanks to his intimate knowledge of the laws of nature, and his past experiences that have taught him not to prematurely dismiss the weather as (too) predictable. In the course of the film, his behavior, a cornucopia of male-connoted actions and tropes such as leadership, fighting, violence, bravery, and rational analytic cognition, proves efficient and successful in the fight against the sharknado. Displayed in the traditional role of the fragile and emotional damsel in distress, many of the female characters are used as a foil for the heroic actions of Fin and his son, which magnifies their heroic hegemonic masculinity while at the same time perpetuating binary gender oppositions. Interestingly, *Sharknado* does not entirely limit its depiction of hegemonic masculinities in extreme weather situations to men, but includes one exception that makes for a more complex gender construction. Just like Fin, the bartender Nova has a close connection to the sea. As a child, while on an overnight boat trip, she encounters a shark that kills her entire family but only wounds her. This moment signifies her initiation into the intimate knowledge of nature and enables her to show similar, albeit less pronounced, bravery and physical strength in the struggle against the storm. She equally delights in slaughtering the sharks and blowing up the twisters. Ultimately, this makes her the only nonbiological family member of Fin’s initial group to survive in the end. It is thus Nova’s special insight into “nature” in general and the sea in particular—not her biological sex—that allows her to develop hegemonically masculine behavior, adding greater complexity to *Sharknado’s* rendering of gender and the environment.
As mentioned above, American popular culture extreme weather narratives tend to affirm national ideologies. *Sharknado*, for example, stipulates the biological family as the safe haven that shelters individuals in the event of a crisis. This becomes most obvious during the reunion of the nuclear family, when Fin and April decide to stick together during the storm and then rediscover their love for each other toward the end of the film. Strikingly, April’s new boyfriend, Collin (who does not even have a last name and, obviously, is not masculine enough to survive), is one of the sharks’ first victims; his death occurs somewhat in passing, and he is mourned neither by April nor her children. Further, when the clouds clear away at the end of the movie, the newly reunited family embraces, indicating that the social order has been restored. Moreover, the fact that the survival of LA depends on individual masculine agency—and not on the nation (e.g., FEMA), the state (e.g., the National Guard), or any other emergency- or disaster-related institution such as the Red Cross—can be read as a vindication of neoliberal disaster politics, which increasingly shifts the responsibility for disaster preparedness and recovery toward private individuals (cf., e.g., Joseph 2013; Leyda and Negra 2015).

**Conclusion**

Through its caricature of typical genre conventions, *Sharknado* nicely illustrates and partly also satirizes the popular contemporary American imagination of how to respond to environmental crises successfully. In this undertaking, masculine behavior such as analytical thinking, resourceful tinkering with technological gadgets, athletic prowess, and, ultimately, physical violence plays an important part. Throughout the film, Fin’s heroic masculine agency emerges as the most effective antidote to weather crisis and hence becomes the desirable and glorified ideal. Exaggeration—especially of the shark fights and rescue scenes—renders both the privileging of heroic masculine agency over empathy with human and nonhuman others, as well as collective and institutional cooperation in the field of disaster preparedness in times of environmental crises, hyper-visible. It thus has the potential to make the audience reflect critically on the need for solidarity and collaboration in environmental activism and politics.

Other, perhaps less obvious, linkages between the natural environment and masculinity surface in the American extreme weather hero’s close connection to wild nature. This intimate relation emerges as the hero’s pivotal character trait and is the source of his skills and power, enabling him to overcome the weather disaster and rescue endangered
communities. Accordingly, Sharknado and many similar weather disaster films—such as The Day After Tomorrow (2004) and Interstellar (2014)—can be seen to take up a much older WASP tradition of thought: one that not only mythologizes male-dominated frontier wilderness as the basic ingredient and central generator of “American civilization,” but which also claims that the “uniqueness in American character came from men’s experiences in nature” (Allister 2004, 2). This narrative renders women and men who do not display hegemonic masculinity invisible in one of the grand narratives of the nation, demonstrating not only the impact the environment has had on national myths, but also how gendered they are.

As in many other American popular culture texts, the confluence of hegemonic masculinity and extreme weather is presented as an opportunity to affirm cultural ideologies (such as neoliberal disaster preparedness) and to correct alleged social ills (such as the decline of the nuclear family or the feminization of society through increasing urbanization). By interpreting disaster as opportunity, extreme weather narratives also continue a centuries-old tradition of Western disaster optimism (cf. Klein 2007; Rozario 2007). As my analysis of Sharknado has demonstrated, the focus on the American extreme weather hero provides valuable insights into the imagination and the conceptual framing of environmental crises in American popular culture. In this context, the intricate entanglement of cultural constructs, such as masculinity and national ideologies, with environmental discourses is among the most noteworthy contributions to the study of the nexus of men and nature. Even stories of chainsaw-wielding surf champions and snarling sharks raining down on LA’s skyline turn out to be valuable research objects, relevant not only to the academic community but also to environmental activism at large, calling for an even deeper awareness of the interconnectedness between social and environmental concerns.

Further Reading


Masculinity, Work, and the Industrial Forest in the US Pacific Northwest

Work and Manhood

I grew up in the Pacific Northwest of the United States during the 1980s. My father worked in a plywood mill during the battles over endangered species protection for the northern spotted owl, a rare bird that requires virgin forest to survive. The media, both regionally and nationally, covered the increasingly volatile protests both for and against owl protection. Environmentalists claimed the loggers “raped” the forest and wanted to cut every remaining tree, as Roy Keene’s article for High County News, “Raping the Private Forests,” suggests (1990, 13–14). Loggers countered that environmentalists did not care about their jobs. In fact, the job losses in the industry during the 1980s and beyond had little to do with protection for owls. Decades of overcutting, export policy, and automation had devastated the livelihoods of the Northwest’s timber workers through the 1970s and 1980s. Forest mismanagement was at the heart of the crisis. Yet, due to cultural differences, environmentalist indifference at the impact of unemployment on timber workers, and an effective corporate campaign to use the owl as a cover up for its own responsibility, greens and workers could not find common ground.

Part of these cultural differences has to do with connections between masculinity, work, and nature. Generations of loggers created a proletarian masculinity through felling some of the world’s largest trees in dangerous conditions. They defined themselves as independent men recreating the landscape through brute force and personal bravery, personified in the character of Hank Stamper in Ken Kesey’s 1964 novel Sometimes a Great Notion. Ending the tradition of cutting the big trees also closed a heavily gendered work culture that had long-term implications not only for men’s finances but also for male loggers’ views of themselves as men. The decline in industrial employment in the United States over the last half-century has also affected genealogies of masculinity and self-worth, with large-scale impacts upon gender roles, class relations, and control over the economic value of landscapes.

Parts of this article appear in Empire of Timber: Labor Unions and the Pacific Northwest Forests (Loomis 2016).
The loggers’ connection between work and their view of themselves as masculine men did not always follow employer dictates that proper manhood meant laboring loyally for the company. Timber workers used their labor organizations to press their own environmental agenda. In doing so, timber workers constructed ideas of masculinity defined through work in nature; they made their own connections between their work and their ideas of themselves as men throughout the twentieth century. These constructions shifted as often as the environmental issues that concerned them and ranged from unions in the 1930s claiming they needed government regulation of the forests to raise their families in a dignified fashion to loggers in the 1980s decrying how environmental protection of the forest undermined their work traditions and masculinity. Examining the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) of the early twentieth century as a case study, this essay shows how historicizing ideas of masculinity, nature, and work can serve as a useful window into understanding natural resource workers today who struggle with economic instability in an era of globalization, deindustrialization, and environmental transformation.

**Radical Manhood**

The industrialized nature of the early twentieth-century timber camp and logging mill brutalized workers. Whirring saws, logs flying through the air, and working on floating logs meant that workers risked their lives every day. With no workplace safety laws, hundreds lost their lives each year. Loggers spent off-hours in remote timber camps, isolated from women and society at large. Instead of mattresses, loggers collected hay for makeshift padding. The hay and rain-soaked, unwashed bedding created a perfect environment for flea infestations. Most companies refused to build sanitary latrines and many located toilet facilities near water supplies or the kitchen, allowing for an increased risk of cross-contamination and gastrointestinal diseases. Methodist minister Oscar McGill testified to the US Commission on Industrial Relations about one Washington camp where the owners placed the toilets between the bunkhouses, leading to a smell so foul that the workers slept in the forest instead of their bunks. Kitchen facilities were as shoddily built as bunkhouses. Companies stored meat in the open air, allowing flies unlimited access. In an article entitled “Who Says a Logger Lives?” in the IWW newspaper, the *Industrial Worker*, in 1910, one logger described the butter served in camps as “white as wax, and as rotten as a putrid carcass, if smell goes for
anything.” A man sitting next to a logger named Egbert Oliver in one camp opened three successive eggs, each inedible. In the third was a half-formed chick. The logger ran outside and vomited. In 1917, a new logger came into an Oregon timber camp. His boss assigned him to a bunkhouse crowded with 80 other workers. Those 80 men shared one sink and one towel. Unfortunately for his bunkmates, this new man had untreated gonorrhea. He used the towel to wipe his infected body. Soon, an outbreak of gonorrhea set in in the workers’ eyes.

In 1907, the IWW began organizing the Northwest loggers. Early organizing attempts focused on issues ranging from the decline of skilled labor to lengthy work hours. But nothing stuck until organizers focused on loggers’ broken, diseased bodies, which became the core issue by 1912. IWW organizers used rhetoric about men transforming nature for themselves rather than for employers. The IWW demonstrated how mobilizing around the indignities in workers’ lives could build collective power. In doing so, it gave a voice to workers desperate to keep themselves safe, clean, and healthy. A June 1913 strike list of demands in the *Industrial Worker* included not only the eight-hour workday and $3 daily wage, but also towels and soap for bathing, “clean sanitary bunkhouses” with mattresses and blankets, and safety equipment around dangerous machinery in the mills. In publicizing the strike, the IWW asked, “Are you dissatisfied with living . . . in miserable bunkhouses?” If so, “refuse to work under bad conditions, demand better camp conditions and pure food.” Fifty camps shut down during this brief strike. These actions slowly built IWW membership over the next two years. By 1917, the IWW had become the single organization fighting for loggers in the camps to live dignified lives.

To build the union, IWW propagandists idealized a working-class manhood based upon toiling with other men in the healthy forests. Drawing stark comparisons between the degrading conditions of work and the healthful forests around the camps, organizers and polemicists urged loggers to use their own masculine spaces as organizing tools. They tied ideas of labor, manhood, and nature together to help workers reclaim their dignity. For example, Ralph Chaplin, composer of the lyrics to the famed worker anthem “Solidarity Forever” and editor of the *Industrial Worker*, wrote in depth on the logging strikes. Chaplin (1920, 35) described loggers as the “husky and unconquerable workers of the Northwest” who would not submit to capitalist authority. Loggers walked, lived, worked, and ate together, creating a culture of masculine solidarity.
against not only their bosses but also those workers toiling away as industrial slaves in urban factories. Through living with other men and in the forests, the logger “resents industrial slavery as an insult” (19). Reflecting struggles to organize the mill workers, where the IWW had less success, Chaplin contrasted the masculine resistance of the logger with what he saw as the feminized mill worker, subjected to wage slavery. Loggers had the “physical strength, cleanliness, and mental alertness” (17) from working in the inherently healthy forests that mill workers did not. Loggers worked hard, moving on when they no longer cared to work for a particular boss because they were the “perfect proletarian type—possessionless, homeless, rebellious” (16).

IWW propagandists claimed that loggers faced challenges to proletarian manhood not only from employers, but also from women. They split women into two groups—wives and prostitutes—constructing a paradigm of imperiled masculinity around stereotypes of these women. For propagandist W. F. Dunn (1920), prostitutes were parasites who “fatten[ed] on the worker in industry” and destroyed workers’ bodies through venereal disease (Kennedy 1922, 57). But if a logger avoided prostitutes and married, his manhood was equally at peril, for the married worker was easier to control and “less apt to exhibit those admirable—but to the bosses undesirable—qualities of independence and rebellion than the unencumbered migratory worker” (Chaplin 1920, 14; Rowan 1919, 7–8). IWW organizers’ reports frequently complained about married mill workers refusing to go on strike because of the fear of not being able to take care of their families. If the mill worker “subordinates his manhood and sacrifices his independence to the will of the company, he is rewarded by a life of grinding poverty, hopeless drudgery, and a condition of economic dependence and insecurity.” But if he stands up for himself, “he faces discharge and the blacklist, which, if he is a married man, means the breaking up of his home, and separation from wife and children” (Rowan 1920, 9). This combination of environmental justice and appeal to masculinity helped lead loggers to their first successful strike actions by 1915. Strikes in 1917 and 1918 led to federal intervention in the forests; the military banned the IWW so it could get needed wood during World War I, in exchange for granting the loggers nearly all their demands about sanitary and clean camps. Loggers won, even if the union lost.
Yet the sheer existence of the IWW outraged conservative elements in the Pacific Northwest. Vigilante attacks grew by 1916, including the massacre of several IWW members in Everett, Washington that year as they attempted to mobilize that mill town. Attacks grew during and after World War I. On 11 November 1919, during an Armistice Day memorial parade, the American Legion in Centralia, Washington, a logging town in the southwestern part of the state, decided to raid the IWW hall to eliminate it from their city. But hearing of their pending attack, the IWW decided to defend their hall. When the Legion attacked, IWW members shot back, killing four. That evening, local men took IWW organizer Wesley Everest from his jail cell and hanged him from a bridge. Trials quickly ensued for a dozen other IWW members. A jury found eight guilty of second-degree murder, and they received life sentences at the Washington State Prison. In defending the Centralia prisoners, the IWW built upon its prewar constructions of loggers as a masculine proletariat. Wesley Everest became a proletarian superhero. IWW publications described him as a “muscular and sunburned young man with a rough, honest face and a pair of clear hazel eyes in which a smile was always twinkling” (Smith 1922, 47). According to one document, his closest friends claimed “he was never afraid of anything in all his life” (64–65). When he had no choice but to face the mob after failing to cross a river to escape, he turned and, in a loud voice, proclaimed his unwillingness to surrender to any legal authority, which the savage mob ignored. When the crowd captured Everest, they beat him and put a rope around his neck in a prelude to what they would do to him that night. IWW reports said that Everest simply responded: “You haven’t got the guts to lynch a man in the daytime” (38). But martyrdom made Wesley Everest more than a man. An IWW Song-book contains IWW songs that compared Wesley Everest to who they considered the ultimate masculine figure: Jesus Christ. The song “Wesley Everest” began, “Torn and defiant as a wind-lashed reed, Wounded he faced you as he stood at bay; you dared not lynch him in the light of day” and ended, “A rebel unto Caesar—then as now—Alone, thorn-crowned, a spear wound in His side.” By fighting and dying for changes in working and living conditions for loggers, Wesley Everest became the personified idea of proletarian manhood.

The IWW collapsed nationwide after 1918 because of violent repression like the Centralia Massacre. It would not successfully unionize the loggers—but future genera-
tions of organizers would, and they also used ideas of masculinity based upon working in the forests to do so. The International Woodworkers of America (IWA) would construct its own ideas of proletarian masculinity in the 1930s and 1940s, attacking the timber industry for deforestation by proclaiming the need for a man to support his family through forest labor and the desire to pass that work down to his boys. In the 1960s and 1970s, the IWA used its members’ desire for pristine forests for hunting and other outdoor sports to fight for wilderness areas. In the 1970s, countercultural reforestation workers deployed new ways of proving manhood through nature as part of their communal work culture. And in the 1980s, with jobs disappearing, loggers used connections between masculinity and work to fight against environmentalists and to save their jobs, with previous traditions of supporting conservation fading in workers’ desperation for employment.

These examples demonstrate that natural resource workers have understood masculinity and nature in a variety of ways, with each category informing the other. Understanding these histories can help environmental activists develop more sophisticated strategies for creating coalitions with natural resource workers, whether fishermen struggling against fishing bans in New England, or West Virginia miners decrying President Obama’s so-called “war on coal.” Ending forms of working in nature also ends traditions of proletarian masculinity. Sustainable economies need to integrate working-class ideas around these issues if workers are to receive the dignity and justice they deserve.
**Further Reading**


Men and Nature

Alex Carr Johnson

Every Day Like Today: Learning How to Be a Man in Love

An Excerpt from the Manuscript

Over the last few years, I’ve taken to running on the shoulders of mountains like a coyote. Letting my muscles and tendons find the route through the juniper and sage. Climbing three thousand feet and screaming from the summit. Letting my heart, a knot of muscle, tell me how fast and slow. I run out the door, into the wilderness, and then find my way back. It’s a habit I began learning when I was 14, lost in the adolescent wastelands of suburban St. Louis. I remember the night clearly. My parents were out; my brother, Matt, was doing sit-ups with his feet tucked under the couch. Too proud to grunt. I lay sprawled on top of it as I half-watched a stupid sitcom. He just said it, you’re so lazy. I said, I’ll show you lazy, and walked right out the front door wearing cargo shorts, a baggy cotton shirt, and sneakers.

I was mostly angry at the easy way Matt moved through the world, confident, handsome, strong. The differences between us were always obvious. Matt took to sports since before he could walk and had always won them all: soccer and baseball, foot races and biking, home run derbies and fishing. I never tried. Couldn’t catch a lobbed ball to save all the daisies in the world. Instead, I drew, piecing together elaborate marble machines, making blueprints for dream homes. I told myself stories. I stared at ants. Matt played the trumpet; I played the viola. Matt made out with girls; I jump roped with them.

My brother and his friends reminded me daily how I was a pussy, a dork, a fag. For years, I hid and dodged. Devised games of escape so I would not have to be caught looking weak or weird or gay. I studied my brother endlessly, especially as he grew into his power. He hit me. Threatened violence. Minor, of course. The most minor of daily offenses. He yelled at my mom. Admired my dad. And he cultivated an adoring crowd. For his abilities to hit home runs. Score goals. Be so fucking confident. With such a good example ready at hand, I grew quite good at the game of becoming a man. I cut my hair short. I stopped playing with girls. I hid my viola, stopped drawing.
I didn’t even notice as I was becoming one of them. Except there was still one, terrible, sneaking, monstrous thing that would keep me from being a man like my brother.

All my life I had been told I would inherit the Earth. I would be powerful. I would do great things. But I was fucking it all up by being soft and sweet and quiet and gay. I was a traitor. Worse than a girl, because at least girls never have the power to begin with. The terror grew inside my darkest places like a terrible illness, except I could not blame a bug or a virus. I could only blame myself. The older and stronger I appeared, the more successfully I passed as a man, the greater the terror grew inside my heart. And the hate. How do I describe it except this? I was more scared of the terrible wild-ness in myself than I was of the violence that it might cause toward me. I wasn’t angry at my brother; I was angry at my own failure for being him. How could I not learn to hate myself? I despised myself. Quietly. Wordlessly. Endlessly. A person can’t last long this way. So something broke.

I pumped my scrawny arms and legs out into the darkened street. I went heaving down the sidewalk. At each street lamp, I crossed the street to the darkness to avoid any unseen eyes. I wanted no one to see this, see me. I kept running when my street ended and the blacktop of the middle school parking lot began, kept running across the lot to the soccer field, kept running to the cinder practice track where I could dig in my toes and sprint. No one could see my chest heaving, could hear me sucking in the dull starless sky, could witness me learning how to turn fear into anger and anger into freedom.

I never really stopped after that. Ranging, I guess. I left that suburb the first chance I could get. South and east to South Carolina, Florida, Georgia for a gap year volunteering. Then north to Wisconsin, the shore of Lake Superior for college. Summers, finding ways to go out farther. Found gigs in Anchorage. With a semester left, quit college to lead a trail crew for a year out of Juneau. Hawaii. Montana. Mexico. A dozen years of running and ranging. I might have looked lost from a thousand miles away, but it didn’t much feel that way to me. It felt like an education. I was learning the shape of the continent by crossing it back and forth, following its edges, looking down box canyons and up long ranges. Learning how to migrate. Learning home. Learning what it meant to be my own kind of man.
I was angry, too—sure, at Matt, but that was just the surface of the anger, he just the easiest target. I didn’t realize how angry I’d been or for how long. But Matt made it most obvious. I was angry because I had never been told that I had another family: the queer and wild ones. I had never been told of these mothers and fathers and cousins and brothers whose stories were my inheritance.

I was more than angry because this inheritance was being wiped from the face of the Earth as I was being born, even as I was being brought into the world, learning how to speak and read and write and ride a bike. My family was dying with their stories. They were disappearing from this Earth.

I was more than angry because it wasn’t just a virus that was killing my family, but a society that allowed that virus to kill these men because they were somehow wrong, somehow unnatural. That’s the fag disease. These queers were dying because they did mean, dirty things in the dark. Things too evil, thank god, to do in the light of the day. I was more than angry because AIDS was still killing us, still staining all our hands, killing black people, killing Africans, killing Latinos, killing American Indians and Native Alaskans. It was killing poor people. The virus followed the fault lines of our society. It eroded away those people already made vulnerable.

I was more than angry because I knew more about the rich, white men who committed suicide after losing their fortunes in the ’20s than I knew of the poor, queer men who committed suicide after being diagnosed with HIV—knowing that they would likely live no more than three years, knowing that their roommates would throw them out, that their families already had thrown them out, that their lovers and friends were dying themselves or taking care of the others who were dying, and that they might have to wait a year before they could even get into a hospital.

I was more than angry that I had to go out searching for my other family on my own. I remembered. It’s the only way I can say it. I remembered that I had an inheritance. I remembered my other family.
I was more than angry because everyone had assumed I was straight. Matt did; Mom did; Dad did; I did. We all assumed I was a boy, too. And I suppose I was. I have become a man. How many different people did I once have the capacity to become? Why was I not allowed to know of those other possible people? Why did I have to fight so hard, the hardest kind of battle, the silent one inside myself, just to be this one man who I did discover I could be.

I was more than angry because our teachers never taught us Larry Kramer’s “1,112 and Counting,” or the Queer Nation Manifesto, or James Baldwin’s Another Country. I was more than angry because my best friend told me I was not allowed to be angry. I am a man. I am white. I am privileged. I am not allowed to be angry.

I was more than angry because a part of me still believes my best friend. I believe that I am not allowed to be angry. I try not to be angry. I do not want to be angry.

I was more than angry because it was not Matt who had to be patient. It is not you who has to be patient; it’s us. We are the ones who must keep loving you, even when you hate us. Even when you tell us we are unnatural. Even when you tell us that we are abominations. That our love should not exist. Even when some terrible part of us believes those things. Don’t you see how if we turn away from our love then we turn away from our lives?

It is the love of possibility and creativity and imagination. It is a queer love. It is the love that extends out beyond your blood and beyond the walls of what we call ourselves. We can love other people’s children. We can love the ones who came long before. We can love people we have yet to meet. We invent our love every day, and our families. We can press our outstretched hands to the gorgeous curves of difference. We can love animals. We can love the land. We can love a river. We can love our strange sphere of liquid rock spinning through space, living as it is, somehow changing, growing, becoming new.

But all that wildness in people’s souls scares them. We have been taught to fear it. That way leads to sin. And death. And darkness. You know what the thing is about darkness? In darkness lies the unknown. In darkness lies possibility. In darkness lies hope.
I wish I could tell you that Pete and I are now free. But we still can’t hold hands when we walk down the street in town, not without the risk of physical threats to our lives. And do you want to know the really angering part? Our fear is nothing special. So many of us are not safe to walk down the street in our bodies. Our skin tone, the language we speak, our gender, the gods we praise, the love we have to give to the world. These are the things that are used against us. To keep us from living freely in the world.

The mountains don’t care, though. Or the rivers. The bears and the terns. The swallowtails and the porcupines. So I will keep going out to meet them. Their wildness is my freedom and my escape. They offer me my home, my family, and my peace. If we allow them to be burned and developed and tamed then we will be forever less wild, and so we will forever be less free. I will defend them, their wildness, in order to protect our own wildness, our own freedom, and our own love long after my body has gone away. This is the heart of it. Can you see it? It’s beautiful, I swear.
Inventing Bushcraft: Masculinity, Technology, and Environment in Central Africa, ca. 750–1250

Knowing Undocumented Pasts: The Stakes

Deep and undocumented pasts can be dangerous tools. In the absence of records telling us directly what people living long ago thought about their actions, it has been easy to read our own visions of ourselves onto the archaeological and biological records. For example, it is conventional wisdom to suggest that Man’s mastery over Nature through the invention of hunting (Man the Hunter) was a transformative moment in human history. Although Woman the Gatherer is acknowledged for supplying the bulk of the diet, this dyad attributes to men the innovations—achieved through technological mastery of environments—that separated humanity from our beastly cousins. These ideas seem to say more about the high modernist techno-environmental projects of the mid-twentieth century than what men and women, children and the elderly, thought about the significance of their subsistence techniques in the Paleolithic era.

But not all undocumented pasts are inaccessible. Indeed, the ideas about gender and the environment developed by communities who left behind no written records are important and necessary political tools in modern-day debates about who endures climate change and who benefits from environmental degradation for two important reasons. They remove the possibility of naturalizing current gendered experiences of climate change and access to environmental resources, and the technologies developed to exploit them. In so doing, deep and undocumented pasts contribute—as historians and anthropologists have long done—those alternative conceptualizations, values, and case studies that are vital to challenging hegemonic narratives in the present. I am not, of course, suggesting that deep histories should be used only to reveal mistakes to be avoided or lifeways to be replicated; rather, broadening our knowledge of the possible necessarily produces ideas and questions that are (re)braided into our own lives, potentially changing the storyline in the process. In the story told here, new environments, lexicons, and masculinities were invented together in medieval south central Africa (as they have been many times in human history), but in ways that had to acknowledge the contribution of women because success in any endeavor in new
environments was understood to be homologous to human procreation. I’ll return to this point about thinking through homologies in the conclusion.

The Problem: Men, Techno-environments, and Social Clout in Central Africa

Between the mid-eighth and mid-thirteenth centuries, men who practiced metallurgy or hunting and fishing with spears in south central Africa (fig. 1) invented and named a new category of environment: *isokwe*, often glossed in English as “the bush.” The coproduction of *isokwe*, bushcraft technologies, and the fame and even political authority enjoyed by metallurgists and spearmen has often been explained by an instrumental approach to men’s labors: such men produced protein and metal—both essential to the subsistence economy. Of course, protein was more readily available through growing or gathering legumes, trapping, and communal fishing. Other scholars have explained the status of technicians of the bush through a symbolic analysis of the supposedly inherent dangers of their work, or how such labors appropriated the power of women’s fertility, a point to which we will return. But we can and should listen to Africans’ own words rather than assert the explanations that make sense to us.

Like many other times and places in human history, some central African men—those engaged in the “high prestige” work of hunting and smelting—claimed social and
political influence based on their ability to master high-tech work in a special environment. But, the relationship between men’s status, new technologies, and environments in central Africa ca. 750–1250 explicitly acknowledged women as being central to successful actions in the environment—smelting and hunting—and did not attempt to mask that codependency. This stands in stark contrast to our emerging knowledge about the hegemonic masculinities controlling access to wealth-generating and climate-corrupting extractive carbon economies in the more recent past (see contributions to this volume).

**Bellows Work and Bluster: Reworking the Ancient Windy Character of Fame**

We’ll pick up this story in the mid-eighth century, when speakers of the protolanguage Central Eastern Botatwe (fig. 2) cultivated personal distinction by inventing a new category of work—bushcraft—and asserting that such work was unique from a cluster of related, banal activities that had long been a part of daily life.¹ At the heart of this change was the invention of new categories of celebrated technicians. As part of a region-wide revolution in spearcraft, Central Eastern Botatwe speakers reconceptualized skill in hunting and fishing with spears as being more socially meaningful than other kinds of hunting skill. We can see this process in changing regional lexicons. Inhabitants of the southern savannas, from northeast Angola to central Zambia, developed a new noun from an older word for a kind of long blade: *-pàdò, a “celebrated, skilled hunter/spearman.” Skill in hunting with spears was nothing new, but the category of man who might become famous for it was a novel contribution to the social landscape. Famous, celebrated

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¹ For details of the linguistic methods and evidence undergirding this essay, see de Luna (2015).
spearmen were “marksmen” in two senses of the word. They “marked” prey, but they also “marked” certain kinds of knowledge and labor that had once been quite banal (in this case, spearcraft) as available for new social meanings.

From the vantage point of our individualistic culture, it is tempting to naturalize fame by assuming a universal ambition for its trappings. But scholarship on the historical construction of emotions, affects, and feelings suggests that we should investigate how fame was understood by the communities who invented new ways to acquire it in the closing centuries of the first millennium: How did fame work? How was it recognized? And what did it feel like to both the celebrated and the celebrants? The answer for Central Eastern Botatwe speakers was “windy” or “blustery.” They inherited an old name for fame, *mpₙwo, which derived from an older Bantu word, *-pʊʊp-, meaning “blow, wind, breath from lungs.” This single root encapsulated a nested set of ideas that shaped how Central Eastern Botatwe communities thought fame worked. From the broadest, oldest meaning of “wind, breath, and lung,” many Bantu languages, including some Eastern Botatwe languages, developed meanings like “spirit,” “news,” “opinion,” “talk,” or a “thing well known.” This range of meanings illustrates the connections between the discursive mechanisms by which fame was literally called into being (and even physically experienced as breathless or whispered speech) through gossip, opinions, and exchanging news, and the social circuits of the living and the dead through which fame was later understood to be inherited.

As Central Eastern Botatwe speakers reconfigured the relationship between fame, subsistence technology, and the politics of knowledge in the last centuries of the first millennium, they also added new words to their lexicon of fame. At the same time that the status of *-pₙdₙ was invented, Central Eastern Botatwe speakers similarly invented the status of *-vₙbi, “famous, rich person,” from their knowledge of an object used in metallurgy: the bellows. The development of a new form of fame from the tool used to blast air through a smithy or smelting furnace built on older ideas about the blustery, aerial character of fame encapsulated in the term *mpₙwo—even as the knowledge and materials through which men could build up great fame and wealth shifted at the end of the first millennium.
For Central Eastern Botatwe speakers in the latter part of the first millennium, hunting, metallurgy, fame, and wind all resembled one another, however distinct they may seem to us. When the windiness of the core objects in play—a spear, bellows, spirit, or fame—was embodied in people or in their tools and landscapes, it necessarily involved the other material attributes embodied in the same entities. Such linked attributes opened connections to further metaphors and, thereby, new arguments about the social meaning of labors like hunting and metallurgy. In this case, further overlaps in the material qualities of spears and bellows and in the embodied experience of hunting and metallurgy converged at the human-made intersection between the geographies of spearcraft, smelting, and spirits’ influence: the bush, *-sókwe.

Central Eastern Botatwe men who engaged in those forms of hunting and metallurgy that were associated with fame and wealth, did so under the cover of the bush. The bush was a key concept for understanding the ritual dimensions of local landscapes. It was associated with metaphysical forces implicated in acts of transformation (like hunting, initiation, and smelting). Entry into this space and activities undertaken within it required careful planning and ritual management to be successful, but the bush itself contributed to that success because it contained strong, potentially generative powers. Although many villagers traveled through the bush and harvested its wild fruits and medicines, speakers discussed what was now gendered about some people’s experiences of and in the bush—novelties that were dependent on the changing bodily experiences of those men involved in bushcraft, as the next section elaborates. To understand the gendering of the landscape through its varied uses, we need to understand its name.

The new name for this landscape, *-sókwe, was developed from an older, more widespread verb *-còk- (to incite), which itself derived from an ancient Bantu term that glosses as “to poke in, put in, prick with a point, hide, ram in.” Contemporary attestations reveal a complicated network of meanings tying together ideas about “provoking,” “inciting,” and “stabbing” with “being first,” “establishing,” or “originating.” When Central Eastern Botatwe and neighboring communities named the open bush around them with the passive form of the verb *-còk-, they imagined this landscape to be a place of potential creation, “the poked, the prodded, the hidden, the entered” place. The windy qualities of spearcraft and metallurgy were still present, but they were bundled with the qualities of pricking, piercing, poking, and inciting. It was this
latter cluster of kinesthetic experiences that was emphasized in the name *-sókwe as the quintessential encounter with the landscape. *-Sókwe was a place of great power activated by skilled hunters and smelters: thrusters of spears and blustery inciters of flames, capable of prodding such generative forces towards acts of creation and social significance.

Central Eastern Botatwe communities were already familiar with this landscape. Why did they invent the new name *-sókwe, with its emphasis on inciting acts of creation through prodding, poking, and spearing? Perhaps this was a matter of controlling the power of the bush or those who worked within it. Yet, the homologies and materialities in play suggest a far more complicated situation. When hunting, smelting, and the bush took on new meanings and new names in the Botatwe area in the centuries around the turn of the first millennium, they also changed older ideas about how spiritual powers were harnessed and understood to work, through the metaphor of human fertility—a metaphor that necessarily implicated both men and women.

Sex, Technology, and Generation

When hunters, metallurgists, and their friends, neighbors, elders, and dependents spoke about bushcraft in south central Africa in recent centuries, they were also often indirectly speaking about sex. This connection is old. Using such evidence as the breasts and gynecological attributes adorning ancient furnaces, and parallels between bearing children and hunting and smelting in songs and proverbs, Eugenia Herbert (1993) has eloquently argued that human fertility was used by central Africans to conceptualize the transformative power involved in activities like smelting and hunting. She argues that men appropriated the power of female procreativity and sought to replicate it in technologies they controlled. But the invention of isokwe (its morphology, derivation, and materialities) insists on the vital contribution of virility in addition to fertility. The invention of the bush as *-sókwe depended on the idea that, as Herbert observes, the drama of human fertility explained how some kinds of powers worked. But the sensuous, affective qualities of technology mattered because only men experienced the kinesthetic resemblances between poking and prodding as an act of origination in the use of new iron-tipped spears or of bellows, and the generative act of sex.
Conceptualized as homologous to human fertility, this new form of masculinity both depended on and was subject to the whims of women. For example, it was believed that wives’ infidelities could kill husbands who were away, working in *isokwe*. Similarly, incestuous sex with a mother or sister was an empowering act that ensured a spearman’s success and brought great wealth to his female relatives (in the context of matrilineal kinship, he owed support to his sisters and mother before his wives and children, who belonged to a different lineage).

Celebrated spearmen and smelters created a new way of acting in and on the world, inciting and prodding creative acts in the seclusion of the pierced landscape of the bush. Their way of being—their fame, wealth, and virility—was built on the older “windiness” of fame but also incorporated new material conditions and settings that limited access to fame. What was special about spearmen and metalworkers had nothing to do with the inherent ritual dangers of their crafts, as anthropologists undertaking symbolic analyses have long insisted. Rather, these technicians saw that some of their bundle of “windy” objects and actions also shared an overlapping “piercedness, proddedness, incitedness” and new convergences with older explanatory paradigms, like the drama of human fertility. By using the passive form of the verb to name *isokwe* as the “pierced, prodded place,” speakers insisted that those whose work defined the landscape were the initiators of all such endeavors. In other words, technicians used the material dimensions of their bodies, tools, and actions to conceptualize new landscapes that were named for new ways of acting as a successful man. But their homologous thinking ensured that success was understood to depend on the actions of women, even if women did not traverse the environment with men.

**Alternative Futures: Old and New**

Ancient pasts of worlds very different from our own are sources of new ways of thinking about the relationship between masculinity and the environment. Most importantly, they insist that the status quo is neither natural nor inevitable. The particular story of the invention of *isokwe* in south central Africa illuminates the intersection of bodily feelings (especially gendered experiences of the environment and of sex), technology, metaphor and homologies, and skill, and the social and economic dependencies such intersections generated and threatened. There are obvious parallels here with the
present. In both the late first millennium world of south central Africa and the early third millennium world we inhabit today, men’s assertions of expertise are tied to the power to control the environment, as many contributors to this volume demonstrate. But, the investments and vulnerabilities of men and women are also alarmingly different in the modern context. Here, I return to the idea of thinking with homologies.

Across the spectrum of debates about environmental degradation and climate change, human reproduction is a core issue; readers of this volume might argue that damage to the environment and climate threatens humans’ abilities to reproduce and this requires immediate and robust intervention. Detractors might argue that such intervention (particularly in the form of government regulation) threatens profits and, thereby, jobs: the economic means by which humans sustain social and biological reproduction. Communities living in south central Africa some millennia ago shared this association of work, personal and reproductive success, and exploiting the environment, albeit with vastly different scales and technologies. But the way the association between working in and on environments and ensuring life and livelihood were conceptualized was vastly different. Today, we think about causation when we link environments and life; in the
undocumented past of south central Africa, men and women thought through homolo-
gous rather than causal relationships, which ensured recognition of the significance of
women’s actions in men’s efforts to develop careers that exploited the environment.
We know well the stalemate of causal thinking in modern debates; how might thinking
through homologies change our modern understandings of gender, the environment,
climate, and power? We need older histories, I would argue, to be able to recognize and
conceptualize anew both our current gendered world and its shared futures.

Further Reading

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Will Abberley

“The Love of the Chase Is an Inherent Delight in Man”: Hunting and Masculine Emotions in the Victorian Zoologist’s Travel Memoir

The Victorian zoologist was sometimes imagined as deeply entangled with nature, sharing basic, primordial feelings with the animals he studied, notably the excitement of hunting. Yet he was also figured as detached from nature, elevated above immediate instincts and sensations to a higher, intellectual plain. These opposing figurations were thrown into sharp relief when expeditionary zoologists narrated their experiences in travel memoirs. Their interspecies encounters were often highly emotional experiences, which seemed (for them, at least) to narrow the boundaries between humans and animals. However, zoologists also frequently tried to downplay or dismiss such affective experiences in order to bolster their credibility as objective observers. I argue that this conflict arose from different configurations of masculinity that framed men as alternately inside and outside of nature.

Zoology was a popular pastime in mid-nineteenth-century Britain that attracted enthusiasts of many social classes and both genders. Nonetheless, authority over zoology as a body of knowledge was generally vested in a small group of educated, middle- to upper-class “men of science” affiliated with institutions such as the Linnean Society of London. These men were usually able to devote themselves to zoology through inherited wealth, or particular work such as museum curating or capturing specimens for private collectors. Among such men was a still smaller class of expeditionary researchers who visited remote, faraway lands and brought back new knowledge of animal life. Their work was heavily gendered in the Victorian imagination, associated with the masculine traits of courage, determination, and self-possession, as well as physical strength and endurance. The novelist Charles Kingsley wrote that the roving zoologist must be like “the perfect knight-errant of the Middle Ages”: “strong in body,” “brave and enterprising, and withal patient and undaunted” (1855, 39–40).

1 The research for this article was completed thanks to an Early Career Fellowship funded by the Leverhulme Trust. I am also grateful to Sherilyn MacGregor, Nicole Seymour, and Kathryn de Luna for their help.

2 This term was distinct from “scientists,” which did not enter into frequent use until the late nineteenth century (White 2002).
The tensions within this discourse of zoological masculinity remain largely unexplored, though, particularly regarding emotions. Previous research has shown how, in Western culture, women have frequently been linked with nature and animals through their supposed emotionality (Plumwood 1993, 19–21; Lutz 2002, 104–5). The converse image of such primal, emotional femininity was the association of masculinity with detached, self-controlled rationality (Forth 2008, 30–1). Yet this model was opposed in the Victorian period by what Bradley Deane (2008) calls “primitive masculinity,” which located manliness primarily in bodily strength and instincts. Such masculinity (hinted at in Kingsley’s muscular zoologist) dovetailed with imperialist ideology by framing white men as vigorous conquerors, even as it undermined their supposed intellectual superiority over their “barbarian” antagonists. I argue that while the rationalist model characterized masculinity by restraint of emotions, the primitive one viewed certain emotions (such as the excitement of the hunt) as the essence of masculinity. As a literary scholar, I will illustrate this tension through textual close readings of travel memoirs by two of the most famous expeditionary zoologists of the period: Charles Darwin’s *Journal of Researches* (1845) and Alfred Russel Wallace’s *The Malay Archipelago* (1869).

Since philosophers first defined them in the early nineteenth century, emotions had been imagined as linking humans with animals. Unlike earlier, more ambiguous categories of feeling, “emotions” were strictly separate from human intellect (see Dixon 2003). For zoologists, emotions such as hunting fever might be seen as a resource for understanding the commonalities between humans and other animals. Reflecting on his experiences of hunting in South America, Darwin commented that “the love of the chase is an inherent delight in man—a relic of an instinctive passion” (1845, 505).
Darwin would draw on his experiences with animals to argue that humans shared basic emotions with them in his 1872 book *The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals*. Yet masculine science was also imagined as rationally unemotional. In the words of the physicist John Tyndall (after whom the Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research is now named), the man of science was characterized by “self-renunciation” and “loyal surrender of himself to Nature and to the facts” (1854, 308).³

This conflict can be seen in Darwin’s memoir, which vacillates between celebrating the ecstasy of hunting, and stressing the zoologist’s detachment from such emotions. Commenting on his experience of men’s instinctive “love of the chase,” Darwin reflects that such feelings constitute “the savage returning to his wild and native habits. I always look back to our boat cruises, and my land journeys, when through unfrequented countries, with a kind of extreme delight, which no scenes of civilization could have created” (1845, 505). However, Darwin hesitates to dwell too long on this ecstasy, listing reasons “of a more reasonable nature” (506) for zoologists to travel the world, such as broadening their knowledge. Similarly, Darwin’s hunting anecdotes often emphasize his self-restraint as he stops short of killing creatures and tests their behaviors instead. Noting the lack of fear and defensive ingenuity among gannets and terns on an Atlantic islet, he writes, “Both are of a tame and stupid disposition, and are so unaccustomed to visitors, that I could have killed any number of them with my geological hammer” (10). Darwin’s use of the subjunctive (“I could have”) highlights his suppression of his violent impulses. While his imagined savage would have indulged his bloodlust, the man of science in him seeks to discover the unseen causes of the birds’ tameness, theorizing that geographic isolation has eroded their defensive instincts. Later, he repeatedly catches and then releases a lizard to test whether it can adapt its habits to evade threats. Darwin’s narrative contains many references to native South Americans’ hunting methods, some of which he adopts for obtaining specimens; but only he, the Western man of science, pursues animals to experiment upon them.

Darwin also distances himself from the primitive emotions involved in hunting by avoiding detailed descriptions of slaughter. He skirts over encounters with individual animals, instead generalizing species-typical behavior. For example, he only briefly

³ On the development of scientific ideals of objectivity, see Daston and Galison (2007).
mentions his hunting of Uruguayan deer to reinforce his argument that such creatures have been conditioned to fear humans on horseback but not on foot. Darwin writes, “If a person crawling close along the ground, slowly advances towards a herd, the deer frequently, out of curiosity, approach to reconnoitre him. I have by this means killed, from one spot, three out of the same herd” (48). He later abstracts to an even higher level when referring to his bird shootings in the Falklands and Galapagos islands. Darwin compares the relative timidity and brazenness of different species, and the differences between his experience hunting them and those of another traveler a century earlier. While his predecessor reported that many birds were easily killed, Darwin finds them more elusive, suggesting that they have “learnt caution” of humans. He concludes that instinctive fear develops gradually over generations, writing: “We may infer from these facts, what havoc the introduction of any new beast of prey must cause in a country, before the instincts of the indigenous inhabitants become adapted to the stranger’s craft or power” (401). Darwin’s choice of words highlights his performance of scientific detachment. His grand theory of species change eclipses the many, individual acts of killing upon which it was built.

A similar narrative strategy of downplaying the emotions involved in hunting is discernible in Wallace’s *Malay Archipelago*. Wallace’s dramatic anecdotes of hunting orang-utans always portray him as unflappably calm in pursuit of his prey. The zoologist’s self-possession is emphasized by the contrasting discomposure of others, such as his young assistant Charley. Recalling one day when Charley came to alert him of an orang-utan nearby, Wallace writes that the boy

rushed in out of breath with running and excitement, and exclaimed, interrupted by gasps, “Get the gun, sir,—be quick,—such a large Mias!”

“Where is it?” I asked, taking hold of my gun as I spoke . . . Two Dyaks chanced to be in the house at the time, so I called them to accompany me, and started off, telling Charley to bring all the ammunition after me as soon as possible.

(1869, 72)

Charley’s broken speech is opposed by Wallace’s pointed questioning, quick organization, and forethought. As he pursues the orang-utan through dense vegetation, Wallace’s calmness is again highlighted by the contrasting reaction of Chinese workers who “were shouting their astonishment with open mouth: ‘Ya Ya, Tuan; Orang-utan,
Men and Nature

Tuan’” (74). After shooting the creature, Wallace instructs his native Dyak servants to cut down the tree that holds the body; “but they were afraid, saying he was not dead, and would come and attack them” (75). Wallace further reinforces the natives’ closeness to animal nature (and hence their emotionality) with the book’s frontispiece illustration, which depicts another scene in which a Dyak wrestles with an attacking orang-utan (fig. 2). Thus, Wallace accentuates his detachment from nature by presenting others around him as contrastingly embedded in animal environments and unable to control their primitive feelings.

In these hunting scenes, Wallace indicates no feelings of sympathy for the orang-utans, and moves the narrative swiftly onto his preparation of their skins and skeletons for display. Such ruthlessness was to be expected in the narrative of a practical zoologist concerned with obtaining specimens. Nevertheless, Wallace’s emotional orientation towards the orang-utans changes dramatically when he kills a mother and decides to nurse its surviving infant. Feeding and playing with the creature over several months, Wallace comes to view the orang-utan in almost human terms. He observes that it sucked his finger before “giving] up in disgust, and set up a scream very like that of a baby in similar circumstances” (66). Wallace’s language shows how his emotional life becomes entwined with that of the infant as he narrates his efforts to quell its crying. Having made “an artificial mother” out of buffalo skin, which the infant could grip onto, Wallace comments, “I was now in hopes that I had made the little orphan quite happy.” Like an affectionate parent, he finds that, when spoon-feeding the creature, “it was a never-failing amusement to observe the curious changes of
countenance by which it would express its approval or dislike of what was given to it” (68). The anthropomorphism becomes increasingly pronounced as Wallace describes the infant’s tantrums not as similar to but “exactly like a baby in a passion” (69). When the young orang-utan sickens and dies, Wallace describes the event as a minor bereavement, writing, “I much regretted the loss of my little pet, which I had at one time looked forward to bringing up to years of maturity, and taking home to England. For several months it had afforded me daily amusement by its curious ways and the inimitably ludicrous expression of its little countenance” (71, see fig. 3). Despite these statements, however, in the following paragraph, Wallace is again out shooting orang-utans with apparent composure. Living alongside the creature in the domestic interior of the hut enables Wallace to engage in the emotions of love and sympathy, which are wholly suppressed while hunting outside in the forest. This tonal dissonance suggests an uncertainty for Wallace about the role of emotions in his identity as a zoologist. Like the thrill of hunting for Darwin, Wallace’s affection for his pet suggests that emotion has a place in scientific masculinity, helping zoologists to explore possible overlaps between human and animal. Yet Wallace’s authority as an objective “man of science” also depends on his suppressing this emotion and, so, reasserting his distance from nature and the animals it contains.

Darwin and Wallace’s emotionally ambivalent anecdotes of encounters with wild animals magnify the contradictions in Victorian attitudes to masculinity and nature, and Victorian men’s attitudes towards nature. The zoologists vacillated between presenting themselves as highly emotional beings—swept up in predaceous excitement and anthropomorphic sympathy—and, conversely, cool, intellectual observers, detached from the wildlife they studied. This instability was echoed in a clash of literary modes as the authors veered in their writing between the objective facts and abstract theories of science and the subjective experiences of autobiography. Similarly, as wild environ-
ments were liminal spaces without clear demarcations, the zoologist’s travel memoir was a liminal genre in which highly charged emotional narrative sat side by side with rarefied theoretical discussion, and opposing visions of the “man of science” collided.

Further Reading


Many regions affected by climate change are located in the Global South, where rural livelihoods depend on rainfall. For the rural poor in these regions, adapting to climate change means living off the land while coping with increasingly frequent droughts and floods. To support these populations, governmental and nongovernmental organizations are deploying adaptation projects aimed at enhancing rural populations’ capacities to cope with rapidly changing environmental conditions. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the scientific authority in the field, has recently acknowledged that not only do climate change impacts, such as floods and droughts, have different effects on women and men, but that adaptation projects may also reinforce the gender norms of a given society (IPCC 2014). Understanding how climate change affects gender relations is especially necessary in countries in the Global South, where the urgency of climate change adaptation overshadows other issues that should be priorities: among them, the need to tackle gender inequality. But climate change policy makers often see social injustices as less urgent than addressing the planetary crisis; this has been partly attributable to a lack of research on the gender, race, and class dimensions of climate change. In the majority of cases in which the nexus between gender and climate change has been investigated, the focus has been on women. There is almost no research on how climate change affects men or how the aims of climate change adaptation projects align or clash with masculine values and identities.

This essay begins to fill that gap by focusing on a specific climate change adaptation project implemented by an NGO in rural Nicaragua. I focus on the ways in which rural masculinities influence how the project is being received by its intended participants: the mostly male cattle-ranching population. My intention is to draw the attention of researchers, policy makers, and practitioners to the fact that masculinities matter when it comes to implementing climate change adaptation projects. I show that it is important to analyze the discursive and cultural constructions of hegemonic masculinities that shape the way climate change is addressed on the one hand, and how the “subjects” of climate change adaptation interventions sometimes reproduce hegemonic gender identities on the other. Indeed, masculinities come with internalized norms in rural
Nicaragua, a country where, as in many places in Latin America, macho culture is omnipresent. Among these norms is the fact that being a cattle rancher is tantamount to being a “real man.” In particular, I discuss why some men refuse to implement project activities when their gendered subjectivities as cattle ranchers are threatened.

**Blaming Smallholder Farmers for the Changing Climate**

In 2014, I conducted ethnographic field research in El Pijibay, a rural community in the municipality of El Rama, in the region of the South Caribbean Coast of Nicaragua. Through interviews with NGO workers and 34 Pijibay inhabitants (20 men and 14 women), I learned about a climate change adaptation project that is one of many Nicaraguan initiatives promoting cocoa production. Related to the Nicaraguan government’s 2013 climate change adaptation strategy, the project encourages cattle ranchers to switch to cocoa production as a means of adapting to shorter rainy seasons. Replacing cattle ranching with cocoa farming is seen as a way to mitigate climate change by preventing deforestation. Unlike ranching, which leads to forest clearing to make pasture, cocoa production requires planting trees that help maintain soil fertility and humidity. Indeed, cocoa production is presented nationwide as part of the solution to the crises in the coffee and livestock sectors—crises that are attributed to climate change effects, such as increased droughts and irregular rain patterns (Zelaya 2014). Additionally, the initiatives present cocoa production as a means of stopping the advancement of the agricultural frontier: by settling in one place to grow cocoa, farmers no longer need to move towards the eastern parts of the country that are still forested, in search of new lands and pastures for their livestock.

The project was designed to give small- and medium-scale cattle ranchers—a total of 40 families—the means to convert to cocoa production, such as training, plants, and tools. The NGO’s rationale for promoting the cocoa project was that small- and medium-scale cattle ranchers in El Pijibay were responsible for deforestation in the community, and it was therefore up to them to do something about it: reforestation through planting cocoa. This accusatory narrative is characteristic of the dominant message conveyed by climate change projects. For example, the United Nations Development Program’s 2014 communication campaign on climate change, broadcast on the radio, featured two popular Nicaraguan cabaret figures posing as smallholder
farmers who ask each other how they should adapt to the changing climate. Part of the answer is: “It’s simple! By harvesting rainwater. By saving water. We must not burn or cut trees. Rather, we have to plant trees.” Scapegoating local farmers for destroying forests is an indication that climate change adaptation projects do not seek to tackle environmental injustices. The main drivers of deforestation in El Pijibay are the illegal timber trade and land grabbing for palm oil plantations, both of which are enabled by economically and politically powerful nonindigenous elite families whose activities contribute to reinforcing the capitalist system. As one of the ranchers informally shared with me, it is ironic that smallholders are blamed for cutting down a hectare of forests per year, when palm oil plantations have cleared entire communities in the region in the last five years (paraphrase from field notes, 2014). Thus, scapegoating local smallholder farmers for degrading the natural environment, and labeling their environmental and agricultural practices as “maladapted” takes attention away from environmental injustices in a highly polarized, neoliberal—and patriarchal—society.

Changing Weather, Resisting Masculinities

In contrast to the NGO staff tasked with running the cocoa project, the inhabitants of El Pijibay do not worry about climate change or the community’s rapid deforestation. At a workshop in El Pijibay in 2014, only 2 out of 18 participants, both of them men over 40, mentioned changes in the local environmental conditions as important changes in their lives and environment over the last 10 years. Nobody mentioned the fact that the forest cover has significantly diminished in the surrounding area. Instead of talking about the negative effects of their cattle-ranching activities on the forest cover, it was the externally imposed “obligation” to implement reforestation that appeared to be a burden: they could no longer cut down trees without a project telling them that they needed to plant new ones. This “obligation” to contribute to reforestation was mentioned by 12 of the 18 participants, 9 of them men.

My research showed that the men involved in the project played nice outwardly, but did not give cocoa prominence either on their agricultural plots or in the time they dedicated to its production. This contradiction can be understood through the lens of resistant masculinities. Indeed, the project challenged traditional gender roles in that it took away symbolic masculine power from men by prompting them to produce
cocoa instead of cattle. Recalling Campbell’s (2006) study of masculinities in New Zealand in their own work on the effects of drought in Australia, Alston and Kent write: “[The] destabilization of traditional, hierarchical, gender roles challenges traditional normative rural masculinity and is resisted in various ways by men” (2008, 137). When looking at Nicaraguan farmers’ behavior through this lens, we see that male cattle ranchers refuse to execute climate change adaptation activities because they want to preserve practices that maintain local hegemonic masculinities, despite the fact that these practices are environmentally destructive.

The climate-change-related threats to cattle ranching, along with changes ostensibly required for adaptation, appeared to be threats to local cattle ranchers’ masculine sense of self, according to my study. This was reinforced by the fact that the NGO’s cocoa project mainly targeted men: in El Pijibay, only men were directly involved in the project. The way smallholder cattle ranchers rationalized the project illustrated the desire of men to increase their cattle herds. When I asked the beneficiaries what they would do if they generated a significant income through cocoa production (which was not yet the case), they answered that they would use the money to buy more cattle. Some added that they found it convenient that they could plant cocoa on plots not well suited for pastures and therefore “did not mind converting” to cocoa, as long as it did not compete with cattle ranching. Of course, this was not in accordance with the NGO project’s objective to bring about the progressive abandonment of cattle ranching. The farmers’ comments suggested that when they decided not to convert to cocoa, it was not just driven by the fact that cattle ranching still generates more economic gains than cocoa production; it highlighted the importance of the social status afforded to men by cattle ranching in the Nicaraguan social imaginary, over potential economic gains (Flores and Torres 2012).

**Local Arrangements to Maintain Hegemonic Masculinities**

There was a direct relationship between the number of cows grazing on a man’s pastures and his social status. Indeed, all my male interviewees shared the wish to increase their livestock. To that end, arrangements were implemented between large-scale cattle ranchers who owned many cows but who lacked pastures, and smallholders who did not have animals but had land. For smallholders and medium-holders, it did
not matter if the animals belonged to them or not; the important thing was having the animals graze on their own pastures. It did not matter to large-holders whether the animals were grazing on their own pastures (they usually did not live on their farms anyway); the important thing was to own the greater number of animals. Both sides saw these arrangements as advantageous when it came to increasing men’s social status. To be considered a “real man,” a rancher needed to have as many cows as possible, no matter if this entailed deforestation in the short term.

Interestingly, while class differences are usually evident in Nicaraguan rural society, they were erased when it came to developing practices that reinforced rural masculinities. The masculinities of both large-scale ranchers who owned hundreds of cows and subsistence-level farmers who could afford just a few animals depended on the number of animals they had. Large-holders and smallholders needed to unite their efforts to reach their respective objectives. The difference was that smallholders destroyed their last remaining plots in order to raise these animals, while large-holders could afford to increase their status without needing to find new territories to set up pasture—and, thus, without being blamed for deforestation that contributes to climate change.
Lessons for Climate Change Adaptation Policy Makers and Practitioners

My study shows that the intersection of patriarchy, hegemonic rural masculinities, and climate change is destructive to the environment and, if ignored by climate change adaptation practitioners, can result in failed projects. No matter how important it is for climate change, practitioners and policy makers need to understand that challenging the role of male cattle ranchers—be it by decreasing pasture availability or through NGO actions—can threaten their sense of self and macho identity, which in turn motivates their resistance to adaptation activities. This resistance may be hard to detect, especially since farmers are ambivalent (Butler 1997) towards these initiatives. For example, though male cattle ranchers in El Pijibay resent adaptation initiatives, they still comply with expectations to take part in project activities, which may push them into leadership roles.

Policy makers should be aware that hegemonic masculinities reproduce under many conditions, even under the effects of climate change. Yet as noted by Connell and Messerschmidt, “gender relations are always arenas of tension” (2005, 853). As such, the dominant patterns of masculinity that become hegemonic in certain conditions may be destabilized, and hence open to challenge as these conditions change—in this case, as rainfall patterns change and disrupt established climatic conditions, and with them the gendered social relations of agriculture. The point is to detect how socioenvironmental transformations can come about under new conditions: i.e., how climate change can be conducive to the democratization of gender relations and to more sustainable production systems. Practitioners, social and environmental movements, and researchers may have an important role to play in triggering these changes through appropriate interventions that are sensitive to local gender dynamics. They may start, for example, by identifying the “champions” of adaptation initiatives by detecting the rare and exceptional cases in which men do abandon cattle ranching for cocoa production.

Conclusion

The climate change adaptation project described here intends to destabilize what Campbell (2006) calls “traditional normative rural masculinity”—an intention resisted by men. According to my case study, unsustainable cattle-ranching practices do not persist because of their disastrous environmental outcomes or their unsatisfying long-
term economic results; unsustainable cattle-ranching persists because it mobilizes existing, naturalized gender roles (Carr 2008). Hence, aspiring to reproduce masculinities and the macho culture—which in this case is related to the cultural significance of cattle ranching—determines why particular climate change adaptation measures are not adopted and why certain types of masculinities are reinforced. This is an important—yet largely ignored—issue in climate change research. Projects may fail to reach their objectives because men refuse to do what they are told in an effort to preserve their masculine social status. It is also important because ignoring how masculinities can influence rural populations’ responses to climate change projects may contribute to reinforcing existing inequalities and their intersection with environmental degradation, which can become a vicious circle. In the case of the cocoa project in El Pijibay, male smallholder cattle ranchers who have been made vulnerable by climate change may become even more vulnerable because the NGO’s blame narrative ignores their cultural conditions and misplaces the responsibility for deforestation. Perhaps, more importantly, this narrative fails to open up new spaces for desperately needed socio-environmental transformations.

**Further Reading**


Mainstream environmentalism is a White man’s space. Eight of the top 10 “Big Green” environmental groups in the United States, including the Sierra Club, the World Wildlife Fund, and Friends of the Earth, are led by White men. Research has found that these mainstream environmental organizations reflect and reinforce the social privilege of White people, and particularly White men, through insular recruitment practices, implicit bias, and low levels of engagement with diversity and environmental justice concerns (Taylor 2014). The domination of American environmentalism by White men is ironic given that opinion polls suggest that they may be less concerned about environmental problems than any other demographic group (Leiserowitz and Akerlof 2010; McCright and Dunlap 2012). Women and people of color suffer comparatively more from the effects of environmental degradation and, as a result, have been at the front lines of grassroots environmental movements for decades in North America and beyond. Women in the United States have led struggles against toxic pollution and environmental racism; movements to protect trees and water have been initiated by women in the Global South; and Indigenous women are at the forefront of Idle No More and other movements to protect the land and water from colonial dispossession. The history of women and people of color resisting the destruction of the planet is extensive and well documented. Why, then, do White men almost exclusively claim the roles of experts and leaders in the mainstream environmental movement?

There is a lamentable lack of academic research on how hegemonic masculinity shapes environmentalism and how it interacts with embedded racism, colonialism, and sexism to construct an exclusionary climate. In response to this critique, our contribution is to offer a critical gender analysis of the micropractices and participation dynamics in one mixed-gender student environmental group. Working within the context of a North American university anti-climate-change campaign, we are in an ideal
location from which to explore the power relations on the front lines of mainstream environmentalism. At our university, students run the local chapter of an international organization dedicated to stopping climate change and, at least rhetorically, to fighting for climate justice. However, finding ways to integrate justice into the workings of the campaign itself has proved difficult. Even within the group, racialization, patriarchy, and settler-colonialism have often made it difficult for us to work together equitably. Racial and ethnic make-up fluctuates, but the group is majority White, even as Indigenous, Black, South Asian, and East Asian students become increasingly involved. Men and women tend to attend meetings in roughly even numbers (there were no openly trans or other-gendered students), and yet despite this balance, gendered participation dynamics—which we discuss below—significantly constrained women’s ability to participate in the group. We came to the conclusion that White men’s performances of hegemonic masculinity positioned them as leaders within the campaign, regardless of their level of actual experience, while rendering women and people of color marginalized. This finding prompted us to explore how hegemonic masculinity and expertise can become conflated and how they reinforce and reproduce the larger dynamics that are seen across the environmental movement in North America. We seek to understand and address these dynamics so that groups like ours, and others in the movement, can begin to change their participation dynamics in ways that support women and people of color, and to recognize their contributions, even when they do not reflect hegemonic masculine patterns of expertise and leadership.

**Hegemonic Masculinity: Doing Gender, Doing Expertise**

In thinking about the gendered dynamics of participation in our activist campaign, we use the idea of “doing gender” (West and Zimmerman 1987) to reflect the view that gender is constructed through social interaction rather than being a fixed category. We understand the enactment of gender as a situated process, dependent on context as well as on people’s location within social relations of race, gender, class, colonialism, dis/ability, and sexuality (Hill Collins 1986; West and Zimmerman 2009). This is an important lens for analyzing participation because it allows us to avoid essentializing notions of how men and women act as being tied to biology or psychology, and re-centers our attention on gender as an interactional process.
Connell’s work on gender employs the concept of “hegemonic masculinity” to describe a pattern of practice that maintains men’s dominant social position in relation to women (Connell and Messerschmidt 2005). Hegemonic masculinity is the culturally dominant, most visible form of masculinity in a particular context and is associated with positions of authority and leadership. The concept is frequently used to explain how behaviors of dominance—such as professed expertise, speaking in a loud, deep voice, and authoritative engagement in conversation, among other “typically masculine” behaviors—are constructed. They may vary from context to context, but similar types of behavior tend to be rewarded socially when they are performed. Connell emphasizes the need to address the participation of all genders in the co-construction of masculinity and argues for the recognition of the agency of marginalized groups as well as the power of dominant groups in the production of gender dynamics (Connell and Messerschmidt 2005). Certain patterns of masculine behavior become hegemonic when they are widely accepted, expected, and idealized in a culture.

Commonplace understandings of “doing expertise” conjure ideas of particularly skilled people capable of accomplishing specific tasks with more efficiency and better results than the average person. Within sociocultural theories of expertise, learning is as much about practicing skills and accomplishing tasks as it is about developing an identity as an expert and becoming recognized by a community of practice—including, and especially, those already in positions of mastery—as an expert member (Lave and Wenger 1991). Expertise, like gender, is thus fundamentally interactional, performative, and relational. In order to demonstrate expertise, one must master particular modes of performance—including speech content, delivery, and gesture—that communicate authority (Matoesian 2008). Carr (2010, 6) also observes that “realizing oneself as an expert can hinge on casting other people as less aware, knowing, or knowledgeable.” In other words, people position themselves and others through actions, uses of space, ways of speaking, and physical presentation (Holland et al. 1998). To be recognized as an expert, a person needs to establish their place in a hierarchy and demonstrate both their own qualifications and an ability to judge the qualifications of others—and other people must agree.

Ideas about doing gender, doing expertise, and hegemonic masculinity can be linked as a way of theorizing how masculine domination is constructed and sustained in social groups. Feminist studies of conversation have shown that women’s speech con-
tributions are considered less valuable and valid when they are delivered in typically feminine ways, e.g., with self-deprecation and in soft, high-pitched voices (Stokoe and Smithson 2001). Conversely, masculine ways of speaking and participating can earn disproportionate recognition; hegemonic masculinity is a way of “doing gender” that garners recognition and validation for those who perform it. Connell and Messerschmidt (2005) have called for more research on the ways that hegemonic masculinities are produced collectively. In the next section, we illustrate how people of all genders participate in the validation of hegemonic masculinity, how men’s voices become recognized as expert—while women’s are sidelined—and how these dynamics affect men’s and women’s participation in the environmental movement.

**Constructing White Male Expertise: Micro-level Practices**

For 18 months, we conducted a research project designed to help us understand the gendered participation dynamics in our student environmental group. We used detailed microanalysis of group interaction, which involved recording all of the group’s meetings and analyzing a specific set of participation dynamics, such as who speaks and how frequently, whose ideas are adopted, and who is recognized publicly for their contributions. In our analysis, we found several practices that we judge to be rooted in expressions of hegemonic masculinity. Here, we focus on “exclusive talk” and establishing expertise as two micro-level practices that reinforced White men’s claims to leadership of the group.

*Exclusive Talk*

We observed that White men engaged more often than anyone else in “exclusive talk” (Dookie 2015), which is an exchange between two or more people that does not include the majority of meeting participants, despite being part of a larger conversation. In the meetings, exclusive talk was established through eye contact, body positioning, the explicit naming of speakers who “should” participate, and the discussion of issues about which only certain people had information. Exclusive talk often involved inaccessibly rapid speaking and a final decision being made within the closed, small group of participating speakers. Our analysis revealed that men were much more likely to engage in exclusive talk within groups consisting only of other men, than women were
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...to engage in exclusive talk with other women. People of color, by contrast, were never included in exclusive talk at all, despite being present at all meetings. When groups participating in exclusive talk consisted of both men and women, they often had a male to female ratio of at least two to one. This had the effect of relegating women and people of color to the sidelines during many important decision-making conversations and implied that the White men who participated in exclusive talk were more knowledgeable and experienced.

The fact that participation in these exchanges was so skewed based on gender and race demonstrates how White men’s participation was affirmed as expert and necessary, while people of color and women’s was not. During these exchanges, exclusive talk speakers often shared inside information that not everyone had, further demonstrating a position of access and authority. Through their quick exchanges with other knowledgeable colleagues, they affirmed those involved in exclusive talk as co-authorities, while others did not need to be brought up to speed or included in decision making.

Establishing Expertise

We observed the production of hierarchical expertise, structured by race and gender, to be an active process in our group. There were several mechanisms by which White men established themselves as experts in relation to women and people of color. As a result, even when women and people of color had achieved some level of skill or knowledge, it was not recognized in meetings in the same way as White men’s contributions were.

First, the men asserted their claim to expertise by advocating for a type of framing within the campaign that was at odds with how women and people of color wanted to work. Most of the White men in positions of expertise dismissed the legitimacy of other approaches to campaign strategy and asserted that their particular approach, namely working through the university’s bureaucratic and administrative avenues, was best. They enacted a form of hegemonic masculinity in arguing that their frame was more rational, practical, and appropriate to the task. At the same time, they continually claimed that other approaches—such as doing Indigenous solidarity and anti-oppression work—were not only ineffective, but also a distraction from the group’s main priorities.
A second mechanism was undermining others’ competency by equating participation with expertise. We saw this at work in a meeting held halfway through the academic year, attended by a large number of new members. In an attempt to be welcoming, returning members of the group offered to explain the context of the conversations. Over the course of the first 10 minutes, with 16 women and 9 men in attendance, 4 White men spoke a total of 41 times, for a total duration of almost 9 minutes. Two women spoke a total of 20 times, with a total duration of just under a minute. Even more revealing than the imbalance in speaking time was a set of comments made by 2 White men, 8 minutes apart, at the beginning of the meeting:

Student 1: Ask us questions. And also, if you have a question you don’t think you want to ask in public, just write it down, ask one of the people that talks a lot.

Student 2: If you would really like to come to the retreat, I guess just talk to . . . any of the people who you see talking a lot.

These statements, combined with group dynamics in which White men were the people who spoke most often and for the longest duration, advised new members that the White men in the room were the experts. They also implied that the women and people of color in the room, who spoke less often, were unable to answer questions and were not in positions of authority.

The ongoing and interactional process of performing expertise shaped the group’s dynamics into a self-reinforcing feedback loop. White men in positions of authority became gatekeepers, deciding whose claims to expertise were legitimate and valuable. By perceiving only White masculine performances of expertise as indicative of competence, men constantly reestablished themselves as experts. Women and people of color also treated their own work as less valuable than that of the White male members, contributing to a group culture that habitually undermined their leadership. Moreover, women and people of color rarely actively dismissed White men’s ideas—and were often ignored when they did.
How meeting participants recognized expertise in general became patterned after the way White men performed hegemonic masculinity: by speaking frequently, authoritatively, and at length to the exclusion of other voices. Over the year, men gained access to training and skill-building opportunities and were increasingly likely to be selected as public representatives. The more this happened, the more quickly White men’s positioning as experts gained legitimacy, despite their not necessarily having as much experience with activism, or as much technical knowledge about climate change, as some of the women and people of color in the group. For White men in the group, their ways of interacting quickly and confidently were invisible to them. When faced with decisions to include women and people of color, White men continually invoked a dichotomy between being “diverse” and having the “best” people representing the group. For these men, doing their race and gender in hegemonic ways made them “the best.” Thus, we conclude that doing race and gender—in particular Whiteness and masculinity—is key to the performance of expertise. How we interpret claims to expertise cannot be disentangled from how we understand White men’s performances of Whiteness and masculinity.

**Conclusion**

In 1990, Connell suggested that men’s participation in environmentalism would not only lead to positive sociopolitical change, but also help men reflect critically on the power and privilege that comes with masculinity. Nearly three decades later, there are few signs that either of these predictions has been realized. In fact, judging by the composition of key institutions involved in environmental governance and expertise, from the United Nations to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, men dominate mainstream environmentalism at all levels. Some have suggested that the movement has become more masculinized than ever (MacGregor 2010).

Recognizing how hegemonic masculinity is collectively constructed and conflated with expertise within our student campaign may offer important lessons for the environmental movement more broadly. Our group is not unique; these gendered and racialized dynamics are reproduced in all sorts of contexts and organizations. But what our research achieves is to observe, measure, and document the patterns of behavior and habits of thought that equate hegemonic masculinity with authority and expertise
almost without question in group participation settings. For environmentalists, it is imperative that we learn to recognize and disrupt these patterns of interaction so that our movements are able to integrate all people as members and leaders. We cannot fight for climate and environmental justice in name only, without addressing implicit racism and sexism in practice. Exposing and challenging how hegemonic masculinity operates within the environmental movement is an important place to start.

**Further Reading**


Nicola von Thurn

Boys Will Be Boys

*An Art Installation: Staged Wilderness and Male Dreams*

Nicola von Thurn’s series *boys will be boys* was created between 2011 and 2015 and remains an ongoing project. It consists of two main parts that together form an installation: staged photographs and porcelain sculptures depicting details of the photographic images. The white porcelain objects are casts of real tools as they appear in the photographs and reveal the activities of the men portrayed. In the images above and below respectively, for example, we see a *Lumberjack* firmly gripping his axe and a *Jäger* (hunter) posing with his rifle and the deer he shot. Further subjects (not illustrated here) include the *Cowboy* and the *Wilderer* (Bavarian poacher).

It seems evident that the artist is using these pictures to reveal stereotypes: stereotypes of male dreams, of a life in the wilderness—a far cry from civilization, in a seemingly wild landscape that appears as unreal and synthetic as the dreams themselves. Dreams constructed by society, by media, by advertising.
We’re left with little doubt that the performed activities are male activities, the jobs male jobs; that the chosen settings—a prairie, a forest, rough mountain scenes—represent settings where men are the masters and protagonists.

However, Nicola von Thurn’s photographs are actually self-portraits. It takes a second glance to realize that the male stereotype pictured is, in fact, a woman posing as a man . . . Is she eager to become one of these stereotypes or is she perhaps just dreaming about living this kind of life? Does she hope to fit in seamlessly with these male settings?

But why do we think of these places as male places? Why are these settings men-only territory? Why are these dreams male dreams? The pictures may reveal that even in our Western society—which prides itself on free thought and equal opportunity—perception and ideal concepts of gender are still biased. Does it matter if a girl dreams a “boy’s dream”? And do the places themselves change if the gender of the protagonist changes? The pictures offer no real answer—the viewer’s perspective, however, may be more revealing.
The clues lie in the small details—they unmask the scenarios as staged, as unreal. Looking more closely, we see that the man is a woman, the dead deer a puppet, the forest a suburban park, and the rifle a replica. Why shouldn’t a woman take over the male role in this weird setup? Or must the whole scenario be dismissed as spoiled, as a figment of the imagination just because the protagonist is female? Would the scene be perceived as more “acceptable” with a “real” man, even if the setting remained visibly staged? Or is the gender switch the very thing that makes the scene interesting?

All the works in this series—the porcelain sculptures included—bring together apparent opposites to create a new aesthetic quality. Hard, rough, brutal tools are transformed by their antithetical material—in this case, fragile porcelain with all its connotations of femininity and domestic life. Through the simple diametrical combination of statement and material, two contradictory elements come together to form a more richly textured object. Suddenly, the cold metal of the hard rifle transforms into the homely white lace of a doily, and the rifle’s ornamental baroque décor is revealed. The axe seems more fragile than the wood it chops.

This installation of photographs in combination with objects is an invitation to think outside the box. It’s an opportunity to question norms, to find beauty in grey areas between the obvious—beyond gender-dominated conceptions.

Nicola von Thurn
Munich, 2016

Further Reading/Viewing


**Artists’ Individual Works:**

Matthew Barney
Claude Cahun
Daniela Comani
Pierre Commoy et Gilles Blanchard
Sarah Lucas
Robert Mapplethorpe
Catherine Opie
Richard Prince
Man Ray
Cindy Sherman
Laurie Simmons
Diane Torr
About the Authors

Will Abberley is a lecturer at the University of Sussex in the School of English. His first monograph, *English Fiction and the Evolution of Language, 1850–1914*, is published by Cambridge University Press and explores how evolutionary theory reshaped visions of language change in the Victorian popular imagination. He is currently completing a postdoc, funded by the Leverhulme Trust, that considers how Victorians imagined mimicry and deception as biological phenomena, from insect replicas to animal camouflage. He also recently organized the conference “Underwater Worlds: Aquatic Visions in Art Science and Literature” at the University of Oxford.

Jody Chan is a writer and environmental organizer based in Toronto. She is an MA graduate from Teachers College, Columbia University, where her research centered on identity development and sociopolitical learning for student activists.

Raewyn Connell is professor emerita at the University of Sydney and a Life Member of the National Tertiary Education Union. Her books include *Masculinities, Southern Theory*, and *Gender: In World Perspective* (2002). Her writing has been translated into 19 languages. She has worked for labor, peace, and women’s movements, and for democracy in education. Website: www.raewynconnell.net; Twitter: @raewynconnell.

Joe Curnow is a PhD candidate at the University of Toronto. Her research examines learning about race, gender, and colonialism within social movements. Recent work looks at student-led social movements like Fair Trade and the Fossil Fuel Divestment campaign, problematizing their NGOization and the pedagogical and political implications. Her work has been published in *Gender and Education, Antipode*, and *Interface: A Journal for and about Social Movements*.

Kathryn de Luna is an assistant professor in the Department of History at Georgetown University. An historian of precolonial Africa, Kate writes histories of food, emotions, and technology and publishes in the fields of history, linguistics, and archaeology. Her first book, *Collecting Food, Cultivating People: Subsistence and Society in Central Africa*, was published in the Agrarian Studies Series at Yale. She is now working on a 3,000-year history of pyrotechnologies in central Africa and a 1,500-year history of sparkle and other percussive sensory phenomena in south central Africa.
Jim Fleming is the Charles A. Dana professor of science, technology, and society at Colby College, a research associate at the Smithsonian Institution, and series editor of Palgrave Studies in the History of Science and Technology. His books include Meteorology in America (1990), Historical Perspectives on Climate Change (1998), The Callendar Effect (2007), Fixing the Sky (2010), and Inventing Atmospheric Science (2016). He is deeply invested in connecting the history of science, technology, and environment with the arts and public policy.

Noémi Gonda holds a PhD from the Department of Environmental Sciences and Policy at Central European University, Budapest, Hungary. Her PhD research, a feminist ethnography, focused on the politics of gender and climate change adaptation in rural Nicaragua. She has extensive professional experience in rural development and natural resource management, mainly in Central America where she worked with smallholder farmers, indigenous groups, and international organizations between 2002 and 2010. Her recent work has been published in the journal Gender, Technology and Development and by the UNDP in Nicaragua. She recently obtained a postdoctoral position at the Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences.

After receiving his BA in Japan, Naoki Kambe went to the United States to work on his graduate degrees in communication studies. He received his MA from the University of Northern Iowa and his PhD from Wayne State University. He is currently an assistant professor in the College of Intercultural Communication at Rikkyo University, Tokyo, where he teaches courses related to communication, culture, and gender. His scholarly interests include representations of Japanese culture, gendered nonverbal communication/bodies, and communication pedagogy.

Susanne Leikam is an assistant professor of American studies in the Department of American Studies at the University of Regensburg, Germany. Her major research areas include visual culture studies, memory studies, disaster studies, and ecocriticism. Her dissertation, Framing Spaces in Motion: Tracing Visualizations of Earthquakes into Twentieth-Century San Francisco (2015), analyzes the development of the pictorial repertoires and interpretive framings of earthquakes from early modern Europe into the twentieth-century United States. Further publications include “Iconographies of the Calamitous in American Visual Culture” (2013), and “What’s in a Name?: Cli-Fi and American Studies” (2017).
Erik Loomis is an assistant professor of history at the University of Rhode Island. He is the author of Empire of Timber: Labor Unions and the Pacific Northwest Forests, published by Cambridge University Press in 2016 and Out of Sight: The Long and Disturbing Story of Corporations Outsourcing Catastrophe, published by The New Press in 2015. He writes online at the blog Lawyers, Guns, and Money and his work has appeared in publications such as Dissent, Boston Review, Salon, and In These Times.

Sherilyn MacGregor is reader in environmental politics, jointly appointed to the Department of Politics and the Sustainable Consumption Institute at the University of Manchester, UK. Her research explores themes of environmental (un)sustainability, gender (in)equality, and theories and practices of citizenship. She is author of Beyond Mothering Earth: Ecological Citizenship and the Politics of Care (UBC 2006); more recent publications include articles on gender and the politics of climate change (published in Hypatia and the Sociological Review, among other journals). She edited the Routledge Handbook on Gender and Environment, published earlier this year, and until recently was an editor of the journal Environmental Politics. She held a Rachel Carson Center fellowship in 2014.

Nicole Seymour is an assistant professor of English at California State University at Fullerton. Her first book, Strange Natures: Futurity, Empathy, and the Queer Ecological Imagination (2013), won the 2015 book award for ecocriticism from the Association for the Study of Literature and Environment (ASLE). She currently serves as ASLE’s vice president and as an area team coordinator for the Knowledge Action Network for Transformative Climate and Sustainability Education and Action, a joint project of the California State University and University of California systems. Her forthcoming book, Bad Environmentalism: Affective Dissent in the Ecological Age, was developed through a 2013–14 fellowship at the Rachel Carson Center.

Nicola von Thurn studied painting and graphic arts at the Institute for Art Restoration in Florence, Italy, art history at LMU Munich, and visual art and teaching at the Academy of Visual Art, Munich. She earned a degree in art pedagogy in 2011, when she won a governmental exam award for artistic performance. She has mounted several solo exhibitions across Germany and Finland, including Superorganismus (“Superorganism”) at artLABOR München, and Gesang der Zitrone (“Voice of the Lemon”) at the Wasserturm in Dachau. She is a member of GEDOKMünchen, the largest collective of women artists in Germany.